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 ABSTRACT 
My research is based on a fifteen months field-work carried out in the city of Tripoli. In 
particular, my thesis focuses on the Issawiya, a Libyan Sufi brotherhood that has often 
attracted the curiosity of western observers due to the spectacular nature of its ritual 
performances. For centuries Libyan Issawis have made use of a specific secret 
knowledge that has allowed them to perform karamat (“miracles”). These miraculous 
exhibitions involve acts of self-harm aimed at demonstrating a prodigious invulnerability, 
and supernatural actions carried out through the acquisition of the strength of animals. 
Even though these miraculous performances are attested both in the colonial literature 
and in local narratives today the majority of the Issawis dismiss karamat as outdated 
practices that are in contrast with the dictates of the Qur’an. Bearing this in mind, one 
would be tempted to say that the Issawiya has embraced a more ‘disenchanted’ 
approach to Islam. In my thesis, however, I challenge this assumption. More specifically, 
I demonstrate that Issawis have not lost their belief in miracles, but only changed their 
attitude towards secrecy. Though still very much concerned with divine manifestations 
and supernatural phenomena, Issawis feel the need to distance themselves from the 
secret practices of the past in order to demonstrate the ‘transparency’ and orthodoxy of 
their religiosity. In order to understand why the brotherhood has ‘lost’ its secrets, I 
contextualise the Issawiya within the broader scenario of Gheddafi’s Libya, paying 
particular attention to the impact of the regime’s religious rhetorics on Sufism. In doing 
so I demonstrate that Libya’s political framework has forced Issawis to re-articulate the 
role of secrecy in their practices, but I also identify some internal dynamics of the 
brotherhood that have contributed to this ‘loss of secrets’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PREFACE  
 
Since the completion of my field-work in 2008 Libya has witnessed a series of radical changes.  
As documented by the world press, in February 2011 the citizens of Benghazi initiated a series 
of protests against the regime of Muammar Gheddafi, and in the space of a few weeks the riots 
developed into a civil war. In the following months the anti-Gheddafi forces constituted a 
Transitional National Council that asked for a foreign military intervention, and in August 
2011 the rebels managed to enter Tripoli putting an end to forty years of dictatorial rule. By 
October of the same year the last loyalist strongholds were defeated, and in the course of these 
operations Colonel Gheddafi was killed. The Libya of today is different from the Libya I have 
experienced some four years ago. I have kept in contact with my Libyan friends before, during 
and after these recent events, and in the course of a short visit in February 2012 I was pleased 
to find that many of them were still alive. Some had participated to the conflict, and though 
shaken by the war they were extremely excited about the upcoming democratic elections, the 
first Libya had witnessed in fifty years. Even though I had the occasion to comment on the 
Libyan war and on the post-conflict situation through short journalistic pieces, I have decided 
not to include these recent developments in my thesis. An in-depth analysis of the changes that 
have taken place in the country would require further research, and I intend to return for a 
prolonged period of field-work as soon as possible. In the meantime, I have written this 
dissertation as if none of the above had taken place in order to facilitate the reader. It is also 
important to clarify that I have decided to implement a simplified version of the transliteration 
from Arabic.  Following the example of other published ethnographies (Gilsenan 1973; 
Hammoudi 1997; Marchand 2001), I have chosen to spell the Arabic words replicating their 
sound in the Libyan dialect (or at least the way they sounded to my ear) without using the 
standard diacritics for Arabic transliteration (“Gheddafi” instead of “Qaḏḏāfī”).  Following this 
principle, I have also made specific choices of spelling (e.g. “Issawiya” instead of “Aissaoua” 
or “Aissawa” that are used in other publications). Occasionally, I have preferred the anglicised 
version of an Arabic term, particularly for what concerns the plural form (“Issawis” instead of 
“Issawyin”). The speeches of Colonel Gheddafi mentioned in this thesis have been examined 
using a digitalised database put together by the personnel of the “Centre for the Studies and 
Researches on the Green Book” of the city of Tripoli. For this reason, whenever I refer to these 
texts I do not include a specific page number. The same speeches can be found in paper form in 
a voluminous collection of Gheddafi’s declarations published under the title “Al Sijil Al Qawmi:  
Bayanat wa Ahadith al Aqid Muammar al Gaddafi”. As a final note, it is important to clarify 
that the people mentioned in this thesis are referred to using pseudonyms, except when they are 
referred to as a group (e.g. the Issawy order or the Banun family). Chapter Five constitutes an 
exception in this sense, but it is important to clarify that I have never asked politically 
‘dangerous’ questions to the people whose name and surname are stated in this thesis (these 
people have also never indulged in karamat).  The reasons for these exceptions (which have 
been agreed upon by my informants) will be apparent to the reader.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAP OF LIBYA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GLOSSARY 
 
 
Bandir:  musical instrument used in Sufi rituals  
Baraka: blessings, spiritual power. 
Bida’: ideas or practices that are considered to be outside of the textual tradition of Islam 
Dhikr: an invocation of the ninety nine attributes traditionally ascribed to Allah 
Hadra: Sufi ritual which involves dhikr, movements and music.  
Hezb:  litany which is recited in the zawaya on a weekly basis.  
Ijaza (Ijazat):  written license, a necessary component of shaykh-hood  
Jedheb:  state of ecstasy, trance  
Karama (Karamat): miracle 
Mal’uf : melodious genre of music which was imported in North-Africa from Andalusia 
Mawlid: celebration for the birthday of the prophet Mohammed  
Mazar (Mazarat): festival held in honour of a saint  
                 Medina: ‘city’, it usually indicates the old part of the city  
Muhib(Muhibbin): devotee in a Sufi zawiya 
Murid (Muridin): Sufi disciple  
Sanad (Assanid): spiritual genealogy of a Sufi shaykh, but also a familial group within the Issawy order  
Sharif(Ashraf): descendent of the prophet Mohammed 
Shaush (Shauash):  person in charge of one of the aspects of the life of the zawiya  
Shaykh (Shuyukh): Sufi master 
Sidhi/Sayyed: a blood descendent of the prophet Mohammed, or a saint or an important person 
Tariqa(Turuq): Sufi order 
Tasawwuf:  Sufism 
Tasbih (Tasabih): spiritual exercise 
Zawya (Zawaya) : Sufi gathering place 
 
 
 “...My Secret is from the Secret of God, 
 my Light is from the Light of God, 
 I have experienced 70.000 Secrets, 
 in the vicinity of (the heavenly) Jerusalem 
 Lovers meet...” 
 
 Mohammed Ben ‘Aysa, Sixteenth century AD. 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
 
For Martin Lings Sufism is “simply Islamic mysticism” (Lings 1988:45), while for Clifford Geertz it is 
rather “a series of different and even contradictory experiments” (Geertz 1971:48). Though seemingly 
conflicting, these two definitions are effectively both true. Sufism (or “tasawwuf”) is generally 
understood to be the mystical dimension of Islam, but it is also a highly complex phenomenon that has 
taken different shapes and forms throughout history (Werbner 1995, 2003: 289, 2007: 197)1. In the 
Muslim world Sufism is mainly organised into “turuq” (sing. “tariqa”, “ways”), brotherhoods or orders. 
Each “way”, however, is characterised by its own very peculiar background of practices and doctrines, or, 
to use Geertz’s definition, “experiments”. Far from providing an account of Islamic mysticism as an all-
encompassing religious category, this thesis deals with one specific tariqa, the Issawiya, a Moroccan Sufi 
order founded in the sixteenth century that has spread in a number of North-African countries. In 
particular, I concentrate on the Libyan branch of the brotherhood. Though aimed at presenting different 
aspects of the social life of Libyan Issawis, this work is mainly concerned with secrets and miracles. More 
                                                          
1 Detailed accounts of the historical and doctrinal aspects of Sufism can be found in Rinn 1884; Massignon 1943, 1982; 
Montgomery Watt 1962, 1963; Nicholson 1963: Schimmel 1975, 1994; Stoddart 1976; Burckhardt 1976; Vanover 1977: 345; 
Nurbaksh 1984; Lings 1988; Chittick 1989, 1999, 2005; Popovic & Veinstein 1996; Melchert 1996; Trimigham 1998; Sirriyeh 
1999; Knysh 2000; Baldick 2000; Netton 2000; Hirtenstein & Tiernan 2003; Byniamin 2003; Abisaab 2004; Winter 2008. The 
word “Sufi” is possibly related to the Arabic “Suf” (“wool”) with reference to the rough clothes worn by the first ascetics of 
Islam as a sign of penance and renunciation of the world (Knish 2000:6; Chittick 1999: 15-31; Crapanzano 1973:15).  
specifically, this dissertation tells the story of a Sufi tariqa that seems to have lost its miracles, but in fact 
it has only lost its secrets. 
 
In the ethnographic literature the Issawiya is most renowned for the performance of “karamat” 
(“miracles 2 ”). These miraculous exhibitions involve acts of self-harm aimed at demonstrating a 
prodigious invulnerability and supernatural actions carried out through the acquisition of the strength of 
animals. For centuries Libyan Issawis have made use of a secret body of spiritual knowledge that has 
allowed them to perform these wonders. Nevertheless, today only a few members of the brotherhood 
value secrets and karamat as an important part of their religiosity while many Libyan Issawis dismiss 
them as outdated practices that are in contrast with the dictates of the Qur’an and the Sunna3. When faced 
with this change in Issawy spirituality one might be tempted to say that the brotherhood has renounced 
miracles and developed a more ‘rational’ approach to religion. In this thesis, however, I challenge this 
assumption. By relying on fifteen months’ field-work carried out in the city of Tripoli between 2006 and 
2008,  I will show that Issawis have kept their belief in supernatural phenomena and divine 
manifestations, but changed their attitude towards secrecy and, therefore, towards esoteric practices like 
karamat.  
 
In abandoning karamat Issawis have not lost their sense of the miraculous, but their secrets. In shedding 
light on this phenomenon, I will show that the political scenario of contemporary Libya has pushed the 
members of the order  to re-articulate the role of secrecy in their practices, but I will also identify some 
internal dynamics of the brotherhood that have contributed to this ‘loss of secrets’. In order to expose the 
                                                          
2 Islamic theology differentiates between “mu’ajizat “(miracles performed by the prophets) and “karamat” (signs of grace 
granted by God to particularly pious individuals) (Flueckiger 2008: 171).  
3 “Tradition”, a set of practices and ideas whose origin is traced back directly to the prophet Mohammed (Hallaq 2005: 46-56). 
Together with the Qur’an the Sunna constitutes the textual apparatus of Islam. 
different facets of my argument I will firstly contextualise my work in light of the existing literature on 
the Issawiya and on Libyan Sufism, showing the shortcomings that have characterised this scholarship.  
Secondly, I will present an overview of the recent history of Libya paying particular attention to the role 
played by Sufism in the vicissitudes of the country. Subsequently, I will position my thesis within current 
anthropological debates on secrecy and miracles, and identify my contribution to these theoretical 
discussions. Finally, I will present the methodological aspects of my field-work and the outline of the 
thesis.  
 
1- Exotic, Notorious and Inconsequential (The Issawiya in the Academic Literature) 
Ethnographers dealing with North Africa have been intrigued by the “fakiristic” (Rouget 1985: 274) and 
“strange” (Rinn 1884: 303) performances of the Issawy order, but they have also failed to produce an in-
depth analysis of these practices. Doubtlessly, the brotherhood is known in the anthropological literature 
as “the most exotic and notorious of all North-African ways” (Gellner 1981: 137). Nonetheless, many 
scholars have mentioned the Issawiya only cursorily dismissing it as an odd brotherhood indulging in 
“scenes of collective hysteria” (André 1956: 216), mysterious practices centred around the mimicry of 
animal behaviour, and disturbing acts of self-flagellation (Felice 1936; Drague 1951: 75 – 217; 
Crapanzano 1973: 145, 1980: 92; Michon 1978; Eickelman 1981: 83, 352; Andezian 1996: 395-401; 
Trimingham 1998: 86, 276; Glasse’ 2002:40). The few anthropologists who have dedicated a 
monographic study to the brotherhood have either portrayed  the  miraculous performances of the 
Issawiya  as an “ensemble of heretic beliefs” (Brunel 1926:  246), or described them as archaic practices 
that have disappeared in modern times without probing further (Andezian 2001:114). The “most 
notorious” of the Sufi ways remains therefore a largely un-explored phenomenon4.  
 
In this thesis I will show that Issawy miracles are not manifestations of ‘hysteria’ as the previous literature 
has suggested but expressions of a sophisticated esoteric spirituality that has been abandoned by Issawis 
due to a combination of factors. In doing so, I will attempt to expand the scarce anthropological 
knowledge of Issawiya, but I will also try to fill a vacuum in the ethnographic literature on Libyan 
Sufism. The  Issawy brotherhood appears in publications dealing with Morocco (Brunel 1926; Drague 
1951: 75; 121; André 1956: 216 – 217; Rabinow 1977: 51; Geertz 1979; Crapanzano 1973: 79, 141-145, 
203; 1980: 16, 36, 82, 91-92; 1981: 83), Egypt (El Said Yousef Mosa 2008: 179), and  Algeria (Andezian 
2001). The scholarship on Libya, however, has completely ignored the Issawiya focusing instead on 
another Libyan brotherhood, the Sanusiya, a tariqa that has played an extremely important role in the 
modern history of the country (Santa Maria 1912; Nallino 1940; Adams 1947; Evans-Pritchard 1946, 
1949; Ziadeh 1958; De Candole 1988; Peters 1990; Gilsenan 1990: 160; Triaud 1995, 1995b; Vikor 1995, 
1996; McGuirk 2007). As documented by a vast number of publications, during the first half of the 
twentieth century the Sanusis created a form of local government in the Eastern part of Libya and later a 
kingdom that lasted until Muammar Gheddafi’s revolutionary takeover in 1969 (ibid.).  Given the 
importance of this brotherhood scholars have largely equated Libyan Sufism with Sanusy Sufism. The 
Libyan Issawiya has been therefore completely neglected. 
 
The work of renowned British anthropologist E.E. Evans-Pritchard has been instrumental in the academic 
‘marginalisation’ of the Libyan non-Sanusy orders like the Issawiya. In his 1949 classic “The Sanusi of 
                                                          
4 “Everyone has heard about the Aissaoua and their strange practices, yet few people know exactly what they are” (Rinn 
1884: 303, translation mine). 
Cyrenaica5” Evans-Pritchard famously argued that the Sanusiya was able to achieve its political status 
because of its solid internal organisations while the other Libyan brotherhoods remained inconsequential 
entities due to their “lack of cohesion, common direction, and political influence” (Evans-Pritchard 1949: 
84). Doubtless, some aspects of Evans-Pritchard’s account have been criticised by the subsequent 
scholarship (Eickelman 1981b: 52). Indeed, Scholars have unpacked the reasons behind Evans-Pritchard’s 
choice to focus on the Sanusiya6, questioned the importance of the brotherhood in the political dynamics 
of the country (Peters 1990: 10-28; Baldinetti 2010) and debated over whether the order had an intrinsic 
political inclination or not (Evans-Pritchard 1949: 26, 173; Ziadeh 1958; Ahmida 1994: 100, 173; Triaud 
1984, 1995; Vikor 1995, 1996, 2000). Even still, “The Sanusi of Cyrenaica” has had the enduring effect 
of reducing the non-Sanusy orders like the Issawiya to a list of marginal organisations that have not left 
any visible mark on Libyan history (Brunel 1926:64; Agela and Cerbelli 1949: 41-43; Evans-Pritchard 
1949: 84-85; Drague 1951: 75; Goodchilde 1970:26; Depont & Coppolani 1987: 304; Grandin 1986; 
Triaud 1996; Baldinetti 2003: 136; Najem 2005). In analysing Issawy practices I will try to furnish this 
list with some ‘ethnographic flesh’ showing that Libyan Sufism is a variegated reality that cannot be 
understood only by looking at the Sanusiya as scholars have done in the past. In order to do so, I will first 
present a brief account of Libya’s transition from Sanusy monarchy to revolutionary state, and then lay 
out an overview of the Libyan brotherhoods that academia has ignored.  
 
2- From Sufi Kingdom to State of the Masses (Historical Overview) 
                                                          
5 Libya is divided into three main regions, Tripolitania in the West, Cyrenaica in the East and Fezzan in the South, for an 
analysis of the historical origins of this geographical division see Peters 1982; Vandewalle 2006. 
6
 Evans-Pritchard collected the material on the Sanusiya while working for the British Military Administration in Cyrenaica.  
For an analysis of the professional, intellectual and personal motivations that have pushed Evans – Pritchard to study the 
Sanusiya instead of other Libyan orders see Douglas 1980: 46; Li Causi 1988; Peters 1990:21-24; Ahmida 1994; Baldinetti 
2010: 14. On the relationship between Anthropology and colonialism see Asad 1973; Asad 1991; Goody 1995: 1-6; Stocking 
1996: 367-421; Kuper 1996: 94-114. 
From a religious point of view, Libya is officially a Maliki7 country whose population is made up entirely 
of Sunni Muslims, most of whom are of Arab and Berber origin8. From a political point of view, Libya is 
a Jamahiriya (“state of the masses”), a unique political system instituted by Colonel Muammar Gheddafi. 
Prior to Gheddafi’s revolutionary coup, however, Libya was a kingdom with a Sufi king. Even though the 
rise to power of the Sanusis has been described as “the most remarkable tariqa event in the last century” 
(Trimingham 1998: 257), the brotherhood started out mainly as a missionary organisation with no political 
agenda9 (Trimingham 1998: 119). The Sanusiya was found by the Algerian Sufi Mohammed Ibn Ali 
asSanusy, a scholar and mystic usually referred to as “asSanusy al Kabir,” the “Grand Sanusy” (Peters 
1990:14; Vikor 1995).  Born in Algeria about 1787, the Grand Sanusy studied under the well- know Sufi 
master Ahmad bin Idris al Fasi and joined forty different Sufi orders before establishing his own tariqa 
(Giglio 1932: 1-11; Evans-Pritchard 1949: 12- 13; Vikor 1995: 49–76, 1996: 127–142) 10 . After an 
unsuccessful attempt to settle in Mecca he travelled to Eastern Libya, where he founded his first zawiya11  
in the city of al Baydha in 1843 (Adams 1947:3-10).  From al Baydha asSanusy moved to the oasis of 
Jaghabub, deep in the Libyan desert, where he was able to organise an important centre of religious 
studies with the purpose of revitalising local Islam (Evans-Pritchard 1949:14). Among the Bedouins of 
                                                          
7 One of the four schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam, the others being Hanafi, Shafi’i and Hanbali (Melchert 1997).  
8 Amongst Libyans there are also Corioghli (Libyans who claim Ottoman blood in their ancestorship), and blacks (who count 
immigrants or slaves amongst their ancestors). Many black Libyans consider themselves as Arabs. At times, however, the skin 
colour is invoked as a sign of different ethnic membership, ad in the case of the Tabu, a self proclaimed ethnic minorty living 
at the borders between Libya and Chad. Libya host also a few thousands Tuaregs.  
 
  
9 The creation of the Sanusiya should be looked at in the context of the various revivalist movements that have characterised 
Islam in the nineteenth century (Ziadeh 1958; Abu Nasr 1987; Trimingham 1998: 105-132). 
10 Very often an individual can be part of two or more Sufi orders at the same time. Multiple membership is quite a common 
feature in North-African Sufism (Gellner 1981: 138).  In my experience a Sufi would often perceive one of the orders he is part 
of as his main tariqa, and the others as ‘secondary’ ones. This aspect of Sufism will be briefly discussed later on in the 
introduction.   
11 pl. zawaya , litt. “corner”, the term will be used extensively in this thesis. In the Arabic-speaking world “zawiya” indicates a 
Sufi gathering place. In Evans-Pritchard’s words, a zawiya “may be regarded as a kind of club, founded for religious exercises 
(and) for the performance of good works” (Evans-Pritchard 1949:87). 
Cyrenaica the cult of the Murabitin12, the holy men, was deeply diffused, and the Grand Sanusy begun to 
be seen as a saint and as a wonderworker very soon (Peters 1990:16; Mason 1977: 50-65). After his death 
in 1859, the Grand Sanusy was buried in Jaghabub. His tomb became a site of pilgrimage, and his 
brotherhood started spreading throughout the Eastern region gaining a certain influence amongst the tribes 
of Cyrenaica (Evans-Pritchard 1949:73; Peters 1990: 10-28). 
 
When the Sanusiya started to spread, Libya was part of the Ottoman Empire. Even though the relationship 
between the Sublime Porte and the Sanusis was initially characterised by a certain antipathy, the Ottoman 
authorities and the order established a rapport of mutual approval (Davis 1987:27; Ziadeh 1958: 11-34). 
Nonetheless, with time the brotherhood developed into something more than a peripheral religious 
organisation. Having established its centre far from the cities of the coast (and therefore far from the seats 
of the Ottoman administration), the Sanusiya was able to increase its political weight undisturbed (Evans-
Pritchard 1949: 88; Vandewalle 2006: 23; Baldinetti 2010: 32). The prominence of the order became 
explicit during the Italian occupation in the First World War. When the Italians invaded the country in 
1911, the Ottomans made peace with them. The Sanusis, however, launched a defensive jihad (“holy 
war”) against the colonisers and the Libyan tribes continued their resistance under the Sanusy banner 
(Evans-Pritchard 1949:104; Evans-Pritchard 1946). Failing to crush the opposition, the Italians were 
forced to come to terms with it, but they could not negotiate peace with an indistinct tribal system. In 
order to settle a non-aggression pact they had to establish relations with the only organisation that was 
                                                          
12
 Sing Murabut, “saints” (hence “Maraboutisme”, or “Maraboutage”, “cult of the saints”, in the French colonial literature – 
Soares 2005:26; 129). The term means “tied ones” and it is linked both with the idea of “being tied to God” and with the 
word “ribat” (“fortified sanctuary”). In the Muslim world the expression ‘Murabut’ has been used with different connotations 
(Rinn 1838; Geertz 1968: 43; Eickelman 1981; Rasmussen 1992; Andezian 1996: 390; Gemmeke 2009). For an analysis of the 
use of the term in Libya (where ‘murabitin’ is also used to describe a tribe that traces its origin to a holy person) see Evans-
Pritchard 1949: 65-70; Peters 1990: 40-83; Najem 2005: 43. On Libyan tribes see de Agostini 1917, 1922-23, Behnke 1947; 
Evans-Pritchard 1944; 1944b, 1949:51; Mason 1977, 1978, 1982; Davis 1987; Peters 1977, 1990; Obeidi 2001: 108-135; 
Wright 2002; Najem 2003.  
representative of the complicated tribal structure of the nomads: the Sanusy order. In dealing with the 
Sanusis as the true leaders of the Libyan nomads, the Italians furnished the Sanusiya with a symbolic and 
political recognition and with time “the tariqa, the religious order, began to speak of itself as a hukuma, 
government” (Evans-Pritchard 1949:105).  
 
When the Fascists took power in Italy at the end of 1922, Benito Mussolini begun a new colonial 
campaign with the intention of‘re-conquering’ Libya, thus breaking the treaty with the Sanusis. The 
Sanusy guerrilla resisted this second invasion for nine years, fighting against the troops of General 
Rodolfo Graziani, newly appointed Governor General of Libya (Evans-Pritchard 1949:191; 1946b). The 
head of the brotherhood at the time, Idris asSanusy, grandson of the Grand Sanusy, went into exile in 
Egypt searching for allies in the fight against the Italians, while the famous Sanusy leader Omar al-
Mukhtar (“our irreducible enemy” as general Graziani called him) became the chief of all the partisan 
bands and, to all intents and purposes, the incarnated symbol of the Libyan resistance (Evans-Pritchard 
1949:168; Rochat & Goglia 1986; Peters 1990: 20).  The resistance, however, died when its symbol did.  
In September 1930 Omar al Mukhtar was captured, put on trial and hanged before twenty thousand 
Bedouins and the notables of Cyrenaica (Evans-Pritchard 1949:190). The repression of General Graziani 
was brutally sanguinary, and the Bedouin population was, according to Evans-Pritchard, reduced by half 
(Evans-Pritchard 1949:191; 1946b; Ahmida 2005: 43-54). Finally, on 24 January 1931 the resistance was 
sedated, the war ended and Libya became, in Mussolini‘s famous words, the “quarta sponda”, the “fourth 
shore” (Vandewalle 2006: 24-42): Italy’s projection on the other side of the Mediterranean.  
 
The exiled head of the Sanusis Idris asSanusy had already received formal support from Britain, but when 
Italy’s increasing colonial expansion started to worry the British this support turned into military help 
(Ministero 1949: 53-55).  Following the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1936 Britain and Italy came into 
conflict, and a newfound Anglo-Sanusy coalition opposed the Italians in the Second World War (Davis 
1987: 28). In forging an alliance with the Sanusiya the British authorities started to deal with Idris as a 
head of state. Eager to transform Libya into a protectorate, Britain offered the head of the order not only 
the future independence from Italy but also the crown of Cyrenaica (Davis 1987: 28).  On 23rd January 
1942 the British forces entered Tripoli while simultaneously the French occupied the southern region of 
Fezzan. Idris asSanusy, now officially king of Cyrenaica, returned to the country after an exile of twenty-
two years and the Fascist domination of Libya came to an end (De Candole 1988:65). The Libyan 
kingdom (initially organised as a federal monarchy) remained under the British military administration 
until 1952, when, with the approval of the United Nations, Libya became the first African colony to gain 
independence (Wright 1969: 208-228; Davis 1987: 30). Eleven years later, the discovery of Cyrenaican 
petroleum became a new cohesive factor destined to strengthen many Libyans’ desire for national unity 
(Kubbah 1964; Allan 1981; Barker & McLachlan; Davis 1987: 30; Bergs 1988:133). King Idris 
abandoned therefore the federal constitution and proclaimed the birth of the unified kingdom of Libya 
(ibid.). 
 
With time, the identity of the Sanusiya as a Sufi order begun to weaken (Davis 1987: 110 n15; 
Vandewalle 2006: 45), but members of the order (and of King Idris’s family) maintained prestigious 
positions of power in the country (Vandewalle 2006: 43-73). The Sanusy kingdom, however, was bound 
to crumble at the beginning of its second decade of life. On the first of September 1969, a message from a 
non-identified “purely revolutionary council” (Davis 1987: 30) was delivered to the Libyans.  From the 
very first lines of this communiqué, the ‘modernising’ agenda of the council was very clear: “to remove 
all past hindrances to solving the various social and economic problems of the Libyan nation” (ibid.). In 
the same year Muammar Gheddafi, a twenty-seven year old junior military officer born from a Bedouin 
family in Sirte staged a bloodless coup d’état together with a small group of fellow soldiers (Bianco 1975; 
Blundy & Lycett 1987). Following the example of the Egyptian “free officers” (whose socialist revolution 
led by Jamal Abdul Nasser had overthrown the Egyptian monarchy in 1952), the Libyan “free officers 
“abolished the monarchy. The Sanusiya was dismantled (Davis 1987)13 and Idris asSanusy, first and last 
king of Libya, was sent back into exile in Egypt where he died in 1983 (De Candole 1988). After a few 
uncertain years the coupists managed to ensure control over the country, nationalising banks and oil 
companies and producing a provisional constitutional declaration (Vandewalle 2006:  97-136).   On the 
7th of April 1974 Gheddafi (now raised to the grade of Colonel) resigned as head of state in order to 
devote himself to revolutionary activities, assuming the symbolic title of Qaid atThawra (“Guide of the 
Revolution”) but keeping control of the armed forces (ibid.).  In 1975 Libya became the “Libyan Arab 
Republic”, a Socialist state organised around Nasserian principles and headed by a “Revolutionary 
Command Council”(RCC) under the leadership of Colonel Gheddafi (Obeidi 2001:45-57). 
 
Having led a revolution, Gheddafi was now forced to organise the vague ideals of the “free officers” into 
a recognisable ideology. Between 1975 and 1979 the Guide of the Revolution published the three 
volumes of his Kitab al Akhdar, the “Green Book”, elucidating his “third universal theory”, a political 
alternative to Communism and Capitalism (Bleuchot 1982; Gathafi 2005).  In his book colonel Gheddafi 
launched the creation of a system of direct political participation based on local popular assemblies, and 
in 1977 Libya became a Jamahiriya, a state supposedly managed by its own citizens (Vandewalle 2006: 
97-136). In proposing a mixture of religious language, Socialism, anti-Western sentiment, diffidence 
towards the party system and ‘statelessness’, Gheddafi created not only a unique political system but also 
                                                          
13 Many of my Libyan informants confirmed to me that the government ordered the destruction of the tomb of the founder of 
the Sanusiya in Jaghabub.  
a specific political rhetorics that was going to accompany the country for three decades (Bianco 1975; 
Anderson 1981, 1986; Bearman 1986: 282-286; Brundy and Lycett 1987: 79-159; Davis 1987: 15-136; 
Lemarchand 1988; Vandewalle 1998:32-36; Joffe 1995; Obeidi 2001). Libya’s new political makeover, 
however, was not well received by the West. In 1979 the American government included Libya in the 
State Department list of sponsors of state terrorism, and in 1982 the United Nations imposed a trade 
embargo on the country (Bearman 1986: 287-297; Vandewalle 2006: 169-171).  The following years 
were characterised by a series of changes both in internal and in foreign policies. After the initial abolition 
of private property promulgated by the regime in 1978 Libya entered into a slow process of liberalisation, 
and in 1987 the Libyan authorities decided to re-introduce the private sector as part of a broader project of 
reform that lasted through the eighties and the nineties (Vandewalle 2006: 144- 167). By the late nineties 
Gheddafi  started to show signs of openings to the international community, and in 2004 the United 
Nations Security Council revoked the embargo on Libya (Vandewalle 2006: 169-171), allowing the 
country to become a member of the Council in 2007. Strengthened by this international recognition, 
Gheddafi emerged as the undisputed leader of a state that was supposed to be governed solely by the 
people. 
 
3- Mapping Libyan Mysticism (The Non-Sanusy Orders) 
In the course of last sixty years Libya has witnessed the birth of a Sufi kingdom, the creation of a pariah 
state despised by Western powers, and the consolidation of a dictatorial regime backed up by the 
international community. When trying to delineate the role played by Sufism in this complex process the 
vicissitudes of the Sanusiya stand out as the main ‘Sufi contribution’ to Libyan history. Libyan 
mysticism, however, is a complex phenomenon that goes beyond the political achievements of the tariqa 
that ended up becoming a state. Indeed, Libya presents a series of non- Sanusy orders that have been 
largely ignored by scholarship because deemed less important. Evans-Pritchard noticed the existence of 
the ‘other’ brotherhoods (1949: 84-85), but he also dismissed them as marginal entities that lacked any 
“unity of direction” (Evans-Pritchard 1949: 88), and therefore as organisations unworthy of academic 
interest14. The Italians, on the other hand, approached the non-Sanusy orders with greater attention. As 
shown by a recent study of Italian colonial documents (Baldinetti 2003), the colonisers sought to find an 
agreement with turuq with the purpose of  gaining  allies in the fight against the Sanusiya (Baldinetti 
2003:129)15.  In order to do so, the Italians collected some information on the brotherhoods, enough to 
delineate a map of non-Sanusy Sufism in colonial times.  
 
The Italian sources present a great deal of information about the Sanusiya, but they also mention a 
number of non-Sanusy turuq, mainly orders related to the Shadiliya, an extremely influential tariqa that 
gave rise to a family of different Sufi orders in North-Africa (Geoffroy 1996: 65; Bhurkhardt 1976:46; 
Trimingham 1998: 44-51). Amongst these non-Sanusy brotherhoods,  the Issawiya is described as being 
particularly widespread, at least for what concerns  the Western region of Tripolitania (Baldinetti 2003: 
134)16. The colonisers collected information concerning the location and distribution of Issawy zawaya, 
but they also realised that the Issawiya was a tariqa made up of independent zawaya without a common 
leader (ibid.). Though large in numbers, Issawis were considered too divided to be used for military 
                                                          
14  Evans-Pritchard’s approach to Libyan Sufism should be looked at in the context of a certain ‘obsession’ for social 
organisation and for social structure that has haunted British anthropology until the seventies (Radcliffe-Brown 1952; Fortes 
1963; Stocking 1984). For an analysis of the developments in Evans-Pritchard’s thought compare Evans-Prichard 1949, Evans-
Pritchard 1956 and 1974.  
15 The intention of using the orders against the Sanusis is explicitly stated in “Le societa’ segrete della Tripolitania” (“The 
Secret Societies of Tripolitania”), a 1912 document written by the Italian military intelligence  with the  purpose of  furnishing  
the Italian officers with various information on the brotherhoods (Baldinetti 2003:129).  On the use of colonial documentation 
in Anthropology see Peel 1996. On the relationship between the Italians and Islam in colonial times see Marongiu 1982; 
Vandewalle 1996: 32-40; Graziani 2002: 73. In their propagandistic maneuvers the Italians portrayed the Libyans as “Muslim 
Italian citizens” while in fact treating them as ‘lesser’ Italians (ibid.). 
16
 The presence of the Issawiya in Libya is also cursorily mentioned in Brunel 1926: 64, according to whom the number of 
Issawis in Tripolitania was particularly elevated. See also Evans-Pritchard 1949: 84-85; Drague 1951: 75; and Goodchilde 1970: 
26.  
purposes, hence the Italians attempted to create an alliance with the Madaniya, a Sufi order which is 
described in the documents as the largest tariqa in Libya after the Sanusiya (Baldinetti 2003:131; Grandin 
1986; Triaud 1996)17. Even though the head of the Madanis showed a certain antipathy towards the 
Sanusis, the Italians did not manage to persuade the members of the brotherhood, and as a consequence 
the Madaniya remained essentially neutral in the military operations (Trimingham 1998: 113; Baldinetti 
2003:132-133, 147-149). The Italians evaluated other possibilities, but the other turuq proved to be 
unsuitable candidates. The members of the ‘Arusiya (Trimingham 1998: 87) were rather numerous in 
Libya, but they did not have a common leadership to negotiate with, while the Rifa’iya (Popovic 1996; 
Trimingham 1998: 37–44; Najem 2005: 50), the Qadiriya (Zarcone 1996; Depont & Coppolani 1897: 
304), and the Sa’adiya were small orders that could not possibly contribute to the success of the colonial 
campaign (Baldinetti 2003: 131-139). In the end none of the turuq sided with the Italians, but they did not 
actively take part in the Sanusy resistance either (Peters 1990: 18; Baldinetti 2003). 
 
Being motivated by a military agenda, the Italian documents focus on the geographical distribution of the 
orders, and contain very little information about the origins of the turuq (Baldinetti 2003:138). Due to the 
partial nature of these data, reconstructing a pre-colonial history of non-Sanusy Sufism is particularly 
difficult. Tracing a more contemporary history of the turuq, however, is equally hard. Out of the 
brotherhoods mentioned by the Italians today only the Issawiya, the Madaniya, the ‘Arusiya and the 
Qadiriya are still present in Libya while the other turuq seem to have died out in a process which is 
difficult to delineate18. Though once large enough to be considered as a possible ally by the Italians the 
                                                          
17 Evans-Pritchard mentions briefly that the Italians had tried to play the Madanis against the Sanusis, but he does not expand 
on the matter (Evans-Pritchard 1949: 87). The Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid had already tried to use the Madaniya in order to 
contain the growing expansion of the Sanusiya (Baldinetti 1996: 147; Trimingham 1998:126).   
18
 In time the Rifa’iya seems to have merged with the Issawiya.  According to the Italian documents after 1903, the year of 
the death of the last head of the order in Libya, the number of the Rifa’is started to diminish very rapidly until the order was 
completely absorbed by the Issawiya with which it shared deep doctrinal and ritual similarities (according to the documents 
Madaniya has developed into a small and largely un-influential brotherhood19, while the Qadiriya has 
retained his minor role in Libyan Sufism. The Issawiya, on the other hand, has become the largest tariqa 
in the country, as confirmed to me by the totality of my informants and by the personnel of the Central 
Auqaf of Tripoli (the institution dealing with religious affairs in Libya) 20, while the ‘Arusiya  is today the 
second largest order in Libya. Other turuq have recently started to spread in the country, but they remain 
minor orders in terms of number of zawaya.  The Tijaniya (Abu-Nasr 1965), the Burhanya (Luizard 1996: 
356), and the Khaliliya (Trimingham 1998: 124) were brought to the country between the sixties and the 
seventies (respectively from Algeria, Sudan and Egypt), but they are not particularly diffused within 
Libyan society. The Alawiya (Lings 1961), the Jaafariya, and the Khalwatiya (Clayer 1996; Trimingham 
1998: 74-78) are the latest additions in the Libyan Sufi landscape. These orders have entered the country 
from Egypt between the nineties and the early two thousands, but they count an extremely small number 
of followers. Interestingly, the Sanusiya has also become an inconsequential order, even more so than the 
minor brotherhoods I have mentioned. As I have previously explained, the brotherhood was officially 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
many Tripolitanians did not even see the Issawiya and the Rifa’iya as two separate orders) (Baldinetti 2003:136). According 
to some of my informants some people have recently tried to re-affirm the Libyan Rifa’iya as an independent order without 
succeeding. In my field-work I have only met two people who identified themselves as ‘purely’ Rifa’is. More remarks on the 
relationship between Issawiya and Rifa’iya can be found later on in the introduction. Though not mentioned by the Italians, 
the Zarruqya (Khushaim 1976; Trimingham 1998: 87), the Tayybiya (Andezian 1996: 394-398) and the ‘Azuziya (Evans-
Pritchard 1949: 84-85) were also once present in Libya. According to some of my informants, the Hamdushiya (Crapanzano 
1973), the Maaziya, the Marghaniya (Trimingham 1998: 116-118), and the Ayssiya should be also added to the list of the 
Libyan turuq that have disappeared in time. Trimingham reports the presence of a branch of the Badawiya in Tripolitania 
(Trimingham 1998:45), but the order has not left any trace in the colonial literature or in local narratives.  
19
Comparing the data collected by the Italians and the little information on non-Sanusy Sufism contained in Evans-Pritchard, 
one realises that the loss of influence of the Madaniya has been a gradual process which was evident already in the forties 
(Evans-Pritchard 1949:85; Baldinetti 2003:134, see also Triaud 1996:410,  Najem 2005: 54).  
20
 At the time of my field-work the Auqaf (which will be mentioned again in this introduction and in the course of the thesis) 
was processing data collected in a census of the turuq in the different Libyan municipalities. According to a preliminary 
counting in 2007, there were about four hundred Issawy zawaya in the whole of Libya, mainly concentrated in the cities of 
Tripoli and Benghazi. This number might seem small when compared with the figures of other ethnographies on Sufism, 
particularly those dealing with Egypt (Gilsenan 1973). It should be borne in mind, however, that Libya has a population of 
only six million (less than Cairo’s) distributed on a large geographical surface of 1.800.0000 km
2
. 
dismantled by the regime after the coup of 1968. However, a number of self-proclaimed Sanusis still 
exists in Libya, even though they do not profess their membership publicly nor do they gather together in 
zawaya21.  
 
Even though scholars have examined the role of religion in the ideology of Gheddafi (Bleuchot & 
Monastiri 1981; Bruce St John 1983; Bearman 1986; Davis 1987: 57, 66-68, 76; Joffe 1988; Obeidi 2001: 
86-107), they have never analysed the relationship between the regime and Sufism. During the years of 
the monarchy, the turuq were highly regarded by the Sanusy king22. As a consequence, following the 
coup of 1969 Gheddafi treated the brotherhoods as one of the “past hindrances” (Davis 1987: 30) that the 
revolution aimed at removing. The Guide of the Revolution, however, saw the brotherhoods not only as a 
fossil of the monarchic past but also as organisations whose doctrines were incompatible with his 
understanding of Islam. Since the early days of the regime Colonel Gheddafi had stressed the need for 
Libyans to re-discover the centrality of the Qur’an as the only source of religious direction for Muslims, 
and the necessity to purify Libyan religiosity from practices that did not have a clear basis in the holy 
book (Gellner 1981: 62, 63, 172; Bearman 1986: 162-163; Davis 1987: 44-58). As soon as he established 
control over the country, the revolutionary leader identified the mystical background of Sufism as an 
agent of corruption that had polluted the simplicity of the Quranic message. As a consequence, Gheddafi 
presented Sufism as a source of “rottenness and regression” (Gheddafi 1982) whose followers “deserve to 
be slaughtered” (ibid.). Throughout the seventies and the eighties a number of zawaya were closed down 
                                                          
21 It is really difficult to determine the number of Sanusis living in Libya today. The fact that some people in Tripoli were open 
with me about their ties with the Sanusiya suggests that the authorities tolerate the order as long as it does not proselytise, and 
condone its underground existence. In the past Sanusis were also simultaneously members of other orders (Santa Maria 1912: 
145; Evans-Pritchard 1949: 8; 86-89; see also footnote 9).  The Sanusis I have met in the course of my field-work were also at 
the same time members of other brotherhoods. Some of them saw the Sanusiya as their main order (even though they did not 
gather with other Sanusis, nor they publicly professed their membership), others told me that they joined the Sanusiya only as 
secondary tariqa (see footnote 9). In a private communication Prof. John Davis, author of “Libyan Politics – Tribes and 
Revolution” (1987) told me that at the time of his fieldwork in Libya, the Sanusiyya was already a “dormant practice” that was 
slowly dying out.   
22 Often Sanusis were also, simultaneously, members of other brotherhoods. See previous footnote. 
or destroyed by the Libyan police. Gheddafi’s approach to Sufism, however, begun to change with the 
approaching of the nineties. All of a sudden the Colonel realised that another force was more threatening 
for the Jamahiriya, and that Sufism could be actually used as a deterrent against this force.  
 
In the late eighties a series of Salafi-inspired23 organisations started to spread in Libya (Joffe 1988; 
Pargeter 2005; Martinez 2007: 59-84).  Signs of increasing ‘Salafisation’ could be detected throughout 
the country in the form of an increasing use of the full hijab, Islamic veil, for women (Pargeter 2013: 
165), a practice that had somehow decreased during the monarchy and in the first years of the revolution. 
Preoccupied with the political agenda of some of these ‘Islamist’ groups, the government decided to 
eradicate Salafism from Libya. During the eighties and nineties several thousands of Salafi activists were 
arrested, tortured, executed and detained in inhuman conditions (Joffe 1988; Pargeter 2005; De Bona 
2013: 81). In some instances, anti-Salafi measures involved even the use of armed forces, particularly in 
the Eastern region (Ibid; Pargeter 2013: 169). Gheddafi excluded the ‘Islamists’ from the benefit of 
judicial guarantees following the so-called ‘1991 Law on the Consolidation of Freedoms’ whose article 
five stated that religion could not be exploited for political purposes (ibid.). In March 1997, the regime 
introduced a collective punishment law that allowed it to persecute the families and even tribal groups of 
suspected Islamists (Pargeter 2013: 169). Gheddafi decided to create a ‘Popular Guard’ whose task was to 
prevent Salafi groups from creating a supporting network in the mosques of the Libyan urban centers 
                                                          
23
 ‘Salafism’ (from Salafi  - “predecessor”) is a Sunni school of thought that takes the first three generations of Muslims of 
early Islam (Mohammed’s companions, their successors, and the successors’ successors) as exemplary models.  The main 
theoretician of Salafism is perhaps the famous Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahab (1703-1792).  Salafi Islam encompasses a series 
of different groups but it is generally characterised by a literalistic interpretation of the Qur’an, and by a strong antipathy 
towards Sufism (either in its entirety or in some of its manifestations) (Sirryeh 1999; De Jong & Radtke 1999). On the 
complexities that characterise this current within Islam see  Euben 1997; Salvatore 1997; Nagata 2001; Roy 2002; Devji 2005; 
Soares 2005: 1-8; Marsden 2005b, 2007b, 2008; Mahmood 2005; Hirshkind 2006; Meijer 2009; Ostebo 2012; Osella and 
Soares 2010: 9-12; Huq 2010). The literature on Libyan Salafism is particularly scarce (Joffe 1988; Pargeter 2005; Martinez 
2007: 59-84; De Bona 2013: 80-82).  
(ibid.), and in a speech delivered on the 20th of July 1991 Gheddafi called the ‘Islamists’ “agents of the 
enemy” (Ibid.)24.   As part of this general anti-Salafi approach, the Libyan government decided, quite 
surprisingly, to counter-balance the expansion of Salafism by promoting Sufism (thus paralleling similar 
measures undertaken by the governments of other North-African countries25).   
 
As part of this process of rehabilitation of the Sufis, the regime decided to furnish the brotherhoods with 
an administrative apparatus. In 1990 the government created the “Idhara Turuq wa Zawaya” 
(“Administration of the brotherhoods and of the zawaya”), a bureau which still exists (and which will be 
mentioned again throughout the thesis) whose purpose is favouring the coordination between the different 
turuq.  At the same time Gheddafi started to praise publicly Sufism as a “modern weapon” in the battle 
against fundamentalism (Gheddafi 1995e), and as a form of spirituality that had re-discovered its Quranic 
roots (Gheddafi 1988, 1995, 1995d), so that by the mid-nineties Sufism was re-incorporated as part of the 
national discourse26. Today the Sufi orders are a highly celebrated component of Libyan society. Every 
first day of September the turuq participate in the feast for the anniversary of the revolution in Tripoli, 
parading in the main square of the capital.  Members of the orders live a very public existence, and 
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 According to Martinez, by antagonising ‘radical’ Islam Gheddafi tried to join in the global ‘war on terror’ and win the 
sympathy of the West (Martinez 2007: 59-84). 
25 The idea of playing the Sufis against the Salafis is by no means a Libyan invention. In the course of private conversations 
with Prof. George Joffe and Dr. Michael Willis (Oxford University) I was told that in the early 2000’s the governments of 
Morocco and Algeria have started to publicly support Sufism with the specific aim of containing the expansion of Salafi 
groups. Though not dealing with this specific issue, preliminary thoughts on the measures applied by these governments in 
order to marginalise Salafism can be found in Willis 1996; 2006 and Magrahoui 2009.  
26
 As I have previously explained, the Sanusiya exists in Libya only on an underground level but it seems to be tolerated by the 
government. Perhaps it is in the mid-nineties that the government has ceased to persecute the brotherhood, maybe as a 
result of this new pro-Sufi attitude.  In a post on the website 16Beaver, Hakim Bey (pseudonym of the political writer Peter 
Lamborn Wilson), says that in the mid-nineties he was invited to a conference in Tripoli to discuss the relationship between 
Sufism and the thought of Colonel Gheddafi.  In the post Hakim Bey says: “…the Sanussi order still exists (‘just not the royal 
branch of it’, as a Libyan delegate told me)...” (“Jihad Revisited”, 6
th
 August 2004, 
http://www.16beavergroup.org/mtarchive/archives/001033.php, accessed 25
th
 November 2012).   
 
Sufism is constantly praised by media as part of the national cultural heritage. In its transition from 
despicable religiosity to celebrated spirituality, however, Libyan mysticism seems to have changed. Most 
specifically, it seems to have lost its miracles.  
 
4- A Jihad made of miracles ( Non-Sanusy Narratives of Resistance) 
As we have seen, the non-Sanusy turuq maintained a neutral position in the war against the Italians and, 
subsequently, they unwillingly became a tool in the political manoeuvres of the regime of Gheddafi. In 
looking at this process one might formulate the opinion that the history of the orders is characterised by a 
certain ‘passivity’ particularly when compared with the one of the Sanusiya. Nonetheless, in some local 
narratives of the past the brotherhoods appear as ‘active’ agents in the historical vicissitudes of the 
country, at least for what concerns the colonial period.  Though ready to recognise that the Sanusiya was 
the only order that took arms against the colonisers, my informants often clarified to me that the other 
turuq played a role in the anti-colonial struggle. When I asked about these non-Sanusy narratives of 
resistance, I was frequently told that the Sufis performed miracles in front of the Italian officers in order 
to demonstrate that God was on the side of the Libyans. Though extremely brief and un-detailed these 
stories were presented to me as having an ‘historical’ significance: they represented a record of the non-
Sanusy participation in the colonial war.  In telling me these narratives, however, my informants also 
stressed to me that Sufi miracles (or at least certain kinds of Sufi miracles) were once much more frequent 
than nowadays.  
 
The ‘jihad made of miracles’ was mentioned to me by Libyans of different age and social status both 
inside and outside of Tripoli. Often the occasional story-teller would tell me about these miraculous 
events upon learning that I was an Italian citizen27. Other times the stories were brought up because the 
conversation was taking place in a location where a miracle had happened in colonial times28. Benito 
Mussolini or General Graziani would occasionally appear as characters in the narration. More often, 
however, the story would feature a nameless “Italian officer”. Though different in the details, these 
accounts were usually characterised by the same narrative structure. In the first part of the story the 
overbearing Italian officer challenged the member of a brotherhood to prove that he was a real 
“marabutto”29 . Accepting the challenge, the Sufi performed a miracle in order to demonstrate that 
Libyans - and Muslims in general - enjoyed the favour of God. Finally, the Italian surrendered in front of 
the miraculous powers of the pious Sufi, and either embraced Islam as the true religion or began to treat 
the Libyans with respect30. The chronological dimension of these tales of resistance (and conversion) was 
often kept rather vague by my informants (“during the colonial occupation”). The temporal connotation 
of the miraculous jihad, however, was presented to me also as a time where certain specific 
manifestations of the divine were more common than in the present. 
 
                                                          
27 Further reflections on my presence in Libya as an Italian anthropologist can be found later on in the introduction.  
28 On the relationship between history, geography, memory and  story-telling  see Douglas 1968: 65; 1975:146; Basso 1984; 
Bloch 1998: 120 - 121; Lowenthal 1985; Casey 1993: 273-278 . On the complex relationship between history and 
anthropology see Fabian 1983: 37-52; Axel 2002: 1-44; Lambek & Atze 1995; Lambek: 2002: 3-49; Simpson & Kresse 2008. 
On topography and mysticism see De Certeau 1992:21. On the relationship between folk-poetry and colonial memory in Libya 
see Ahmida 2005.  
29 Italianised version of the word “murabut”, “saint” (see footnote 10) attested in early Italian accounts on Libya (Della Cella 
1912; Agabiti 1912: 75; Graziani 2002: 260). “Marabutto” has become part of the Libyan dialect together with a number of 
Italian words like  marshiabiedi (“marciapiedi”, “pavement”), barkiju (“parcheggio”, “parking place”), and many others. At 
times the meaning of these words differs from the  original Italian meaning, In Tripolitania, for instance,  “Ghusto” (“Gusto”, 
“Taste”) indicates an entertaining (and therefore “tasty”) event, while a man with a goatee connected to the moustaches is 
described as having a “shinque” (“cinque”, “five”) because the shape of his facial hair resembles the  number five in the Arabic 
script. On the peculiarities of Libyan dialects see Griffini 1913, Iannotta 1933, Cesaro 1939 and Panetta 1943. For an analysis 
of the role played by the manual of spoken Arabic in colonial Libya see Airo’ 2003. 
30
 On the under-studied phenomenon of the Italians who converted to Islam at the time of the colonial enterprise in Libya see 
Santarelli et al. 1986: 156. On the Islamic notion of miracle as proof to be exhibited in answer to a challenge by an un-
believer see Flueckiger 2008 and Van Lent & Bearman 1997: 615. For an analysis of the same concept in other cultural 
contexts see Davis 1998 and Dempsey 2005. 
The protagonists of these stories were often described to me as “Sufi persons” without any specific 
connotation. Other times, however, the raconteurs were able to identify the name of the wonder-maker 
and his membership to a specific brotherhood, as in the case of the famous Sidhi31 Abdallah al Fitury, an 
‘Arusy32 character of the past whose miraculous adventures occupied a number of conversations I had in 
the Tripoli area. Born in Ajillat (a small town at about 70 kilometres from the capital), Sidhi Abdallah was 
imprisoned by the Italians and deported together with other Libyans to the Italian island of Ponza33. As it 
was explained to me by a number of interlocutors, the Sufi was kept under arrest by a particularly stern 
Italian officer and, when the daughter of this man fell mysteriously ill, challenged to perform a miracle. 
Intentioned to demonstrate the truth of Islam to the oppressors, Sidhi Abdallah read some verses from the 
Qur’an over the girl and, having succeeded whereas the Italian doctors had not, he was recognised as a 
holy person and offered freedom.  Narratives similar to the one of Sidhi Abdallah were reported to me 
featuring members of other turuq.  Issawis, however, were amongst the main protagonists of these stories, 
even when the story-tellers were not associated with the Issawy order.  Interestingly, those who told me 
these tales explained  to me that in the colonial past the Issawiya used to perform  a  very specific 
typology of miracles, and that these special wonders, or karamat,  had disappeared in modern times. 
 
Unlike other narratives of ‘miraculous resistance’ the Issawy tales were always characterised by one 
recurrent theme: the need to show the colonisers that even though they had conquered Libya they could 
not subjugate the bodies of the Libyans. In some cases the protagonist (often an anonymous Issawy) 
would impress the colonial oppressor by drinking a cup of poison without suffering any damage or by 
stabbing himself with a knife without dying. In other cases the Issawy would perform supernatural 
                                                          
31 Short for “Sayyed”. The term (which will be used extensively in this thesis) indicates a blood descendent of the prophet 
Mohammed, and it is a common epithet for a saint or an important person. 
32 See page 17. 
33 In colonial times a number of Libyans were deported by the Italians to this Island of the Tyrrhenian sea (Baldinetti 2010:23).  
exhibitions demonstrating that he had the strength and the dexterity of an animal, or that he was capable 
of taming all sorts of wild beasts34. Though often centred on an act of self-harm these narratives would 
occasionally feature a ‘miraculous aggression’, as in the case of Sidhi Nueji as-Serrari, a deceased Issawy 
who famously performed a ‘miraculous attack’ against an Italian in the area of Beni-Walid (South-West 
of Tripoli). As I was told on a number of occasions, Sidhi Nueji was challenged by an Italian general, and 
in order to demonstrate the truth of Islam he stabbed the officer with a sword leaving him miraculously 
un-harmed. Tales of Issawis demonstrating the power of God over their own bodies (or over the bodies of 
the colonisers) were a constant feature of my field-work. Interestingly, however, the story-tellers often 
felt the need to add that with time the Issawiya had abandoned its ‘self-hurting miracles’ and its ‘animal 
powers’. Though once used to defend Islam against the infidels, these practices were now described to me 
as problematic, old-fashioned and even irreligious.  
 
The narrations of the miraculous jihad of the Issawis struck me for a number of reasons. On the one hand, 
these stories featured  the notion of miracle  as  “weapon of the weak”  (Scott 1990) thus evoking a series 
of similar examples documented by the anthropological literature  (Gilsenan 1990: 77; Reeves 1995: 310)  
and by  the scholarship on oppression and resistance (Fanon 1963:44; Llewellyn 1985).  On the other 
hand, these narratives had also the purpose of explaining that Issawy practices had radically changed with 
time. Doubtlessly, these tales represented an attempt to portray the Italians as witnesses of the truth of 
                                                          
34 Though absent in the Italian military documents these practices are attested in other Italian sources of the time. Agela and 
Cerbelli ( 1949: 41- 43) explain that the Issawis of Tripoli were able to  “stab themselves with swords from front to back  
without producing any blood…and  to perform jumps like cats despite having received no acrobatic training” (Agela & 
Cerbelli 1949: 43 translation mine).  A similar description can be found in Agabiti 1912: 77. “Fakiristic exhibitions “are also 
briefly mentioned by Evans-Pritchard (1949:88).  According to Jones, in colonial Algeria the French were the object of a 
similar miraculous jihad launched by local Issawis.  In dealing with the Issawiya the French deployed professional illusionists 
from France with the purpose of un-masking the Issawy ‘tricks’ Jones 2010. 
Islam in order to express the spirit of resistance of the local Muslims35. However, in telling me these 
stories Issawis expressed often a paradoxical mixture of pride and ‘distance’. Though proud of their 
miraculous past, they also clarified to me that Issawis had changed their spiritual priorities.  In describing 
their brotherhood as a powerful Sufi order that had ‘fought’ the oppressors through miracles, the Issawy 
story-tellers explained to me that the order was now concerned only with the teachings of the Qur’an, 
thus implying  a discrepancy between karamat and the dictates of the holy book. During conversations 
and interviews, some Issawis maintained an ambivalent position towards karamat describing them as 
problematic practices that though powerful should not be performed by good Muslims. Others explained 
to me that since Libya was no longer oppressed by infidels karamat had simply lost their purpose of 
proofs for non-Muslims. Others in turn, told me that even though karamat might have been necessary at 
the time of the jihad they were nevertheless practices that explicitly contradicted Islamic orthodoxy.  
 
Though initially convinced that the Issawiya had lost its miracles in the course of my field-work, I 
realised that the order had simply lost a specific type of miracles. With time I slowly understood that 
many Issawis rejected the miraculous practices related to invulnerability and to the acquisition of animal 
powers, but that they had nonetheless kept the notion of ‘miracle’.  Being members of a Sufi tariqa, 
Issawis were very much concerned with miraculous manifestations of the divine and with mystical 
experiences. However, they had changed their attitude towards those specific miraculous expressions that 
had made them well-known in the past developing the idea that these practices were somehow in 
contradiction with the Qur’an. Furthering my exploration of Issawy practices I also realised that a small 
number of Issawis had kept these practices alive and that, unlike the majority of the members of the order, 
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Similar ethnographic  cases where the oppressor has been ‘translated’ into a familiar narrative language by the oppressed 
can be found  in Worsley 1970; Clyde Mitchell 1971; Comaroff 1985; Boddy 1989: 269-309; Taussig 1993: 1-88. For a more 
philosophical take on the process of making the ‘other’ similar to oneself see Ricoeur 1990.   
they saw karamat as being compatible with the dictates of Qur’an and Sunna. When I asked this restricted 
group about their capacity to make their bodies invulnerable and capable of feral strength, I was told that 
karamat are the expressions of an ancient body of Issawy secret knowledge entirely based on the 
Qur’an36.  It was this discovery of the relationship between secrecy, karamat and the Qur’an that made 
me re-frame my approach to Issawy miracles. Both those Issawis who had kept the karamat of their 
predecessors and those who had abandoned them seemed to be concerned with miraculous manifestations 
and with the necessity to follow the textual apparatus of Islam. The difference between the two, however, 
lay in their relationship with the notion of ‘secret’. While some members of the order had kept an esoteric 
approach towards miracles and towards textual orthodoxy, the majority of the Issawis had not. 
Throughout the decades, while Libya was transiting from colonial oppression to ‘Qur’ano-centric’ home-
made Socialism, the Issawiya had somehow lost its secrets. 
 
5-  Keeping the Enchantment, Losing the Secrets (Miracles, Modernity and Secrecy) 
The Issawy order seems to have lost its miracles, but in fact it has only lost its secrets. Even though, as I 
have shown, Issawy secret practices are attested in the narratives of the colonial times they have been 
abandoned in more recent times, and in order to understand this change in Issawy spirituality it is 
important to contextualise my discussion in light of current anthropological debates on modernity, 
                                                          
36 The secretive dimension and the Quranic foundation of Issawy karamat has been completely ignored by the literature on 
the Issawiya.  According to Brunel, the mimicry of animal behavior found amongst Issawis was simply the fossil of a pre-
Islamic carnivalesque practice that has survived in Morocco and in other North-African countries (Brunel 1926: 214; 
Hammoudi 1993). According to Eliade, who took an interest in the brotherhood, these practices were the reminiscences of 
a pagan mystery cult involving lycanthropy (Glasse’ 2002:409).  Acts of Self-mutilation have been noticed by anthropologists 
dealing with other Sufi brotherhoods in the Islamic world (Crapanzano 1971, 1973; Gilsenan 1973; 211; Van der Veer 1992; 
Frishkopf 1999: 339; Hoffman 1995:85-86; Shannon 2004: 385; Louw 2007:45; Biegman 2009; Pinto 2010:468). However, 
these scholars have  
put more emphasis on the mysterious aspect of these practices then on the secretive one. On flagellation in the context of 
public display of mourning amongst Muslim communities see Ayoub 1978; Ende 1978; Hegland 1998; Abou-Zahab 2008. For 
a more comparative analysis of self-harm in religious phenomena see Bloch 1992; Glucklich 2001. 
miracles, Sufism and secrecy. For most of the twentieth century scholars have held the conviction that 
miracles were bound to disappear (Giddens 1997: 441; Soares 2005: 3). Influenced by the theories of  
Max Weber (1968, 1978, 1991) – but also, indirectly, by earlier philosophers like Vico (1970), Hume 
(1989), and Comte (Hadden 1997: 27-30) – social scientists have long believed that miracles and 
modernity were incompatible, and that this incompatibility had to do with the very features of the modern 
age. According to Weber, the advent of modernity brought about an inevitable bureaucratisation of human 
institutions, and, consequently a rationalisation (or ‘disenchantment’) in the way human beings dealt with 
the universe (Weber 1968, 1978, 1991). Following this framework, scholars have either foreseen a 
gradual decline of religion, or predicted that modern religious phenomena were bound to lose their 
mysterious and miraculous aspects (Berger 1967; Wilson 1975; Howell & van Bruinessen 2007:5). 
Today, with very few exceptions (Bruce 1996; Hamilton 1995: 186; Chaves 2004), academics have 
abandoned this conceptualisation of modernity (Parsons 1967: 383-425; Casanova 1994; Martin 1978; 
Swatos & Christiano 1983, 1999; Alridge 2007: 100-128). Social scientists have noticed that the 
importance of religion has not diminished in modern times (Martin 1978, 2002), and that religious 
phenomena have not become less ‘enchanted’ or less ‘mysterious’ (Luhrmann 1989; Comaroff & 
Comaroff  1993, 1999; Heelas & Woodhand 2005; Dempsey & Raj 2008) even in those contexts where 
formal attachment to religion has become weaker (Davie 1994; Lester 2005). Propelled by this evidence, 
scholars have realised  that Weberian theory was based on the erroneous belief  that mankind was going 
to transit from pre-modern ‘magic’ to  modern ‘religion’, a notion deeply  rooted in nineteenth century 
evolutionary ideas  (Malinowski 1948: 68-92; Douglas Frazer 1988: 2003: 72-90; Howell & Van 
Bruinessen 2007:5).  
 
Similar developments in the theorisation of the miraculous can be identified in the study of Islam, and 
particularly in the anthropology of Sufism. Adopting a Weberian approach, Ernest Gellner famously 
argued that modern Muslim societies were destined to lose their miracles and, consequently, their 
mysticism (Gellner 1969b, 1981: 1-85, 99-113, 1992). Having identified the Sufi tradition as a 
particularly ‘enchanted’ form of Islam, Gellner predicted the modernity was going to be characterised by 
the decline of Sufism and by the diffusion of more ‘disenchanted’ approaches to Islam like Salafism37 
(ibid.). Similarly Clifford Geertz envisioned an inevitable Weberian shift from “maraboutism”38 (centred 
on miracles and explicit manifestations of the divine) towards scripturalism (based on a ‘modern’ 
attention for the textual apparatus of Islam), thus declaring Sufism moribund (Geertz 1968). With time, 
however, these predictions have proven wrong. By re-visiting previous ethnographic works that had 
predicted a decline of Sufism (or a disenchantment of Sufi practices generated by the bureaucratisation of 
modern Muslim states) (Gilsenan 1973), anthropologists have proven that both Sufi practices and Sufi 
miracles are very much alive in modern times (Zarcone 1992; Hoffman 1995; Salvatore 1997; Yavuz 
1999; Gilsenan 2000; Eickelman 2000; Pinto 2004; Eickelman and Salvatore 2004: xv; Voll 2007; 
Silverstein 2007; Chih 2007; Van Bruinessen 2007; Howell & Van Bruinessen 2007: 3-18; Flueckiger 
2008).  Scholars have successfully demonstrated not only that Sufism has survived even in ‘hostile’ 
environments (Pinto: 2004b: 191; Silverstein 2009, 2011), but also that the decline or the flourishing of 
Sufi practices has to do with specific socio-historical contingencies, and not with homogeneous trends 
within Islam (De Jong 1974, 1978; Baldick 2000: 158-159). In unpacking the dichotomy of 
‘scripturalism’ and ‘miraculous religiosity’ anthropologists have also shown that Sufism is often 
characterised by a strict faithfulness to the ‘text’ (Pinto 2005; Sikand 2007; Weismann 2007), and that 
                                                          
37 See footnote 19 
38 See footnote 10.  
literalistic forms of Islam are not necessarily ‘disenchanted’ (Marsden 2005: 157-192) thus dismantling 
the Gellnerian binomial  of ‘textual’ and ‘miraculous’ Islam. 
 
The anthropology of Islam has abandoned the notion of modernity as monolithic ‘disenchanting’ process 
and embraced the idea of different ‘modernities’ characterised by different and complex forms of 
religiosity (Ahmed & Donnan 1994; Eickelman & Piscatori 1996: 22-37; Salvatore 1997; Euben 1997; 
Abu Lughod 1998: 7-13; Eickelman 2000; Arkoun 2002; Eickelman & Salvatore 2004, Osella & Osella 
2006; Simpson 2008:378-383;  Masud et al. 2009). Following this line of thought, ethnographers of Sufi 
communities have proven not only that Sufi miracles and Sufi practices have still a role to play in the 
modern world, but also that the Gellnerian differentiation between ‘textual Islam’ and ‘miraculous Islam’ 
is misleading because Sufism is (and has always been) a composition of both. In revealing these 
dynamics, however, anthropologists have spent more time demonstrating that Sufism has ‘survived’ 
modernity than analysing the way in which it has survived. Those scholars who have demonstrated the 
modern persistence of Sufism have also indirectly (and often unintentionally) shown that many Sufi 
orders have undertaken a change in modern times. Doubtlessly, modern Sufis have neither renounced 
miracles nor developed a new attention for the ‘text’ (Van Bruinessen & Howell 2007: 10-11; Van 
Bruinessen 2009).  Nonetheless, Sufi orders  have often been forced to adapt to specific modern political 
contexts, and in doing so they have frequently abandoned or downplayed those aspects of their spirituality 
that clashed with state-sponsored  religiosity (Ewing 1983, 2006; Gilsenan 1990: 237-250; Pinto2004b: 
191, 199;  Silverstein 2007, 2011; Van Bruinessen 2007; Van de Bos 2007) or with locally diffused 
understandings of Islam (Gardener 1993; Frishkopf 1999; Knysh 2001: 413;  Hoffman 2005; Hatina 
2007: 396;  Villalon 2007). In this process Sufi communities have not necessarily lost their enchantment 
or developed a new-found scripturalism. However, they have often embraced specific ‘types of 
enchantment’ and specific understandings of ‘textual orthodoxy’ that were not necessarily part of their 
spiritual repertoire in the past (Gilsenan 1973: 24, 1990: 85; 2000; Ewing 1997: 180). 
 
Whereas the majority of the anthropologists of Sufism have simply focused on unpacking the equation 
between modernity and disenchantment, Katherine Ewing has analysed the way in which specific 
localised modernities have impacted on Sufism (Ewing 1983, 1997).  Drawing from the work of 
theoreticians interested in the relationship between modernity, identity and religion (Gramsci 1971; 
Foucault 1973, 1988; Lacan 1977), Ewing has suggested that Sufism has often experienced a ‘re-
articulation’ in its encounter with the modern nation state (or with forms of hegemonic ideology) (Ewing 
1997: 65-90). Even though this encounter has not necessarily had a ‘disenchanting’ or a ‘scrpituralistic’ 
effect (as Gellner argued), it has nevertheless produced hegemonic understandings of what counts as 
‘proper Sufism’ and what does not (ibid.). Modern Sufis, in other words, have often experienced a 
hegemonic “split” (Ewing 1997: 47-64), so that practices and ideas that were once associated with Sufism 
have been labeled as not ‘fully Sufi’ by those in power (Ewing 1997: 201-270). According to Ewing, the 
relationship between Sufism and modernity should not be looked at through the lenses of a generalised 
theory of ‘Sufi modernisation’ (whether with a focus on disenchantment or on the persistence of 
enchantment). On the contrary, in Ewing’s view, an analysis of Sufi practices should be guided by an 
understanding of the way in which Sufism has been re-defined according to local hegemonic projects of 
modernisation. Building on Ewing’s argument one realises that anthropologists should not simply register 
the persistence of Sufi miracles or prove that Sufism has always been textual even in pre-modern times. 
On the contrary, ethnographers should look at how specific encounters between Sufism and modernity 
produce specific hegemonic ‘styles’ of enchantment and of textual orthodoxy.  
 
This notion of a hegemonic “split” of Sufism is particularly useful for an understanding of the Libyan 
Issawiya. As I have previously explained, those Issawis who have abandoned karamat have neither 
become more ‘disenchanted’ nor developed an unprecedented necessity to follow the Qur’an, but simply 
changed their attitude towards secrecy.  Bearing in mind Ewing’s argument, we realise that this change in 
Issawy spirituality can be understood by illuminating the effects that the modernising discourse of the 
Gheddafi regime has had on Sufism. Doubtlessly, the advent of the Jamahiriya has not deprived the 
Issawiya of its sense of the miraculous, neither has it implanted a new textual orthodoxy that Issawis did 
not have before. However, the encounter between Sufism and the Qurano-centric modernising project of 
Gheddafi has produced a specific style of enchantment and of textuality that has forced Sufis to develop 
an ‘explicit’ spirituality with no secrets. This phenomenon became apparent to me when I compared the 
opinions of the majority of the members of the order with those of the few Issawis who had kept the 
secret knowledge of karamat. The first explained to me that, being Sufis, they dealt with the spiritual 
world (a world whose dynamics are mysterious and often miraculous), but they also clarified that Issawy 
practices are explicitly based on the Qur’an and characterised by an un-ambiguous orthodoxy. The 
second expressed the same level of ‘enchantment’ and the same attention for textual orthodoxy, but they 
also clarified that even though Issawy practices are based on the Qur’an some of these practices (like 
karamat) are secret, and one should be initiated in order to appreciate their orthodoxy. These explanations 
made me realise that the difference between those Issawis who rejected karamat and those who valued 
them lied neither in their degree of belief in the mystery nor in their level of ‘textuality’, but purely in 
their relationship with the notion of ‘secret information’.  
 
Exploring the relationship between ‘secret’ and ‘mystery’ is particularly important for an understanding 
of the effects that Libyan modernity has had on the Issawiya. The majority of the Issawis described 
themselves as members of an orthodox brotherhood that deals with mystery but only in a paradigm of 
explicit textuality where there is no space for secret information. The Issawis who had kept the 
knowledge of karamat, on the other hand, portrayed themselves as Sufis whose mysterious practices can 
be fully recognised as ‘orthodox’ only by those who partake in a specific secret knowledge. Both these 
two groups presented themselves as people who have a privileged relationship with the mysterious realm 
of the ‘unseen’, but they differed in the way they managed this relationship. Those Issawis who rejected 
karamat told me that Sufis can see and experience things that others cannot but only through practices 
that are accessible (though not necessarily understandable) to every Muslim. Those who valued secret 
knowledge, on the contrary, explained to me that in order to access the invisible world a Sufi can make 
use of a set of information which is secret for the un-initiated. In a sense, they both described Sufism as 
having a ‘hidden’ (and therefore, ‘secret’) dimension. However, the first described the esoteric side of 
their practices as a matter of mysterious and unexplainable phenomena, while the second portrayed it as a 
combination of mysterious dynamics and of secret information. In light of this consideration one can 
understand how the encounter between Libyan modernity and Libyan Sufism has produced a specific 
form of enchantment that leaves room for mysteries but not for secrets. 
 
6- Secrecy as Pedagogy, Secret as Experience (The purpose of Issawy Secrecy) 
A study of the Libyan Issawiya can help enrich the debate on the relationship between modernity and 
miracles but it can also contribute to furthering the anthropological discussions on secrecy. 
Anthropologists of Islam have studied the esoteric aspects of religion amongst Muslim communities 
(Clarke 1976; Shankland 2004; Marsden 2005: 157-192; Gemmeke 2009) and Sufi communities 
(Gilsenan 1973, 1990; Brenner 1984: 105; Soares 1996:742, 2005: 127-152; Brenner 2000; 2005: 127-
152; Flueckiger 2006; 2008: 178) identifying the “esoteric episteme” that characterises many forms of 
Sufi knowledge (Brenner 2000). However, these ethnographers have also often adopted a simplistic 
conceptualisation of the notion of ‘secret’ in Sufi practices. Even though these scholars have noticed that 
Sufi secrecy entails both ‘dealing with mysteries’ (Gilsenan 1973: 24, 36) and ‘possessing a body of 
concealed information’ (Dilley 2009:59), they have not investigated the relationship between these two 
facets of the ‘secret’ properly.  All Libyan Issawis, as I have explained, portray themselves as Sufis whose 
practices have a mysterious and esoteric side, but if some include secret information in this paradigm, 
others do not. An analysis of Issawy practices can therefore contribute to a better anthropological 
understanding of secrecy by revealing that Sufis can conceptualise the esoteric facet of Sufism in different 
ways. However, it can also help deepen the anthropological debate concerning the very purpose of 
secrecy. 
 
Anthropologists have taken different positions in analysing the dynamics of concealment. Some 
ethnographers have noticed that  those who deal with secrets put more emphasis on the ‘form’ of secrecy 
than on its ‘content’, and that maintaining the notion that ‘there is  secret’ is often more important than 
protecting the secret itself (Gell 1980: 737;  Bellman 1981,  1984; Wagner 1984; Piot 1993; Taussig 
1999). Secrecy, according to these scholars should not be looked at simply as a voluntary act of 
concealment, but as a type of ‘aesthetics’ : a way to portray the universe  as having a  hidden dimension 
(Bellman 1975, 1984; Herdt 1990, 2003; Ferme 2001: 1-21; Piot 1993; Urban 1997) and society as having  
‘things that should be left un-said’ (Simmel 1950). Other anthropologists, however, have preferred to 
concentrate on the purpose of secrecy illuminating different functions of concealment (Fulton 1972; 
Ottenberg 1989), and paying particular attention to the use of secrecy as a tool of power (La Fontaine 
1977; Bledsoe & Roby 1986). These ethnographers too have noticed that secrecy is more a matter of 
‘form’ than of ‘content’ (Barth 1975, 1987, 1990; Murphy 1980; Godelier 1982, 1986; Ottenberg 1989; 
Herdt 2003: 60-61). Instead of focusing on ‘aesthetics’, however, they have suggested  that often those 
who claim to be the ‘protectors of the secret’ have, in fact, no secret to protect and that secrecy is 
therefore a deceptive tool used  to subordinate ‘those who do not know’ (ibid.). Doubtlessly, recent 
studies have shown that while secrecy is frequently  used to perpetrate domination it can also have, at the 
same time, other functions like the one of protecting  practices that are perceived to be at risk of 
disappearing (Herdt 2003: 34). Even still, anthropologists are still very much influenced by the notion of 
secrecy as instrument of power, particularly when it comes to analysing the internal dynamics of Sufi 
groups (Werbner 1995: 151).  
 
These ethnographers have successfully shown that secrecy is often a matter of aesthetics (or of ‘form’ 
rather than of ‘content’) and that acts of concealment carry an intrinsic hierarchical dimension (an 
inherent differentiation between ‘those who know’ and ‘those who do not’). Nonetheless, these 
anthropologists have also largely ignored indigenous motivations for secrecy (Bellman 1984:143; Piot 
1993:354). When I asked those Issawis who have kept the knowledge of karamat about their “esoteric 
rationale” (Bok 1989: 39)39, I was often told that secrecy is most of all a pedagogical necessity. These 
members of the order explained to me the knowledge of karamat is secret because the Sufi must 
undertake a specific spiritual path before he can understand them, thus highlighting a ‘didactic’ aspect of 
secrecy that has never been noticed by scholars interested in forms of esoteric knowledge. More than once 
these Issawis clarified to me that secrecy is part of pedagogy: the novice who enters the order must be 
gradually exposed to certain aspects of Issawy knowledge, otherwise he might misunderstand them. This 
pedagogical conceptualisation of secrecy is very far from the anthropological understanding of 
                                                          
39 According to philosopher Sissela Bok there is always a specific  “esoteric rationale for protecting what is held sacred and the 
secrets that partake of it” (Bok 1989: 39) 
 
concealment as tool of power and from the negative connotation of secrecy as ‘deception’ that can be 
found in a number of publications (Simmel 1950: 331; Tefft 1980: 13-14, 1992; Herdt 2003: 48; 55). 
 
Unlike those anthropologists who have stressed the importance of the ‘form’ of secrecy over its ‘content’, 
in conversations Issawis expressed a ‘holistic’ understanding of the two. The few members of the order 
who had kept the performance of karamat explained me that, in the end, it is the very ‘content’ of secret 
knowledge that demands the ‘form’ of secrecy. These Issawis told me that if one is to understand karamat 
he needs to have a direct experience of them and that being ‘experiential’, karamat cannot be fully 
‘explained’ verbally. The secrecy of these practices, therefore, was presented to me as being motivated 
both by the pedagogical necessities of Sufi knowledge and by the very nature of this knowledge. This 
understanding of secret knowledge as a combination of secret information to be learned and of specific 
experiences to be had is extremely interesting, particularly when bearing in mind that anthropologists, as 
we have seen,  have  emphasised the form  (or the ‘doing aspect’) of concealment  over  the content ( or 
the ‘knowing aspect’) of secrecy (Barth 1990; Whitehouse 2000; Laidlaw 2004). Being based on both a 
specific knowledge of the Qur’an and on direct experience Issawy secrecy encapsulates both these 
aspects, thus challenging the notion of concealment as a matter of pure ‘form’.  
 
In light of these considerations, the Issawy case appears as an important ethnographic conundrum. By 
analysing how Gheddafi’s religiosity has pushed the brotherhood to develop spirituality where there is 
space for mystery but not for secrets one notices the shortcomings that have characterised the literature on 
miracles and the scholarship on secrecy. On the one hand, the Issawy ‘loss of secrets’ demonstrates that 
anthropologists who deal with Sufism and modernity should not simply highlight the persistence of 
enchantment, but look for specific hegemonic modes of enchantment. On the other hand, the indigenous 
explanations for Issawy secrecy show that ‘concealment’ is not necessarily a matter of ‘form’ (whether in 
an ‘aesthetic’ sense or in a ‘deceptive’ one) because secrecy can be a pedagogical measure where form 
and content are interconnected. These clarifications are extremely important for an understanding of the 
Issawiya: they show that in embracing a style of hegemonic enchantment which emphasises mystery over 
secrecy Issawis have also changed their approach to knowledge. Though still concerned with the 
mysteries of Sufism many members of the order have lost the notion of secrecy as ‘didactic tool’ which is 
necessary in managing some aspects of Sufi knowledge. In my analysis of the Issawiya I will touch upon 
these different facets of the ‘loss of secrecy’, deepening my discussion in the different chapters and 
contextualising my argument in light of the ethnographic material. Before I do so, however, it is 
important to present also the more ‘practical’ aspects of my research explaining how my relationship with 
Libyan Sufism came about and the way in which I decided to conduct my research in the field.  
 
7- Accessing the Libyan Issawiya (Field, Field-work and Methodology)  
I was first exposed to Libyan society in the course of three visits I made to the Eastern part of the country 
in 2002 and 2003 as a member of the archaeological mission of the University of Chieti. At the time I was 
conducting a survey in the famous Greek Necropolis of Cyrene (modern Shahat)40 in order to collect 
material for my dissertation in Classical Archaeology. During these visits I realised that as much as I was 
fascinated by Libyan archaeology, I had also a strong interest in the Libyan people. While staying in 
Shahat I heard about a group of people who “stab themselves with knives without dying”. My unethical 
curiosity led me to ask my friends whether I could see this miracle, and one night I was taken to a local 
zawiya where I took part in a large Sufi gathering. Contrary to my expectations, the evening did not 
                                                          
40 Libya presents a rich archaeological landscape characterised by a beautiful and complex mixture of Greek and Roman 
material. It is interesting to notice that the flux of Greek immigration to the country has continued throughout the centuries, at 
least in the Eastern part of Libya. Today the descendants of Greek and Cretan immigrants (commonly referred to as “Gritli”)   
are perfectly integrated in the local tribal system of Cyrenaica. Some of them have also kept the use of Greek language.  
involve any miraculous performance, but it nevertheless implanted in me a strong interest for Sufism. 
Following the completion of my Mphil in Anthropology I applied therefore for a research visa in order to 
study the Libyan Sufi orders. After nine months of long waiting, I realised that the Libyan embassies of 
London and Rome did not know how to deal with my situation. None wanted to take the risk of offering a 
visa to a ‘suspicious’ archaeologist who wanted to return to Libya in order to study people instead of 
tombs. Thanks to my ‘archaeological connections’ I finally managed to get in contact with the “Umar al 
Mukhtar University” of al-Baydha whose personnel, unlike the Libyan immigration officers, understood 
(and supported) my transition from archaeology to anthropology.   
 
After a short one month visit made on a tourist visa in December 2006, I was able to come back to Libya 
with an invitation letter of the University of al Baydha in early March 2007. The actual release of the visa 
took quite some time and involved a mysterious combination of stamps, conversations, visa-renewals, 
letters, waiting rooms and trips from al Baydha to Tripoli which is too complex to be summarised here. 
Eventually, however, I was allowed to remain in the country for fourteen months until the end of April 
2008 and to spend the vast majority of my time concentrating on my research. Given my previous 
‘Cyrenaican experience’ I initially intended to conduct my field-work in the Eastern region, but I soon 
realised that the Sufi orders were mainly concentrated in the capital. When I decided to move to Tripoli  
(with the blessings of  the “Umar al Mukhtar University”), the head of the ‘Department of Antiquities’ of 
the capital kindly allowed me to stay in “Villa Volpi”, a  house in the city centre built during the time of 
the Italian occupation that had been re-converted into a small museum closed to the public, and that 
became my Tripolitan home.  
 
At the time of my research Libya presented a reasonably high level of scholarisation and literacy. As part 
of Gheddafi’s project of modernisation of the country, the government had implemented the building of a 
series of universities. Every reasonably large urban centre in Libya had a university (with teaching 
personnel often working in more than one university at the same time), a phenomenon which is 
particularly striking when bearing in mind that at the time of independence ninety percent of the 
population was illiterate (Obeidi 2001: 31-38; Vandewalle 2006: 51). Even still, the educational system of 
the country did not meet the need for trained and skilled personnel (Fathaly & Palmer 1980: 28), and I 
could detect a certain presence of foreign high-skilled labour, particularly in the capital. As for the 
employment rate, in 2003 Libya’s unemployment was estimated at thirty percent (Vandewalle 2006:184) 
and even though it is difficult to gather more recent data, I am under the impression that the situation has 
not particularly improved. I have rarely witnessed extreme poverty in Tripoli, but Libya striked me as a 
rich country inhabited by not particularly rich people. The proliferation of the private sector (a trend that 
has accompanied the Jamahiriya, particularly in recent years) had brought a certain level of economic 
vivacity (Vandewalle 2006: 139-196). Nonetheless, many of my Libyan friends complained about the 
difficulties they encountered in finding a stable job and buying a house41 During my stay Libya was also 
undergoing a constant growth in terms of urban population, at least in Tripoli. In the early twentieth 
century less than one fifth of the population lived in urban areas and oases, and even though according to 
some scholars the figure had likely remained un-changed (Vandewalle 2006: 15) many of my friends told 
me that their families had recently moved to the capital (a phenomenon that seems to be the natural 
progression of certain trends identified by works published during the first decades of the Jamahiriya - 
Fathaly & Palmer 1980: 28; Peters 1982:115). 
 
                                                          
41 Renting a house was very much perceived in negative terms by the totality of my Libyan informants. 
In political terms, the majority of my Libyan informants (both Sufis and non-Sufis) seemed to be in a 
state of imposed (and at times voluntary) political alienation (a phenomenon that has been documented in 
broader terms by some works on political culture in Libya -   Obeidi 2001; Werfalli 2011). As it will be 
clear to the reader, I have interacted with people who were close to (or even working for) the regime as 
much as with individuals who preferred to stay as far as possible from politics. However, for what 
concerns this second category, the interviews and the conversations I had were often coloured by a sense 
of resignation and impotence. Some of my Libyan friends engaged in what one might call ‘everyday acts 
of resistance’ (Scott 1990), and often joked about Gheddafi, or criticised the regime’s policies in the 
privacy of their houses (particularly for what concerned the lack of civil, political and human rights in the 
country – De Bona 2011). Nonetheless, the same people frequently described the regime as something 
that could not be possibly fought against. In its four decades of power, Gheddafi had ensured that Libyans 
did not have the tools one might need to organise a revolt. As I have witnessed during my field-work, the 
secret service was omnipresent in Libya, and people were very much aware of the fact that they were 
constantly watched, monitored and observed. As I will show later on in the thesis, many had either 
memories or knowledge or personal experience of repression and violence operated by the regime. Very 
often this proved to be quite a strong deterrent for any potential act of resistance. Obviously, this is not to 
say that Libyans did not wish for their country to change, or for the regime to come to an end. Indeed, 
many, particularly amongst the youth, expressed these desires to me. Quite differently, people often told 
me that  they did not know how to change their country, and that they had to resign to the hope that things 
will one day change for the better.  
 
Tripoli became my home for a few months. The capital is the country’s largest commercial and 
manufacturing centre, the site of the University of Tripoli and the political nexus of the Jamahiriya. As 
part of the internal policies of the regime Tripoli played a fundamental role in keeping a centralised 
management of the country. The city hosts a series of public offices and institutions that operate on a 
national scale, and it is not uncommon to meet Libyans from different parts of the country who are 
visiting the capital in order to solve a bureaucratic issue, get their passport done or collect documents that 
cannot be produced by local offices. Tripoli’s city centre is a mixture of impressive buildings of the 
Fascist era, gigantic billboards portraying Gheddafi in different phases of his life, cafes, markets, and 
shops. “Saha Khadra”, the “Green Square”, the main plaza of the capital stands as the centre of the 
centre. On the square, the “Soraya el Amra”, the “Red Castle”, a fortress built by the Knight of St. John in 
the sixteenth century which is today the site of the museum of Tripoli. The streets of Tripoli are often 
crowded with taxis42 and people. However, walking through the city particularly in the evening, one can 
feel a sense of intimacy (often of ‘small- scale quietness’) that cannot be found in other North-African 
capitals. Tripoli is a city, the largest Libyan city, but at times it feels like a small place, even on Thursday 
night, when many Tripolitans go out, ready to enjoy the long week-end43. Some Tripolitans have kept a 
certain knowledge of the different families living in the different areas of the city; some describe the city 
in terms that resemble a town rather than a capital. Even still, during the months I dedicated to my 
research on the Issawiya the capital of Libya stood as complex universe made of rich neighbourhood, as 
much as of poor (or even dangerous) areas. It is by moving in this urban texture that I approached the 
Issawiya. 
 
As soon as I realised that the Issawiya was the largest tariqa in the city, I immediately started to build up 
a network of friends and informants in the different Issawy zawaya of Tripoli. As I will show in the 
                                                          
42 Libya does not have a system of train transport nor does it have a service of bus transport. Urban transport is organised 
through taxis. Inter-urban transport entails paying for a sit on private cars and mini-buses. The price for a taxi in Tripoli is 
around 2 or 3 dinars while the price of extra-urban journeys by car varies greatly. In terms of airplanes, the country is connected 
by a good network of flights, particularly between Tripoli and Benghazi. On transport in Libya see  Elazzabi 1982.  
43 In Libya many professions have both Friday and Saturday as days off.  
following chapters, the Issawy zawaya constitute an intricate urban network of shuyukh (sing. shaykh, 
“Sufi masters”) and muridin (sing. murid, “disciples”). In approaching this complex network of people I 
have dealt exclusively with male individuals. Even though female Issawis do exist, they are very few in 
numbers, they do not take part in the activities of the zawaya in any way, and, most importantly they live 
a life which is scarcely accessible to an un-married European anthropologist44. My Issawy informants 
belonged to a highly differentiated social spectrum. Some scholars have shown that in the Moroccan 
context the Issawy brotherhood is linked with specific professions (particularly blacksmithing) (Geertz 
1979). More generally, however, the literature dealing with the Issawiya in North-Africa has often 
described the Issawy order as a ‘popular’ brotherhood, (Brunel 1926; Drague 1951: 75; 121; André 1956: 
216 – 217) and at times it has even suggested a link between the low-class social matrix of the order and 
its supposedly ‘heretic’ practices (Zghal 1976: 13; Hammoudi 1997: note 6): an approach that can be 
found also in ethnographies of the past dealing with so called ‘low Sufism’, understood as a form of 
Sufism which is practiced by the un-educated lower strata of society (Crapanzano 1973; Gilsenan 1973). 
A reading of the Italian colonial documents seem to confirm the view of a popular Issawiya since, 
according to the documents, in Tripolitania the order was particularly widespread amongst the lower 
strata of society (Baldinetti 2003). Interestingly, some of my Tripolitan informants told me that in the past 
some Issawy zawaya tended to be frequented by fishermen45. ‘Fossils’ of this relationship between the 
fishing community of the capital and the order can be seen even today, as in the case of the Zawiya 
                                                          
44 Even though my thesis is not concerned with gender-issues, it is important to clarify that in Libya the division of genders is 
(with very few exceptions) acute, or at least it is in my experience. To my knowledge, women are free to work, to dress as they 
like, to pursue an education at any level and, in many cases, to stay un-married if they wish. However, Libyan houses (in 
Tripoli as elsewhere) have always a ‘female section’ and a ‘male one’, and it is very rare for a male European visitor to be 
introduced to the ‘world of women’. The same division applies to a series of social occasions (weddings, funerals etc.). 
Towards the end of my field-work I heard about an all-women zawiya in the area of Misurata, but I could not check this 
information properly. Broader reflections on the role of women in the Jamahiriya can be found in Souriau 1986; Davis 1987: 
271- 273; Graeff-Wassink 1993; Obeidi 2001.  
45 Fishing is one of the most ancient and important activities in the city of Tripoli. The city is the site of an extremely important 
port (Norman 1965: 118-125, Anderson & Blake 1982).  More broadly on Libyan industry, Oil – industry, agriculture (and 
economy in general) see Kubbah 1964; Allan 1981, 1982; Khader & El-Wifati 1987; Vandewalle 2006.  
asSaghira (the “Small Zawiya”), one of the most ancient Issawy zawaiya in Tripoli46, whose main hall 
hosts an old hand-made wooden ship model: a reminiscence of the Issawy devotion of some Tripolitan 
fishermen of the past. Nonetheless, it is interesting to notice that today, the order does not present any 
particular pattern of membership based on social class or profession. In the “Small Zawiya”, as in other 
zawaya, Issawis come from all walks of life, and form a diversified plethora of people with different 
degrees of education and different social statuses.  
 
The notion of ‘low Sufism’ has been extensively criticised by the recent scholarship on Sufism (Howell & 
van Bruinessen 2007), particularly because it is based on the simplistic Gellnerian notion that Sufism has 
little to do with literacy, scriptures and education47. As a proof of the strength of this critique it is 
important to mention that amongst the Issawis I interacted with there were lawyers, doctors, teachers 
(both at universities and at schools), undergraduate and postgraduate students, imams, technicians of 
different kinds, businessmen, builders, workers, un-employed, and shop-keepers. I could not detect any 
substantial social difference between those Issawis who practiced karamat and those who did not (as the 
reader will realise, both categories presented an equal mixture of educated, un-educated, low class and 
high class people). Even though many of my informants tended to be over thirties the age-range of the 
Issawis I have interviewed was highly diversified (from teenagers to retired old men in their eighties), and 
so was their level of education (from primary school or no schooling, to university level). Generally 
speaking, the younger Issawy informants tended to be educated at a university level (mainly 
undergraduate), while the older ones tended to have lower levels of schooling. However, this should be 
taken more as an unquantifiable impression on my part rather than as a universal statement, since some of 
my older Issawy friends (both those who practiced karamat and those who did not) were highly educated 
                                                          
46 The “Small Zawiya” will be mentioned again later on in the thesis.  
47 See earlier on in the introduction.  
professionals. A large number of my informants were able to converse in Italian or English (and French in 
some cases)48. Nonetheless, the great majority of my conversations were held in Arabic 49 (some of my 
Issawy friends could not speak any other language). I have resorted to English or Italian only rarely, 
mainly when my informants insisted that they preferred so and always making sure that the level of 
communication was good.   
 
Dealing with the Issawiya meant also, in a sense, dealing with other Libyan brotherhoods. It is safe to say 
that the relationship between the Issawiya and the other Libyan orders is one of peaceful co-existence50. 
As I will show later on in the thesis, the life of the orders is characterised by a series of weekly activities, 
social gatherings, and special occasions, and it is not rare for members of other orders to take part to 
Issawy events (or even to Issawy rituals) and vice versa. I have not encountered any ‘competition’ 
between the orders. Generally speaking, Issawis tended to invite members of other orders to their 
gatherings. Occasionally, the Issawis I interviewed were also, at the same time, members of other turuq51. 
However, those people I interviewed who identified themselves as ‘Issawis’ (often demonstrating a fluid 
and complex sense of identity, as I will explain in the first chapter) tended to consider the Issawiya as 
                                                          
48 Many old Libyans both in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania have kept a knoweldge of the Italian language (some of them have 
received schooling during the Fascist occupation). As for the younger generations, in Tripoli many attend courses in English, 
Italian or French organised by the British Council, by the Centre of Italian Culture, and by the French Cultural Institute. 
Finding a way to learn English seems to be one of the the main concerns for the younger generations in the capital. A 
considerable number of young Libyans go to study aborad,(often in Italy or England) as the government offers grants and 
scholarships for this purpose.  
49 In preparation for my field-work I have studied Arabic for one year, undertaking two intense courses in Arabic Grammar 
and in spoken Modern Standard Arabic at the “School of Oriental and African Studies “of London.  I have also taken private 
Arabic lessons in London, studied the language in my spare time with the use of audiocassettes and signed to an accelerated 
Arabic language course in the city of Cairo in the summer of 2006. The fact that Libyan Arabic features a pronunciation which 
is very similar to the one of Standard Arabic (and a grammar which is much easier) helped me to become familiar with the 
dialect. 
50 Occasionally some of my informants told me that in the past, particularly during the Sanusy kingdom, the Issawiya had some 
clashes with the Sanusiya for the ‘control’ of certain areas. The same people, however, added that rivalries were usually 
resolved in diplomativ ways, and that in Libya the relationship between the orders has always been generally peaceful.  
51See footnote 9. Issawis were usually open about their multiple membership to different orders, except for those who were 
affiliated with the Sanusiya. (see footnote 20).  
their ‘main order’.  Some Issawis were particularly prone to highlight a link between the Issawiya and the 
Rifa’iya 52  , and identified themselves as Issawis – Rifa’is. Others, however, simply recognised an 
historical relationship between the two orders (but firmly affirmed to be Issawis), and others in turn did 
not mention this relationship at all. More often, Issawis demonstrated a close relationship with the 
‘Arusiya53 , the second largest order in the country. Some of my Issawy informants were also, at the same 
time, ‘Arusis (and often Issawy gatherings were characterised by a considerable ‘Arusy presence), but 
generally speaking they treated the Issawiya as a distinct, recognisable and specific entity.  
 
During my previous experiences in Libya I had become used to the strict perquisitions of the Libyan 
police, as well as to the presence of regular check-points in the streets. My access to the ‘field’, however, 
proved to be less problematic than expected. In the course of my research I was frequently interrogated by 
the police, but mainly in a polite way. Even though I have been occasionally stalked (or detained in a 
police-car for a few hours), I was largely allowed to perform my visits to the zawaya freely and to take 
notes undisturbed. Often, while attending a Sufi event in a zawiya a self-declared ‘agent’ in plain clothes 
would ask me to exhibit my documents and to wait under his custody until he had made” few phone-
calls”, but I was never asked to report on the results of my research nor to submit my field-notes (which, 
out of precaution, I had decided to write in an ‘encoded’ way).  Occasionally my Libyan friends would 
tell me that the police had enquired about me and that they had been forced to report on my movements. 
However, I have always encouraged my informants not to keep any of this information secret, and I have 
always enquired whether they had been mistreated by the police in any way (which luckily never 
happened). Paradoxically, the fact that I was continuously checked on by police-men (and always left free 
to continue my research with no consequences) contributed to re-enforce the trust of my informants by 
                                                          
52 The two orders merged in the early twentieth century, as explained in footnote 17.  
53 See page 17.  
proving that I was ‘clean’. Towards the end of my research (after I had bought my return ticket), I was 
asked to stay for one more month so that my file could be ‘cleared’ before the release of an exit visa,  but 
I was also allowed to use this time to further my research  and to collect some more data. Essentially, I 
have been constantly monitored, but always allowed to work without interference.  
 
My presence as an Italian also proved less problematic than I thought, partly because Libya was going 
through a particular stage of its search for international recognition at the time of my research. While I 
was conducting my field-work the Libyan government managed to ratify a treaty with Italy that involved 
the payment of a large amount of money as compensation for the damages inflicted  during the colonial 
occupation, and this broader political atmosphere contributed to making my presence more acceptable (or 
tolerable) for the local authorities. However, there were also other factors that played a part in my 
interaction with the Libyans as an Italian citizen. The majority of my informants associated ‘Italy’ not 
only with the atrocities of the Fascist era, but also with more recent and more positive memories.  During 
my conversations I found out that a large portion of Italians had remained in the country until the 
seventies (when the regime had decided to expel them and to expropriate their lands) and that many of 
them had become fluent in Arabic and familiar with local customs. Though very aware (and proud) of 
their anti-colonial heritage, many of my Tripolitan friends had either experienced a peaceful interaction 
with this community or heard stories about it. Indeed, the fact that I was Italian did not prevent anyone 
from treating me with anything but utter respect and, very often, with affection.  
 
Amongst the people who treated me with particular friendliness Shaykh Ramadan deserves a special 
mention. Shaykh Ramadan, a thirty-six year old Issawy master with a trimmed black beard and an 
extremely charismatic presence, is one of the few members of his brotherhood who has kept the secret 
knowledge of karamat, but he is also in friendly terms with those Issawis who whole-heartedly reject 
these practices. Shaykh Ramadan proved to be a scrupulous, open-minded, and well-connected person 
with a love for books and ancient buildings: in short, an intellectual. In his life he gained a doctorate in 
Islamic Law, studied a series of different subjects (amongst which dentistry), and served as imam in a 
local mosque. Most of all, however, Shaykh Ramadan proved to be a mentor more than an informant. 
Born in a family that had been part of the Issawy order for centuries, Ramadan was a walking 
encyclopaedia of Libyan Sufism, and an invaluable source of information on mysticism as well as on the 
history of Tripoli. At the time of my field-work he had just published a book on the history of the 
Issawiya. Even though Ramadan never ‘monopolised’ my research (but always encouraged me to collect 
the opinions of other Issawis) he offered criticism, suggestions and moral support. Ramadan wanted to 
make sure I understood the complex world I was moving in, and in order to do so he invited me to his 
house (where he lived with his parents, his wife and his children) on a daily basis.  
 
As will be apparent to the reader, Shaykh Ramadan played an important role in my research. In the course 
of my field-work, however, I have also spent a considerable amount of time with a large number of 
Issawis from different zawaya as well as with members of other brotherhoods, ‘non-denominational’ 
devotees of Sufism, personnel of the Auqaf 54and of the Idhara Turuq wa Zawaya55 , and even people 
who did not have a particular interest in Sufi matters56. My interaction with the brotherhood involved 
mainly taking part in the ritual life of the zawaya and visiting the houses of my Issawy friends. My 
‘participant observation’ also entailed tours of the city, chats accompanied by a good cup of tea, 
                                                          
54 See page 18 
55 See page 20 
56 The only exception was represented by those associated with Salafism. As previously explained, Salafis have been (and still 
are) harshly persecuted by the Libyan government, As a consequence, I have only been able to collect very few interviews 
with them. Though extremely short, these conversations are dealt with in one of the chapters of the thesis.  
 
communal meals and jokes. I have accompanied my informants while they performed their prayers in the 
mosque or relaxed in cafés, and often visited them at their work-place. Even though my research was 
mainly concerned with secrecy and miracles, I have had the opportunity to converse with Issawis on a 
number of different topics, to be introduced to their families and to share their life. In asking questions 
that might have been judged as ‘political’, I have always clarified the agenda of my research and asked 
my informants whether they felt comfortable discussing these matters or not. When dealing with Issawis 
who valued the secret knowledge of karamat, I have always been very respectful of the limits dictated by 
secrecy, even when this meant that I had to rely on the opinions of the Sufi masters and reduce my 
‘access’ to the disciples. More importantly, I have never demanded for a miraculous demonstration. 
Neither did I complain when it was presented to me un-requested. 
 
8– The Structure of the Thesis  
The information I have collected in the field – together with the theoretical concerns I developed in 
analysing this material - have very much informed the structure of this thesis. In order to present the 
different facets of my argument, I have divided this dissertation into five chapters. In the first chapter, I 
will present an overview of the structure of the Issawiya, describing the internal organisation of the 
zawaya and some fundamental aspects of the order (amongst which the Issawy conceptualisation of 
‘secret’ and a series of differences and commonalities that characterise the way in which Issawis approach 
their tariqa). In doing so I will offer a framework for analysis that should be borne in mind by the reader 
in approaching the rest of the thesis. In my second chapter I will look at the ritual practices of the 
brotherhood furthering my discussion on secrecy and exploring both the weekly liturgical routine and the 
‘special occasions’ that mark the social life of the Issawiya. In my third chapter I will deal specifically 
with the ‘loss of secrets’ that has characterised the order, presenting the main differences between those 
members of the Issawiya who still perform karamat and those who do not. In my fourth chapter, I will 
contextualise my discussion within the political scenario of the Jamahiriya, elucidating the relationship 
between Gheddafi’s religiosity and the ‘loss of secrets’, while in the fifth I will present other factors 
(mainly related to family dynamics) that should also be taken into account when trying to understand the 
changes that have taken place in Issawy spirituality. While the first four chapters are a combination of 
theoretical reflections and ethnographic descriptions, the last one is mainly ethnographic in its content. In 
order to maintain a stronger continuity between the sections of the thesis, I have decided to start each 
chapter with a very brief ethnographic vignette featuring the same character. Hopefully, this will help 
maintain cohesion within the work.  
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“THE ESSENCE IS IN MOROCCO BUT THE SECRET IS IN LIBYA” 
The Structure of the Issawy Order 
 
 
 
 
On the day of his initiation the murid did not seem anxious. The akhwan (the “brothers”, as 
members of a zawiya call themselves) were in a circle. The murid knelt down in front of the 
shaykh. Someone brought a large green flag. Two brothers placed the flag over the murid so that 
he was completely covered. The shaykh put his hand on the murid’s head, and all the brothers 
started chanting “La ilaha illa Allah”, “There is no God but God”. The shaykh joined the murid 
under the flag, both covered completely by the cloth. Later on I was told that during the initiation 
ceremony the shaykh kneels in front of the candidate, takes his hand and asks the murid to 
perform an oath. The flag was removed. The ceremony ended. The murid spoke to his shaykh who 
gave him a specific prayer to recite. The murid and I took a taxi and left. On the back-seat of the 
car hi lips were whispering, and I tried not to disturb him. He was praying and I envied him for 
having something to do during the trip. Intrigued by the ceremony, I started asking other shuyukh 
about the dynamics of the initiation to the brotherhood. To my surprise, however, I realised 
Issawy masters had different opinions on the matter. They all told me that joining the Issawiya 
meant entering into a brotherhood with a specific tradition, but if some insisted that the ceremony 
with the flag was necessary others did not. The Issawiya seemed to be a spiritual path where rules 
apply differently.  
 
 
 
Many Issawis, One Issawiya (Introduction) 
In the introduction I have demonstrated that Libyan Sufism is a complex phenomenon that cannot 
be analysed by concentrating only at the Sanusiya as scholars have done in the past.  In particular, 
I have shown that the Issawiya plays an important role both in Libya’s contemporary Sufi 
landscape and in local narratives of anti-colonial resistance. Following on from this necessary 
background, this chapter presents the Issawiya in greater detail, introducing the founder of the 
brotherhood, providing an account of the presence of the order in Tripoli, and focusing in 
particular on the structure of the tariqa. As I have previously explained, the Italian colonial 
officers noticed that Issawy zawaya were particularly independent entities.   Today, as we will 
see, the Issawiya has maintained this ‘fragmented’ structure. In this chapter I will show that the 
Issawiya is composed by different autonomous groups (or “assanid”) headed by independent Sufi 
masters (shuyukh) who do not recognise a common spiritual leader and who have very different 
understandings of the ‘rules’ of their brotherhood. In presenting this internal fragmentation, 
however, I will also show that, though divided, Issawis see themselves as members of the same 
brotherhood.  
 
The Issawiya presents the observer with a paradox. Issawy shuyukh apply the regulations of their 
order differently, and live their role as Sufi masters independently. However, they  also portray 
themselves as people who share the same spiritual identity. Unfortunately, the previous literature 
on Sufism does not provide us with the necessary analytical tools to unpack this paradox. 
Anthropologists interested in Sufi practices have often shown a preference for the study of 
brotherhoods with centralised organisation and with a homogeneous system of rules (Evans-
Pritchard 1948; Cruise O’Brien 1971; Gilsenan 1973; Chih 2007: 21-22), demonstrating a 
predilection for cohesiveness that is of little help for an understanding of the ‘fragmented’ 
Issawiya57. Doubtlessly, ethnographers have noticed that Sufi orders have often a loose and 
decentralised structure characterised by division and fragmentation (Gilsenan 1973: 4-5, 65, 199; 
De Jong 1983).  However, the very few studies that have dealt with ‘loose brotherhoods’ have 
                                                          
57  Past scholarship has suggested that gradual systematisation (both for what concerns the organisation and the 
internal rules of the Sufi orders) is a general trend in the history of Sufism all over the Muslim world (Trimingham 
1998: 67-105; Chih 2007:21) and that often the turuq become more cohesive in order to survive in certain socio-
political environments (Gilsenan 1973: 5-91). Gellner identified ‘pyramidal hierarchy’ as one of the defining aspects 
of Sufism defining the establishment of the Sufi orders as a “reformation in reverse” within Islam: the formation of a 
church-structure within a religion born without ecclesial hierarchy (Gellner 1971: 255; 1981: 48-51). Other 
anthropologists noticed that, being cohesive entities by nature, Sufi brotherhoods contribute to bring cohesion in 
society (Evans –Pritchard 1948; Day Howell & Van Bruinessen 2007: 21; Soares 2005:69). Generally speaking, as 
Evans-Pritchard’s analysis of Libyan Sufism shows, social scientists have held the opinion that ‘un-organised’ Sufi 
orders are destined to remain inconsequential in the large scheme of things (Evans-Pritchard 1949).  
generally failed to analyse the relationship between identity and organisation (Crapanzano 1973), 
or focused on internal divisions (Chih 2007) without considering that Sufis who belong to a 
‘loose’ order might nevertheless feel part of the same tariqa.  
 
Issawy identity entails multiplicity and fragmentation, but also the idea that all Issawis belong to 
the same spiritual path. In this chapter I will attempt to account for this complex mixture of 
difference and commonality, and in doing so  I will introduce an analytic framework that will 
inform the rest of the thesis. Borrowing from Talal Asad’s notion of “discursive tradition” (Asad 
1986), I will demonstrate that even though Issawy shuyukh are independent leaders with different 
understandings of ‘Issawy rules’ they nevertheless legitimise themselves as Sufi masters by 
referring to a common ‘Issawy tradition’. In analysing the concept of ijaza (“licence”) – an 
indispensable component of Issawy shaykh-hood – I will demonstrate that the Issawiya is not 
merely a ‘loose’ order, but a tariqa characterised by a complex ‘discursive tradition’ that allows 
Issawis to do ‘different things in the same way’. In the chapter I will also analyse the role played 
by ‘mystery’ and ‘secrecy’ in this tradition. In particular, I will show that all Issawis see shaykh-
hood as a condition based on a privileged relationship with the mysteries of the spiritual world, 
but I will also explain that whereas some shuyukh articulate this relationship in terms of  
‘mysterious dynamics’, others see it as a condition that entails knowing a specific set of secret 
information. In presenting these aspects of the order I will introduce the reader to a series of 
concepts that will be referred to again in the other chapters, but I will also identify some historical 
factors that have contributed to determine a ‘fragmentation’ within the order.  
 
1.1 Patron Saint and Perfect Shaykh (The Founder of the Order) 
As in all respectful ethnographies on Sufism, we need to begin with the founder. Sufi orders trace 
their origin to an intitator, and the Issawiya is no exception. Sidhi 58  Mohamed Ben ‘Aysa 
asSufiany al Mukhtary (usually referred to as “asShaykh al Kamil”, “the Perfect Shaykh”, or as 
“Fahlu arRijali, “the Stallion amongst men” Brunel 11926:54), was born in Morocco into an 
Idrisy sharif family in the fifteenth century59. The few scholars who have taken a serious interest 
in the life of Ben ‘Aysa have lamented the impossibility to isolate the little biographic 
information from “the very abundant growth of hagiographic legend” (Michon 1978: 93). The 
historical profile of this intriguing character of Moroccan Sufism is particularly elusive. Even the 
narratives concerning the supernatural aspects of his life, though abundant, are scanty and un-
detailed. According to a widely diffused Libyan legend, the Perfect Shaykh was related on the 
maternal side to the famous Libyan saint Sidhi Abdusalam al Asmar, whose shrine in the city (or 
“holy city” if you trust certain sensationalist travel guides to Libya) of Zlitan is visited by large 
numbers of pilgrims until this day. Sidhi el Asmar (who will be mentioned again in the course of 
the thesis) is the most powerful indigenous figure of Libyan religiosity: his name is celebrated in 
songs and poetry, called up by people, and invoked by mothers when children cross the street and 
risk of being run over by cars. The claim that he and Sidhi Ben ‘Aysa shared the same blood is 
most probably erroneous (shaykh Ramadan explained that Ben ‘Aysa’s mother Meryem 
Mukhtariya was not a descendent of the prophet, while el Asmar’s was). Nevertheless, this claim 
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 Sharif , pl. ashraf,  indicates (like the word sayyed – see introduction footnote 25) a blood-descendent of the 
prophet Mohammed. An “Idrisy” is a sharif who traces his genealogy through the prophet’s grandson Hasan, and 
particularly through Hasan’s grandson Idris ibn Abdallah (d. 791), originator of the Idrisid dynasty in Morocco. The 
dates of birth and death of the Perfect Shaykh are disputed. Brunel proposes 1465-66 and 1526-27 (1926: 15), 
Trimingham, 1465 and 1524 (1998: 86), while Michon 1467-68 and 1523-27 (1978:  93). In his own book on the 
origins of the Issawiya Shaykh Ramadan, my main informant, opts for 1467 as date of birth of the Perfect Shaykh 
(al-Sara>ri>   2009: 15). 
represents an interesting attempt to ‘indigenise’ the figure of the Perfect Shaykh by making him 
the relative of a well-known character in Libyan Sufism60.  
 
According to a narrative collected by Brunel, seven months after his conception, still in his 
mother’s womb, the Perfect Shaykh asked God to purify him before he entered the world (Brunel 
1926: 20-21). From early childhood he applied himself to Quranic studies, showing a 
supernatural proficiency in his schooling and attracting the curiosity of his preceptor who 
recognised him as a saintly child (ibid.). Still young, Ben ‘Aysa travelled through northern 
Morocco with his father (a pious but modest man) finally settling down in the city of Meknes, 
where he attached himself to eminent shaykh Ahmad al Harithi, and –after the death of his master 
– to famous shuyukh Muhammad asSaghir asSahli and Abdul Aziz Tabba (known as el Harrar, 
“the silk-maker”), all direct disciples of great North African Sufi Muhammad ibn Sulayman al-
Jazuli61 (Michon 1978: 93; Trimingham 1998: 85-86). Al Jazuli was a member of the tariqa 
Shadiliya62 and (though never eager to create a brotherhood of his own) he originated through his 
peculiar spirituality the prominent order of the Jazuliya (ibid.). The Issawiya could therefore be 
identified historically as a branch of the Jazuly order (and more broadly of the Shadily tariqa), 
                                                          
60 Sidhi Abdusalam’s nickname (“Al Asmar”, “the Brown”) is most probably a vernacular distortion of “asSamir” 
(“the one who is awake”) in relation to the saint’s habit of indulging in spiritual exercises at night. Sidhi Abdusalam 
is particularly dear to the ‘ Arusy brotherhood (see introduction page 17) of which he was a member. Sidhi 
Abdusalam is very much an ‘Arusy saint, and the story of a blood-relation between him and Ben ‘Aysa testifies 
therefore to a close relationship between the two major Tripolitanian orders of the Arusiya and Issawiya (see 
introduction). In his study on the Moroccan Issawiya Brunel reports on a number of narratives where the Perfect 
Shaykh meets or befriends other famous Sufi saints (Brunel 1926: 32; 54).  Brunel comments with skepticism on the 
historicity of these narratives explaining that often the saintly figures met by the Perfect Shaykh were far from him 
not only topographically but also chronologically (ibid.) 
61 d. between 1465 and 1470. (ibid.) 
62 See introduction page 16. 
and this certainly explains the ‘Jazuly elements’ that, according to many of my informants, 
characterise the practices of the Issawiya63.   
 
Having concluded his mystical training, Ben ‘Aysa built a zawiya, gathering a number of 
disciples and gaining a remarkable reputation based on his religious knowledge and piety. Ben 
‘Aysa’s fame, however, grew particularly because of his miraculous deeds. In Meknes the Perfect 
Shaykh became known because during his preaching each one of his auditors found in his words 
the answer to the questions they had in mind (Brunel 1926:35). His ‘miraculous reputation’ 
exceeded Morocco and, according to a famous poem written by Tunisian Issawy shaykh Abu bakr 
Sharif (and occasionally quoted to me by Shaykh Ramadan), a “king of Senegal”, having seen the 
Perfect Shaykh in a dream, decided to send him slaves as a homage for his holiness. The 
miraculous powers of the Perfect Shaykh seem to have been particularly prominent in relation to 
the wild and the harmful. He gained immunity to poison and snakes for himself and his disciples, 
and he became able to discipline dangerous beasts that would occasionally accompany him on his 
travels (Brunel 1926: 36, 58; Michon 1978: 93; Crapanzano 1980: 91; Andezian 1996: 98), 
developing a particularly friendly relationship with lions64. This particular aspect of Ben ‘Aysa’s 
saintly powers (which was reported to me by some of my Issawy informants but denied by others) 
is deeply connected with Issawy practices and it will be analysed later on in the thesis. For now, 
however, it suffices to say that the Perfect Shaykh embodies the well-known prototype of the 
“tamer of the wilderness”, a literary archetype which is particularly recurrent in the complex 
corpus of Islamic hagiography (Werbner 2003: 45-490; Schimmel 2003: 7-8).  
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 The only discrepant source in this sense is Khushaim, according to whom the Issawiya originated from the Libyan 
order of the Zarruqiya (see Introduction footnote 15) (Khushaim 1976: 113). In light of both the available literature 
and the information I collected through my informants Kushaim’s statement appears to be completely wrong. 
64 According to some of my Issawy informants, Ben ‘Aysa was often accompanied by two lions. 
 Ben ‘Aysa lived in a time of deep political turmoil that took place between the end of the Marinid 
and the rise of the Sa’did dynasty in Morocco (Abu Nasr 1987: 202-234). Nevertheless, he 
appears not to have taken any position whether in sustaining local chiefs or in fighting against the 
Portuguese that were invading Maghreb at the time (Cornell 1990; Bennison 2002: 15-41). The 
Perfect Shaykh seems to have kept himself far from worldly politics. Even so, due to his 
popularity, he occasionally attracted the jealousy of local authorities, to the point of being forced 
to leave Meknes for a period of time (Michon 1978: 93). The link between Ben ‘Aysa and the 
city that was going to accept him as a patron saint, however, remained deep until – and long after 
- his death. From Meknes the Issawiya spread throughout Morocco, and, with time, throughout 
North-Africa. The Perfect Shaykh was buried in the zawiya he himself built in the city, a place 
which still exists and that I have learned to recognise by looking at the faded photographs you 
find on the walls of Libyan zawaya: a dis-coloured, two-dimensional celluloid link between 
Libya and the Moroccan mother of all Issawy zawaya. 
 
1.2 The Medina as a Microcosm (The Issawiya in Tripoli) 
The relationship between the Issawy order and Morocco was always commented on cursorily by 
my Libyan informants. Issawis described their brotherhood as a tariqa whose roots are in 
Morocco but also as an order that, with time, has become quintessentially Libyan. Even still, 
Issawis would occasionally mention anecdotes on the life of the Perfect Shaykh in Morocco, often 
referring to him as “wali Meknes”, “the saint of Meknes” thus expressing a certain geographical 
sensibility in assessing the origins of the order. It is therefore not surprising that the best known 
narrative on the diffusion of the order in Tripoli is directly linked with the figure of the Perfect 
Shaykh. Many of my informants told me that at an unknown date between the sixteenth and the 
seventeenth century Mohammed al Allam Banun al Fasi, a Moroccan shaykh from the city of Fes 
and a disciple of the Perfect Shaykh, left the land of his master Ben ‘Aysa and settled down in 
Tripoli. The story of the arrival of Shaykh Banun was reported to me by different sources with 
different narrative details. All my informants, however, agreed that once in Tripoli shaykh Banun 
built what was going to become the oldest, for some time the only and for a long time the most 
important Issawy zawiya of the city of Tripoli, the Zawiya al Kabyra, the “Great Zawiya”65. 
 
The construction of the “Great Zawiya” some four hundred years ago led to the very first 
exposure of the city of Tripoli to the Issawy order. The Zawiya al Kabyra, located today near a 
compound of houses of the Italian period called “Mariotti”, right at the entrance of the old city,  is 
therefore both a fundamental element of local ‘Issawy archaeology’ and a testimonial of the Sufi 
heritage that impregnates the ancient part of Tripoli. “Al medina al qadima”, the “old city” (often 
referred to as the “medina”, the “city”, perhaps an indication of the fact that old Tripoli was in 
fact the whole of Tripoli up until the twentieth century – Ward 1969: 33; 38; Rossi 1968) is an 
amalgam of strata of different materials from different times. Inside its pentagonal walls you can 
find architectonical treasures (and if you look carefully, you can even notice pieces of Roman 
columns re-used in some of the Islamic buildings, or discover Tripoli’s synagogue, left in decay 
after the Gheddafi regime decided to expel the Libyan Jews in 1974). The old city is an intricate 
ensemble of narrow streets, tombs of saints and garbage where - a poet who loved Tripoli once 
said – you can easily “experience an odd sensation that might be rather akin to that of a bucket 
dropping down a well” (Ward 1969: 34). In the medina the fish is cooked in a simple but tasty 
                                                          
65 Amongst the Libyan authors who have briefly mentioned the arrival of Banun in Tripoli in relation with the 
spreading of the Issawy order we can mention Qa{t{‘a>ni> 2001: 23, and Najem 2005: 51. The “Great Zawiya” is 
mentioned also in the Italian colonial documents (Baldinetti 2003: 134). 
way, and the gold traders seem to respect the too often miscalculated euro/dinar rate. Today 
(apart from the Ottoman monuments, a series of famous buildings of different periods, the 
markets, and a few restaurants) the old city is an elaborate world of broken houses inhabited 
mainly by immigrants from Sub-Saharan countries66. Nonetheless, the medina can be also looked 
at as a meaningful microcosm of Tripolitan Sufism. 
 
Out of the five zawaya of the ancient city, the three most active ones belong to the Issawy order: 
the already mentioned Zawiya al Kabyra (or” Great Zawiya”), the Zawiya asSaghira (“Small 
Zawiya”)67, and the Zawiyat el Mukni (a 10-15 year old Issawy zawiya that originally belonged to 
the ‘Arusy brotherhood).  The remaining two are the practically abandoned ‘Arusy zawiya of 
Sidhi el Hattab and the zawiya el Fnedeq, a zawiya of the Qadiry order68 built in front of Jama 
enNaga (the “Mosque of the She-Camel”, the oldest mosque of Tripoli – Ward 1969: 29). 
Nowadays the majority of the Issawy zawaya of the city are to be found outside the confines of 
the old medina. Nevertheless, the distribution of the zawaya of the old city seems to mirror 
proportionally the distribution of the Sufi orders in modern Tripoli and surrounding areas. 
According to a 2007 census carried out by the Auqaf (the institution dealing with religious affairs 
in Libya), out of the 113 zawaya located in the administrative area of the city of Tripoli 34 are 
                                                          
66 On issues of immigration in Libya see Muller 1982 and Paoletti 2011.  Finding Sub-Saharian immigrants in 
the Issawy zawaya (or in Sufi zawiya in general) of Tripoli is quite rare. Although I have seen some in the 
course of some Issawy gatherings (such occasions will be discussed in the following chapter). In the course of 
my field-work I have met only one Sudanese immigrant who was a regular zawiya goer and Issawy devotee. At 
the time of my research there was also a strong migratory flux from Egypt, although I have never met Egyptians 
in my visits to the zawaya. On this note it is important to say that I have never met Libyan of Berber origins in 
the zawaya. Generally speaking, I could detect a certain racism against sub-Saharian immigrants in Tripoli. 
67 According to the Italian colonial documents, the “Small Zawiya” was founded by Sidhi Yaqub al Khashab, an 
Issawy master who, according to the Italians, brought the Issawy order in Tripoli together with Shaykh Banun 
(Baldinetti 2003). My informants told me  that this information is wrong and that “Sidhi Yaqub” is simply the name 
of a saint – much older than the zawiya – who is buried inside the “Small Zawiya”.  
68 See introduction page 17.  
Issawy, 14 Arusy and 5 Qadiry69. The Issawiya is the most active and visible order in the city. As 
I explained at the beginning of this work, it is important not to reduce Libyan Sufism to ‘Sanusy 
Sufism’ or indeed to any other limitative category as scholars have done in the past. Even still it 
is safe to say that contemporary Tripolitan mysticism is deeply Issawy in its outline, particularly 
in its most urban connotation.  
 
As I have explained, the arrival of Shaykh Banun from Morocco started up the diffusion of the 
Issawy brotherhood in Tripoli, but it also produced one of the most respected families of the city. 
Today the Banun are a well-known family of lawyers, and they are still in charge of the first 
Issawy zawiya built by their ancestor70. Nonetheless, the fact that both the family and the zawiya 
of the first Issawy master of Tripoli continue to exist to the present day should not been taken to 
mean that the Banun have a privileged position within the brotherhood. Pioneers are not 
necessarily leaders. The account of the first Banun is a narrative that Issawis mentioned to me 
mainly when they were talking about the past (or when they were trying to incorporate stories 
into history in order to make the ethnographer happy). Even though it is fair to assume that both 
the first Banun and his descendents enjoy and have enjoyed a high status throughout local Issawy 
history, today the Issawiya in Tripoli - and for that matter in all of Libya - does not have a 
recognised spiritual leader. Issawy zawaya are distinct entities headed by local shuyukh, and the 
brotherhood appears as a ‘fragmented’ order: a composite entity made of autonomous and 
independent groups. The fact that the presence of a direct disciple of the founder of the order has 
not generated a centralised hierarchical structure is not particularly surprising, since 
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  See Appendix A.  
70 The first Banun, the disciple of the Perfect Shaykh who came to Tripoli, was an Idrisy sharif (see footnote 3) and 
the history of his family resembles the one of many contemporary Libyan ashraf who also claim a Moroccan/Idrisy 
origin. I will analyse the Banun family in greater detail in the fifth chapter.  
ethnographers tell us that the Issawy order does not have a unified leadership even in its 
Moroccan homeland (Brunel 1926: 68-71; Andezian 2001: 98). It is nevertheless interesting to 
notice that in Libya the autonomous organisation of local Issawy zawaya is so strong that even 
the regime has not been able to systematise it.  
 
Unlike countries like Egypt, Libya does not have a supreme Sufi council that regulates the 
activities of the orders (Gilsenan 1971: 36). In 2004, therefore, the Idhara Turuq wa Zawaya 
(Administration of the brotherhoods and the zawaya)71  invited Issawy shuyukh to gather and 
elect an amin (a “secretary”) of the order with the purpose of systematising the organisation of 
the brotherhood72. Many shuyukh, however, told me that they did not participate in the election 
because they were not interested in choosing the secretary. Effectively, as it was clear from 
interviews and conversations, Issawy shuyukh - though respectful towards the amin and inclined 
to submit to the legal regulations concerning Libyan religious institutions – organise their own 
zawaya mainly in an autonomous way. This does not mean to say that the Libyan government 
relates with the order with a complete laissez faire attitude. As we will see in the fourth chapter, 
the relationship between the brotherhood and the Libyan regime is complex, and both the figure 
of the amin and the presence of the Idhara do force Issawy zawaya to a degree of negotiation. For 
now, however, it is safe to say that, regardless of official attempts of systematisation the structure 
of the order is clearly fragmentary. The brotherhood is constituted by independent Sufi masters, 
or shuyukh, that lead their own zawaya (and their own disciples) independently. In order to 
comprehend this division into segments (and before I explore the relationships between these 
                                                          
71 See introduction  page 20 
72 The figure of the Amin (together with the relationship between the order, the Auqaf and the Idhara, will be looked 
at in greater detail in chapter 4. . 
autonomous groups), I will first explore the ‘basic unit’ of the brotherhood, the zawiya, looking at 
the different relationships that typify its social existence.  
 
1.3 Masters, Disciples and Devotees (the Structure of the Issawy zawiya)                                                               
An Issawy zawiya is a ‘visual place’. A zawiya is a cosmos made of pictures of Sufi saints, lights, 
and photographs of Mecca. Red and green flags with Quranic lines delimitate the inner space of 
the zawiya. Apart from the main hall a zawiya can, and usually does, have a kitchen. It can also 
have a rest-house for guests, and an office. A zawiya can have properties registered under the 
name of the shaykh of the zawiya (usually only the piece of land on which the zawiya is built). 
These are properties that have been donated by donors.  The richest zawaiya might have small 
allotments of land, and in these cases the shuyukh might decide to rent the allotments. Some of 
the zawaya of the old city receive monthly payments by shop-keepers whose shops are built over 
allotments that have belonged to the zawiya since generations73.  In the proximity of a zawiya or 
inside it you can often find the tomb of a saint. All the times a zawiya’s name starts with “Sidhi” 
you can assume there is a saint buried nearby74. Asking an Issawy about the organisation of the 
zawiya means entering into a sophisticated discussion that starts with the definition of muhib 
(“lover”, “follower”).  As for other Sufi orders (Crapanzano 1973:89), the Issawy muhib (pl. 
muhibbin) is quite literally someone who has ‘love’ for the brotherhood, a devotee of the order. 
‘Muhib’ is a term that indicates the great majority of the people in the tariqa, but it is also a 
condition which is particularly difficult to define. A Muhib can be someone who visits the zawiya 
only occasionally, or a person who comes regularly in search of spiritual advice. He can have a 
                                                          
73 Shuyukh receive also a monthly income from the state. Further reflections on this and on the economy of the 
zawaya can be found in chapter 4.  
74 In Tripoli names of saints are important topographic indicators. A specific place or a ‘zangha’ (one of the narrow 
streets of the old medina) can be named after a saint that is buried in the proximity.  
 
specific duty in the congregation and actively participate in social and ritual occasions, or he can 
simply stay in the back row minding his own business, ready to quickly come out and light up a 
cigarette as soon as the ritual is over. 
 
There is no codified way of becoming muhibbin. People just are. A young muhib told me that in 
the summer he used to go to a specific zawiya every day because he did not have any particular 
place to go to. Another muhib told me how he had been going to the same zawiya for twenty-five 
years developing a strong affection for the place and the brothers; but adding that he considered 
himself “free as a bird”, greatly enjoying his role of informal aficionado and ‘non-
denominational’ Sufi devotee,  and recognising the prophet Mohammed as his only true spiritual 
guide.  Sometimes, devotees recollect memories of being taken to the zawiya as children by their 
own fathers, or reminiscences of attending a Sufi ritual as young kids. A man in his thirties born 
and raised in the old city once told me how in the medina (“…it is famous for this”) you find two 
kinds of people, those who threaten you with a knife and those who go to Sufi places, and that 
since his house was near a zawiya he became a muhib75. Muhibbin have an attachment which 
oscillates between active membership and loose affective loyalty, but it is not uncommon for a 
muhib to look at a particular zawiya as ‘his zawiya’. In a way, their attachment to a particular 
zawiya is an expression of the fragmented structure of the order. Each zawiya with its own 
devotees. A situation that, as an informant told me once drawing a comparison from sports, can 
be a bit “zay al kura”, “like football”.  
 
                                                          
75  A zawiya is also a place of memory."...thanks to the house, a great many of our memories are housed...” 
(Bachelard 1997:89). For the philosophical and sociological aspects of the relationship between place and memory 
see Bachelard 1997, 1998; Lefebvre 1991. 
Muhibbin are erratic enthusiasts (often proudly so) who can choose to remain casual devotees for 
the rest of their lives76. Nonetheless, becoming a muhib can also be considered as a first step in 
joying the tariqa in a formal way. The Issawiya is considered to be a “path” of spiritual and 
moral formation, and a casual attachment to a specific zawiya (or to the brotherhood in general) 
can be considered as the very first stage of the path. Shaykh Ramadan, my main informant, told 
me that the Sufi master should observe the muhib (who does not necessarily need to know) for at 
least one or two years in order to understand if he is suitable for the tariqa. However, a muhib 
who intends to become a formal disciple, (or murid, “the one who desires”, pl. muridin), can wait 
for a longer period of time. If the candidate is particularly young, the observation can take up to 
six or seven years. Shaykh Ramadan told me once that one of his own disciples waited for 
fourteen years before being accepted as a murid. With his typical tendency to highlight the 
complexity of things Ramadan explained to me that the passage from muhib to murid can take an 
indeterminate hiatus that stretches from a number of years to twenty-four hours. Becoming part 
of the Issawy order is usually described as “taking the tariqa” (“khut atTariqa”). If the muhib 
decides to ‘take the tariqa’ – and if he is judged suitable for the path – he receives his initiation 
performing an oath to the shaykh who takes him as a disciple. Obviously, people decide to join 
the Issawy order for different reasons. “Everyone has his own story”, I was often told. Frequently, 
however, the accounts of people who have decided to join the brotherhood have the colour of true 
narratives of conversion.  
 
Often when Issawis told me about the reasons that had pushed them to join the order they stressed 
that a chain of - sometimes miraculous - events had forced them to become part of the 
                                                          
76 Muhibbin seem to have a similar position also in other Issawy contexts as exposed by Andezian in her study on the 
brotherhood in France and Algeria (Andezian 2001:102). 
brotherhood. Twenty-five-year-old Hasan, for instance, told me that his relationship with the 
Issawiya started with an event that happened to one of his close relatives. Hasan (an un-married 
language teacher who loved to converse with me in English), told me that this relative was fired 
from his job and that this man was understandably depressed. One day, therefore, he decided to 
visit the tomb of a Sufi saint to make a sincere vow: if God had freed him from his problems he 
would have joined a Sufi tariqa, trying to be a better Muslim at God’s willing. Hasan’s relative 
came back home, and miraculously, even though the situation looked hopeless, he learned that his 
boss had changed his mind and that he could keep the job. If a system works, you do not usually 
change it. Since his sincere prayers were answered with such efficacy, Hasan’s relative went back 
to the same shrine and asked God to show him a good shaykh that could guide him on the 
spiritual path. Few days later, while Hasan’s relative was shopping in the market, he felt a sudden 
attraction towards a zawiya he had passed by few times before.  He entered inside, met the 
brothers - and lately the shaykh of the zawiya - and from then everything started. Hasan was 
particularly close to this person, knew the story, met the shaykh through him and remained close 
to the master after his relative died. He told me that his relative had a ulcer before he joined the 
brotherhood and that, as soon as he decided to become an Issawy, the ulcer suddenly disappeared, 
miraculously.  
 
The decision to become an Issawy can involve spiritual inspiration and miracles. Usually, 
however, the figure of the shaykh plays a key-role in the process. Even though Hasan’s first 
contact with the order was the consequence of supernatural events, he told me that he had chosen 
the Issawiya because he had happened to love the shaykh that he met through his relative (and 
consequently the brotherhood the shaykh belonged to). Hasan explained to me that he understood 
that his shaykh was a true spiritual guide when he realised that he was an exceptional individual 
because “when you meet him, you love him… he loves people, this is what makes him special”. 
Often I was told that people see a particular Issawy shaykh in a dream, and understand that they 
have to take the tariqa from him, perhaps abandoning another brotherhood they had previously 
selected.  Forty-year-old Buajeila, for instance, (a married worker who had been part of the order 
for a number of years) told me that he used to be a muhib in another brotherhood until he had a 
peculiar dream. Buajeila dreamt of being with three other muhibbin who wanted to go to Iraq 
(geography in Sufi dreams does not mean much) to visit the tomb of great medieval saint Abdul 
Qadir al Jeilani77 or maybe the saint himself (death in Sufi dreams does not mean much). At some 
point Buajeila felt the need to leave his companions and the unexpected desire to go to Morocco 
to pay a visit to the Perfect Shaykh, Ben ‘Aysa. All of a sudden Buajeila found himself in a valley 
called Abu Siba (“master of the lions”), a real location in the Jebel Akhdar region in Eastern 
Libya. From the valley - whose name in my friend’s dream acquired a clear reference to Ben 
‘Aysa’s power to tame lions - Buajeila travelled to Morocco, where he found an Issawy Shaykh 
he had known in the past.  Later on Buajeila met the same shaykh in real life, and he was advised 
by him to join the Issawiya78.   
 
The Issawy order is constituted by autonomous Sufi masters, and sometimes choosing one of 
them involves an undeniable intervention of the divine. Other times, however, a muhib decides to 
become the murid of a particular shaykh purely because he develops an attraction – whether 
spiritual or personal - for him. Perhaps the shaykh is simply the head of the zawiya that the 
                                                          
77 The founder of the Qadiry order (see introduction page 17).  
78 Dreams play an important role in many Sufi contexts (Ewing 1990, 1994; Katz 1996; Green 2003; Mittermaier 
2008).  Some sources claim that “Abu Siba” was also the name of the original tribe of the Perfect Shaykh (Brunel 
1926: 17) 
disciple used to visit as a devotee. Maybe the shaykh is particularly enlightened, or he gives 
special moral guidance. Often, however, affection plays an important role as in the case of 
Mansur, a forty-year-old doctor who spoke with me in detail about his relationship with a shaykh 
he had been knowing for more than two decades. Mansur told me that he had suffered greatly in 
the past for the divorce of his parents, and that he had found in his shaykh not only a guide that 
could give him a spiritual knowledge he could not acquire otherwise (“I am a doctor, not a 
shaykh!”), but also someone that could fill the emotional vacuum left by that traumatic 
experience79.  
 
After joining the tariqa, the murid begins his spiritual path under the supervision of a shaykh.  If 
he proceeds successfully, he might acquire mashykha (“shaykh-hood”),  and become himself a 
shaykh (or muqaddim, “spokesman”) thus gaining the right to gather his own muridin and to 
initiate them into the order. When a master decides that his murid is ready to become a shaykh, he 
produces for him an ijaza (pl. ijazat, “licence” or “permission”). The ijaza is a written “licence” 
to shaykh-hood 80 and it embodies the idea that a given master can exercise his role since his 
shaykh-hood derives from a certified source. The “licence” expresses this sense of accreditation 
because it contains the spiritual genealogy of a shaykh. The Issawy receives a mystical formation 
from a specific master, who in turn has received it from his own master and so on. These different 
spiritual genealogies – whose origin is always traced back to the Perfect Shaykh – are usually 
referred to as  assanid (sing. sanad,  a concept that has a fundamental relevance in Sufism, in 
                                                          
79  The importance of affective bonds in the relationships between Sufi masters and disciples is perhaps 
ethnographically understudied (Werbner 2003: 134).  This is quite ironic given the importance of “mystical love” in 
many Sufi traditions.  
80 For an ethnographic discussion on the importance of the ‘written text’ in Islam see Messick 1993. For a broader 
anthropological discussion on literacy and writing see Goody 1968; 1977; 2004; Bloch 1998; Street 1993; Fuller 
2001. Philosophical reflections on the topic can be found Derrida 1976, Ahearne 1995: 52-64.   
Libya as anywhere else  - Gril 19916: 31 – 43; Baldick 2000: 75-77). The written ijaza contains 
the sanad of a master in the form of a list of previous shuyukh that have educated muridin (and 
have been educated as muridin) through time. The “licence” constitutes therefore the public 
pedigree of the Sufi master. The ijaza is altogether a business card, a reference letter and possibly 
much more. You can often find it on the wall of a zawiya (a visual testimony of the fact that 
zawiya is part of a broader network of accredited mystical education) or kept somewhere, ready 
to be taken out in case a proof of shaykh-hood is required.   
 
Each shaykh chooses only one of his muridin as successor at the guide of the zawiya giving him a 
written ijaza, and for this purpose he might decide to indicate publicly his chosen candidate as 
naqib, making him a vice-shaykh that takes his place temporally when he is absent and 
definitively when he dies. Issawy shuyukh often say that blood relations are not important when it 
comes to choosing a successor. In actual fact, however, shuyukh tend to select members of their 
own families as heirs, usually their first born sons, and as a consequence Issawy assanid tend to 
have a strong familial character. In order to understand this system it is also important to clarify 
that while the shaykh chooses only one successor for his own zawiya, he can still give a ‘licence 
to shaykh-hood’– and donate his spiritual genealogy - to a number of muridin who might or might 
not belong to his family. Occasionally these new made shuyukh might decide to remain in the 
zawiya of their shaykh without creating a congregation of their own, but usually they gather their 
own disciples and form their own zawaya. When this happens, the original shaykh (and after him 
his successors) might manage to retain a degree on influence over them, becoming the spiritual 
head of a number of zawaya (and of shuyukh) that belong to the same sanad. In other cases, 
however, particularly when the original shaykh dies, ex- muridin who have acquired an ijaza 
become independent forming their own autonomous (and often familial) assanid and choosing 
not to recognise the successor of their shaykh as their new spiritual leader.  
 
The rules of the ijaza are understood and applied in different ways by Issawis, and if some 
shuyukh feel that they have to remain close to the successor of the master who licenced them, 
others believe that the system of ijaza do not oblige them to do so. Grasping this diversified use 
of the ijaza system means understanding the way in which Issawy fragmentation takes place, 
particularly in the light of studies that have shown the importance of a precise code of fixed rules 
in maintaining cohesion within a Sufi brotherhood (Gilsenan 1973:199). This fragmentation, 
however, does not prevent Issawis from feeling part of the same brotherhood. Occasionally 
shuyukh express discontent when their leadership is not recognised by the ex-muridin of their 
predecessors. Generally speaking, however, the heads of the different assanid  interact with each 
other in an atmosphere of general respect and, more importantly, mutual recognition, even when 
they have radically different understandings of the ijaza system. Bearing this in mind, the 
Issawiya appears as a tariqa characterised by a complex mixture of diversity and common 
identity. In order to understand the tariqa it is therefore important to contextualise my discussion 
within a series of debates concerning organisation and identity looking for an analytical 
framework that might account for both difference and commonality. 
 
1.4 Fragmented Sufism (Assessing the Structure of the Issawy order) 
As I have previously explained, the majority of the anthropologists dealing with Sufism have 
concentrated on brotherhoods characterised by a centralised organisation and by a cohesive 
structure. Some ethnographers, however, have attempted to explore more ‘fragmented’ Sufi 
phenomena and in doing so they have shown that Sufi turuq are often less cohesive than 
anthropologists want them to be, thus demonstrating that the scholarship on Sufism has put 
forward a ‘centralised’ model that does not always correspond to reality (Werbner 2003, 2008; 
Malik & Hinnels 2006; Chih 2007). Rachida Chih’s work on the Khalwaty order in Egypt, for 
example, dismisses ‘Sufi centralised models’ on the basis that they have more to do with the 
literature on Sufism than with Sufism itself. In doing so, Chih invites scholars to concentrate on a 
much more defining feature: the local relationship between master and disciple (Chih 2004; 2007: 
22). In Chih’s view, a focus on the relations of patronage between local shuyukh and their 
disciples allows us to look at Sufism in a much more realistic way: as a composition of different 
localised micro-hierarchies (Chih 2007: 33-34). This conceptualisation of Sufi orders as 
combinations of different patronal relationships seems to be useful in the analysis of the Issawiya, 
particularly because it echoes ideas expressed by anthropologists who have dealt with lack of 
centralised authority in other contexts. 
 
In the past, ethnographers have been puzzled by the fact that tribal societies seemed to function 
despite not having a centralised organisation. In trying to solve this ethnographic enigma Evans-
Pritchard (1974) (and later on Gellner - 1969:41-44; Munson 1993), proposed to analyse tribes as 
ensembles of different segments that identify themselves in terms of common or different 
ancestorship. Through conflicts and alliances these segments form a system “sustained by a 
balance of power between its elements” that does not require centralised authority (Dresch 1986: 
309). Subsequent reflections have shown that personal networks play an important role in this 
system. Instead of focusing merely on how segments  create a balance between themselves, 
anthropologists have begun to analyse how individuals affiliate with different segments creating a 
flexible web of micro-hierarchies (Hammoudi 1974; Rosen 1979; Eickelman 1981b; Dresch 
1986:309; Caton 1987; Abu-Lughod 1989; Gilsenan 1990: 161; Khoury & Kostiner 1990; Sneath 
2007) 81 . Viewing the Issawiya as an ensemble of micro-hierarchies based on patronal 
relationships seems therefore correct also in the light of conclusions that scholars have reached 
through different, but analogous, debates.  Unfortunately, however, an examination of the way 
Issawis see themselves seem to suggest that this conceptualisation is simply not enough to 
understand the brotherhood.  
 
Issawis live their lives associating with different and autonomous networks of masters. However, 
they also see the Issawiya as a specific brotherhood that was created by the Perfect Shaykh, and 
not merely as an acephalous amalgam of local leaders.  Looking at the Issawiya through the 
lenses of local hierarchy and personal affiliation is certainly revealing. However, if we focus 
merely on local divisions, we run the risk of diminishing the sophistication that characterises 
Issawy identity. As we have seen, each zawiya is an autonomous universe populated by muridin 
and muhibbin, and headed by a local shaykh that might or might not choose to remain under the 
influence of the sanad that produced his licence to shaykh-hood. In the minds of Libyan Issawis, 
however, these autonomous segments are the Issawy order in Libya. Though autonomous 
shuyukh share a strong sense of belonging to the same mystical path, and, more importantly, they 
do not see the fragmentation of the order as being in contradiction with the idea of a common 
Issawy identity. Shaykh Ramadan, for instance, explained to me that Issawy fragmentation is in 
fact a source of spiritual richness for the tariqa because different Issawy assanid contribute with 
different portions of ‘Issawi-ness’ to the development of the brotherhood. The Issawiya is clearly 
                                                          
81 On Libyan tribes and segmentation see Peters 1990. Broader philosophical discussions on segmentation in 
relationship with multiplicity and identity can be found in Deleuze and Guattari 2007: 208-231). 
a fragmented brotherhood that thinks of itself as a distinct tariqa. In order to analyse it we cannot 
therefore concentrate purely on internal divisions.  
 
Since ethnographers have called for a broader contextualisation in the study of local Islam 
(Eickelman 1982), a debate on whether the Issawiya could be better understood as a distinct 
brotherhood or as a bricolage of different groups can be approached through a larger discussion 
on diversity and commonality in Islam. Anthropologists have long tried to reconcile the diversity 
of local Muslim communities with the notion of a recognisable Islamic tradition (Abu Lughod 
1989; Tapper 1995; Salvatore 1996; Bowen 1998; Varisco 2005; Simpson & Kresse 2008). Some 
of these ethnographers have sought for Islamic social invariables (Gellner 1969b, 1981), or 
dismissed the notion of ‘Islam’ in favour of an appreciation of the different local ‘Islams’ (El 
Zein 1977). Others, on the other hand, have identified different styles of Islamic behaviour and 
consciousness (Geertz 1968), analysed the way in which local Muslims define ‘ultra-local Islam’ 
(Gilsenan 1990), and looked at Islam as an ‘emotional category’ that, though diversified, creates a 
strong sense of common identity (Marranci 2008). Talal Asad, in particular, has famously 
proposed a definition of Islam as “discursive tradition” (Asad 1986), that – apart from being the 
conceptual basis of a series of ethnographies on Muslim communities (Mahmood 2005; Marsden 
2005) - seems to be particularly useful for an understanding of  Issawy dynamics. 
 
According to Asad, the different local understandings of Islam refer, in different ways, to a 
common discursive tradition. A “discursive tradition”, in Asad’s terms, consists of “discourses 
that seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, 
precisely because it is established, has a history” (Asad 1986: 14). In Asad’s view the Islamic 
tradition is therefore made of a set of discourses that - in informing certain practices - “relate 
conceptually to a past” (ibid.). According to Asad, however, the relation between these discourses 
and the history they refer to is not static because a “discursive tradition” is not simply the 
“repetition of an old form” (Asad 1986: 15). Since discourses are informed by a quest for what is 
traditionally correct and what is not, they “aspire” (Asad 1986: 16) to a coherence that is rooted 
in the past, but they also allow for heterogeneity when people attempt to achieve this coherence in 
the present (Asad 1993: 210). Asad, of course, deals with ‘Islam’ as a general category, 
highlighting the importance of the Qur’an and of the Ahadith82 in the ‘past’ the Islamic tradition 
refers to (Asad 1986: 14). Nonetheless, recent ethnographic works have argued that the Asadian 
paradigm can be applied in the analysis of specific forms of local Islam treating them as specific 
“discursive traditions” within the broader “discursive tradition” of Islam (Zaman 2002:5). 
Following on from this, I suggest that the Asadian framework can be also used in the analysis of 
the Issawiya. 
 
If we apply Asad’s ideas in the analysis of the Issawy order we realise that, though internally 
divided, the brotherhood articulates its own identity through the idea of an exclusive tradition that 
is related, in terms of source, to a common past. As I have previously explained, shuyukh have 
different approaches towards the practices related to the legitimisation of shaykh-hood. In 
particular Issawy masters have different interpretations concerning the restrictions that regulate 
these practices when it comes to deciding whether the relationship with the original sanad (or 
                                                          
82 (Sing. Hadith) written accounts of the sayings and deeds of the prophet Muhammad. Interesting ethnographic 
insights into the role of ahadith can be found in Metcalf 1993 and Zaman 1999.  Ahadith have a moral, 
jurisprudential and practical value (Robson 1999), and should be understood within the broader concept of Sunna, or 
“tradition’ (see introduction footnote 3). 
 
spiritual genealogy), that produced the ijaza (or licence to shaykh-hood) should be kept or not. 
However, if we concentrate on the ijaza system, we find that the idea of Issawy “licence”, though 
acted out in different ways, is based on a specific discursive tradition. This tradition - like all 
traditions at least in the Asadian understanding - presumes to regulate things in a correct way 
according to a model ‘from the past’, but it also allows for different opinions and variation when 
discussing how this has to be done in the present. 
 
1.5 Issawis and their rules (Assessing the Ijaza system) 
In order to explain the relationship between the ijaza system and the ‘Issawy discursive tradition’, 
I will first contextualise the different approaches shuyukh have towards the ijaza within a broader 
discussion regarding the notion of ‘Issawy rules’. In my conversations with Shaykh Ramadan, for 
instance, I was told that the order has a specific set of rules that regulate the production of the 
licence to shaykh-hood with extreme precision. According to Ramadan, the brotherhood has 
effectively two kinds of ijazat: a simple one called “ijaza muqayyda” (“limited ijaza”) that allows 
a given shaykh to run his own zawiya, and a more sophisticated one, the “ijaza mutlaqa” (“un-
limited ijaza”) that provides the shaykh with the right to make some of his disciples shuyukh of 
other zawaya83. In Ramadan’s understanding of the system, the shaykh who receives an “un-
limited ijaza” can have under his care a number of shuyukh (his ex-muridin) who will need to ask 
for his agreement when designating their own successors. In Ramadan’s view, the shaykh who 
receives an un-limited ijaza becomes therefore the shaykh el mashaykh (the “shaykh of shaykhs”, 
or khalifa, “representative”), of a particular line of shuyukh (or sanad) who will be attached to 
him (and to his successors) for ever.  Shaykh Ramadan’s approach to the rules of the ijaza implies 
                                                          
83According to shaykh Ramadan the quantity of zawaya can be restricted in number, and in that case the number 
would be indicated in the ijaza.  
that a shaykh should always remain under the leadership of the head of the sanad that produced 
his licence. When I asked other shuyukh, however, I was told that this is not the only way in which 
the rules of the ijaza system can be interpreted. 
 
In my interviews many shuyukh recognised, like Ramadan, the existence of different types of 
ijaza. In many cases, however, they also told me that the difference between these types is minor, 
and that, essentially, all licences are the same: they all allow a shaykh to create his own 
congregation, to be the autonomous head of his zawiya and to choose his successor freely. Often, 
shuyukh would explain to me that remaining attached to one’s original sanad (and therefore to the 
successor of one’s shaykh’s) is a voluntary act of piety, not an obligation. Other times, Issawy 
masters told me that rules apply differently to different situations, and that a shaykh might decide 
not to recognise the authority of his shaykh’s successor when this person is younger than himself. 
Shuyukh demonstrated different understandings of Issawy rules, and often they even used a 
different terminology in referring to these rules.  Whereas some shuyukh like Ramadan used the 
expression “shaykh el mashaykh” (“shaykh of shaykhs”) to indicate an Issawy master with an “un-
limited ijaza”, others would use it to highlight the absence of a common leader recognised by all 
Issawy shuyukh (“the Issawiya does not have a shaykh of shaykhs”)84.  
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The great majority of the Issawis I have interviewed told me that the brotherhood has never had (and will never 
have) a common leader.  At the time of my research an Issawy master from the city of Misurata claimed to be the 
rightful leader of all Issawy zawaya and the legitimate heir of the Perfect Shaykh. This particular shaykh, however, 
received very mixed (and often very critical responses) in Tripoli and elsewhere. In one case a murid from a 
different brotherhood told me that the “secretary” of the order elected under the invitation of the ‘Administration 
of the Brotherhoods and the Zawaya’ (see page 51.) is the leader of all Issawis: a statement which would have  
horrified many of my Issawy informants.  
These differences in the way Issawis approach the rules of the ‘licence’ should also be 
contextualised within a broader discussion on the different ways in which shuyukh approach the 
internal rules of the zawiya. The literature on Sufism has often analysed the relationship between 
masters and disciples in terms of blind obedience (Hammoudi 1997: 5, 89-97, 134 - 158). In 
accordance with this notion of ‘Sufi submission’, some Issawy shuyukh maintain that discipline 
should be the main aspect of spiritual discipleship and that – to quote a Sufi dictum I often heard 
amongst Issawis  - the murid should abandon himself in the care of the shaykh as a corpse in the 
hands of the undertaker. According to some shuyukh every decision taken by the murid (whether 
in the spiritual life or in life in general) should be approved by the shaykh first. These Issawy 
masters told me that when a murid commits a moral mistake or fails to fulfil his duties a shaykh 
can decide to punish him and that when this happens the murid can either be admonished verbally 
or be asked to make amends by paying some money. In the most serious cases, I was told, the 
shaykh can even force the disciple to leave the zawiya or (I witnessed this eventuality myself) 
asked to avoid interaction with the brothers for a period of time85. Indeed, for some Issawy 
masters the zawiya is a place of rigors and of strong regulations. Nevertheless, the order does not 
have a codified system of internal sanctions accepted by all, and different masters have, once 
again, different approaches towards their disciples86.  
 
If some shuyukh see themselves as guarantors of a set of rules, others describe (and live) their 
relationship with the disciples simply in terms of friendship or social acquaintance. Mrajah, for 
instance, (an educated shaykh in his forties) told me once that he was aware of the existence of 
                                                          
85 An informant told me that in the past shuyukh used to inflict corporal punishments to their muridin. Nowadays, 
however, this practice has been abandoned.  
86 The best ethnographic discussion on the role played by sanctions and rules in a Sufi tariqa remains Gilsenan 1973: 
92 -128.  
‘Issawy rules’, but he also explained to me that he preferred to treat his disciples “as friends”. 
Mrajah told me that the main task of a shaykh is “to love his disciples”, and that, for this reason, 
he never forced his muridin to do anything else apart from coming to the zawiya. Like Mrajah, 
many shuyukh manifest a certain ‘flexibility’ in terms of rules. The same attitude, however,  can 
be found also amongst many muridin. If some disciples believe that joining the tariqa involves 
submitting to a specific set of regulations, others live their disciple-ship in a much looser way. 
Occasionally muridin feel entitled to abandon their shaykh (or to deny the authority of their 
shaykh’s successor), and sometimes they join the tariqa with a particular shaykh but receive the 
ijaza to shaykh-hood from a different one. Indeed, Issawis manifest different opinions not only 
when it comes to the rules of shaykh-hood but also for what concerns the way in which the 
relationships within the zawiya should be managed. 
 
In the past anthropologists of Islam have looked at the discrepancy between ‘rules’ and ‘actions’ 
mainly in terms of dissonance between ‘belief’ and social interaction (Geertz 1973, Bell 1992: 30-
46). Recent ethnographic works, however, have emphasised the dangers of looking at Muslim 
communities with a rigid focus on discipline and rules, suggesting that anthropologists should 
account instead for the ambiguities, contradictions and “unfinished conversations” (Simpson 
2008: 382) that mark the relationship between  people and religious obligations (Ewing 1990b; 
Laidlaw 1995; Marsden 2005). These scholars have denounced the risks of looking at religious 
people with expectations of continuous coherence (Schielke 2009, 2009b), and problematised the 
notion of ‘discipline’ as mere submission to rules (Mahmood 2005; Hirshkind 2006) offering 
reflections on ‘variety’ and ‘agency’ that are particularly relevant in the case of the Issawiya 
(Lambek 1990, 1990b, 2000; Laidlaw 2002; Ortner 2006: 129-155; Mahmood 2005: 1-39). 
However, if we explore the notion of ijaza we find that, once again, a focus on difference and 
variation is not enough to understand the brotherhood. A closer examination of the dynamics of 
shaykh-hood reveals that regardless of their different approaches to rules all Issawy shuyukh refer 
to a common set of Issawy discourses when they legitimise their shaykh-hood. This ‘Issawy 
discursive tradition’, as indicated by Asad (1986), allows for different approaches to shaykh-hood 
in the present but it is also makes reference to a common Issawy past. Shuyukh might be 
autonomous leaders, but if they want to justify their status they have to demonstrate a relationship 
with this past. In short, in order to be shuyukh, they need to demonstrate that they are Issawy first.  
 
1.6 An Issawy Discursive Tradition (Secrecy and Mystery)  
As I have explained, Issawy shaykh-hood is mainly a ‘genealogical’ condition. It takes a shaykh 
to make a shaykh, and even though Issawy masters have different opinions concerning the 
implications of shaykh-hood, they are nevertheless informed by specific discourses that evoke a 
sense of a ‘common past’. A shaykh can only become one in genealogical terms: he needs another 
master to write an ijaza for him including him into a sanad, a spiritual genealogy. This system 
might justify, as we have seen, the existence of an independent familial line of masters, but it also 
forces Issawis to demonstrate that their genealogies trace back to Ben ‘Aysa (whether in a linear 
way, or through other genealogies). Looking at the order purely in terms of differences makes us 
forget that all Issawis are, in a sense, forced to relate to a common history. Issawy shaykh-hood 
might be actualised in different ways, but all shuyukh are required to prove (through a written 
licence) that they have a relationship with a tradition of the past in which the Perfect Shaykh has, 
at least formally, a central position. The ‘Issawy discursive tradition’ has therefore a strong 
‘genealogical’ character, but it carries also a component of mystery and secrecy that deserves to 
be explored. For many shuyukh the spiritual genealogy, or sanad, is perceived to be a silsila 
(“chain”), a mystical chain made of the different masters through whom a specific tradition has 
been passed on. Those shuyukh that are willing to articulate this aspect in broader terms say that, 
through Ben ‘Aysa, his previous masters, and their predecessors (the closest ones being members 
of the Jazuliya and the Shadilya) the Issawy order traces back its mystical chain to Ali, the fourth 
caliph of Islam and cousin of the prophet, and from him to the prophet himself 87 . When 
describing the silsila, Issawis usually say that through the mystical chain they have received 
“asrar” (sing. “sirr”, literally “secrets”, but also “mysteries” in Arabic) from their predecessors, 
and in articulating this notion they demonstrate, once again, a mixture of similarity and 
difference.  
 
In Libyan dialect “asrar” can be used to indicate a body of secret information, but also as a 
synonym for “baraka”, a well-known term in the anthropology of Islam that indicates blessings, 
grace and divine favour (Westermarck 1926; Geertz 1968, Gellner 1969; Crapanzano 1973; 
Eickelman 1981; Cruise O ‘Brien and Coulon 1988; Rasmussen 1991, 2005; Soares 2005). 
Baraka expresses “a conception of the mode in which the divine reaches into the world” (Geertz 
1968:44), and in the case of the Issawiya, it indicates the mysterious spiritual powers (“asrar”, 
“mysteries”) that constitute the very basis of shaykh-hood. Shaykh-hood (with all its spiritual gifts 
and competences) is seen not only as a status that is acquired through education, but also as a 
condition whose spiritual foundations are materially inherited from a precise line of masters and 
derived from the mysterious world of the unseen. In this perspective, the Issawy ijaza, is 
perceived to be a channel through which one receives the mysterious capacity to do, say, perform 
                                                          
87  The great majority of Sufi orders trace their mystical chain back to Ali and consider him to be the first Sufi in the 
history of Islam - Trimingham 1996: 133-136; Hoffman 1995:70). 
and feel those things that distinguish a shaykh  from a commoner. The great majority of the 
shuyukh stress mainly the ‘mysterious’ connotation of “asrar”, but some of them embrace also 
the ‘secretive’ one, explaining that through the spiritual genealogy a shaykh receives both a 
specific body of secret knowledge and the mysterious power which  makes this knowledge 
effective. This double meaning of “sirr” (as  “secret”, and as “mystery”) is particularly 
significant, and it will be touched upon again throughout the chapters. For now, however, it is 
important to explain that Issawis articulate the esoteric dimension of their practices differently 
(some see it as a matter of mystery, while others as a combination of mystery and secrecy) but 
always referring to the notion of “sirr”. 
 
Doubtlessly, Issawy shuyukh pay different degrees of attention to the spiritual aspects of their 
shaykh-hood. Many Assanid, as I have explained, have a familial character, and masters would 
often say that they are shuyukh mainly because their predecessors (possibly their fathers or 
grandfathers) were also shuyukh.  When asked to articulate (and legitimise) their shaykh-hood, 
however, Issawy masters always refer to the same ‘Issawy discursive tradition’, mentioning the 
notion of “sirr” (in one way or another), and stressing that they have a valid ijaza that testifies to 
a link with the original source of Issawi-ness88. Being discursive the Issawy tradition allows for 
both difference and commonality, but also, more specifically, for discussions. A shaykh, for 
instance, might claim that a line of shuyukh has more “asrar” than other lines, while another 
shaykh might disagree. Similarly, some shuyukh might argue that the mystical tradition of the 
                                                          
88 My informants have often demonstrated incredible attention in tracking down Issawy genealogies and in verifying 
Issawy licences. At times this particular aspect of the tariqa requires a specific competence, an “elm al assanid” 
(“science of the assanid”) that involves knowledge of the different lines through which shuyukh have received their 
shaykh-hood. In Shaykh Ramadan’s case the level of knowledge of the different Tripolitan assanid was uncanny: he 
was able to trace not only his own mystical chain but also the assanid of other shuyukh of the city of Tripoli and 
surrounding areas. Being a sharif, Shaykh Ramadan was also able to trace his genealogy back to the prophet enlisting 
all the ancestors of his blood-line. Interesting links between descent from the prophet and the concept of Sufi 
mystical chain and can be found in Gellner 1969:261 and Lewis 1998:10. 
order can be .enriched by new ‘spiritual revelations’, while others might have a different opinion 
on the matter. Some shuyukh might value the link between the Libyan Issawiya and its Moroccan 
counterpart, while others might stress that the Libyan incarnation of the order has developed its 
own peculiar ‘spiritual repertoire’ or kept the original Issawy tradition more faithfully than in 
Morocco. As a shaykh with the gift of lyric synthesis told me once, when it comes to the Issawiya 
“al johar fi Maghreb, wa lakin asSirr fi Libya”, “the essence is in Morocco, but the secret (or the 
mystery) is in Libya”. 
 
The Issawy brotherhood might be divided into different local leaderships and fragmented into 
autonomous familial groups that follow different rules. Nonetheless, the way in which these 
autonomous cells articulate the basis of their legitimisation involves a shared, but discursive, 
relationship with a common source. Shuyukh need to demonstrate a link with a specific tradition 
and with the founder of this tradition in order to be considered as such: they need to prove that 
the ‘source’ of their status is unmistakably Issawy. The Libyan Issawiya is not merely a loose 
brotherhood, but an order characterised by a common discursive tradition within which the notion 
of ‘secret’ and the one of ‘mystery’ play an important role. Indeed, the picture of Ben ‘Aysa’s 
zawiya on the walls of Libyan zawaya might be discoloured, but it is still there. What we are 
dealing with is a multi-layered sense of being part of the same brotherhood that, though difficult 
to articulate, is definitively real. When it comes to the Issawiya, fragmentation and cohesiveness 
are not necessarily two mutually exclusive things. It is simply that, in essence, Issawis are 
complex people. 
 
1.7 A Note on Comparative Sufi History (The Issawiya Contextualised) 
As  I have demonstrated , Issawis operate according to an Issawy tradition that allows them to 
share a sense of common identity and, at the same time, to develop different approaches towards 
the tariqa. Having shed light on these dynamics, it is also important to clarify that the Issawy 
‘fragmentation’ (both in terms of rules and for what concerns the internal organisation of the 
order) is the result of specific historical factors. In categorising Sufi orders as centralised or 
‘loose’ anthropologists have often lacked an in-depth historical contextualisation. It is  interesting 
to notice that the studies that have analysed brotherhoods characterised by a centralised authority 
(or by an homogeneous set of regulations) have always focused on ‘young’ orders whose founder 
had either recently died or been dead since few generations (Evans-Pritchard 1949; Cruise O 
Brien 1971; Gilsenan 1973; Damrel 2006) while those works that have described more 
‘fragmented’ brotherhoods like the Issawiya have dealt with  much ‘older’ turuq (Crapanzano 
1973; Chih 2007).  
 
The literature has highlighted the importance of the figure of the founder of a Sufi order as a 
catalyst for cohesion, identifying the phase after his death as a critical point in the life of a tariqa, 
when members of the order might be required to take some measures in order to ensure 
continuation and cohesiveness (Gilsenan 1971). Echoing Max Weber’s famous notion of 
“charismatic authority”, the Sufi founder has been looked at as the source of pure charisma, and 
the time that follows his departure as moment of ‘charismatic crisis’ where the cohesion of the 
order is at risk (ibid. O’Brien & Coulon 1988; Weber 1991; Boubrik 2000). Obviously, we cannot 
generalise saying that all orders whose founder has been dead for a long time (as in the case of 
the Issawiya) are more prone to fragmentation, particularly in light of the fact that scholars have 
argued against the use of rigid historical categories when dealing with Sufism (Werbner 2007: 
197-98). Nevertheless, regardless of whether the ‘post-founder phase’ is always a critical time for 
the cohesion of all turuq or not,  we need to appreciate that there is a link between the historical 
circumstances of the Issawiya, its loose organisation, and its high level of variation when it 
comes to rules.  
 
As I have explained in the introduction of the thesis, the scholarship on Libya has focused on the 
Sanusiya as the only brotherhood that managed to become a political entity as opposed to the 
non-Sanusy orders like the Issawiya that remained marginal in Libyan history. However, looking 
at Libyan Sufism only in these terms means de-historicising the turuq. In his discussion on the 
reasons behind the fact that the Sanusiya was able to become a strong political agent Evans-
Pritchard depicts the Sanusis as having a strong hierarchical structure and a level of cohesion that 
seems to have been lacking with the other orders89. Nevertheless, what strikes me in Evans-
Pritchard’s analysis is that he does not realise how the comparison he is proposing is heavily de-
contextualised from an historical point of view. Even though the Sanusy order had its own 
internal tensions and dynastic problems (Evans-Pritchard 1949: 21, 27, 131), at the time of 
writing of the “Sanusi of Cyrenaica” the tariqa was still a young Libyan order whose founder had 
been dead only for ninety years90.  The Sanusiya was studied by Evans-Pritchard in a time when 
power was still in the hands of the founder’s successors and when, therefore, some sort of 
                                                          
89 It is important to clarify that Evans-Pritchard saw the Sanusiya as having a functional structure, and not a perfect 
organisation. According to the British anthropologists, the organisation of the Sanusis was overall rather inadequate, 
to the point that if it was not for the Italian occupation that rallied the “outraged sentiment of the Bedouin” (Evans-
Pritchard 1949: 26; Gilsenan 1990:160) against the common enemy, the order would have most probably collapsed 
(ibid.). Nevertheless, Evans-Pritchard tells us that the Sanusiya was organised enough to have local shuyukh 
appointed directly by the  head of the order and that the Sanusis had a system of taxation that ensured the collection 
of each zawiya’s economic surplus (Evans-Pritchard 1949: 26, 83, 84),   
90 At the death of the founder of the Sanusiya in 1859 the leadership of the order was taken up by his eldest son 
Muhammad al Mahdi (1844-1902). When al Mahdi died  his eldest son,  Idris, was still young, and the founder’s 
nephew (son of al Mahdi’syounger brother) Ahmad al-Sharif (1873- 1933) took over. After al-Sharif’s departure 
from Libya (McGuirk 2007) the line of succession came back to its original stock, and Idris (1889 – 1983) -  later to 
become the first and last king of Libya (see introduction page 13) – became the head of the order (Evans-Pritchard 
1949: 20, 131).  
cohesion could be kept. The Issawiya on the other hand, arrived in Libya and remained there for 
four hundred years after the Perfect Shaykh’s death in Morocco91 . Unlike the Sanusiya, he 
Issawiya had time to develop a structural fragmentation (and a strong diversification in terms of 
rules) in a land that was not its homeland. 
 
As I have shown, the Issawiya is constituted by independent assanid that trace their common 
spiritual genealogy back to Morocco and to the Perfect Shaykh. The history of the order, 
however, is not simply the history of a ‘linear movement’ from Morocco to Libya. As I have 
explained at the beginning of the chapter, the story of the Banun family constitutes a well-known 
narrative of how the Issawiya was firstly brought into Tripoli. However, it is interesting to notice 
that the spiritual genealogies recorded in some written ijazat I have seen contain names of Issawy 
shuyukh of the past that lived in different locations of North Africa, This fact suggests that the 
Issawiya must have ‘entered’ Libya more than once, on different occasions, brought by different 
lines of masters, even after the order was introduced the first time.  The Issawiya spread and 
roamed in North Africa for four centuries, creating a large number of assanid that have moved 
geographically and generated other assanid in turn. This historical dimension has to be taken into 
account when examining the fragmented organisation of the order. Decades and distance are 
enough to shorten memory, and time increases the possibility for the branches of a sanad to 
become independent whether in familial terms, ijaza terms or both. 
 
An historical view of the organisation of the order allows us to contextualise its fragmentation 
properly, but it also helps us to understand that the ‘Issawy discursive tradition’ is not static. 
                                                          
91 Reconstructing the line of succession after the death of the Perfect Shaykh is quite difficult due to lack of data. All 
we know is that his son became head of the brotherhood after his death (Brunel 1926: 43). 
Zawaya inside and outside Tripoli are linked with each other through a complex network of ‘ijaza 
- relationships that, with time, have loosened up. However, these links are not simply forgotten or 
remembered: they are also created and re-created in time. A shaykh who believes that the licence 
of another master has originated (in the past) from his own sanad might decide to write a new 
ijaza for him in order to‘re-create’ this relationship. The master can accept it as an act of 
courtesy, recognise it as a renewal of an historical link, or simply ignore it. The Issawy discursive 
tradition relates conceptually to a common past, but it is also dynamic. At the time of my field-
work, for instance, a particular zawiya in Tripoli was ‘claimed’ verbally by three different 
assanid. The heads of two of them produced two separate ijazat for the shaykh, who, being a man 
of peace, accepted both regarding one as a genuine act of courtesy and the other as the restoration 
of a lost link with the original sanad. Sometimes these attempts to rebuild what history has 
separated are not particularly well received. In one case, for instance, a shaykh told me that he 
had been contacted by a zawiya in Morocco that wanted to reconstruct a lost sanad-relationship, 
and that he had categorically refused because he saw his licence as being perfectly valid. Indeed, 
the essence of the Issawiya might be in Morocco. However, in four hundred years the secret has 
become Libyan, and Libyan only. 
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter I have provided an account of the origins of the Issawiya, a description of the 
different dynamics that characterise the life of an Issawy zawiya, and an overview of the presence 
of the order in Tripoli. In particular, I have shown that the Issawy order is composed by 
autonomous groups that have often a familial basis, and that articulate their existence in terms of 
sanad, or spiritual genealogy. However, I have also problematised the view of the Issawiya as a 
‘loose’ order demonstrating that, though autonomous, Issawy shuyukh refer to a common ‘Issawy 
tradition’. Through an analysis of the mechanics that constitute Issawy shaykh-hood I have shown 
that this tradition - being distinct but discursive – allows Issawis to keep a sense of common 
identity but also to approach the rules and the practices of their order in different ways. I doing so 
I have explained the significance of the notion of “sirr” (“secret” or “mystery”) in the Issawy 
tradition, and I have suggested that the fragmentation of the order should be contextualised 
historically. Bearing these considerations in mind, in the next chapter I will further explore the 
esoteric dimension of the order and the Issawy identity with a focus on the ritual practices of the 
order. In doing this, I will focus on religious occasions when Issawy identity becomes very 
visible, and on ritual performances where the same identity is articulated, on the contrary, in 
secret.  
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“THINGS THAT OTHERS CANNOT SEE” 
        Rituals, Routine and Special Occasions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The murid is a sensitive person, but he is also a practical man. Often he preferred not to be seen with me since, 
he told me, people loved gossiping about foreigners. It was Friday evening, and I went to a popular Issawy 
zawaya. The murid was there, but he pretended he did not know me. The ritual started and the attendees 
formed a series of concentric circles. People began to move slowly. With time the movements became quicker. 
I started feeling agitated, I realised that I was waving my head, and very soon we all became part of a kinetic 
assembly. Then the music started. One of the attendees told me to watch out for one particular song: “When 
they play that one you will see the Issawis go to trance”. While the man  was still talking to me, someone had a 
convulsive shiver upon hearing the beginning of the song, Later my new friend was of course proven right. 
After a while some people did stand up moving at the rhythm of the music, in a trance. The murid was not even 
looking at me.  
 
 
 
 
Secrecy in Public (Introduction)  
In the previous chapter I have demonstrated that the Issawiya is characterised by a specific discursive 
tradition. As I have shown, this tradition allows Issawis to refer to a sense of common identity and, at 
the same time, to approach the rules and customs of their own brotherhood in different ways.  
Similarity and difference, however, are not the only parameters used by members of the order to 
articulate their own ‘Issawi-ness’.  As I have also explained, the concept of ‘sirr’ (“secret”) plays an 
important role in Issawy discourses, with “secret” indicating both a body of esoteric knowledge and 
the mysterious supernatural force that, amongst other things, makes shaykh-hood effective. Bearing 
this in mind (and postponing a detailed discussion on the double meaning of “sirr” to the next 
chapter) I will now elaborate on how these dynamics affect the ritual life of the zawaya. First of all, I 
will show how Issawis maintain that their brotherhood is characterised by certain common ritual 
obligations while, at the same time, accepting that these obligations are carried out in different ways 
by the zawaya.  After expanding on how this reflects the mixture of commonality and diversity that 
characterises the dynamics of Issawy tradition, I will embark on a longer description of the esoteric 
dimension of Issawy rituals.  
 
The Libyan Issawiya is characterised by a variety of ritual practices. The most popular one, however, 
is the performance of Mal’uf (“familiar”, “popular”) (Ciantar & Sebai 2005), a melodious genre of 
music which was imported in North-Africa from Andalusia at the time of the Moorish caliphates in 
the Hispanic peninsula.92 Historically speaking, Mal’uf has a strong Sufi connotation, since many of 
the songs performed in the zawaya are either adaptations of Sufi poems of the past or lyrical 
compositions in praise of Sufi saints (amongst whom is the Perfect Shaykh himself)93. However, 
because of this extremely fashionable genre of music, the Issawiya attracts a large amount of people 
who have no interest in Sufi affairs who gather in the zawaya at specific times of the year. Since, as I 
will show, Mal’uf is performed in the context of a specific ritual called “hadhra”, during these 
occasions many Tripolitans who do not normally associate with Sufism actively participate in the 
ritual where, at least from an external observer’s point of view, they engage in exactly the same ritual 
actions as the Issawis. Being a combination of formulas, music and movements the ritual 
                                                          
92
Mal’uf belongs to a complex musicological family that counts a number of orally transmitted local variations in the 
whole of North-Africa (Davis 1996a; 1996b). The genre seems to have arrived in Maghreb with Muslims and Jews 
escaping the Spanish reconquista of Andalusia (Davis 1997:3). In Libya Mal’uf is also called Muwashshah Andalusia (“the 
Andalusian Muwashshah”), Muwashshah being a specific genre in Arabic music whose technical characteristics are well 
described in Zwartjes 2006. Ciantar, the only ethnomusicologist who published on Libyan Mal’uf, mentions the 
possibility that this genre of music might have been brought to Libya via Tunisia (Ciantar 2006:58). For an understanding 
of the musicological characteristics of Mal’uf see Ciantar 2003, 2005, 2006 and Davis 1997, 1996 a, 1996 b. The most 
comprehensive publication in Arabic on Libyan Mal’uf is the voluminous Bushiyyah 2006 and 2006b.  
93
The lyrics of many Mal’uf songs were composed by the Andalusian Sufi mystic Abu l’Hasan Al Shushtari (or ashShishtri, 
according to the Libyan pronunciation) (1212 – 1269) (Hanif 2002: 178; Abou Bakr 1987). Others are of unknown author. 
On issues of authorship in Sufi poetry see Frishkopf 2003. Aspects of Sufi sainthood will be dealt with in chapter 4.  
performance of the hadhra is a highly emotional moment (Crapanzano 1973: 185-235; Frishkopf 
1999: 263 -345, 2001) where trance behaviour is common amongst both Issawis and non-Issawis. 
Nevertheless, Issawis claim that, though public and open to non-initiated, the ritual has an esoteric 
dimension which is accessible only to few.  
 
When asked about the role of Mal’uf, Issawis constantly clarify that music is not a defining feature of 
the Issawiya. In particular, in describing occasional attendees of the hadhra as people who are 
interested only in music, Issawis articulate their identity as members of a brotherhood which is more 
concerned with spirituality than with entertainment. Members of the order, however, also describe 
the experience of trance as having a mysterious dimension that only Sufis would understand. Though 
downplaying the role of music, Issawis  explain the trance produced by Mal’uf music as a moment 
where God gives spiritual gifts to the muridin in secret, as opposed to the trance of sporadic 
attendees that (though apparently similar) is often portrayed as a mere emotional response to the 
ritual. In light of these considerations, the hadhra is described as a moment of ‘secrecy in public’: a 
public event where, even though all participants perform the same actions, only a few experience the 
mystery behind these actions.  
 
Studies of Sufism have highlighted how repetitive rhythms and movements instil highly emotional 
states in those who participate in Sufi rituals (Frishkopf 2001; Avery 2004; Racy 2003: 100-225). 
Sufi trance, consequently, has been mainly looked at as a product of sensorial stimulation (Rouget 
1985; Frishkopf 1999: 263 -345, Shannon 2004). These considerations have certainly enriched the 
anthropological debate on emotionality (Crapanzano 1989; Rosaldo1984; Rosaldo 2004) and altered 
states of consciousness (Eliade 1951; Atkinson 1992; Vitebsky1993). Nevertheless, in reducing 
trance to an emotional dynamic, these publications have also failed to explore how Sufis themselves 
make sense of the experience of ecstasy. Past ethnographic studies have analysed trance either as an 
instrument of resistance used by marginal strata of society against mainstream forms of religiosity 
(Lewis 1989), or as a way to discharge personal tensions in a socially accepted manner (Crapanzano 
1973: 229). Even though the anthropology of Sufi rituals has been persuaded by these two 
approaches (ibid. Gilsenan 1973), studies not concerned with Sufism have successfully shown that 
trance is much more than a tool for the release of social or emotional pressure. As demonstrated by 
these works, trance is locally defined by a series of beliefs and ideas that help constructing altered 
states of consciousness as ‘meaningful experiences’ (Lambek 1981; Obeyesekere 1981; Boddy 1989, 
1994). These works have suggested that in understanding how local discourses make trance more 
than a sheer emotional state we can learn about the way in which those who experience it see the 
world (ibid.). Nonetheless, the ethnography of Sufism has largely ignored this suggestion, paying 
scarce attention to how Sufis differentiate between spiritual ecstasy and mere emotional rapture in 
their public rituals. More importantly, these studies have not paid attention to the fact that the 
difference between the two might be considered a secret affair, and that this in turn can be useful in 
understanding how Sufis see themselves and the world around them.   
 
Secret rituals have occupied a number of anthropological minds. And even though scholars of 
secrecy have focused on ritual actions carried out outside of the public domain (Barth 1975; Turner 
1967: 103, 1977; T. Turner 1977; La Fontaine 1986; Richards 1988; Kratz 1990; Herdt 2003; Van 
Gennep 2004) they have nevertheless suggested that the difference between public and secret rituals 
is often blurry. Ethnographic accounts have shown that restricting the participation in secret rituals, 
particularly in the context of initiation, does not necessarily entail a complete separation of the 
initiated from the public (Barth 1975, 1987; Middleton 1973; Hage 1981; Godellier 1982; Urban 
1997). On the contrary, secret ceremonies are sometimes understood as practices aimed at preparing 
individuals to become full members of larger society (Bledsoe 1984:465; Kreamer 1995:59) and 
engendering “an understanding of the larger world of which secrecy forms only a part” (Ottenberg 
1989:56). More importantly, scholars have shown that often those who deal with secrets put more 
effort in describing what they do in terms of secrecy than in actually protecting their secrets from the 
public (Simmel 1950; Bellman 1975, 1981). Frequently, for instance, those who participate in secret 
rituals decide to share some information with those who are excluded from them (Crook 2007: 11), 
so that the arcane knowledge protected by ritual secrecy is often publicly known though still referred 
to as a secret (Taussig 1999: 5). These considerations have successfully contributed to the demolition 
of simplistic differentiations between ‘private’ and ‘public’ (Rosaldo 1980; Comaroff 1987; Moore 
1988; Seligman 1998): an enterprise that has helped scholars to demonstrate the imagined nature of 
the boundaries between the two domains (Bellman 1981; De Certeau 1993; Joseph 1997). 
Nevertheless, the debate has focused much more on the public dimension of secret rituals than on the 
secretive aspects of public ones. Scholars have explained that secrets can be publicly known without 
being publicly articulated (Taussig 1999). The fact that secrets can be under everyone’s eye while 
still remaining secret, however, has not attracted as much interest.  
 
Though ready to explain how secret ritual can be public, anthropologists seem to be in trouble when 
it comes to understanding how public rituals can be secret. The scholarship on secrecy has 
highlighted that secrets - whether personal, shared or both - are a feature of public life (Simmel 1950: 
330-376; Pitt-Rivers 1971; Richardson 1988; Bok 1989; Gilsenan 1990: 122; 1995; Ferme 2001: 12) 
even in societies that practise ritual secrecy (Piot 1993; Bellman 1984: 43-52).  Secrecy, it has been 
pointed out, is as a habitual aspect of the public sphere, particularly in contexts where concealment 
creates the possibility to safely comment on public dynamics (Scott 1990b; Murphy 1990). Attempts 
to produce a more specific analysis of secrecy in public rituals, however, still remain at the margins 
of the academic discussion, perhaps due to a rooted prejudice that sees secrecy as an inherently anti-
social force (Herdt 2003: 36, 47-49) with no role in forms of public interaction like rituals. 
Doubtlessly, the idea that a public ritual might have specific meanings and functions that are 
accessible only to a restricted portion of participants has been ethnographically documented (Gilmore 
1993; Pitt Rivers 1971). As shown by some ethnographers, ritual performers might claim that 
formulas which are uttered publicly have a second meaning which is comprehensible only for a few 
(Bellman 1984; Apter 1991), or use an encoded language in order to protect themselves from 
repercussion by others who attend the same ritual (Piot 1993). However, these scholars have not 
reflected enough on the implications of their data. By showing that rituals can involve – paraphrasing 
a famous TS Eliot poem - ‘private words that are addressed in public’, these works have in fact 
involuntarily shown that often, for a specific community, secrecy takes place publicly. Apart from 
leaving this point unaddressed, these works have failed to realise that this is particularly telling when 
it comes to understanding how that community defines itself. 
 
A rich corpus of publications has suggested that communities often use exclusive ritual performances 
to define themselves (Radcliffe-Brown 1965; Leach 1970; Geertz 1980; Cohen 1985; Valeri 1985; 
Durkheim 2008), with rituals acting as tools that help in shaping a feeling of corporate membership 
(Bourdieu 1977: 194-195; Douglas 2007) or solving internal conflicts (Gluckman1963; Turner 1967, 
1996). More recent literature, however, has advised against similar monolithic interpretations, 
highlighting how rituals generate a plethora of different meanings (Firth 1973; Aune 1996; 
Obeyesekere 1981) because they are constantly informed by the different personal experiences of the 
participants (Schechner 1977; Lewis 1980; Ortner 1984; Schieffelin 1985; Moore 1999; Bell 1992; 
Humphrey & Laidlaw 2004: 12). In light of these considerations, more than simply looking at how 
rituals define groups, scholars have focused on how groups construct discourses around rituals, 
claiming specific meanings for them, and creating distinctions between those who understand these 
meanings and those who do not (Anderson 1991; Harrison 1992; Hobsbawm 2003; Cannadine 2003). 
Though clarifying that this process is negotiable (Lambek 1990; Comaroff & Comaroff 1991; Beatty 
2006), anthropologists have mainly paid attention to how ritual performers trace these distinctions in 
an explicit way either in the organisation (Holloman 1973; Bloch 1977, 1985; Valeri 1985; 
Rappaport 1979: 101, 116,121) or in the exegesis of public rituals (Bourdieu 1990: 36, 75, 371-283). 
Less interest has been raised, however, for cases in which ritual participants maintain that these 
differentiations - though perceived to be real – remain ritually invisible, and cannot be articulated 
because they are secret.  
 
This lack of interest in ‘secrecy in public’ is particularly apparent in ethnographic publications 
dealing with rituals in Islamic settings. The anthropology of Islam has shown how Muslims might 
resort to notions of secrecy in making sense of their own practices and doctrines (Clarke 1976; 
Marsden 2005: 157-192) or in formulating ideas about the world they live in (Soares 1996: 745, 
2005: 127-152). However, these studies have also concentrated on how those who claim to possess 
the ‘secret’ make this claim overtly (Brenner 2000), excluding those who do not possess it from 
certain ritual practices (Shankland 2004). Doubtless, the literature has demonstrated that the process 
of meaning-making involved in Islamic rituals is complex (Eickelman & Piscatorial 1996), so that, 
for instance, in performing ritual practices that are deemed universally Islamic Muslims are in fact 
informed by localised or personalised notions of religiosity  (Combs-Schilling 1989; Bowen 1989, 
1992, 1992b; Manger 1999; Harir 1999; Marsden 2005; Mahmood 2005: 118-152). Nevertheless, 
anthropologists have also mainly looked at how Muslims compete in claiming meanings for their 
rituals in a public and explicit way (Asad 1986; Gilsenan 1990: 242; Lambek 1990b; Eickelman & 
Salvatore 2002, 2004, 2004b, Zaman 2004, Didier 2004). Consequently, the relationship between 
secret meanings and public rituals in Islam has been largely ignored.  
 
Interestingly, this is true even for what concerns studies on Sufism. The view of the Sufis as those 
who understand the true meaning of Islamic practices (whereas other Muslims might simply perform 
them without grasping their essence) can be found in classical studies of Islamic mysticism 
(Burkhardt 1976; Schiemmel 1994). This understanding of Sufism as being concerned with ‘what is 
invisible for others’, however, has only provided theological background for the anthropology of 
Sufism (Gilsenan 1990:116-141; Pinto 2006, Schielke 2008b: 121) without inspiring a specific 
analysis of secret dynamics in Sufi public performances. Though clarifying that Sufi rituals are often 
open to non-Sufis, ethnographers have mainly concentrated on contexts where the division between 
initiated and non-initiated is explicitly visible either in the organisation of the assembly during the 
ritual (Gilsenan 1973: 160) or in the actions that are performed in it (Crapanzano 1973: 218). The 
existence of Sufi discourses involving subtle and secret differentiations within the ritual context has 
therefore escaped anthropological scrutiny.  
 
Similar limitations can be found in studies dealing specifically with Sufi music. In following current 
trends in ritual studies, these publications have mainly focused on how Sufi rituals generate a 
multiplicity of meanings for the listeners (Qureshi 1995, 2000; Shannon 2004). As shown by a body 
of anthropological literature dealing with musical performances (Appadurai et al.1991; Staal 1996; 
Wolf 2000, 2001: 381, 413) the meaning of music “is not static and immutable, but an evolving, 
changing attribution of a gesture or sound term” (Meyer 1956: 48). Even though the practice of music 
is always shaped by culturally specific sensibilities that people develop as members of a specific 
community (Seeger 2004; Hirshkind 2006: 101), the meaning of music is actively constructed by 
those who participate in the performance, because they bring their own intentions and expectations in 
the very act of listening (Hirshkind 2006: 2-31, 35, 2001). Certainly, these studies have successfully 
demonstrated how music means different things for different listeners (Caton 1990: 256; Miller 2007: 
159; Marsden 2007).  When it comes to Sufism, however, scholars have not paid enough attention to 
ritual discourses centred on the notion that both ritual and music do have one specific meaning, and 
that, since this meaning is secret, only a few might be able to access it. 
 
A consideration of Issawy rituals as moments of ‘secrecy in public’ can help us understand not only 
that  secrets can be public while still remaining secret, but also that Issawy secrecy is, in the end, a 
way of describing the world ( Ferme 2001: 1-21; Herdt 2003: 204). Issawy rituals show that secrecy – 
far from being merely about creating a realm cut off from the public - is a way or portraying both the 
universe and Sufism as being made of more than what meets the eye. Issawy secrecy, therefore, is not 
necessarily only about ‘keeping secrets away from the public’ but also about ‘knowing that there is a 
mystery though the public might not be able to see it’. The implications of this phenomenon are of 
fundamental importance for an understanding of the way in which Libyan Issawis tell the story of 
who they are. Realising that ‘secret’ does not involve only ‘knowing the mystery others do not know’, 
but also ‘knowing that there is a mystery’ is crucial for a comprehension of the main theoretical 
concern of this thesis.  Later on, this clarification will help me to explain the paradox of why, in the 
context of contemporary Libya, Issawis downplay the importance of secretive knowledge while still 
keeping the notion of ‘secret’ as a fundamental aspect of their spiritual life. 
 
2.1 Same Routine, Different Schedules (Weekly Gatherings) 
Before entering into a deeper discussion on secrecy it is important to start with an exploration of the 
ritual routine of the zawaya. In particular, in this first section I will show how Issawis perform their 
rituals in slightly different ways while still conceiving of a common identity, demonstrating therefore 
the dynamics of the Issawy discursive tradition that I have previously delineated. Zawaya, as I have 
previously explained, are spaces characterised by a continuous social interaction between masters, 
disciples and devotees.  Zawaya, however, are also where the weekly ritual routine of the Issawiya 
takes place. The main liturgical event that happens in the zawiya is the recitation of a litany called the 
“hezb” (pl. ahzab, “section”), a term which is used with the same meaning (but with different 
connotations) also in other Sufi orders (Gilsenan 1973:156; Hoffman 1995: 156). According to the 
majority of the Issawy shuyukh, the hezb - usually called “hezb al kabyr” (“the great hezb”), “hezb 
atTawhid” (“the hezb of the oneness of God”) or “hezb subhana adDaim” (“the ‘glory to the 
Eternal’ hezb”) - is the main ritual obligation of the Libyan Issawiya. Muridin are expected to come 
and devotees or the zawiya are always welcome. A zawiya might be used on an everyday basis for 
different reasons. But the day of the hezb is the day of the hezb.  
 
Zawaya recite the hezb either on Thursday evening or on Friday. The performance of the hezb is 
always taken care of by a specific person in the congregation that is appointed by the shaykh, the 
shaush. The shaush (pl. shauash) is someone who is in charge of one of the aspects of the life of the 
zawiya from an organisational point of view. A zawiya has usually a number of shauash who, 
according to some of my informants, should have a knowledge of the tariqa which is superior to the 
one possessed by simple muridin. Usually, in my experience, shauash are people with good practical 
and social skills. You will easily recognise them because they know everyone in the zawiya and they 
are frequently in the middle of doing something. Theoretically a zawiya can have a shaush for every 
sort of purpose: there might be one who is responsible for keeping the zawiya tidy, and even one who 
takes care of the shoes left at the entrance of the zawiya. In the great majority of Tripolitan zawaya, 
however, the purpose of the shauash is mainly liturgical: shauash ensure that rites are performed 
properly, continuously putting order into the assembly, inviting people to stay silent or join the group 
instead of leaning on the wall of the zawiya. There is always a specific shaush who is responsible for 
the hezb (a “shaush el hezb”). As the hezb is performed remaining seated on pillows that are put on 
the floor, the shaush is usually the only person who stands up and moves around in case his services 
are required94. 
 
At the beginning of the hezb the brothers sit on the floor in a rectangular shaped assembly. The 
shaykh of the zawiya has usually a central position facing all the others. At the centre of the 
congregation there is a low lying table with a jar of water or honey, aspersoria and (at times the hezb 
is recited with low lights) lit candles. The water over which the hezb is recited becomes moya 
muqaddisa, “holy water”. It should be handled respectfully and used for various spiritual purposes95. 
The performance of the litany is usually organised in two groups. After declaiming the opening sura 
of the Qur’an96, the shaykh - together with a group of people that know the hezb by heart - recites the 
                                                          
94 As already noticed in the colonial literature (Baldinetti 2003:135), in Tripoli the shauash who have a ritual 
responsibility are often referred to using the term “shaykh” (shaykh el hezb, the “shaykh of the hezb”).  
95 If the shaykh of the zawiya is an active exorcist the “holy water” is mixed with copious litres of normal water in order 
to have a constant storage of curative liquid to be used in exorcisms. On spirit possession and Islam see Lambek 1981 and 
Boddy 1989, more specifically on Sufism and practices of exorcism see Crapanzano 1971, 1973, 1977 and Ewing 1984. 
96 The Qur’an is divided into 114 chapters, or “suwar “(sing.”sura”) (Nelson 2001:4). 
first verses of the hezb. As the recitation proceeds the second group repeats the verses, declaims other 
lines or joins the first group according to the recitative rules of the hezb. Occasionally the recitation 
can be accompanied by rhythmic movement of the body, though the hezb is usually a very 
‘contained’ performance. At the end of the “great hezb” the shaush stands up,  puts a hand on his head 
or on his chest and asks “man shaq anNabì”, “whoever loves the Prophet” to praise him chorally, 
inviting the attendees to recite the opening sura for Mohammed, the “ashraf el mursalin”, “the most 
honourable of those who have been sent by God”. Subsequently, the shaush of the hezb goes all 
around the assembly and using the aspersoria he pours water mixed with essence of the flowers on 
the hands of the attendees who wash their hands and faces. The fragrance of the rose-water is 
refreshing. Then tea, and hopefully sweets are served.  
 
Since the Issawy order has a variegated repertoire of litanies, some shuyukh might invite the brothers 
to meet a second time during the week – usually on Sunday -  in order to read another hezb 
(frequently the hezb al falah, “hezb of deliverance”, also called “hezb asSaghir”, “the small hezb”). 
However, even in those zawaya where the brothers meet regularly twice a week, the “great hezb” of 
the Friday is always described as ‘the’ hezb97. If the brothers of a zawiya decide to meet during the 
week in order to recite one of the minor litanies of the brotherhood, the shaykh would always make 
sure that everyone hears him saying “come to the zawiya on Friday!”. The “great hezb” is described 
as an Issawy ritual obligation, and it is therefore interesting to notice how Issawis recite slightly 
different versions of the litany. Since, as I have previously explained, the Issawiya is divided into 
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Sometimes, the brothers might also recite a third hezb, the “hezb el Fatah “, “the hezb of the conquest”, although this 
is quite rare. The  ahzab cited in this chapter are also mentioned in the literature concerning the Moroccan and the 
Algerian Issawiya  (Brunel 1926:90- 93, Andezian 2001:104 note7)  
groups (or assanid), different assanid within the order (and occasionally different zawaya within a 
sanad) have their own peculiar way of performing the hezb.  
 
Some zawaya might start the hezb with six recitations of the opening sura of the Qur’an: one for 
God, one for the Prophet (and his companions and family), one for the Perfect Shaykh (and his 
masters and disciples), one for the saints (the “ahl illah”, “the people of God”) and one for the 
deceased Muslims (the “amuat el muslimin”). Others, however, recite only three (for God, the 
Prophet and Ben ‘Aysa), or one. In some zawaya the recitation of the hezb is completed with – or 
preceded by – a series of “la ilaha illa Allah” (“there is no God but God”), “Allah ya Allah” (“God, 
oh God”) and “Astaffirullah” (“forgive me, oh God”). However, if some shuyukh insist that these 
formulas should be repeated respectively two-three hundred times, one-two hundred times and thirty-
three times, others do not recite them at all. After the hezb a shaykh might choose to read a different 
section of the Qur’an every week - or at times always the same - while another shaykh might decide 
not to do so98. Perhaps some shuyukh might give a dars, a “lecture”, on religious matters after the 
reading of the Qur’an, while others (indeed the majority of them at least in Tripoli) might not think 
this is necessary, or might simply not feel comfortable with the idea of preparing a lecture every 
week.  In the zawiya of shaykh Ramadan, my main informant, after the hezb the brothers invoke 
God’s blessings (“ya Rauf!” “Oh, you the compassionate!”) twice over the holy water, but this does 
not happen elsewhere. 
 
Variations can be found not only in what comes before and after the hezb, but also in the actual 
recitation. From the point of view of the content the hezb is a list of the main coordinates that should 
                                                          
98The term “hezb” is also used to indicate one of the sixty sections in which the Qur’an is divided (Allen 2000:53). After 
the recitation of the “great hezb”, some zawaya perform therefore a “hezb el Qur’an”, “a hezb from the Qur’an”. 
orientate the life of the Issawy as a Muslim: a formulaic reminder that the bases of the order are the 
fundamentals of Islam, and a definition of God’s perfect attributes as creator against the 
imperfections of men as creatures. Nonetheless, some zawaya might repeat three times a section of 
the hezb that others perform only once, or recite slightly different verses. Since the performance 
includes formulae for the request of tawassul, (“intercession” from saints or the Prophet) the brothers 
usually chant a long list of famous, relatively known and rather obscure saints.  However, in doing so, 
a zawiya might seek the help of a Sidhi Yunnis, while another might ask the intercession of a Sidhi 
Uweiss. Sometimes different zawaya refer to the same saintly characters, but in different ways, or ask 
intercession from spiritual powers that other zawaya do not invoke. In a zawiya there might be a 
weekly mention of the “ahl el loh wa ahl el qalam”, “the people of the pen and of the loh99”, with 
reference to God’s angels that write down past, present and future events, but this line might have 
never been uttered in the hezb of another zawiya. Variety is a very visible feature of the Issawy 
weekly life in Tripoli. Interestingly, however, Issawis do seem to see it as a problem.  
 
Even though Issawis commented to me on the differences in the performance, they never developed 
the concept of an orthodoxy of the hezb. Some told me that a specific way of reciting the verses better 
conveyed the meaning of the text, or remarked that sometimes people misread or misconstrue the 
lines due to lack of education. From time to time Issawis elaborated on the reasons behind a certain 
version of the hezb, as in the case of a zawiya that, according to some informants, changed a 
particular verse because it could have been misunderstood by the Libyan authorities as having a 
                                                          
99The wooden panel used by Libyan students in Quranic schools to practise their writing. On Quranic schools in Libya see 
Cerbella 1943. For a general discussion on Islamic education see Hefner & Zaman 2007. 
political connotation100. Even still, my questions regarding the differences in the hezb were usually 
dismissed rather quickly as not relevant.  In Libyan dialect the word “barnamj” (“program”) broadly 
indicates “routine” or “things you are up to”. Unsurprisingly, therefore, when asked about the 
differences in the hezb Issawis nonchalantly answered that each zawiya had simply its own 
“barnamj”, its own habitual way of doing things101. The same Issawis, however, would refer to the 
hezb as “our hezb”, or the “Issawy hezb”. The hezb, I was told, is a text that belongs to the order in its 
entirety despite differences and variations.  The relation between the litany and the Issawiya as a 
group was reflected even in jokes or indirect statements. Playing with the fact that the Arabic “hezb” 
can also mean “party”, an Issawy shaykh once jokingly told me “our party (our litany/our group) is 
the only political party allowed in Libya!102”  
 
The fact that members of a community might enact the same rituals in slightly different ways has 
been documented in the anthropology of ritual. Nonetheless, very rarely scholars have explicitly 
acknowledged that difference in practices might not particularly trouble the practitioners themselves. 
Generally speaking, anthropologists have noticed that repetition and consistency are not necessarily 
defining aspects of rituals (Goody 1977b:28; Tambiah 1985; Myerhoff 1977: 201), demonstrating 
instead how ritual routine leaves space for re-elaboration of old schemes (Bloch 1987), variations on 
a theme (Fox 1979), creativity (Barth 1987; Csordas 1997), and even surprise (Whitehouse 2000). 
                                                          
100The hezb mentions Idris ben Abdallah, originator of the Idrisid dynasty in Morocco (see chap. 1 footnote 3), but some 
feared that the line could have been mistaken for a reference to King Idris asSanusy, the last king of Libya overthrown by 
Gheddafi in 1969 (see introduction of the thesis page 13). 
101
Though a common word in standard Arabic, in Libya “barnamaj” is ubiquitous term which is used in different ways. 
“Shnu barnamej-ek?” (“what is your program/what are you up to?”), “keifa el barnamj?” (“What is the program/ what is 
the situation?”).  In commenting on the extensive use of the term a Tripolitan computer engineer once jokingly told me 
“in Libya everyone is a programmer”.  
102Following Colonel Gheddafi’s famous indications contained in his “Green Book”, the Libyan political system  does 
not involve political parties since they are seen as “the means by which a narrow majority can usurp the right to speak in 
the name of all” (Davis 1987: 40-44; Gathafi 2005: 8-11; Vandewalle 2006: 103). Broader considerations on the 
relationship between the Libyan government and Sufi orders can be found in chapter four.  
Even though these studies have shown how ritual is much more than a repetitive action that demands 
total conformity (Bell 1992:72-74; Asad 1993: 57-58; Mahmood 2001), they have nonetheless 
emphasised that people can be either disturbed by differences in the ritual performances of their 
communities, or simply not willing to elaborate on them once asked (Barth 1987:5; Fox 1979: 158).  
Issawis, on the contrary, were usually very aware of the variations in the recitation of the hezb, and 
always ready to clarify that differences were simply a normal aspect of the tariqa. At times they even 
patiently sat me down to enumerate all these variations, but never engaging with an idea of ‘official 
text’ that should be performed unanimously by everyone. 
 
Aside from illustrating a genuine openness to variety that will be clearer to the reader by the end of 
this chapter, the perception of the hezb as a common obligation which is carried out in different ways 
clearly testifies to the dynamics of the Issawy discursive tradition. James Laidlaw and Caroline 
Humphrey have argued that the actions involved in a ritual are often regulated by a necessity to 
follow rules rather than by a clear codification of what these rules might be (Laidlaw & Humphrey 
2004: 111-132). Ritual performers, in other words, might be driven more by a need to ‘get the ritual 
right’ than by a desire to systematise the right way of doing so (ibid.). Similarly, Issawis feel the need 
to refer to a common tradition made of rules and obligations, but in performing the obligatory 
recitation of the hezb they also enact the specific peculiarities of each sanad within the order. Even 
though the “great hezb” is portrayed as ‘one’, each version of the litany is in itself a practice that has 
been passed on through a line of shuyukh within a specific sanad. In other words (as often happens 
when it comes to ‘tradition’ - Gilsenan 1990:15; Boyer 1990; Hobsbawm 2003), behind the notion of 
the one hezb there are effectively several traditions that have developed historically. Nevertheless, as 
we have previously seen, the Issawy discursive tradition involves a specific link with a common past, 
and in the case of the hezb this link is anything but vague.  
 
In conversation, shuyukh and muridin were able to contextualise the hezb fairly well within the 
history of the order as a whole. I was told on many occasions that the text was originally written by 
Sidhi al-Jazuli who, as I have previously explained, was the historical originator of the spiritual 
tradition from which the Issawiya blossomed as an independent order103. Occasionally, an Issawy 
shaykh would tell me how one of his predecessors in the sanad (whether his father or a more ancient 
figure) added some verses to the hezb for spiritual reasons.  Shaykh Ramadan, in particular, explained 
to me how (as already noticed by Brunel – 1926: 91) even the Perfect Shaykh and his masters el 
Harithi and asSahli104 enriched the original text with some additional formulas for the request of 
intercession. Nevertheless, shuyukh and muridin always emphasised the continuity between the hezb 
of Jazuli and the hezb recited by the Issawiya, recognising the hezb as a text coming from a common 
Issawy past. Only on one occasion did a shaykh tell me that he had decided to make amendments to 
the litany (changing therefore the version of the hezb that had been passed on to him by his 
predecessor). The shaykh, an educated professional in his late sixties, avoided reciting the formulas 
of intercession from the saints because he wanted to teach his muridin that trusting in God only was 
more important than reciting the hezb in its entirety. Significantly, in a later conversation, the same 
shaykh also explained to me not only that seeking help from the saints was not in itself a negative 
practice, but also that the hezb was characterised by an historical continuity because  Ben ‘Aysa 
“kept (al Jazuli’s text) as it was”.   
                                                          
103
See chap. 1 page 46. The fact that the main body of the litany was not written by the founder of the Issawiya is not 
particularly surprising bearing in mind the fact that the Perfect Shaykh was not exceptionally prolific in terms of literary 
production (Brunel 1926).  
104 See chapter 1 page 46.  
 It is also important to say that Issawis do not debate the differences in the hezb because they do not 
debate the hezb in the first place. On the one hand, the differences in the performance are essentially 
minor. On the other hand, the litany is in a sense an ‘unproblematic’ topic of conversation. Apart 
from having a well-known position in the history of the order, the hezb has also, as explained, an 
explicit pious and devotional content. With its unambiguous references to the Prophet and the pillars 
of Islam the text remains therefore a fundamentally uncontroversial subject. This ‘un-
problematic‘nature of the hezb will be better understood in the next chapter when compared with 
other practices that generate divergent opinions amongst Issawis because of their supposedly ‘less 
explicit’ piety. Nonetheless, for now it is important to highlight that one of the reasons why the hezb 
is portrayed as the Issawy practice par excellence is precisely this overt piety. In diminishing the 
importance of the differences that characterise the hezb in the different zawaya, Issawis portray their 
order not only as a homogenous brotherhood, but also, as we will see later on in the chapter, as an 
unambiguously pious organisation.  
 
So far I have explored ideas of commonality and sanad-specific diversity in Issawy liturgical 
practices. However, in the following section I will show how Issawis do not approach their ritual life 
merely as a matter of doing the same things in different ways. The members of the brotherhood also 
cultivate other ritual discourses. In particular, as I explained in the introduction to the chapter, 
Issawis describe their rituals as performances that, though public, have a secret dimension which is 
not accessible by everyone.  In order to discuss this complex aspect of the Issawiya, I need to engage 
in a more comprehensive discussion of the practices of the order. Even though the hezb is portrayed 
as ‘the’ Issawy ritual, the brotherhood has a rich ritual variety that involves, amongst other things, 
musical performances, and it is on these practices that I will concentrate in order to discuss issues of 
secrecy and publicity. Before doing so, however, I will need to describe the ‘special occasions’ that 
characterise the life of the zawaya since these are the occurrences where Issawy ritual variety takes 
place, becomes visible and, most of all, audible. 
 
2.2 Devotion, Socialisation and lots of Tea (Issawy Special Occasions) 
Even though some zawaya attract a good number of Issawy devotees who might decide to participate 
in the hezb, in Tripolitania the average quantity of attendees during weekly gatherings is usually 
around ten people (occasionally more, often less, mainly muridin). Without a doubt, this datum is 
important for an understanding of the dimensions of the brotherhood. However, it should be also 
kept in mind in order to appreciate that when it comes to Issawy ‘special occasions’ the scenario is 
very different. Following the order in which I present them in this chapter, for reasons of clarity (but 
not the one in which Issawis would necessarily rate them), Issawy special occasions are mainly 
festivals held in honour of a saint and celebrations related to the birthday of the prophet Mohammed. 
It would be wrong to assume that Issawis only spend their time between following the weekly 
routine of the zawiya and participating in these occasions. I have accompanied Issawis to 
recreational visits in the countryside, lounged in the guestroom of their houses, and laughed at their 
jokes (that in Tripolitania for some reason always concern the inhabitants of a specific little town 
whose name I will purposely omit). However, it would be wrong to exclude Issawy ‘special events’ 
from this list of leisure activities. In order to explain how Issawy rituals are moments of ‘secrecy in 
public’, I need to show how these rituals are attended also by non-Issawis. In presenting these 
occasions therefore I will only concentrate on the large participation of occasional attendees that 
characterises them, explaining how these feasts are not only occasions of devotion, but also of 
entertainment. Even though one of the main reasons behind this element of entertainment is music, I 
prefer to give a general overview of these events before taking musical performances into account.  
 
The term “mazar” literally means “place of visitation” (Trimingham 1998: 230; 307), and in many 
Islamic contexts it indicates the shrine of a saint (Lemercier-Quelquejay 1996:306; Gaborieu 1996: 
207).  In Libya however the term does not refer to a place, but to an occurrence. “Mazar” is a word 
that can be used in the broader sense of religious gathering, but also to indicate a festival held in 
honour of a saint, usually in the proximity of a darih (pl. adriah), a saint’s tomb. The Libyan 
landscape is a constellation of saints’ shrines of all dimensions and shapes, from small cubic 
buildings to much larger domed constructions.  Some of them host mazarat while others do not. The 
duration of these festivals can vary greatly, and the dates in which they start might be slightly 
different every year. Usually, when it comes to ancient saints, the dates are set up according to the 
Islamic calendar, as in the case of medieval saint Sidhi el Andalusi whose shrine hosts the longest 
mazar in Tripoli that lasts for a week. However, festivals that commemorate more recent saints 
generally follow the Western calendar, as for the popular festival of Sidhi Ali Budabus celebrated in 
the area of Jamzur, just outside Tripoli, every 12 of July in remembrance of the day of his death in 
1999105.  
 
A Libyan mazar is a pious occasion for many: attendees come to pay a visit to the tomb of the saint, 
sitting close to the shrine in contemplation. However, often the shrine is just an element of the scene, 
and not necessarily the most important. Frequently, people are only able to produce poor accounts of 
                                                          
105Unlike other Arabic countries, in Libya there are officially three calendars. In addition to the Islamic (Hijri) and the 
Western (Miladi) a third calendar that starts from the date of the death of the prophet (632AD) has been introduced by the 
government together with new names for the months of the year  (Bearman 1986:163) In everyday life none seems to use 
this system.  
the life of the saint who is celebrated, and very often they admittedly come to the mazarat only to 
meet other people and have fun. Though ready to identify the broader social implications of saints’ 
festivals (Werbner 2008; Stauth & Schielke 2008), scholars of Islam have generally emphasised the 
devotional character of these events (Hoffman 1995: 101-122). In particular, anthropologists have 
identified processes of sacralisation of locality (Saheb 1998; Takim 2005) highlighting how a festival 
held in honour of a saintly figure is “not just a festival but a ritual” (Werbner 2003:258).  This is 
obviously true since in Libya visiting the shrine of a saint is perceived to be a form of devotional 
pilgrimage, or zyara (Tapper 1990; Werbner 1998; Coleman &Elsner 1995:69-73). Nevertheless, 
recent publications have also stressed the importance of the entertaining aspect of these events, 
explaining how religious festivals can be occasions of leisure, and even playfulness (Coulon 1999: 
196; Schielke 2006: 119-120, 2008). Generally speaking, Libyan festivals are very small events that 
lack the “element of the medieval fair” (Gilsenan 1973:48), or the general vivaciousness that 
characterises the veneration of shrines in other ethnographic contexts (Gilsenan 1973: 50). Even 
though mazarat might take the form of fêtes with clothes’ sellers and tents assembled for the 
attendees, they are usually nothing more than an all-male cosmos of chats, hand-shaking and food 
that takes place in the courtyard of a shrine.106 Yet, Libyan mazarat remain highly sociable occasions 
where people come to eat, talk and enjoy a cup of tea. In a Libyan mazar you will not find the public 
manifestations of moral irreverence that have struck ethnographers dealing with ideas of fun and 
entertainment (Verkaaik 2004; Torab 2007).  Tea, however, is never missing. 
 
                                                          
106
Even though mazarat can be held for female saints, women are not usually present in Libyan saints’ festivals. Issues 
of saint cults and gender in Islam are dealt with in Jeffrey 1979, Basu 1998 and Callan 2008. From my experience (based 
on a 2006 visit to the festival held in honour of the 8th century saint Sayyda Nafisa in Cairo), and by examining the 
literature (Gilsenan 1973, Biegman 1990; Hoffman 1995; Schielke 2003; 2008; Madoeuf 2006) I am under the impression 
that Libyan festivals are generally considerably smaller than Egyptian ones.  
I have countless memories of friends passing by my house to ask if I wanted to go with them to a 
mazar.  At times, they were people who had no interest in Sufi matters whatsoever, while other times 
they were Sufi enthusiasts or people who did not have a specific opinion on Sufi affairs. We would 
usually get inside a car, perhaps stop for a macchiata107 on the way, and, once arrived, have a good 
time. Attendees sit on mats on the ground, while the people who take care of the event carry trays 
transporting small cups of tea (pouring tea from above causes a thin layer of froth which is much 
appreciated). Carbonated soft drinks are omnipresent. Dinner is always served, usually after the 
sunset prayer. The menu can include fruits, couscous, rice, mbakbuka (a pasta meal whose 
onomatopoeic name comes from the noise of the boiling pot) or makaruna108. You are almost forced 
to chat. Conversations cover all sorts of subject. Even when I decided to go to a mazar by myself, I 
have always found a glass of tea and someone to talk with (or, better said, someone has always found 
me). It is when I started to be recognised in all the mazarat I went to in Tripolitania – and when one 
of my friends jokingly stated that I would have gone anywhere as long as the name of the destination 
started with “Sidhi” - that I knew that my network of contacts was solid. Mazarat are occasions of 
strong interaction and socialisation. 
 
The importance of certain saints’ festivals for specific tribal groups has been documented in Libya 
(Peters 1976; Mason 1981) and generally in North-Africa (Marx 1977; Eickelman 1977, 1981). 
However, ethnographic studies have also highlighted how these occasions can often be very inclusive 
events (Gilsenan: 1973: 62; Werbner 2003) and this is certainly the case in the Tripoli district where 
                                                          
107From the Italian “macchiato”:  espresso coffee with milk.  According to my ethnocentric palate, Libya is the Arab 
country where you can find a decent espresso.  
108In Italian “maccaroni” indicates a specific kind of pasta. On eating and fasting in Sufism see Hoffman 1995b. Insightful 
discussions on the relation between food and religiosity can be found in Bynum 1987, Lester 1995. 
the participation in the mazarat is open to different strata of society and to different Sufi orders109. 
Since Sufi zawaya are often built close to - or directly on - the tomb of a saint, sometimes the mazar 
is organised by the brothers of the zawiya that hosts the shrine. Other times, however, the festival is 
put together by people from the local neighbourhood who might not have anything to do with a Sufi 
order. For what concerns the Issawiya, different zawaya, and sometimes different people within a 
particular zawiya have their own habits in relation to saints’ festivals. Some zawaya go every year to 
the same mazar, particularly when they have friendly (or sanad-based110) relations with the zawiya 
that hosts the festival. Others, however, do not go to any at all. Some shuyukh openly distance 
themselves from the crowded nature of these events, as in the case of Shaykh Ramadan who often 
expressed no interest in participating due to the “zahma”, the “crowding” of saints’ festivals. In this 
regard, the Issawy presence in saints’ festivals should be understood in the broader context of the 
flexible mobility that characterises the life of the zawaya. Issawy shuyukh often invite each other on 
the occasion of funerals or births, and sometimes, when the relative of a murid dies, people from 
different zawaya might decide to gather in his house and perform the hezb. These events are flexible 
occasions that might or might not see a large Issawy participation, and in a similar vein mazarat are 
events characterised by a highly variable degree of Issawy presence.111 
 
There are of course festivals where Issawis are more likely to participate either because the saint that 
is celebrated was a member of the order or because the mazar is organised by a particularly popular 
                                                          
109One possible exception might be the mazar of Sidhi Sulayman al Fituri (whose shrine is in the proximities of the Mahari 
Hotel in Tripoli). Sidhi Sulayman is the originator of the seven branches of the Fwatir, the tribe of the famous Libyan saint 
Abdusalam el Asmar (see chapter 1 page 45). I was told that this mazar is particularly dear to members of this tribe, but I 
have not been able to check this information properly.  
110 See previous chapter.  
111 Some Issawis shuyukh might also decide to invite brothers from other zawaya in order to celebrate together a 
recurrence of the Islamic calendar, whether the Isra wal-Miraj (the night journey of the prophet Mohammed to Jerusalem 
and to heaven), Laylat el Qadr (the night of the revelation of the first verses of the Qur’an) or Laylat an-Nus min 
Sha’baan (the night of mid Sha’bban, the month preceding Ramadan). Many Issawy zawaya, however, do not organise 
particular celebrations for these occasions. 
Issawy zawiya. In Tripoli, for instance, members of the brotherhood tend to gather every year in the 
suburb of Tajura to celebrate a mazar at the shrine of Sidhi Ali Jundub, an influential Issawy shaykh 
who died in 1978. Popular amongst Tripolitan Issawis are also the mazarat held in honour of Sidhi al 
Mazri and Sidhi al Kittani, organised by the members of two very important Issawy zawaya that are 
named after these two saints. Worth mentioning, finally, are also two festivals that happen in the city 
of Zlitan the day after the ayd asSaghir and the one after the ayd al Kabyr (the two most important 
festivities of the Islamic calendar). The two mazarat are particularly dear to all Libyan brotherhoods 
since they are dedicated to Sidhi Abdusalam el Asmar (a fundamental figure in Libyan mysticism, as 
previously explained) 112 . Yet, even on these occasions Issawis constitute only a portion of the 
attendees.  These mazarat might attract Issawis, but they are also frequented by members of other 
brotherhoods, and by people who do not usually associate themselves with Sufism. Interestingly, this 
is also the case for what concerns the one festival which bears the most significance for Issawis: the 
celebration for the birthday of the Prophet.  
 
2.3 Poems, Sweets and Parades (The Birthday of the Prophet) 
The only feast that engages the whole of the Issawy order is the celebration of the mawlid annabi’ 
(the “birthday of the Prophet”)113. Like any other birthday, the “mawlid” is celebrated on a precise 
day of the calendar: the 12th day of the Islamic month of Rabya al Aul. For the Issawiya however, the 
                                                          
112
 See Chap. 1, page 45. Sidhi el Asmar’s importance explains not only why two mazarat are held in his honour, but also 
why festivals are organised in the shrines of some of his relatives as well. The shrine of Sayyda Aysha (el Asmar’s 
maternal aunt), for instance, hosts a very popular festival that takes place in the town of Taurgha, near the city of 
Misurata. 
113In other ethnographic contexts the word “mawlid” can indicate a festival held in honour of a saint, particularly when 
celebrated on the day in which the departed holy person was born (Gilsenan 1973). In Libya, however, the term applies 
only to the birthday of the Prophet. For a comprehensive historical analysis of the Prophet’ mawlid in the Islamic world 
see Kaptein 1993 and de Jong 1993. Early ethnographic observations on the mawlid celebrations in Tripoli were recorded 
in Cerbella & Ageli 1949. 
mawlid is not a day but a season.  In every zawiya the commemoration of the mawlid involves a long 
period of preparation that ends with a final celebration called “iom el khatim”, “the final day”.  Each 
zawiya celebrates its “final day” on a different day in a rota, allowing and indeed encouraging other 
Issawis to participate. Often, at least in Tripoli, Issawy shuyukh summon all the zawaya of the city for 
the occasion, so that the mawlid becomes both a zawiya-specific event and a common Issawy affair. 
Brothers of different Issawy zawaya visit each other, devotees of the order become more assiduous, 
and the mawlid strikes the observer as a multiple feast that sets the whole Issawiya into motion. 
Interestingly, even in this time that appears to be so important for the brotherhood, the celebration 
attracts people who do not usually frequent Issawy zawaya during the rest of the year. All of a sudden 
zawaya become full of non-Issawis (both members of other brotherhoods and people without 
particular Sufi inclinations) who come, join in the celebration and enjoy the vibrant atmosphere of the 
feast. 
 
In preparation for the “final day” the members of each zawiya meet regularly for a period of time in 
order to read sections of a long poetic composition in praise of the Prophet which is usually referred 
to as “el Baghdadi”114. The poem mentions episodes from the life of Mohammed, and it is supposed 
to help the muridin entering into the spirit of the feast   (“I cannot know the Prophet if I do not 
listen!” a murid told me once115). Subsequent to the completion of the poem, each zawiya has a small 
parade in the streets of the city. The parades are scheduled on different days, and the participation is 
                                                          
114From the  the name of the author,  shaykh Abdullah Mohammed el Baghdadi (d.266 Hijri). The poem is divided in 
chapters of 21 quintets (groups of five verses) organised according to the letters of the Arabic alphabet. Some zawaya 
prefer to read a similar but more recent poem by Shaykh Ahmed el Bahlul, a famous Libyan Sufi character buried in the 
Sidhi Muneidher cemetery in Tripoli. On the last day of recitation (or on the actual “final day”), some shuyukh might also 
decide to read another popular poem dedicated to the Prophet and written by Imam Jaafar el Barazanji (1834 – 1899). 
This poem (ubiquitously known in Western Libya as “the mawlid”) is also recited during wedding celebrations. The 
families involved in the marriage might ask the brothers of an Issawy zawiya to come and recite it for free, or summon a 
group of semi-professional reciters for a price of 300-400 dinars.   
115 On the relationship between spiritual education and the act of listening (though in a context very different from the one 
I consider here) see Hirshkind 2006. 
often spontaneous: devotees of the order call each other on the phone116 (or text the anthropologist) 
spreading the word that a particular zawiya is “coming out” on a given day. The only zawaya who 
parade on the actual day of the mawlid are the ones of old Tripoli. As shown in the previous chapter, 
the old city hosts the eldest Issawy zawiya in Tripoli, and this might explain why it is the medina that 
initiates the rota of the parades. This tradition might be the fossil of a time when the Issawiya was 
confined between the walls of the medina since there was no Tripoli outside of old Tripoli. If the 
great majority of the zawaya organise little (and at times pretty unnoticeable) processions, the parade 
in the medina constitutes a real urban event that attracts large portions of Tripolitans every mawlid.  
  
The celebration of the mawlid does not involve only the zawaya. In Tripoli children shoot 
firecrackers during and after the feast, Imams deliver sermons against the use of pyrotechnics, and 
housewives prepare great quantities of hasida, a delicious mawlid sweet made of flour, olive oil and 
honey. On the morning of the mawlid, however, the three zawaya of the old medina117 become the 
protagonists of the day. After reciting the hezb, each zawiya starts a procession in the old city 
carrying a standard, shouting out pious slogans and moving according to a different itinerary. In a 
rather theatrical fashion, each parade stops for a symbolic visit of courtesy when passing by the 
building of one of the other two zawaya.  Very soon the inhabitants of the medina start to sprinkle 
perfumed water over the parades from their balconies, while the entire old city becomes crowded 
with occasional attendees. Fathers carry their children on the shoulders, and kids eat sweets made, I 
suspect, only of sugar and food colouring. Using sunglasses and scarves to protect themselves from 
the sun, they join the parade of a particular zawiya, then leave and join another one, or decide to stop 
                                                          
116In recent years the price of sim cards in Libya has become particularly accessible. Sim cards are produced by two local 
companies, and exchanging phone-numbers has become an obligatory social ritual. On mobile phones, religiosity and 
Islam see Rollier 2010. More broadly on Islam and ‘new’ media see Eickelman & Anderson 1999.   
117See Chapter 1 pag.49-50.  
for a chat with an acquaintance. Women stay at distance from the processions, talking amongst 
themselves, and occasionally producing their traditional ‘ululation’118. The streets of the medina are 
so narrow that often one of the parades gets stuck in a corner of the old city for few minutes. At lunch 
time, food is traditionally offered by the attendants of the beautiful 17th century “Mosque of Othman 
Pasha”, one of the most important Ottoman buildings of old Tripoli. One of the zawaya might decide 
to terminate its procession earlier than the other two by leading the crowd outside of the medina into 
the “Green Square”, the central plaza of the city. Usually, however, the parades last until the late 
afternoon, with pauses dictated only by the daily prayers.  
 
The parades of the medina inaugurate a rota of “final days” in the different zawaya. The celebration 
of a “final day” takes place always in the evening (the final day is in fact a final night). If some 
zawaya have their special night on a fixed date every year, others choose a different day every 
mawlid according to organisational necessities. Even though a zawiya can decide to postpone the 
celebration for months after the actual day of the birthday of the Prophet, in Tripoli the interval 
between the various “final days” is reasonably short, so that you can literally find yourself going to 
one every week for a month or two. The atmosphere of a “final day” closely resembles the one I have 
sketched out when talking about saints’ festivals. People who do not manifest any interest in Sufi 
affairs during the rest of the year come to the zawaya to socialise, spend a pleasant evening and enjoy 
themselves.  Zawaya offer food, tea, and khamra (“inebriating”), a sweet that can only be found in 
Issawy gatherings in mawlid time119. Most importantly, Issawy zawaya provide - as I have explained 
                                                          
118 A common expression of joy amongst Libyan women. One could be tempted to think that the practice pre-dates the 
arabisation of the country since it is attested even in the Libyan section of Herodotus’ Histories (Book IV.168-198). 
119
The recipe involves a basis made of hummus, peanuts, almonds, olive oil, honey, sugar, aromas, and - occasionally - 
sesame and dates. However, each sanad (and sometimes each zawiya) adds its own special ingredients to the basis. Like 
so many aspects of Issawy tradition, khamra is a combination of similarities and differences. The brothers read the hezb 
and some Qur’an over the khamra, and then put it in small containers that will be distributed to whoever comes to 
in the introduction to the chapter - Mal’uf music, and this is the one true catalyst that pushes many 
Tripolitans to partake into the Issawy celebrations of the mawlid every year.  
 
Even though Libya has a variety of regional musical traditions, Mal’uf has certainly a central place in 
the soundscape of the country, particularly in Western Libya. Apart from being performed in a number 
of social situations including weddings120, Mal’uf is one of the most popular choices when it comes to 
select music for a car-journey, or to fill up the track list of an Mp3 player. In Tripoli people of 
different age and social status listen to Mal’uf in their recreational time, and this explains why even 
Libyans who are not particularly into Sufism visit the zawaya in mawlid time expecting to listen to 
Mal’uf121. Some Tripolitan zawaya have a particularly good reputation for their Mal’uf, attracting 
therefore both Mal’uf connoisseurs and fans on the occasion of their “final day”. In the Issawy 
zawaya, however, Mal’uf is played in a ritual context. As I will explain in the following section one of 
the most recognisable components of the mawlid seasons is the hadhra: a well known ritual in the 
literature on Sufism that involves involves pious recitations, physical movements and music.  
 
The term (“hadhra”, “presence”) assumes different connotations in the various Sufi traditions 
(Gilsenan 1973: 159; Crapanzano 1973; Hoffman 1995; Trimingham 1998), but in Libya, according to 
many Issawis, it indicates the state of mind of the attendees, who come to the ritual to ‘be present’: to 
elevate their soul in praise of the almighty. Even though some Issawy zawaya perform a hadhra in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
participate in the “last day”. In keeping up with the rota of the “last days”, I had the culinary privilege to taste different 
varieties of khamra.  
120
 In Tripolitania Mal’uf is played in the course of the zaffa, the singing procession that accompanies the groom during 
the wedding (Ciantar 2006: 60). On wedding ceremonies in Libya see Mason 1975 and Abdelkafi 1977. 
121 Generally speaking, young  Tripolitans  have a very diversifieed musical taste that includes American  rock or rap, 
Egyptian, Lebanese or Italian pop , and Libyan reggae (a musical reality that is growing exponentially in Libya). Though 
considered as ‘old music’, Mal’uf is nevertheless largely appreciated by youngsters.  
course of their weekly gatherings during the year, this ritual is usually reserved for special occasions. 
A hadhra can be held in the course of a saint's festival, or to celebrate the birth of a newborn in one of 
the brother’s house. The hadhra, however, is mainly a component of the mawlid celebrations. A few 
days before their “final day”, the brothers of each zawiya start to meet every night in order to perform 
the hadhra, until they celebrate one last, larger hadhra performance on their final day. As I have 
previously explained, the weekly hezb is described as a fundamental part of the Issawy routine and as 
the most important ritual obligation of the order. Nonetheless, the hadhra is the most popular Issawy 
performance, the one that attracts people the most. If the weekly hezb is routine, the hadhra is an 
event. And the hadhra of the “final day” is the main event of the year.   
 
Both saints’ festivals and mawlid celebrations are characterised by a large participation of attendees, 
and by a clear recreational element. Bearing in mind how these occasions are attended by Issawis and 
non-Issawis alike, I will now explore the performance of the hadhra in greater detail. Before doing 
so, however, it is important to remark that participation in the Issawy hadhra is completely open.  
Both members and non-members of the order perform essentially the same actions in the ritual. In a 
sense, this lack of visual differentiation between initiated and occasional participants resonates with 
the ideas of many Issawis who told me how anyone, whether he belongs to a brotherhood or not, can 
receive spiritual gifts in the hadhra122. Nonetheless, the notion that the spiritual power inherent in the 
ritual is limitless (and that it can therefore have an influence on all attendees) is only one aspect of the 
Issawy interpretation of the hadhra. When commenting on the ritual, Issawis also state that even 
though all those who participate in the ritual do the same things, only some understand the ritual in its 
fullness.  
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 “(The hadhra) is performed by men in what are viewed as their primordial, total identities set off from the identities 
and contingent situations of the everyday social world” (Gilsenan 1973: 183).  
 2.4 Recite, Move and Listen (the Hadhra) 
Libyan Issawis (unlike their Algerian and Moroccan counterparts) perform the hadhra as a ritual in 
three parts (Brunel 1926: 112 – 143; Andezian 2001: 107-116).  In the first part the attendees recite 
the “great hezb” in the same manner in which it is performed during the weekly gatherings. Secondly, 
to use a term that can be ubiquitously found in studies on Sufism (Mole’ 1963; Chodkiewicz 1985; 
Schimmel 1994), Issawis perform the dhikr, the “remembrance (of God)”: a prolonged invocation of 
the ninety-nine attributes that Islam traditionally ascribes to Allah (Gimaret 1988; Schimmel 1975: 
177)123. The third part, finally, is the fen (“art”): the performance of Mal’uf music. As I have 
mentioned previously, each zawiya has always a shaush who is responsible for the hezb. However, 
the same is true for the other two parts of the hadhra: a “shaush of the dhikr” takes care of the second 
part of the ceremony, and a “shaush of the fen” looks after the third. The hadhra of the ‘final day’ 
starts in the evening. At the beginning of the ceremony, the attendees gather in the zawiya to recite 
the hezb, which ends with a series of formulaic and spontaneous prayers. After the hezb, there is a 
break in order to allow the attendees to pray the last of the five daily prayers, and perhaps smoke a 
cigarette. When the people come back for the second part of the ritual, they sit on the floor and sing 
poems of religious content (qasaid, sing. qasida)124.   
 
At some point, the shaykh of the zawiya – or the shaush of the dhikr, or even an important non-
Issawy guest - invites the attendees to stand up and form a circle. Subsequently, he recites a well 
                                                          
123The ninety nine “ asma’ Allah al husna, the “most beautiful names of Allah”, include attributes like “latif”,”gentle”, or 
“rahim”, “merciful”. For a broader contextualisation on the divine attributes in Sufi philosophy see Dobie 2010 and Frank 
2009. The importance of these names in Issawy practices will be analysed in the next chapter. Broader anthropological 
reflections on names and naming can be found in Vom Bruck & Bodenhorn 2009.  
124“Qasida” is a specific poetic genre. However, the great majority of my informants used the word rather generically to 
indicate any sort of poem. For a good contextualization of the qasida genre in the complex universe of Arabic poetry see 
Caton 1990.  
known hadith125 concerning the importance of remembering God at all times. The recitation of the 
hadith, as I was often told, reminds the assembly that the ritual they are about to perform is rooted in 
the tradition of the Prophet. The attendees recite the opening sura of the Qur’an three times. Lights 
are dimmed, and incense is burnt. The fragrance of the incense occupies the room, while people begin 
to move slowly, swaying from right to left. Starting from the person in charge, they recite together a 
sigha (pl. sighat), a “formula”. The dhikr is a continuous succession of different codified or 
improvised formulas.  At the beginning the formulas are always chosen by the person who is in 
charge of the dhikr, but at some point someone else (an Issawy, a devotee or an occasional attendee 
who is known in the zawiya) is asked to propose a formula. Even though the first sigha is always “la 
Ilaha illa Allah” (“there is not God but God”), the formulas involve a practically infinite combination 
of the ninety-nine names of God and of pious rhymes, so that every dhikr session is different, unique, 
and open to variation. 
 
After a while there is a division in the congregation. The dhakirin (“those who perform the dhikr”) 
keep on swaying in circle, while the munshidin (“religious singers”)126 group together, sitting at the 
centre of the assembly. There is no particular reason why one should choose one or the other (apart 
from singing abilities, personal preferences or habit), and both members of the order and occasional 
attendees are free to join either of the two groups. Throughout the entire ceremony the munshidin 
sing a series of Mal’uf pieces in order to create a counter tempo with the formulas recited by the 
dhakirin. Together they produce a complicated harmony that does not leave room for silence. After 
three or four minutes the dhakirin change their formula: without interrupting their movements they 
start calling out some of the names of Allah, usually “ya Hay, wa ya Qayyum”, “oh! You the Living 
                                                          
125See Chapter 1, footnote 24.  
126 For a deeper analysis of the term “munshid “see Waugh 1989 and 2005. 
one, oh! You the Self-sustaining”, while the munshidin sing one of the songs from their extremely 
vast repertoire. Munshidin do not take too much time to select a particular Mal’uf song, an 
experienced munshid selects a piece that matches rhythmically with the formulas chosen by the 
dhakirin, and the others follow him.  
 
With time movements become more intense, and as the repetitions become quicker the dhakirin start 
to recite the formulas in a combination of words and emphatic breath: “Allah! (breathe in)  Allah! 
(breathe out)”. If the dhakirin change their formula again, saying, for instance, “Enta el Hoqq!”, “You 
are the Truth!”, then the munshidin select an appropriate song that marries with the formula, perhaps 
“…ashafaa ar-Rasul Allah, ashafaa ya habib Allah”, “…intercede o Prophet of God! Intercede o 
beloved by God!”. As the ritual proceeds, movements change as well. The brothers start leaning back 
and forward, shouting the formulas. The rhythm of the repetition becomes extremely quick until the 
shaykh (or whoever is leading the dhikr) raises his arm saying “La Ilaha illa Allah” (“there is no God 
but God”). The assembly stops. The attendees pause to regain their breath, until one of the more 
experienced munshidin (not necessarily a member of the brotherhood) starts singing an inshad 
(“religious singing”), the solo recitation of a verse from one of the Mal’uf songs, to which the 
assembly collectively replies: “Allah Hay” (“God, the Living one”). This basic unit of the dhikr (a 
series of repetition that ends with an inshad) is repeated a number of times, as a dhikr session can last 
for more than one hour.  
 
The intensity of the ritual grows exponentially, and after a while the formulas are shortened in order 
to keep up with the movements. As soon as the assembly reaches a full coordination  the shaush of 
the dhikr distributes a small hand-drum (the bez) to be played by each one of the attendees at the 
rhythm of the formulas. An appointed person starts playing the cymbals. As the ritual gains sonic 
potency, there is always someone who moves forward leaving the circle, waving his hands with his 
eyes closed, in trance.  Trance (“jedheb”, “being taken”) is quite common, amongst both muridin and 
occasional attendees. The person in trance (“majdhub, “the one who is taken”) is never constrained 
straight away. If, after a while, the shaush of the dhikr thinks that the behaviour of the “taken one” 
can ruin the general atmosphere of the ritual, he tackles him to the floor, holds him down until he 
surrenders, and then whispers a set of pious formulas in his ears that are supposed to help him regain 
consciousness. When the person is back to his senses, the shaush might even impart a massage to 
help him recover.  Meanwhile the ritual does not stop.  
 
With time the synchrony between munshidin and dhakirin reaches completion, and the dhakirin are 
able to resume longer formulas without disturbing the rhythm. The Prophet and Ben ‘Aysa might be 
invoked. “Allah humma salli ‘ala anNabi’, teyyeb el anfas, Ben Aysa shaykna, wali’ Muknas”, 
“God’s blessings on the Prophet who is the best of souls,  Ben Aysa our Shaykh, the Saint of Meknes”. 
When the hadhra reaches this point, it is an emotional detonation. In some zawaya all lights are 
switched off. Large portions of the attendees are free to go to trance. Screaming and growling noises 
can be heard, until the shaykh of the zawiya stops, inviting everyone else to calm down. If someone is 
still in trance, then the shaush might make further use of his ‘re-animation techniques’. The shaykh 
asks a member of the assembly to recite a final spontaneous prayer. People take a break and grab a 
cup of tea, while things are set for the third part of the hadhra: the musical performance, or fen.  
 
At the beginning of the fen a group of amateur musicians that is summoned for the occasion (and that 
can include both Issawis and people who do not usually frequent the zawaya) gathers on one side of the 
zawiya. The musical instruments include the bandir (a single headed drum which is commonly used in 
Issawy parades), the ghyta (a particular kind of shawm), the naqra (a small sized kettle drum), the 
darbuka (a goblet drum) and the nawba (a large drum). The rest of the attendees occupy the space of 
the zawiya sitting dispersed on the floor, or in small groups. The melody is always provided by 
communal singing. It is very rare to find an attendee who does not know at least part of the lyrics by 
heart. The music is called “Mal’uf”, “familiar”, and perhaps not by chance. Often the Mal’uf pieces 
heard at an ordinary wedding are the same that are performed during an Issawy hadhra, and indeed it is 
not uncommon for a groom - particularly but not necessarily one with some Issawy connection – to be 
accompanied in his wedding procession by songs that explicitly mention Ben ‘Aysa. Generally 
speaking, the quantity of attendees who participate in the first part of the hadhra might not be very 
high, but when the fen is played the number grows considerably, and by the end of a mawlid night a 
zawiya can easily host some two hundred people of different age, background and social status. 
 
The fen is divided into different sections or nawbat (sing. nawba)127. Sometimes, particularly on a 
“final day”, a fen-session can last until the early hours of the morning, involving a number of nawbat. 
Generally speaking, Mal’uf is divided into Mal’uf el madah (“Mal’uf of praise”) including songs of 
religious content, and Mal’uf el ghazal (“Mal’uf of courtship”) whose lyrics are centred on love with 
no explicit spiritual connotation128. The Sufi temperament of the music can be detected particularly in 
this second type that, following well-documented literary conventions of Sufi poetry (Schimmel 1982, 
1997; Nurbakhsh 1984: 143; Bruijn 1997: 69; Abbas 2002: 65), presents references to romance, 
drunkenness, and wine. These are supposed to be metaphors of the passionate love the Sufi has for 
God and the Prophet: a love that can bring the mystic to spiritual intoxication. As a shaykh explained 
                                                          
127 Although Ciantar defines a ‘nawba’ as a “suite of songs” (Ciantar 2005), many of my informants used the term to 
indicate a singular song.  
128Even though both kinds can be used in the course of the fen, Issawis prefer to use the first during the dhikr.  
to me once, the Sufi can be “sakran bi khamra ilahiya”, “drunk with divine love”. A famous example 
of this genre is the renowned “Naha el Hamam” (“the Caged Doves”), an extremely popular Mal’uf 
piece which is usually executed towards the end of the fen, and that invites the listener to ‘drink’ from 
the wine of spiritual love: 
 “The Caged doves have cried, 
Oh Nadim129 stand out amongst us, 
Drink your drink merrily 
(Your drink comes) from an ancient beverage, 
From the fermented wine, 
(It is) Sorrel, 
It quenches the thirst, 
A Bride that they have adorned in the darkest hour of the night” 
 
Once again, trance behaviour is very common during the fen amongst both Issawis and non –Issawis. 
Very often, someone who has not stepped inside an Issawy zawiya for years might come to a mawlid 
night and spend a large portion of the fen waving his hands in ecstasy and screaming out unarticulated 
sounds of joy.  Many stand up with their eyes closed, completely “attracted”, often crying. Some 
simply follow the rhythm of the Mal’uf, while others – particularly when the song of choice has a 
vibrant tempo - fall into a violent dance. On one occasion an “attracted” Issawy murid waved his arms 
so violently that his wristwatch unfastened and dangerously flew over the room. When the number of 
people in ecstasy is too high (or if one of the “attracted” refuses to calm down), the shaush might not be 
able to restrain them, and the authority of the shaykh of the zawiya might be required. 
 
The fen is always supervised by the “shaush of the fen”. Attention to musical aesthetics can be very 
high. If the “shaush of the fen” thinks that the musicians are not performing properly – and if he is 
particularly picky or renowned - he might explicitly express his discontent, as in one case where I 
witnessed a shaush declaring that the sound he was hearing from the drummers was as bad as the 
                                                          
129A common male Arabic name here used to indicate the wine-bearer.  
noises of the copper market of the old medina. The fen of the “final day” is a joyful, animated and 
jubilant moment. Sometimes the drum players allow themselves a short drum solo during the 
performance, and the emphasis is so strong that often they break the skins of their drums. When the 
music stops the hadhra is over. Tea is served and greetings are exchanged. It is the end of the vivacious 
mawlid season of an Issawy zawiya, and it is therefore time to participate in the “final days” of other 
zawaya. One can almost feel a comradely atmosphere around. Nevertheless, according to many Issawis, 
only a small percentage of the attendees has actually understood what has happened during the ritual.  
 
2.5 Things that others cannot see (Secrecy as Identity) 
When assessing the hadhra, Issawis make a series of differentiations, all of which imply that the 
ritual, though public, has a hidden (or less visible) dimension that is not accessible to everyone. The 
first and more immediate demarcation (one which was vocalised by shuyukh, muridin and often even 
devotees) concerns the very structure of the ritual. Issawis unanimously say that the first two parts of 
the hadhra (the hezb and the dhikr) are the most important parts of the ritual, while dismissing the 
musical performance of the fen as a less significant moment. This consideration is of fundamental 
importance for a understanding the way in which Issawis articulate the relationship between their 
identity and their rituals, particularly when bearing in mind that the majority of the occasional 
participants of the hadhra come to join the ritual only during the Mal’uf performance. By claiming a 
superiority of hezb and dhikr over the musical performance Issawis stress how the aesthetic 
component of the hadhra should be taken into account only within the spiritual framework of the 
brotherhood. In other words, Issawis imply – and often express - a differentiation between those who 
come only to listen to good Mal’uf music, and those who, being close to the brotherhood, appreciate 
what the ritual is really about.  
 As I have previously shown, the hezb has an important role in the tradition of the brotherhood, one 
that is explained, amongst other factors, by its explicitly pious content and by the strong position it 
enjoys in the history of the order. Similarly, the dhikr, apart from being an omnipresent component of 
Sufi rituals all over the Islamic world (Netton 2000; Werbner 1996, 2003)130, is accompanied by the 
recitation of a hadith of the Prophet that affirms both the pious nature and the strongly ‘Islamic’ 
character of the second part of the ritual131. The musical performance, however, is described by 
Issawis as practice that bears a weaker link with both the Issawy tradition and the pious roots of 
Islam. Though always ready to clarify that Mal’uf is essentially Sufi music, Issawis are unanimously 
adamant in explaining that, unlike the litany of the hezb, the fen was not performed at the time of the 
founder of the order132. Furthermore, Issawis talk about the fen as a moment in the ritual that has a 
less explicit spiritual quality because it can be easily mistaken for pure entertainment.  This is not to 
say, of course, that hezb and dhikr have an explicit virtuousness that would be apparent to every 
Muslim, while the fen does not. Nor it is to say that Issawis are not proud of their musical traditions.  
However, this is to infer that, in privileging the ‘pious’ part of the hadhra, Issawis make a precise 
statement on the nature of their own tariqa. In diminishing the importance of music,  Issawis define 
the brotherhood  not only as an entity which is more concerned with spiritual matters than with 
                                                          
130 “...Dhikr...is the pivot of mysticism” (Trimingham 1998:194). 
131‘Dhikr’ (understood as the conscious attempt to ‘remember God’) is a well known Quranic principle (Schimmel 1975). 
The necessity to’ remember God’ is mentioned extensively in the holy book, for instance in Sura 33, 41 (“remember God 
with frequent remembrance and glorify him morning and evening”). Issawis often quote verses like this in order to stress 
the orthodoxy of the dhikr.  
132 Similar statements make a reconstruction of the process through which Mal’uf music came to be part of the ritual an 
extremely difficult endeavour. All we know it that “it was the Issawiya brotherhood that maintained the tradition of the 
Mal’uf in Libya” (Ciantar 2006: 58). Interestingly, Issawis often say that the Libyan Issawiya has kept on attracting 
people throughout the centuries largely because of music. The Issawy order is characterised by the deployment of 
musical performances also in other geographical contexts (Lortat-Jacob 1986; Slyomovics 1991: 183, Rouget 1985: 310-
311), but it is only in Libya that the brotherhood has developed a link with Mal’uf.  
aesthetic entertainment, but also as an organisation that measures the importance of its rituals 
according to their relationship with a specific tradition. Similarly, in highlighting the importance of 
those ritual practices whose origin can be traced to the textual apparatus of Islam, Issawis describe 
Issawiya as solidly based on Islamic orthodoxy133.  
 
Mal’uf is a deeply rooted zawiya tradition, as demonstrated by the fact that the great majority of 
amateur Mal’uf musicians (whether members of the brotherhood or not) learn how to play in the 
zawaya. In my interviews with Issawis, however, appreciations of Mal’uf were always accompanied 
by a devaluing of the third part of the hadhra. On many occasions Shaykh Ramadan demonstrated a 
sophisticated artistic palate, whether in appreciating a gracious Ottoman building in the medina or in 
commenting on the beauty of a piece of music (be it Western classical music, Mal’uf or traditional 
Arabic material). Nonetheless, Ramadan also explained to me that love for music should pave the 
way for a deeper interest in spiritual affairs. When I asked him why the hadhra was such a 
complicated ritual Ramadan responded saying that “the hadhra is art...not a simple thing”. However, 
he also added that shuyukh who are interested in the more spiritual aspects of the brotherhood are 
usually not particularly gifted with musical skills. When commenting on the relationship between 
Mal’uf and the zawaya, an Issawy shaykh in his seventies once told me how his stuttering grandfather 
was so fond of music that, having been asked to witness in a case of homicide, he resolved to 
overcome his speech impediment by singing his answers in Mal’uf fashion. Yet, the same shaykh 
promptly added that music is not particularly important for Issawis. Similarly some muridin admitted 
to me that the first reason that pushed them to visit the zawaya before joining the order was Mal’uf 
music, and then quickly specified that once initiated into the brotherhood they started to come to the 
zawiya for the important rituals, like the dhikr.  
                                                          
133This aspect will be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapter.  
 In differentiating between those who participate in the hadhra for musical entertainment and those 
who appreciate the real significance of the ritual, Issawis portray the hadhra as a ritual that, though 
public, is understood only by a few. This differentiation, of course, is not entirely representative of 
the real state of affairs of many zawaya. It is undeniable, for instance, that a number of Issawis 
neglects the pious part of the ritual (or even the weekly hezb) and effectively only come to the zawiya 
when Mal’uf music is performed. Nonetheless, even those Issawis who frequented the zawaya only 
when the hadhra was performed always highlighted to me both the lesser importance of music and 
the fact that people might mistake the ritual for an occasion to have fun. This clearly shows how the 
notion that Issawy rituals are more than enjoyable occasions does not prevent Issawis from 
participating in the activities of their zawaya for entertainment. When bearing this in mind, portraying 
non-Issawis as people who are only after fun might seem to be a mere rhetorical device used by 
Issawis to define themselves as pious Sufis. Nevertheless, in my interviews with a number of non-
Issawy attendees, many effectively told me that the only reason that pushed them to take part in the 
hadhra was the music, since they either did not have any interest in zawaya affairs, or were in fact 
critical towards Sufism134. 
 
 It is also important to say that Issawis do not simply differentiate between those who understand the 
spiritual significance of the hadhra and those who do not.  Members of the order also claim that both 
the lyrics and the music of Mal’uf (though not of fundamental importance in the broader scheme of 
Issawy ritual life) have a secret dimension that not everyone would understand. If on the one hand 
Issawis claim to be those who pay respect to the important part of the hadhra, on the other hand they 
                                                          
134As I will show later in the thesis a large number of Tripolitans have a critical attitude towards Sufism. Even though I 
will deal with this in chapter four, for now it suffices to say that many of those who conceptually oppose Sufism 
participate nonetheless in Mal’uf performances in the zawaya.  
also argue that they have the tools to understand that even the less significant part of the ritual is more 
than mere entertainment. Generally speaking, all Issawis tend to describe the music in the hadhra as 
nothing more than a moment of “taruih ennfas”, “relaxation of the soul”. Mal’uf is therefore 
supposed to relieve the attendees from the physical and spiritual fatigues of the first two parts of the 
ritual. At the same time, however, some Issawis particularly value the historical link between Mal’uf 
and Sufism, arguing that since many Mal’uf pieces were initially composed as Sufi poetry they 
contain, as I have previously explained, mystical concepts expressed in a metaphorical manner.  
While being publicly performed, therefore, Mal’uf pieces have, in the words of some of my 
informants, a “manaa thani”, “a second meaning” which is not apparent to everyone135.  
 
In the case of the aforementioned “the Caged Doves”, for instance, the song contains, according to 
some Issawis, a secret symbolic meaning. Shaykh Ramadan explained to me how doves mate only 
once in their life-time. According to Ramadan, if a dove is separated from her partner and put into a 
cage, she grieves loudly and desperately, until eventually she lets herself die out of sorrow.  Bearing 
this in mind, the allegory of the dove is a powerful representation of the human soul which longs for 
his maker, crying in anguish until it finds peace in God. “The caged doves” is therefore, in the words 
of some of my informants, a “nawba li ‘anda sirr”, “a Mal’uf piece with a secret”. Other examples 
concern, for instance, the metaphorical use of the female given name ‘Layla’ in the Mal’uf corpus. 
Even though, as Shaykh Ramadan put it, many might be thinking about their girlfriend when the 
name is mentioned in the lyrics of a mellow Mal’uf piece, praising the beauty of Layla (often 
portrayed as a woman dressed in black) indicates in fact spiritual admiration for the Ka’aba (the 
                                                          
135In differentiating between the pious  part of the ritual and the entertaining one, Issawis do not see ‘ethics’ and 
‘aesthetics’ as completely distinct, but only the first as more important than the second.  For philosophical reflections on 
the relation between ethics and aesthetics see Wittgenstein 2005.  
black-draped building which represents the holiest site of Islam in Mecca - Ayoub 1992: 259-260)136.  
According to a number of Issawis, even though the great majority of the attendees of the hadhra 
might be familiar with the lyrics of Mal’uf, only some are able to relate to their secret meaning since 
they contain “kalam el arrifin”, “words that are understood only by those who know”.  
 
As I have previously explained, both Issawis and occasional attendees often go into trance during 
either the dhikr or the fen. According to some of my Issawy informants, however, while occasional 
attendees can be “attracted” at any given moment of the ritual, Issawis tend to go to trance when 
verses holding a particularly powerful secret meaning are recited, and principally when “the caged 
doves” is played. Interestingly, it is not just members of the order who expressed the opinion that 
Sufis had a privileged understanding of Mal’uf songs. The most influential Libyan Mal’uf performer 
alive, Hasan Areby (a recurrent presence in Libyan state television and a well known personality 
amongst North-African connoisseurs of Andalusian music) told me in the course of a brief interview 
how he considered himself a sympathiser of Sufism. He also added that Mal’uf has a hidden spiritual 
meaning that only few can appreciate, so that “when you see a Sufi listening to Mal’uf and going to 
trance (ijdhib), it is because he knows the real meanings of the lyrics”. Doubtlessly, the view of 
Mal’uf as symbolic language creates interesting parallels with other ethnographic debates concerning 
the deployment of metaphors in public occasions. Studies of oral poetry and rhetoric, for instance, 
have highlighted how the public use of veiled references is often aimed at addressing an audience 
within the audience, creating subtle divisions between those who understand and those who do not in 
the course of a performance (Rosaldo 1973, 1984; Abu Lughod 1985; 1986; 1990). However, some 
amongst Issawis and Issawy sympathisers also explained to me how the secret of the ritual did not 
reside only in the lyrics, but also in the music itself.  
                                                          
136Examples of Sufi poetry using female names as metaphors for spiritual concepts can be found in Lings 1961:106. 
 From the point of view of the musical texture, the songs of Mal’uf follow (like all Arabic music) 
specific maqamat (sing. maqam, “levels”). Maqamat are melodic patterns that are combined in the 
course of the performance in order to achieve a continuous alternation of melancholic, joyful, calm 
and vibrant tonal modes (Frishkopf 2001; Van der Linden 2001; Racy 2003)137. In discussing the 
deployment of the different maqamat with Mal’uf musicians, I was told that each maqam, due to its 
specific rhythmic qualities, is supposed to affect the listener in a different way, inspiring from time to 
time feelings of pious contemplation or passionate agitation in the audience. The idea that different 
melodic patterns can produce different states of mind is a well-known concept both in classical 
Arabic musicology, and in the ethnomusicology of the Middle-East (Racy 2003: 100-225). What is 
interesting to notice, however, is that according to some Issawy devotees, when the Sufis listen to a 
specific vibrant maqam called Muhayyer they cannot help going into ecstasy. While occasional 
attendees might go into trance with all melodic patterns, Sufis are thought to have a particularly 
strong response to the Muhayyer frequency (which incidentally is the one of “the Caged Doves”). 
This happens because, in the words of an Issawy devotee, Sufis are “sensitive people” who are 
particularly touched by the vivacious rhythm of the Muhayyer pattern138.  
 
Whether with a stress on lyrics or on music, many of those who answered my questions on Issawy 
rituals expressed the opinion that the hadhra had certain dynamics that only Sufis could understand 
or perceive. In the earlier phases of my field-work, for instance, when I was still far from grasping the 
                                                          
137 According to some of my informants out of the seventy-five maqamat codified in Arabic music, Libyan Mal’uf 
deploys only thirteen. Each maqam has a specific name and it is based on a specific tonality (Rast, Noua and Ajam are 
melodic patterns in C; Baiati, Saba, Hijaz, Asbahan, Husayni, Maia and Muhayyer in D; Sika and Huzam in E; Jaharka, 
finally, in F). Each one of them is sub-divided into naghamat or sub-tonalities that help coloring the musical piece and 
enlarge the spectrum of rhythmical possibilities.  
138A similar notion can be found in Moroccan Sufism, particularly amongst members of the Hamadsha brotherhood 
(Crapanzano 1973: 95;204).  With regards to the music used in their rituals Hamadsha believe that each person is 
responsive to a particular tune that, when played, can generate trance and ecstasy (ibid.). 
subtle but potent difference between disciples and devotees, I sat close to a person in the course of a 
Mal’uf session, encouraged by the promisingly open expression of his face. I enquired about one of 
the participants in the rite, who appeared to be in ecstasy, completely “attracted”, and he told me that 
the man was an Issawy.  Perplexed, I asked him “what are you then?”. He replied that he was only a 
devotee of the brotherhood, making sure that I understood the fundamental difference implied in the 
statement. My new friend was enjoying the atmosphere, and singing the Mal’uf lyrics he knew by 
heart. With the Issawy, however, there was something secret at work. All the times I have participated 
in the hadhra in a zawiya, I was always allowed to take pictures or tape. As soon as a conspicuous 
number of Issawis went to trance, however, the shaykh of the zawiya would always send someone to 
tell me to switch off my camera. On one occasion, I was explicitly asked “not to photograph the 
Issawiya” even though amongst those in trance there were both Issawis and non-Issawis, almost in an 
attempt to leave the secret undisturbed, hidden (paradoxically) under everyone’s eyes.   
 
It is also important to clarify that, although the idea that Mal’uf lyrics have a secret meaning is fairly 
diffused, not all Issawis necessarily see the music of the hadhra as carrying a secret message. When 
commenting on the metaphorical aspect of Mal’uf, for instance, a young educated Issawy in his 
twenties urged me to realise that the meaning of certain Mal’uf metaphors is understood even outside 
of Sufi circles, as in the case of the popular image of “wine” as a symbol of love139.  Nevertheless, 
both those Issawis who stressed the esoteric dimension of Mal’uf and those who did not often 
articulated the experience of trance (or “jedheb”) in terms of secrecy (and more specifically secrecy 
in public). As I have previously explained, in the Issawy understanding “secret” ( or “sirr”)  is not 
                                                          
139Though certainly true, this statement should not be exaggerated. A thirty year  old Tripolitan (a big fan of Mal’uf  with 
no interest in Sufism)  told me that  Mal’uf pieces refer to “wine” simply because they were composed in ancient 
Andalusia, a rich land full of vineyards where materialistic decadence pushed the faithful to consume alcohol. Criticism 
towards Sufism will be dealt with in chapter 4.  
just a piece of concealed information, but also the mysterious force that makes the practices of the 
brotherhood effective. Even though the first aspect of “sirr “with regards to the lyrics of Mal’uf was 
highlighted only by some Issawis, the second was expressed by virtually all of them. The “sirr” of the 
ritual (understood as the force that might push some of the attendees to go into trance) was always 
referred to as something that operates in an invisible, and therefore secret, way140.  
 
When I asked why people went into trance during the dhikr, shuyukh always told me that the 
remembrance of God starts with the tongue (“lisana”), but that through vocal repetition the love for 
God slowly enters the heart (qalb), and consequently generates movements in the body (jism) because 
“el mahabba tataharra”, “love generates heat”. The attendee of the dhikr who follows the 
movements of the assembly to the point of losing consciousness was therefore described to me as 
someone who remembers God “bi jismha”, “with his body” 141. Similarly, both the music and the 
lyrics of Mal’uf were often described as something that “harraka el qalb”, “moves the heart”, or 
“tkush el qalb tul”, “enters the heart straight away”.  As an Issawy shaykh explained to me, when the 
Sufi listens to Mal’uf he goes into trance because he reaches a “tauazm beina al sod al jamil wa al 
kalaam” (“a balance between the beautiful sound of music and the lyrics”) that pushes him to lose 
control of his body to the point that “isir raqs (“a dance takes place”). Generally speaking, Issawis 
always made sure that I did not give too much importance to trance since, to quote the shaykh of a 
popular Issawy zawiya in the city of Misurata, “the inner state of the person in the hadhra is not the 
basis of Sufism”. “Attraction”, I was often told, is in the end a form of spiritual recreation. When in 
trance, the Sufi, tired from the hardship of a devoted life, can completely relax (“taruih”) in God. 
                                                          
140This double meaning of ‘sirr’ will be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapter.  
141The hadhra is often described as “ryadha ruhaniya” (“spiritual exercise”). The Arabic “ryadha” refers explicitly to 
physical exercise (more specifically to “sport exercise”). Incidentally (and quite ironically) “ryadhi”, “sporty”, is the 
name of a popular brand of cigarettes in Libya.   
Nevertheless, Issawis also always clarified that there was a difference between true and false 
“attraction”, and that this difference, being invisible to external observers, was in the end secret.  
 
Though unanimous in describing “attraction” as relaxation of the spirit, Issawis always differentiated 
between spiritual ecstasy and trance generated by non -spiritual factors. In the first case, as a large 
number of Issawy shuyukh and muridin explained to me, the “attracted” can receive spiritual gifts 
from God, be it a feeling of spiritual bliss or the realisation of a deep inner peace that goes beyond 
consciousness. In the second, however, trance is only a highly emotional state with no spiritual 
connotation, or even worst, mere pretence142. Even though these two states are understood as being 
inherently different, they also portrayed as being similar from the outside. The reason for this is that, 
as a shaykh explained to me, “in the hadhra God gives (spiritual) things to the muridin privately... 
things that others cannot see”. More than once Shaykh Ramadan repeated to me that understanding 
whether a particular person was truly “attracted” or simply emotionally moved was impossible for an 
observer. Even amongst members of the brotherhood, I was told, some go into trance only because of 
“istiriya”, (“hysteria”). In this respect, the hadhra is understood as being ‘secret’ not only because 
there are secret dynamics that only Sufis can understand, but also because the spiritual force of the 
ritual operates, in the end, in secret.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analysed both the ritual routine and the special ritual occasions of the Issawy 
zawaya. In doing so, I have identified how Issawy ritual practices mirror the dynamics of the Issawy 
discursive tradition that I have delineated in the first chapter. In particular, I have shown how even 
though members of the Issawy brotherhood perform their rituals in a different way they nonetheless 
                                                          
142On pretence in relationship with trance see Lambek 1981: 41. 
portray the Issawiya as having common ritual obligations. As I have also shown, in highlighting how 
these obligations are rooted both in Issawy history and in the sources of Islamic doctrine, Issawis 
describe their brotherhood as being homogenous, pious and orthodox. With the purpose of further 
exploring Issawy rituality, I have finally illustrated how Issawis see their ritual as a combination of 
publicity and secrecy. Above all, I have demonstrated how Issawy rituals are described as having 
secret dynamics that nevertheless takes place publicly. Apart from showing the importance of the 
‘secret’ in Issawy discourses, this consideration clarifies that secrecy is not simply the conscious 
attempt to keep a body of secrets hidden from the public. Quite differently, Issawy secrecy involves 
the realisation that there is a mystery, the belief that people might be looking at it without recognising 
it, and the notion that Sufis are those who deal with it. Bearing this in mind, I will now move into a 
more detailed discussion on this two-fold understanding of secrecy as secret knowledge and as 
acknowledgment of the mystery. More specifically, I will show how Issawis are unanimous in 
appreciating the second, but have different opinions when it comes to qualifying the first. If in this 
chapter we have seen how members of the order stress the commonality and homogeneity of their 
practices, in the next we will see how the notion of secret knowledge pushes Issawis to take radically 
different positions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
“THERE ARE NO SECRETS” 
        Spiritual exercises, Miracles and Esoteric Knowledge  
 
 
 
 
 
 The murid and I were sitting on a bench, somewhere in the centre of Tripoli. A couple of months before we had 
seen a miracle, and we were talking about it. The marvel had taken place in the course of a large Issawy 
gathering. I asked the murid if on that occasion the Issawis had felt the need to perform a miracle because I, an 
Italian, was there. Libya is full of stories of Sufis stabbing themselves in front of Italian officers without 
receiving any harm: the miracle was supposed to demonstrate the truth of Islam to the colonisers. I asked the 
murid if the Issawis had made me witness something similar because they wanted me to convert. I told the murid 
that the thought of people hurting themselves because of me had left me unsettled ever since. With his typical 
nonchalance, he replied that they would have done it even if I had not been there. After a while, I left him, and I 
went home. Later on, I happened to think that my guilt might have been merely based on arrogance. Perhaps my 
presence as an ethnographer was less consequential than I would have liked to admit. Perhaps Culture is always 
stronger than Ethnography. Perhaps it will always show itself to you, fiercely, regardless of what you might 
think or do.    
 
 
Secrecy without Secrets (Introduction) 
So far I have shown how heterogeneity does not raise any concern amongst members of the order. In this 
chapter, however, I will dwell on a set of practices that spawns conflicting positions when it comes to 
define the best way of being an Issawy. All members of the brotherhood agree that a specific secret 
knowledge has been handed down over time within the Issawiya, but clash over whether this knowledge 
should be used or not. Issawy esoteric knowledge, as we will see, involves a series of secret formulas that 
are supposed to bestow a supernatural invulnerability and the capacity to assume the strength and agility 
of certain animals. If some members of the order condone public performances of these’ miracles’ (or 
“karamat”), the majority of them believe that these practices are somehow in conflict with the dictates of 
Qur’an and Sunna143. Even though this dynamic would push us to conclude that the Issawiya has moved 
towards a ‘disenchanted’ and literalist understanding of Sufism, in this chapter I will demonstrate that this 
                                                          
143The tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, see introduction footnote 3.  
would be an incorrect analysis of Issawy religiosity. In particular, I will show that those Issawis who 
condone karamat and those who reject them share an equally strong belief in the supernatural and an 
equal diligence in following the texts of Islam.  In doing so, I will demonstrate that the difference 
between the two does not lie in their degree of ‘enchantment’ or in their level of ‘textuality’ but in the 
ways in which they present their relationship with the uncanny and with ‘the text’ and, therefore, in their 
rhetoric of self-representation. In particular, I will explore the significance of the fact that some Issawis 
include the notion of secret knowledge in this relationship while others do not.  
 
As I have previously demonstrated, the Issawy conceptualization of ‘secret’ (“sirr”) indicates both a body 
of secret information and the mysterious spiritual dynamics Sufism is concerned with.  Bearing this in 
mind, in this chapter we will look at the different ways in which members of the order position 
themselves within this paradigm. If those Issawis who condone esoteric knowledge see a continuity 
between the two facets of ‘sirr’, those who reject it stress a difference between the secret (as baraka144, a 
power whose mechanics are mysterious), and secrets (as concealed knowledge that allows this power to 
be accessed). If the first approach  the mystery through secrecy, the second explain that they have a 
privileged rapport with the secret world of the invisible but no secrets to keep. Though ready to admit that 
the brotherhood has used esoteric knowledge to perform wonders in the past, these Issawis explain that 
the tariqa is now concerned with other kinds of miracles. In stressing how the Issawiya is a path of 
spiritual formation, they explain that the order provides miraculous healing of the soul due to its spiritual 
liaison with the mysteries of baraka, and not ambiguous gifts like ‘becoming animal’. Far from denying 
the existence of the miraculous, therefore, the majority of the Issawis simply clarify that miracles are 
beneficial manifestations of the secret, and not obscure manifestations of a knowledge made of secrets.  
 
                                                          
144The spiritual power that, amongst other things, makes shaykh-hood effective (see chapter 1 pag 68-69). 
The esoteric dimension of Sufi miracles has occupied a number of anthropological works. In dealing with 
different aspects of Islamic mysticism, this vast ethnographic corpus has shown that Sufi wonders are not 
simply supernatural gifts that come with piety (Gilsenan 1973; Van der Veer 1992: 561; Hoffman 1995; 
Pinto 2004) but also fruits of a ‘secret’ that is known to the wonder-maker but mysterious for the common 
man (Brenner 1984: 52; Sengers 2000, Soares 2005: 127-152). Nonetheless, these publications offer little 
theoretical help when it comes to analyse the different ways in which Issawy approach secrecy. In their 
analytical frameworks these scholars of Sufism have mainly treated ‘the secret’ as a synonym for secret 
information (Brenner 1984: 105; Soares 1996:742, 2005: 127-152; Flueckiger 2006, 2008: 178). 
However, as shown by the Issawy case, secrecy is an aspect of the supernatural that Sufis articulate and 
fashion in different manners according to a different ‘rhetoric of secrecy’.  It is these different rhetorics 
that allow Issawis to portray themselves as heirs of a secret tradition of miraculous powers, or as pious 
Sufis who derive miracles from the ‘secret’ without resorting to concealment.  
 
The notion of miracles as proof of divine favour has been extensively accounted for in the study of Islam 
(Fierro 1992: 240; Loebenstein 2003). Nevertheless, scholars have also noticed that in order to be counted 
as signs of grace miracles need to be recognised as such (Lewis 1947; Locke 1958; Gilsenan 1990; Ewing 
1997). Though exhibited as irrefutable proof or described as exceptional experiences (Dilthey 1976: 210; 
Turner 1986; Abrahams 1986; Csordas 1994b, 2002), miracles have to be presented as something other 
than coincidences, fabrications or diabolic manifestations (Gaffney 1988; Ewing 1994; Corner 2005; 
Weddle 2010) according to culturally specific paradigms of truthfulness (James 1995). Supernatural 
deeds, therefore, are always accompanied by specific discourses (Granoff 1996), exegeses (Tambiah 
1984:325,330; Dempsey 2008) and various tools of persuasion (Csordas 1997: 153, 2002: 11-57) that are 
used to portray miracles as miracles (Levi-Strauss 1963: 180; Weber 1968: 49).  Far from being simple 
accounts of the uncanny, however, these ‘discourses of the miraculous’, are rhetorical operations that can 
be used to highlight certain features of the supernatural at the expense of others (Gilsenan 1990: 75-94, 
2000; Ewing 1997: 180). Like any other aspect of the miraculous, secrecy is therefore a rhetorical trope 
whose aspects can be selectively emphasised. If some Issawis refer to the ‘secret’ both as mystery and as 
concealment of knowledge, the majority of them describe it mainly as a spiritual connection with the 
unfathomable.  
 
This diversity in the’ rhetoric of secrecy’ sheds light on a broader difference in the discourses Issawis use 
to legitimise their practices. Those Issawis who reject esoteric knowledge emphasise that regardless of 
what the order used to do in the past, now it deals only with educational techniques that are explicitly 
legitimised by the Qur’an and derived from Quranic material. Though concerned with mysterious 
spiritual dynamics, they stress the unambiguous legitimacy of Issawy praxis, dismissing karamat as 
having no clear basis in textual orthodoxy, and no overt pedagogical purpose.  Issawis who perform 
karamat, however, take equally good care in showing their rootedness in the Qur’an and spiritual 
formation, though in a different way. More specifically, they clarify that secret formulas for the 
acquisition of invulnerability and animal powers work according to a spiritual principle that is attested in 
the holy book.  Furthermore, they also explain that if one experiences these practices he realises their true 
secret: that they are powerful spiritual exercises aimed at helping him to follow the dictates of the Qur’an. 
Though all are concerned with ‘the text’, Issawis therefore make different rhetorical choices in presenting 
their relationship with it. Those Issawis who value secret formulas explain that esoteric knowledge is both 
a textual corpus rooted in the holy book and an experiential knowledge whose legitimisation and 
educational capacity lie in the secrecy of personal experience. The majority of the Issawis, on the 
contrary, describe karamat as not being ‘explicit enough’ in their textuality and pedagogical purpose, and 
therefore as not fitting within their paradigm of overt textual orthodoxy with no secrets. 
 
In describing karamat as being both ‘textual’ and ‘non textual’ Issawis who perform secret formulas 
legitimise the secrecy of their praxis.  Conversely, by dismissing karamat as practices that are not ‘fully 
textual’ the majority of the Issawis show themselves as orthodox Sufis who have no secrets. Claims of 
textuality (or lack of it) appear therefore as part of a broader attempt to justify a set of practices. Apart 
from showing the complexity that distinguishes the Issawy approach to secrecy, this consideration is 
particularly important because it highlights some limitations that characterise anthropological reflections 
on knowledge. Generally speaking, anthropologists have preferred to dwell on the difference between’ 
textual’ and ‘non textual’ rather than on reasons why people ascribe knowledge to one of these two 
categories. Ethnographers studying skilled trades and craftsmanship, for instance, have distinguished 
between experiential knowledge (being non-verbal, but not necessarily un-reflexive - Portisch 2010; 
Downey 2010; Ingold 2010) and other forms of knowledge that require textuality, whether oral or written 
(Marchand 2001: 17-26, 179, 2003, 2010). If some have insisted that ‘the textual’ and the ‘non-textual’ 
constitute two distinct realms (Bloch 1986; Marchand 2001: 149-183; Marchand 2009; Graw 2009, Rice 
2010), others have shown that the means of acquisition of these two types of knowledge are similar 
(Cohen 2010) demonstrating that the ‘experiential’ can influence the ‘textual’ and vice versa (Rappaport 
1979: 173-221; Rosaldo 1984; Lambek 1992, 1998: 112-120; Jackson 1989: 136; Csordas 1994:12; 
Strathern & Lambek 1998; Kresse &Marchand 2009: 2). In both cases, however, ethnographers have 
taken these two categories for granted without exploring the rhetorical operations people make in 
applying them.  
 
Similar limitations can be found in the works of anthropologists dealing with regimes of knowledge 
amongst Muslim communities (Lambek 1990b). Even though these scholars have noticed that the 
acquisition of ‘Islamic knowledge’ can  involve bodily techniques (Lambek 1993:396; Zaman 2002: 38-
59) non-textual skills (Lambek 1990), and intertwinement of orality and literacy (Messick 1993) they 
have also identified Islam as a textual entity which is different from forms of purely experiential religious 
knowledge (ibid. Lambek 1995: 263-267, 1993: 12, 19, 63) because the two “cannot be put in the same 
language” (Lambek1995:267).  Doubtlessly, these anthropologists have noticed that the ‘textual’ and the 
‘experiential’ occasionally meet, particularly when it comes to certain forms of Islamic spirituality 
(Mahmood 2005:158) including Sufism (Lambek 1995: 276; Marchand 2001: 72-74, 95, 182; Werbner 
2003: 29; Pinto 2005). However, they have not explored the question of why people categorise 
knowledge in one of the two types, and ignored that ‘textuality’ is - as the different Issawy approaches to 
secrecy show - a contested category.  
 
The Issawy case also compels to look at the ‘rhetoric of textuality’ rather than at the difference between 
textual and non -textual, and this consideration is particularly useful not only for what concerns broader 
debates on knowledge and Islam, but also more specifically for the anthropology of secrecy. 
Anthropologists dealing with non-Islamic contexts, for instance, have shown that ritual secrecy often does 
not involve secrets to be revealed, but only actions without verbal exegesis (Barth 1975, 1987: 26; Herdt 
2003: 141-158, 219). In demonstrating that the meaning of esoteric rituals is often verbally articulated 
only a posteriori (Barth 1987; Crook 2007:5, 195), these scholars have labeled secrecy as inherently 
‘empty’ (Herdt 2003: 219), and non-textual (Whitehouse 1995: 55-56). Ethnographers dealing with 
secrecy in Islam, on the contrary, have paid particular attention to textuality and literacy. Though aware 
that secret knowledge is often understood to be mystical, anti-intellectual (Brenner 200:7, 1984: 161), and 
practical (Marsden 2005: 183), they have suggested that writing is a chief feature of esoteric Islam (ibid. 
Goody 1968b; Bledsoe & Robey 1986).  If the first have looked at secrecy as a peculiarity of anti-
doctrinal and performative modes of religiosity (Barth 1990; Whitehouse 2000; Laidlaw 2004), the 
second have emphasised that Islamic esoterism is distinguished from other secret traditions because it is a 
written science rooted in the Qur’an (ibid.; Soares 2005: 136 – 137;  Marchand 2009: 59-82). 
Doubtlessly, these works have illuminated some important aspects of the intricate relationship between 
knowledge and concealment. In doing so, however, they have also applied rigid parameters of ‘textuality’ 
and ‘non-textuality’ rather than looking at how people use these concepts to legitimise or de-legitimise 
certain practices.  
 
Portraying esoteric knowledge as a not ‘fully textual’ practice that has to be abandoned is a way for many 
Issawis to show their indisputable orthodoxy. In the chapter, however, we will see how this willingness to 
demonstrate that the Issawiya has no secrets is not always articulated as a coherent critique. As I will 
show in the following pages, Issawis occasionally explain that even though karamat are not fully ‘correct’ 
they might have had a purpose in the past when they were used to show the truth of Islam to the Italian 
colonial officers. This paradoxical view of miracles (as proofs to educate those who are ‘outside’ of the 
textual apparatus of Islam, and as practices that are not orthodox enough for those who are inside of it) is 
particularly interesting.   On the one hand, it demonstrates that the Issawiya is a discursive tradition made 
of certain ‘elements of Issawi-ness’ that cannot be completely denied even by those who reject them. On 
the other hand, it sheds light on why secret knowledge is the only practice of the brotherhood that pushes 
Issawis to take a clear stance in terms of what is correct praxis and what is not. Karamat are perceived as 
a ‘un-resolved’ fossil of the past that cannot be ignored but that should not be talked about too much: a 
‘skeleton in the closet’ that prevents Issawis from transparency and overt religious correctness. In this 
chapter I will simply explore the nuances of this phenomenon; subsequently I will identify the reasons 
why many Issawis feel the need to clarify that they have no information to hide from the rest of Libyan 
society. 
 
3.1   Prayer Beads and Cure of the Soul (Spiritual Exercises)  
Before I discuss the contested relationship between esoteric practices, spiritual pedagogy and orthodoxy I 
have to present an overview of the educational practices of the brotherhood. The Issawiya is often 
described as a path aimed at “hailaj enNafs”, (“cure of the self”) through “tarbia enNafs” (“pedagogy of 
the self”). When asked to describe the main tool to achieve this spiritual purification, Issawis always 
mention the recitation of the tasbih. In a number of Sufi orders, but also outside of Sufi circles, the word 
“tasbih” (pl. tasabih, “praising”, also called “wird”, pl. awrad, “access”) indicates a series of pious 
formulas that are recited in addition to the prescribed five daily prayers of Islam (Hoffman 1995: 419; 
McGregor 1997: 264). As unanimously explained by my informants, upon joining the order the Issawy 
receive a specific tasbih from the shaykh to be recited everyday as a spiritual exercise. These recitations 
include standard Islamic formulas, Quranic verses and some of the names of God145, and it is through 
their constant performance that the soul can purified. Usually, but not necessarily, Issawy spiritual 
exercises are performed using a string of prayer beads that can be found all over the Muslim world, and 
that in Libya  is called “sbha”146. In Tripoli the sbha is literally everywhere. Strings of eleven or thirty-
three beads (fractions of ninety-nine, the number of the names of God) can be found hanging from the 
rear-view mirror of a car, or lying down in the guestroom of a house. The sbha is a truly omnipresent 
devotional object. However, it is also an item that Libyans of different religious inclinations, age and 
                                                          
145Standard formulas include “la ilaha illa Allah”, “there is no God but God”, or “Astaffir’Ullah al ‘Adhim”, “may God 
Almighty forgive me”. On divine names see Chapter 2, footnote 32. The use and purpose of the ninety-nine  attributes of god 
will be discussed further on in this chapter.  
146From the same Arabic root as “tasbih”. For an early comparative study of the use of prayer beads in different religious 
contexts see Blackman 1918.  
social status would immediately associate with Sufism. Shuyukh and muridin often carry their plastic or 
wooden prayer beads in their hands, or around their neck. The sbha has a special place in the realm of 
Sufi paraphernalia, since spiritual exercises are, in the words of many Issawis, the “work” of the murid147.  
 
Members of the order constantly remark on the centrality of the tasbih as a means of spiritual 
improvement, stressing the necessity for spiritual exercises to be performed under the supervision of a 
shaykh. Doubtlessly, some shuyukh are more nonchalant than others in managing the tasbih, and 
occasionally prefer to leave the encumbrance of assigning spiritual exercises to their vice-shuyukh148. 
Nonetheless, even those Issawy masters who admit not to entertaining particularly close relationships 
with their disciples obstinately repeat that the tasbih is “qaida atTariqa”, “the basis of the tariqa”. Often 
spiritual exercises are compared with the musical performances in the zawaya in order to highlight the 
importance of the former over the latter. In the words of an Issawy shaykh I briefly met in the course of a 
Mal’uf musical performance, the essence of the tariqa “is not music, but spiritual exercises, the Qur’an 
and the prescribed five prayers”. In line with this paradigm, muridin are generally required to conduct 
their spiritual exercises after the five daily prayers, making sure that they perform tasbih in a state of 
ritual purity149. Furthermore, members of the order often clarify that the very first step for a murid is to 
learn about the Qur’an and the pillars of Islam, and that spiritual exercises are a form of dhikr, a practice 
which is solidly based on Islamic doctrine150. 
 
Pious repetitions are always described as a cumulative practice. The tasbih is generally understood as an 
action that increases in intensity along the spiritual path. Therefore, if the murid is initially asked to 
                                                          
147 On holding prayer beads as a visible sign of piety see Marsden 2005: 172.  
148 “Naqib”. See Chapter 1 pag. 57. 
149  Daily prayers are preceded by wudu, ritual ablution (Glasse’ 2002). 
150 ‘Dhikr’ as previously explained is the ‘remembrance of God’ through repetitions of Quranic verses and God’s names. On 
the Quranic foundation of Dhikr ‘see Chapter 2 footnote 40). 
perform three hundred repetitions after every prayer (“wird asSsaghir”, the “small wird”), with time he 
will be assigned a more demanding tasbih that increases the quantity to sets of five hundreds (“wird al 
wasat”, the “middle wird”), and eventually to a thousand (“wird al kabyr”, the “great wird”). The 
terminology in three parts (which is also used by the Moroccan Issawiya - Brunel 1926:84) mirrors the 
supposed spiritual progresses of the Issawy disciple, and it is used by the great majority of the shuyukh in 
Tripoli. Usually shuyukh ask their muridin to perform also the dala’il al khairat (“way marks of 
benefits”), a well-known series of invocations organised according to the days of the week written by 
Jazuli151  (Trimingham 1998:70).Even though Issawy masters might occasionally implement different 
quantities, or disagree on whether the formulas should be the same for every disciple, they generally 
present this tripartite scheme and the exercises of the Jazuli as the basis of Issawy spiritual education152. 
Nonetheless, more than being a clear-cut codified method, spiritual pedagogy is understood as a versatile 
practice. The degree of this versatility is given, according to many of my informants, by the educational 
skills of the Issawy master. Should the shaykh be a real educator, he can (and indeed he will) 
accommodate the system to the personal needs of the murid. 
 
Many shuyukh only assign the three types of exercises. However, Issawis constantly clarify that not all 
shuyukh are equally good in spiritual matters, and in order to explain why certain masters are better 
spiritual educators than others they usually refer to the figure of the shaykh murabbi (the “shaykh 
pedagogue”). The Sufi master, I was often told, is a spiritual doctor. The “shaykh pedagogue”, however, 
is a talented therapist. In order to explain this dynamic shaykh Ramadan referred to his medical 
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 As explained in the first two chapters, Jazuli was an important figure in the history of the order and the author of the 
litany of the hezb (see previous chapter). The “waymarks of benefits” are used also in the Moroccan Issawiya (Brunel 1926: 
110). 
152In some cases Issawis add other elements to this format. I was once told, for instance, that in addition to tasabih an Issawy 
should read a section of the Qur’an and recite the hezb (see previous chapter) by himself everyday.  
background. A virus might require strong medications, he once told me, but as a result of the heavy 
treatment a sensitive organism might experience headaches or digestive issues. Whereas a doctor might 
simply prescribe antibiotics, he said, the good doctor would study the case, and perhaps administer aspirin 
as well in order to smooth the curative process. Similarly, if a ‘normal’ shaykh only makes use of the 
three types of spiritual exercises, the “pedagogue” adapts the medicine to personal necessities of the 
patient153. 
 
 Shaykh Ashraf - a round-faced, jolly and educated shaykh in his late thirties - expanded on this concept. 
During one of my visits to his house (where he lived, un-married and un-employed, with his parents) he 
told me that a “shaykh pedagogue” examines the profession, education, and everyday schedule of his 
muridin. Though loosely following the tripartite scheme of the tasbih with his muridin, Ashraf clarified 
that different cases should be treated differently. If the murid is illiterate, then asking him to recite the 
litanies written by the Jazuli it is not advisable. If he has a tight everyday schedule, then he should not be 
forced to perform his tasbih after every prayer, otherwise the burden will be unbearable for him. If he has 
a demanding job he should be assigned a lesser number of repetitions, and if he is a student he should be 
asked to perform spiritual exercises that do not converge with his schooling duties154.  However, Ashraf 
also told me that spiritual exercises are not simply a matter of accommodating to someone’s daily 
schedule. The diagnosis for the correct spiritual cure involves also an attentive examination of the 
spiritual idiosyncrasies of the murid.  
 
                                                          
153 At times this parallel between medicine and mysticism produces a ‘clinic’ taxonomy of the diseases of the soul. As a 
“shaykh pedagogue”(recognised as such by his muridin) once told me, spiritual sicknesses can be pinned down to thirty-three 
different types.    
154In the Arusy order (see introduction page 17), this differentiation in spiritual exercises according to profession is even more 
explicit. The Arusy nomenclature includes awrad like the “wird of the farmer” or “the wird of the student”.  
Spiritual exercises are described as “tarbia” (“pedagogy”) and explained as a practice guided by a 
principle of education of the self (“nafs”). In order to be efficacious, therefore, they require God to accord 
his help, the murid to have the intention to be graced, and the shaykh to map the ‘self ’ of the disciple. 
The Issawy master – Ashraf and other shuyukh told me - should look at the character of the murid, 
observing his personality and thought. Based on this analysis, the “shaykh pedagogue” finds the best way 
to tackle the spiritual issues of the murid. Large amounts of spiritual repetitions, for instance, should be 
given only to muridin who have a very active personality. If the murid is nervous or quick to anger, 
Ashraf explained, he should be given formulas that contain a name of God that is related with patience 
and kindness, like “Latif”, “Gentle”155. Sometimes, Ashraf added, pious receptions might not be the best 
spiritual exercise for a murid. Perhaps it is better for him to read certain sections of the Qur’an every day, 
or to fast twice a week instead. Given the variety of the spiritual necessities of the murid, some shuyukh 
avoid pinning down a precise systematisation of the tasbih. Some of them deploy spiritual exercises that 
are used in other brotherhoods, or that comes from the traditions of famous Sufi characters of the past. 
Variety is therefore understood as a strategic way to approach the spiritual dysfunctions of the murid, and 
intuition as the chief tool through which this variety is managed.   
 
According to my informants, a pedagogue derives his skills from a number of sources. Being a shaykh, he 
receives blessings and spiritual grace from his ‘licence to shaykh-hood’ 156 , and from the spiritual 
genealogy of his predecessors that makes the licence legitimate and effective. Having been a murid 
himself, the shaykh pedagogue can also benefit from his own experience as a disciple putting what he has 
learned from his own shaykh (perhaps a pedagogue himself) into practice. However, the pedagogue also 
                                                          
155As Ashraf explained to me, “mush el fayda enta tasbah el ism...el fayda enta kun el ism!”, “the benefit does not come from 
reciting the name...it comes from becoming (litt. ‘being’) the name!”. In the words of Sufi philosopher Ibn ‘Arabi, Sufism is 
“Assuming the character traits of God” (Chittick 1989: 283; 2005:30). On the subject see also Lings 1961.  
156See chapter 1 pag. 57. 
receives special gifts that are mysteriously bestowed on him by God157. As a result of this combination he 
develops what some Issawis call “elm el basira” (“science of the sight”), the capacity to see, amongst 
other things, into people’s true nature158. This knowledge, as shaykh Ashraf told me once, is made of 
“shuhur“(“intuitions”). Through the baraka which is mysteriously embedded in the licence, his 
experience as a murid and the blessings given by the almighty, the Issawy master receives divine 
inspirations that allow him to understand what others cannot. As a shaykh once explained to me, every 
man has a veil that separates him from his true self, and a veil that separates him from God. The 
pedagogue (and indeed any shaykh) is supposed to be the one who helps lifting the first in order to 
remove the second. He enjoys a special relationship with the mystery, and he has the intuitive tools to see 
into the secrecy of someone else’s self.  
 
Often the spiritual exercises provided by Issawy shuyukh are considered to be part of a broader 
educational relationship they have with their disciples. Some muridin describe the very presence of their 
shaykh as a source of comfort and direction159.  “Sometimes” a young fervent disciple told me “a text 
message (from the shaykh’s phone) might be enough, or a quick word (from him), there is always an 
education on what to do, on how to behave160”. Naturally, not all muridin are equally enthusiastic in their 
approach to spiritual education, and often Issawy disciples describe their tasbih simply in terms of 
routine.  A retired murid in his sixties, for instance, told me that after a number of years in the tariqa the  
tasbih had become for him “like cigarettes”, both something he could not live without and a habit he had 
simply incorporated in his everyday life. Nonetheless, Issawy pedagogy is frequently explained as an 
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Here a parallel can be drawn with the life of the Perfect Shaykh who, as we have seen in chapter 1 (page 45 – 48) derived 
his exceptional spiritual skills both from education he received from his masters and directly from God. 
158 On Sufi shuyukh being able to scrutinise the hidden aspects of someone’s life see Gilsenan 1990.  On secrets as something 
that once revelaed might damage social position or reputation see Gilsenan 1995 and Marsden 2005 
159 On how the Sufi shaykh makes present the knowledge he teaches though his own persona see Werbner & Basu 1998. 
160On piety, Islam and technology see Clarke 2008; 2010 
exceptional, if not miraculous process. Sometimes the uncanny and the quotidian merge together, as in 
the case of an Issawy shaykh who assured me that spiritual exercises amalgamate smoothly with other 
daily occupations because while doing them time goes miraculously faster. Other times, however, Issawis 
speak of healing of the self, softening of the heart and meeting with grace. For example, a young educated 
murid in his late twenties who had been performing his spiritual exercises for two months once told me: 
 
 “I am becoming more sensitive…I look at poor people, and it hurts me more…my heart is more 
sensitive...I can feel the change...sometimes when God’s Prophet is praised I am on the verge of 
tears, and I have never been like that before…maybe when I was a kid...”.  
 
 
Similarly, a university student who had been part of the Issawiya only for a month told me how the 
continuous recitation of the tasabih had helped him to achieve a spiritual status he had always desired: 
 
“..I started feeling that God is really watching me.....sometimes when they mention God or the 
prophet I start to shake…..I always wanted to cry from feeling God, and it never happened to me 
(before)...” 
 
In light of these statements Issawy pious repetitions should be looked at as an example of Foucauldian 
“technology of the self” (Rabinow & Dreyfuss 1983: 188-197), techniques through which moral 
education can be implemented in order to achieve an ideal model of self-hood (Foucault 1994b; Rabinow 
& Rose 1994: vii- xxiv; Althusser 1994; Rose 1999).  In this perspective tasabih are a system of exercises 
that “permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations ...so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
perfection...” (Foucault 1982: 17). Issawy exercises evoke this notion of shaping and moulding the self 
even in their nomenclature. The maqamat el anfus (“levels of the selves”), for instance, are often 
mentioned as one of the main tools deployed by a shaykh pedagogue. Through this specific set of 
repetitions (which is deployed also in other Sufi traditions - Werbner 2003: 183-211), the murid is 
supposed to pass through seven stages of purification of the soul, so that the “nafs el amara” (the 
“authoritative self”) naturally inclined towards satisfying the desires of the flesh can be transformed into 
“nafs al kamila”, the “perfect self”. When bearing this in mind, tasbih appears as an important feature of 
Issawy life, one that embodies the pedagogical nature of the order. However, if shuyukh and muridin are 
generally in agreement about the benefits of pious repetitions, they are less so when it comes to a 
particular category of tasabih, and it is on this particular type that I will concentrate in the rest of the 
chapter. After presenting ethnographically the use of these formulas, I will show how some Issawis 
include these practices into the pedagogical paradigm of the order while others do not.  
 
3.2 Secrets in Action (Miracles and Secret Formulas)  
Some members of the order were reticent in discussing special tasabih, and simply clarified to me that the 
topic was covered by secrecy. Shaykh Ramadan, however, decided to give me some general information 
on the matter. Issawy tasabih, Ramadan explained to me, are divided into daruri (“obligatory”), and 
ikhtiari (“optional”). The first typology includes all the different repetitions that can be assigned to the 
muridin as spiritual exercises. The second, however, involves special formulas that are given only to 
some muridin according to the discernment of the shaykh. Amongst the different tasabih that belong to 
this corpus, Ramadan told me, there are some which allow the Issawy to perform miraculous actions like 
piercing his own body with a knife without being harmed or assuming temporarily the characteristics of 
an animal.  Miracles, Ramadan and others often told me, are a gift that God can bestow on anyone. 
Karamat do not require a specific knowledge, but only faith (“iman”) and God’s grace. However, if 
spiritual exercises can allow the murid who has faith to purify his soul, then special tasbih – given the 
same preconditions – allow the Issawy to perform wonders. In this spiritual economy, Shaykh Ramadan 
clarified, the saintly powers of the founder of the brotherhood have a fundamental role.  
 
When mentioning the name of the Perfect Shaykh many Issawis add “qaddas’Allahu sirrha”, “may God 
sanctify his secret”. Shaykh Ramdan insisted that in doing so they refer to the mysterious baraka, the 
“secret”, that was given to him by God. As a consequence of this secret Ben ‘Aysa gained, as explained in 
the first chapter, a supernatural invulnerability and the power to tame wild creatures, and it is this capacity 
to master the wild and the harmful (a power that has God as originator and the Perfect Shaykh as main 
channel) that is given to the followers of Ben ‘Aysa through the special tasabih. “These miracles are Ben 
‘Aysa’s” Shaykh Ramdan told me once “not mine”161. In order to emphasise this point, he quoted a 
famous poem where the Perfect Shaykh describes the special favours granted to him by God through the 
intercession of the prophet: 
“Land and Sea they follow my orders, 
Even on the Day of Judgment I intercede for those  
who have gone astray, 
My grandfather162placed the world (duniya) in my hands, 
Everything is under my command, 
Even the murderous poison, 
fire, iron and the unruly creatures”  
 
Even though Shaykh Ramadan was adamant in relating these practices to the founder, other shuyukh 
traced their origin back to unspecified saintly figures of the past (“those who have spiritual insight”), or 
stressed the power inherent in the secret tasabih without mentioning the baraka of Ben ‘Aysa163. In all 
                                                          
161On the ‘transferability’ of miracles in Sufism see Van der Veer 1992 (who incidentally mentions miracles very similar to the 
ones described in this chapter).  More generally, on miracles as a result of someone else’s baraka see Pinto 2004.  
162The prophet Mohammed, of whom the Perfect Shaykh was a descendant  (see Chapter 1 pag.45). The poem is the well-
known “Fahlu arRijali” (“The Stallion maongst Men”). Sections of the poem are recited  in some Libyan zawaya on the 
occasion of the birthday of the prophet.  
163
The view of secret knowledge as a body of information coming from the past is common also in other esoteric traditions 
(Herdt 2003: 52).  
cases, however, Issawis who practised these formulas told me that they were peculiar to the order164, and 
occasionally opened up on the broader spiritual principle behind the secret practices. 
 
Shaykh Ramdan and Shaykh Ashraf (whom I mentioned earlier on in the chapter) were those who decided 
to explain the secret to me without revealing it. The Qur’an, they told me, says that the whole of creation 
praises God at all times. Animals, plants and objects continuously glorify the creator performing tasbih 
(“praising”) like humans do, though in a language that cannot be understood165. A cat, a bird, and a piece 
of iron all praise their maker, each one using a specific combination of some of the ninety-nine attributes 
of God. These names, however, do not constitute simply  the’ praising’ of a particular creature, but also 
(as a murid whispered to me once, afraid of breaking the secrecy of the practice) its “spiritual secret”, or 
mysterious spiritual nature. It is precisely by virtue of these names, Ashraf told me, that a cat can climb 
trees without falling and a bird can fly, and if someone knows these specific combinations, he can acquire 
the essence of these creatures.  Knowing the names of the lion allows one to tame them or to attain their 
strength; reciting the names of iron to be invulnerable to blades, or to cut things with one’s fingers as if 
they were knives166. Issawis referred to these specific formulas in various ways: “Sla’ esShaykh” (“the 
weapons of the Shaykh”), “Asma’ al Maqamat” (“names of the levels”), “Asma’ al murakkaba”, (“the 
combined names”), “Asma’ atTariqa el Issawiya”, “the names of the Issawy order”. Many called them 
                                                          
164
Even members of other brotherhoods (some of whom used these tasabih) admitted to me that they (or the masters) had 
‘borrowed’ these formulas from the Issawy order.  
165See for instance Sura 17, 44 in the Qur’an: “The seven heavens and the earth, and all beings therein, declare his glory, there 
is not a thing that does not celebrate his praise, and yet you do not understand how they declare his glory (lit. You do not 
understand their tasbih)! Verily he is forbearing, most forgiving!”  
166  Scholar of Sufism Annemarie Schimmel describes a very similar principle (1975). In the philosophy of Ibn’Arabi, God 
created the universe (and manifested himself in it) through his ninety-nine attributes. In this perspective Ibn Arabi considers 
divine names as the “molds though which the creative energy was chanelled to produce particular beings” (270). Each name of 
God, therefore, rules over a particular creature which is submitted to it, and each realm in creation is also the manifestation of a 
particular divine attribute (in the case of the vegetable realm for instance, the name ar-Raziq “the Nourisher”) (197,267-268) . 
In discussing Sura 2:31 - “(God) taught Adam the names of all things” -  Schimmel says that this “simple Koranic statement 
was sometimes explained to imply that God has granted Adam the knowledge of the divine names reflected in creation, which 
he might use in his prayers...”(188).  
simply “al asma’”, “the names”, while Shaykh Ramadan preferred “al Iltihaq bi qawass baa’d al 
makhlukat” “the acquisition of the characteristics of some creatures”. 
 
I witnessed the performances of secret tasabih very rarely, mainly in the course of hadhra performances 
in occasion of the mawlid of the prophet, or during a saint’s festival167.  Often I had to pay attention in 
order to notice that a miracle was taking place. Only after observing one of Ramadan’s muridin, for 
instance, did I realise that when in trance he used to chew with his mouth like a ruminant, and only after a 
conversation with the shaykh I understood that those were the  symptoms of the ‘tasbih of the camel’168. 
Other times, however, guessing the type of tasbih performed by an Issawy was considerably easier, 
though not obvious. In the course of a musical performance in a Tripolitan zawiya, for example, a murid 
in his late sixties stood up with his eyes closed, shaking nervously and then falling on his knees. Walking 
on all four (eyes opened in an angry glance), he approached a brazier used by the musical performers to 
stretch the skins of their drums. Trance, as previously explained, is common in these events, but fearing 
that the old Issawy might burn himself the attendants tried to catch him, though he escaped their 
manoeuvers. Suddenly the Issawy focused his attention on a member of the assembly, a young man who 
was nodding his head at the rhythm of the music. Perhaps irritated by the over-dramatic movements of the 
youngster, the Issawy jumped on him, scratched him with his finger-nails and then escaped again. A 
second Issawy stood up (the music was still playing), and laid down supine in the middle of the assembly.  
After a while, the ‘cat’ took interest in the still body, and begun to touch it in a mixture of suspicion and 
curiosity, until the man on the floor quickly turned, grabbed him and made him come back to his senses 
                                                          
167  See Chapter 2 page 92. 
168  In the Libyan Issawiya animal behaviour during trance is much more ‘discrete’ than in the Moroccan case as described by 
Brunel (1926). An observer can easily miss the miracle, if he does not know what he is looking at.  
.The performance of the ‘tasbih of the cat’ remained unnoticed for many of the occasional attendees who 
dismissed it as ‘usual’ trance behaviour169.  
 
On at least in two occasions, however, karamat took the shape of an undeniable intervention of the 
supernatural. The first time I saw the effects of the tasbih of iron, for instance, I was in a small urban 
centre in Eastern Libya, where I had been invited by local Issawis to celebrate the mawlid. The hadhra 
(that counted approximately one hundred participants) was set up in the courtyard of a very large house, 
with the family of the owner enjoying the scene from an internal balcony looking out onto the yard. The 
ritual seemed to proceed as usual, but at some point I was asked (to my surprise) to stand right at the 
centre of the assembly. The shaykh in charge - a man in his forties- came close to me, invited me not to 
have fear and called up another shaykh, a visibly older man with a white beard. The bearded shaykh 
brought a long iron skewer (the kind people use to roast meat) and made me touch its pointed end to make 
sure it was real. The atmosphere was vibrant, tales of miracles performed in front of the Italian colonial 
officers came into my mind, and I knew what was going to happen. The shaykh asked the assembly to 
chant in honour of the prophet and Ben ‘Aysa, while a young man in his thirties took his shirt off. The 
shaykh passed the skewer over his tongue170, put the tip of the skewer on the abdomen of the youth (who 
instinctively raised his arms), and then pushed against the resistance of the flesh, piercing the stomach 
from front to back and producing one drop of dark blood171. He invited me to take pictures of the 
abdomen of the murid, and then removed the skewer from the man’s stomach. After pushing his finger on 
                                                          
169 In later conversations I noticed that the tasbih of the cat was often referred to as “aqtazi”, Libyan dialect for “feline’. 
170As explained in chapter one, many Issawis look at shaykh-hood as a state that implies the material possession of blessings, 
or baraka (see Chapter 1 page 68) In Libya saliva is considered as a common vehicle for baraka (parallels can be found in 
Crapanzano 1973: 50; Van Der Veer 1992: 554). 
171  Those informants who were willing to commnet on Issawy miracles always specified that blood was the proof that the 
miracle was not an illusion created by witchcraft. Interestingly, in other Sufi traditions the presence of blood in similar karamat 
is, on the contrary, a sign of the action of magic (Pinto 2010: 469). On miracles as something which requires a specific 
secretive knowledge in order to be discerned from sorcery see Flueckiger 2008: 170. The topic of sorcery will be touched upon 
in the next chapter.  
the wound, he took it away leaving what seemed to be only a spot, almost a clean scar. The miracle had 
taken place. The bearded shaykh asked me if I wanted to try, to which I politely declined. Some of the 
attendants came to me, asked me if I was traumatised by the bloody scene, and then offered me tea and 
food. They ritual ended, and the next day I came back to Tripoli, where, few months later, I was going to 
see a miracle for the second time.  
 
One of the zawaya of the old city of Tripoli was having a belated celebration of the mawlid. As I 
approached the zawiya walking in one of the hallways of the medina, I met a group of people talking with 
each other. One of them (a corpulent bearded shaykh in his fifties) introduced himself to me, and told me 
that he felt close to the Issawiya even though he belonged to another Sufi brotherhood. All of a sudden, 
someone in the group recognised me, and told me that he had seen me in the hadhra where I had 
witnessed my first miracle. Upon hearing it, the corpulent shaykh surprised everyone: addressing 
someone in the group he said “bring the iron”. I told the shaykh it was not necessary. “Maleshi” (“let it 
be”), he replied. He took up his shirt revealing some fifty visible scars all over his big stomach, traces left 
by miracles on his body.  Meanwhile, one of his muridin had brought him a knife from his car.  The 
shaykh leaned back, raised his head, and stabbed himself in the throat. He remained in the same position 
for a while, manoeuvring with the blade under his long beard. His hat172 fell on the ground. Irritated, he 
asked for the hat to be put back on. When he suddenly took the knife away with a dramatic gesture, he 
unexpectedly pushed it on the sternum of one of his muridin, right under the throat, and then he put his 
finger on the murid’s wound to stop the bleeding. Feeling somehow uneasy, I could not help asking the 
shaykh if I could see his neck more closely. On his throat there was a deep (but clean) wound. The shaykh 
                                                          
172  The Libyan traditional hat (or “taghiya “) is a simple, cylindrical, quintessentially ottoman headgear.  With cold weather 
two hats of the same shape can be worn, one on top of the other.   
asked me if I was distressed (while in fact I was mainly glad that no one had called the police173). We 
chatted for a while, and then departed from each other. The next day, I managed to meet him on his way 
back to his hometown. We had tea, and he explained to me that he had not performed the miracle with the 
intention of converting me to Islam (“Islam is higher than this!”). Needless to say, on his throat there was 
nothing, even the wound I had seen the night before had miraculously disappeared.  
 
Sometimes Issawis approached the topic with irony (“do you prefer eating a piece of glass or a fork?” 
asked once an Issawy to a friend making sure that I would hear the conversation). Other times my 
enquiries on the topic led to ambiguous situations, as in the case of a shaykh who invited me to his house 
to experience the power of the karama on my own body. Feeling scared I declined. But once taken to the 
house with the reassurance that none would have forced me to do anything, I witnessed the shaykh 
performing a short prayer and then hitting one of his muridin on the back with a blunt, quite un-harmful 
blade. Unsurprised by the fact that the gentle, un-dangerous hits had not produced any wound, I 
respectfully (but unconvincingly) faked amazement in response to the fake (and unconvincing) miracle.  
When the shaykh asked me to uncover my belly in order to experience the karama, I felt obliged to do so 
but the Issawy appeared unsatisfied with my lack of enthusiasm and decided to end his improvised 
domestic performance. Later on, on a subsequent occasion, I was invited again by the same shaykh and 
introduced to one of his friends who, rather unexpectedly, unleashed a very small snake from a bag during 
the conversation in the guest-room. While I was wondering about the ‘names’ he would have used to 
tame the beast, the man promptly explained that he simply enjoyed playing with little creatures since his 
childhood ( no mention of special tasbih was made). When I reported both incidents to Ramadan (who did 
not have a very high opinion of the shaykh) I asked him if my presence had been an incentive for the 
performance of miracles (whether real or fake). He replied that perhaps members of the order had felt the 
                                                          
173  The relationship between Sufism and the Libyan state will be looked at in detail in the following chapter.  
need to impress me, re-enacting the miraculous stories involving Italian colonial officers. He promptly 
clarified, however, that “the names” are much more than tools of amazement for non-Muslims.   
 
3.4   “From Taste you know!” (Experientiality, Secrecy and Pedagogy)   
Ramadan recognised that miracles could be used as ‘proofs’ to show the truth of Islam, and he was very 
much in favour of maintaining the memory of  karamat performed by his predecessors in the sanad174 in 
front of the colonial oppressors. Amongst the blades he used to perform the “names”, for instance, 
Ramadan kept a short sword that was once deployed by one of his ancestors to convince a sceptical 
Italian general about the power of Sufi practices. However, the shaykh never performed karamat in front 
of me. In fact, he preferred to perform the more spectacular miracles only on the day of the birthday of the 
prophet, inviting a selected audience made of muridin, members of his family and Issawis from zawaya 
related to his sanad. Karamat, he explained to me, are not a “sirk” (“circus”) for people’s amusement175, 
but powerful (if not potentially dangerous) encounters with the mystery. The Issawiya is a “strong path”, 
he told me, and if someone is not ready to handle its secret practices “there might be problems”: bad 
things might happen to him as a consequence of approaching the mystery with scarce spiritual 
preparation176.  Furthermore, as he vigorously clarified, special tasabih of karamat are first and foremost 
pedagogical tools for the muridin. Far from being simply instruments to proselytise the infidels, they are 
                                                          
174  Spiritual genealogy. See chapter 1 page 57.  
175  On the inappropriateness of public miraculous displays in Sufism see Hoffman 1995:86. On the necessity to perform 
karamat only privately according to some theological currents in Islam see Ernst 1997:61. 
176  Special tasabih are perceived to be dangerous also because they can be deployed with the conscious intention to harm. As 
Ramadan told me once, one of his predecessors at the guide of the sanad decided to forbid the performance of karamat  for a 
period of time precisely because of this reason. According to Shaykh Ramadan behind this decision there was a specific 
incident. During the Issawy parade for the birthday of the prophet in the medina of Tripoli, a Jewish girl decided to throw urine 
on the Sufis from a balcony as a joke. Enraged by the gesture, an Issawy belonging to Ramadan’s sanad used one of secret 
tasbih to make the girl fall from the balcony (Ramadan did not want to explain how). Following the death of the girl, the head 
of the sanad at the time forbade (“closed”, in Shaykh Ramadan’s words) the secret tasabih. Later on, in safer times, the tasabih 
were “re-opened”.  On Jewish communities in Libya see Cohen 1924; Goldberg  1972, 1990; Hakohen 1980; Simon 1992. On 
the use of divine names in Jewish mysticism in Libya see Cohen 1924: 11-28. On the role of risk in rituals see Howe 2000 
(and, more generally Douglas 2002). For an analysis of violence as an intrinsic component of all ritual performances see Bloch 
1992. 
means that Issawis use to achieve spiritual improvement. The secret “names”, he told me, are most of all 
spiritual exercises, and like any other tasbih, they produce a spiritual faydha (“benefit”) for those who 
experience them.  
 
 As Ramadan told me more than once, the most important aspects of Sufism are education of the soul and 
strict faithfulness to the Qur’an. In following this paradigm, the shaykh organised regular meetings with 
his muridin to discuss their spiritual exercises, and held weekly lectures in his zawaya in which he 
covered Quranic material, Sunna, and the proper way to perform the five pillars of Islam177. The shaykh 
often told me that spiritual formation and knowledge of Islam are far more important than karamat. 
However, he also explained to me that Islam has an exoteric facet (“asSshariya”, the “law”178) and an 
esoteric one (the “ilm al batin”, “science of the hidden”, or “el haqiqa”, the “truth”), clarifying that the 
two are deeply intertwined. Ramadan explained to me that special tasabih have a place in the education of 
the Issawy not only because they are based, as previously explained, on a Quranic principle, but also 
because they allow the murid to have a direct experience of the “truth”. Through miracles the murid gains 
the ultimate experiential proof that the shaykh has, in Ramadan’s words, the “sirr masbut” (“the correct 
secret”). By experiencing miracles in his body the murid understands that his shaykh has access both to 
the correct secretive knowledge and to the secret power that makes this knowledge work, and, therefore, 
that he can be trusted as a channel of divine grace and pedagogue. Ramadan explained to me that karamat 
validate on an experiential level the power of a spiritual education that involves both knowledge of the 
                                                          
177The five essential practices that characterise the religious life of the Sunni Muslim according to the Qur’an: professing 
monotheism and accepting Mohammed as the seal of the prophets, the daily prayers, alms giving, fasting in the month of 
Ramadan and pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca.   
178The term “Shariya”, as explained by countless publications, indicates the moral code and religious law in Islam, but in this 
context it refers to the more normative (and therefore exoteric) aspects of religion. For an analysis of the complexities related 
to the jurisprudential facet of the Islamic faith see Ewing 1988 and Zaman 1999, 2002, 2004. For an historical examination of 
Islamic legal systems see Coulson 1964. For an examination of how Islamic law has been the object of a codification that has 
transformed its multivocal tradition into a rigid legal code see Messick 1993.  
‘texts’ of Islam and experience of its secrets. Consequently, he clarified, they should be accounted 
amongst the various tools of Issawy education. 
 
Shaykh Ashraf elaborated on this connection between pedagogy, textual orthodoxy and miracles. When I 
asked him whether the Issawy who performs the tasbih of an animal turns truly into a beast he told that it 
was impossible for him to explain this spiritual process without me having experienced it179. Similarly, 
when I enquired about the spiritual benefits of the “names” he told me that they could be understood only 
through experience. Ashraf told me that he performed the secret tasabih with a certain regularity, and that 
karamat are not only about becoming invulnerable to blades or acquiring the agility of a cat. “People do 
similar miraculous actions even in India” he said. The difference, he added, is that “Sufism is based on 
the Qur’an and the Sunna”. The Issawy who performs the “names”, Ashraf clarified, acquires not only 
miraculous capacities, but also special graces that help him following the teachings of the holy book. 
Even though the shaykh could not expand on the topic due to its secrecy, he told me that if one performs 
the ‘tasbih of the iron’ he realises that it becomes physically impossible for him to eat food which is not 
cooked according to the dietary rules set up by Qur’an and Sunna (Campo 2009: 246 -250) because his 
body automatically causes him to vomit it out. “The names”, he emphatically repeated to me, are 
supernatural tools that help one becoming a good Muslims. Being actions that allow the divine “secret” to 
educate one’s own self secret, the tasabih are not dissimilar from other spiritual exercises. Unlike 
                                                          
179  Identification between humans and animals has been looked at in different ways in Anthropology. Some have highlighted 
the metaphorical (Urton 1985; Leach 1964; Tambiah 1969; Halverson 1976), or symbolic (Levi-Strauss 1969; Geertz 1973b; 
Boddy1992) nature of similar identifications, other have  observed that they are often intended to be literal (Evans- Pritchard 
1956; Lienhardt 1954; Firth 1966).Others still – touching on sensitive issues concerning the appropriateness of looking for 
symbols where people see reality (Turner 1967; Obeyesekere 1992; Sahlins 1995) – have suggested that, even when it is 
considered real by people, the identification with an animal should be analysed as a metaphor by the Anthropologist (Ashforth 
1998; White 2000). In an attempt to combine both approaches, Harry West has recently argued that ‘becoming animal’ can be 
considered to be both a symbolic and literal statement (West 2007), since metaphors do not simply link two different semantic 
domains, but influence the experience people have of these domains (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Fernandez 1972; Comaroff 
1985). Philosophical reflections on the relationship between humans and beasts can be found in Midgley 1978; Deleuze & 
Guattari 2007: 262; Derrida 2008, and Berger & Segarra 2011. For a general introduction to animal symbology in Islam see 
Schimmel 2003. 
standard spiritual exercises, however, they have to be personally experienced in order to understand their 
link with Qur’an, Sunna and spiritual education.  
 
In the words of Ramadan and Ashraf, secret tasabih appear as something more than rituals of 
transformation (Turner 1967), re-enactments of colonial memory (Stoller 1994, 1995) and performances 
centred on mimicry of animal behaviour (Taussig 1993)180.  The “names” are understood as practices 
related to the Qur’an, and as tools that help the murid to deeply internalise the teachings of Islam. Even 
though these considerations echo a series of anthropological reflections concerning the role of the body in 
absorbing the rules and values of a community, the fact that my informants refused to elaborate the matter 
due to its secrecy prevents me from analysing this process in detail181.  However, if there is one aspect of 
                                                          
180
  I asked Shaykh Ashraf whether a murid can pretend that the miracle has taken place and imitate the behaviour of an 
animal without actually absorbing its powers, but the shaykh excluded this possibility.  Ashraf told me that when an Issawy 
master decides to give a secret formula to a murid he does not specify what are the miraculous powers attached to it. If the 
murid’s heart is in the right place, the ‘secret’ will manifest itself and the murid will find out. If, on the contrary, the murid is 
not spiritually ready, the tasbih will remain ineffective, the murid unaware of the specific powers attached to the formula and 
the secret preserved. In his analysis of the concept of “mimesis” Taussig suggests that imitation (through which one adopts 
characteristics of ‘the other’ while remaining distant from it) is as a powerful tool to master alterity (1993). Even though the 
idea is not applicable to the case I discuss, in her study of divine names in Sufi theology Schimmel suggests that Adam, being 
the first man created by God, received from him knowledge of the “secret of the names” that allowed him to become 
“master over all created things”(1975: 188). Stoller (1995) suggests that mastery of alterity through imitation can involve a 
lived re-enactment of past encounters with the ‘other’ while Bloch (1992) is of the opinion that achieving mastery of death is 
a fundamental component of all ritual systems. Mimesis has also been looked at as an occasion to express internalised 
knowledge that remains un-expressed in everyday life (Jackson 1983), as an attempt to ‘translate’ the other into a familiar 
idiom (Boddy 1989), and as a moment in which one can comment on himself and his society from a ‘distant’ position (Lambek 
1998). Thoughts on the blurry difference between ‘imitating’ and ‘’becoming’ can be found in Deleuze and Guattari 2007: 262. 
181  As elucidated by Foucault, techniques focused on educating the self involve necessarily processes aimed at making the 
body docile (Foucault 1984; 1984b; 1984c; 1991: 3-31) in perspective of desired or imposed ideas of well – being (Foucault 
1988; Turner 1992).  Similar ideas have been developed in studies of educational systems (Elias 2000; Evans et al. 2004), but 
also in works dealing with the process of internalisation of social norms. A vast scholarship has highlighted not only that the 
body plays an important role in the way human beings conceptualise the universe (Douglas 2007:72-92; Lambek 1998: 107), 
but also that moral, intellectual and spiritual values are absorbed through standardised acts repeated in time (Bourdieu 1977, 
1990: 271-283; Taussig 1987: 394; Asad 1993: 83-167; Lester 2005; Mauss 2006; Ortner 2006: 150). Whether with a focus on 
discipline or on performance, these publications have shown that through bodily practices a subject comes to ‘embody’ specific 
social roles and rules (Goffman 1962; Butler 1990; Butler 1993: 121-140; Wacquant 2004). A different approach has been 
proposed by anthropologists inspired by philosophical reflections on ‘experience’ (Moran 2000; Merleau-Ponty 2002) who 
have suggested that the body is not a passive recipient, but the very existential ground of culture and self, and that 
these practices that can be highlighted in light of my informants’ statements it is precisely their secret 
nature. According to Ramadan and Ashraf, esoteric practices have to be experienced in order to be 
appreciated as educational and religiously correct. The only way to know if the tea is good, Ashraf told 
me once, is to taste it because from “taste you know” (“min dhaqa araf”)182. The orthodoxy, Quranic 
foundation and pedagogical nature of the “names” lie therefore hidden in the secrecy of personal 
experience, and this consideration is particularly important for an understanding of Issawy esoterism.  
Both Ramadan and Ashraf told me that special tasabih are kept secret precisely due to their experiential 
nature. If the shaykh tries to explain this practice to a murid (or to someone else) who has not directly 
experienced them, then they can be easily misunderstood and dismissed as having nothing to do with 
Islam. Secrecy therefore stands out as a pedagogical necessity. Concealment, for Ramadan and Ashraf, is 
the only way to manage a particular portion of Issawy knowledge and education which is both textual and 
experiential.  
 
3.5   “Our Religion is very Clear” (Assessing Issawy Esoteric knowledge)  
So far I have elucidated the way in which Issawy spiritual education is implemented and I have explained 
how, according to some members of the order, secret tasabih should be considered as part of the 
educational repertoire of the brotherhood. In this last part of the chapter, however, I will concentrate on 
those Issawis who do not recognise this continuity between secret practices and pedagogy. Almost all the 
Issawy shuyukh, muridin and devotees I interviewed acknowledged that, in the past, members of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
‘embodiment’ is therefore an active dynamic as much as a passive one (Sheper-Hughes & Lock 1987; Jackson 1989; 1996; 
Lock 1993: 137-138; Csordas 1990; 1994). This perspective has been applied in the study of miracles (Csordas 1994b, 2002) 
and Sufism (Pinto 2005), but it has also been criticised on the basis that anthropologists will always interpret experience using 
referents “that are alien to local culture” (Knibbe & Versteeg 2008: 60). Interestingly, my analysis of Issawy secret knowledge 
illuminates another limitation of this approach: when dealing with secrecy (or at least with the kind of ‘experiential secrecy’ on 
which I focus here) investigating the body as ‘existential ground’ becomes practically impossible.  
182  In Libyan dialect “tasting” can be used as a  synonym for “trying” or “experiencing”. On one occasion a young Libyan 
fellow who had nothing to do with Sufism tried to convince me to take up Islam as a religion for a week, to see if it suited me. 
“Dhuqha!” (“taste it!) he told me.  
brotherhood used to perform karamat much more than today. More specifically, many shuyukh 
recognised that their predecessors in the sanad (often their grandfathers, or great grandfathers) had made 
use of the “names” in one way or another. However, for the greater part the same Issawy masters also told 
me they did not intend to perform secret tasabih of karamat nor to assign them to their muridin.  
 
These members of the order neither denied the existence of miracles nor the power of the ‘secret’ as 
divine force. Quite the contrary, they talked with me extensively about the miraculous effects of spiritual 
exercises in healing the soul and the self, and explicitly acknowledged the mysterious power behind 
certain pious formulas or Quranic verses. Often they reported supernatural stories (mainly concerning 
difficult situations that have been resolved through divine intervention) explaining how through the 
performance of certain tasabih one can receive special graces from God. Furthermore, they also stressed 
the importance of the “shaykh pedagogue”, highlighting how – as explained before – the pedagogue is 
able to miraculously scrutinise the ‘secret’ nature of his disciples due to special spiritual gifts that are 
bestowed mysteriously to him by God. Nevertheless, in the great majority of cases Issawis also dismissed 
the role of the secret formulas, or, more broadly, the need to conceal a certain body of information. 
Though ready to admit that a gifted shaykh can achieve intuitive knowledge of the secret, they also 
emphatically clarified that the order does not need any secret knowledge. In describing the nature of their 
brotherhood, they always stressed how the Issawiya is a path of spiritual education and a brotherhood 
based on clear Islamic orthodoxy. In doing so, they also excluded secret formulas from either one or both 
of these defining aspects of the order.  
 
 Occasionally, shuyukh explained to me that they simply did not know the special formulas of the order 
because in time their assanid had lost the knowledge of the “names “. However, in the majority of cases 
lack of knowledge was not the reason behind the decision not to perform karamat.   In one case, for 
instance, a wealthy shaykh in his late seventies (an Issawy master whose zawiya counted a high number of 
muridin and an entrepreneur whose business had proven successful and rewarding) explained to me that 
he had not inherited the secret tasabih from his sanad. Nonetheless, the shaykh also told me that he had 
met a much younger Issawy who had convinced him to learn the special formulas and offered to teach 
them. The old shaykh (who was happy about this new found body of knowledge) recognised the benefit 
and the power of the “names”, but decided that he did not want to use the formulas because piety is more 
important than sensational supernatural deeds.  Sometimes I was told that even though secret tasabih are 
part of the knowledge of the order their miraculous effects can divert the Sufi’s attention from less 
spectacular but more important spiritual matters (“what are you after? The ‘lion’ or God?” an Issawy 
shaykh once asked me commenting on the tasbih of the lion). For the greater part, however, Issawis told 
me that secret tasabih have simply lost their purpose.  
 
Contrary to what was explained to me by Shaykh Ramadan, a large number of Issawis told me that special 
tasabih for the karamat are first and foremost practices designed to impress infidels. At times, shuyukh 
would concede that secret tasabih can occasionally be used when a murid asks his master for a proof 
(“delil”) of his powers and capacities. In the majority of cases, however, Issawy masters stressed not only 
that they had never encountered this necessity but also that this is not the main function of the miracles.  
Forty year old shaykh Abdul Qadir, for instance, told me that he had inherited the knowledge of the secret 
tasabih from his deceased father, a well known shaykh pedagogue in his time. Abdul Qadir is the head of 
a very popular zawiya that hosted a large congregation of muridin, and when I asked him whether he had 
ever performed karamat in front of his disciples he clarified that neither he nor his father had done so, 
because “now, we are all Muslims (in Libya)”.  Abdul Qadir kept the special tasabih for himself, without 
sharing this knowledge with anyone. Significantly, he explained to me that it is advisable for a shaykh to 
impart only the three basic spiritual exercises of the order and to educate his muridin in the teachings 
Islam, implying therefore that the “names” were excluded from this paradigm of education.  
 
Abdul Kerim, an influential Issawy shaykh in his seventies kindly agreed to be interviewed by me on a 
number of occasions, and in the course of these conversations he expressed very similar opinions. Shaykh 
Abdul Kerim (a highly educated professional who spoke fluent English and Italian with his deep baritonal 
voice) is an exception in the Tripolitan Issawiya. Though not against the performance of music in 
principle, he told me that he had forbidden musical performances in his zawiya because he thought they 
were inappropriate. Nevertheless, the shaykh represents a particularly prestigious sanad, and – though 
relatively unpopular due to his disdain from musical performances– he is recognised as the heir of an 
important spiritual genealogy. In discussing karamat, Shaykh Abdul Kerim explained to me that even 
though he had received from his predecessors “tasabih against the poison, or against the knife” he had 
never given these formulas to his muridin nor he had experimented with them personally. “I do not need 
to try”, he said. Like many other shuyukh Abdul Kerim dismissed the necessity to perform karamat in 
today’s age. He explained to me not only that special tasabih had a purpose only in colonial times, but 
also that nowadays Sufis (and Muslims in general) need more articulate and sophisticated ways to show 
the truth of Islam.  In relationship to miraculous performances he told me:  
 
“The problem is that it is not a show. I think, it should be done sometimes, in very few occasions, 
when there is a challenge.  For example, it happened two or three times, as I have been told, not 
in my lifetime, before, in our zawya, when the Italian Governor said: your tariqa and your zawya 
are nothing! So the shaykh asked one of his murid to drink some poison...it is a proof, when you 
are in a position where you are challenged. Otherwise, we don’t need, I think...this is my point of 
view...I will only do it if I am obliged to do it, otherwise I will never do it in my 
zawya...sometimes many people say the same thing that the Italian governor said…so maybe 
other shuyukh are convinced that they have to do it. I am trying to convince people with (he 
points at his head)...I think that in any case your ‘evidence’ should change according to the 
circumstances and to the mentality of the people in society. For example, when the prophet 
Mohammed came his evidence was el Qur’an…speech….because his people, the human beings 
of that time had a better mentality than the people of the period of Jesus or Moses. So, now we 
need an evidence, beside el Qur’an… we need to discuss with the people, to convince them...I am 
not speaking only about the tariqa now, I am speaking about Islam. We need to discuss all the 
cases with our mind, do you understand? Maybe for the simple people, maybe these things, the 
poison, the sword, the knife et cetera, maybe it will be useful for them, but for me it is not useful. 
I need you to convince me, and either you convince me or I convince you” 
 
Shaykh Abdul Kerim presented karamat as obsolete practices that should not be counted amongst the 
pedagogical instruments of the brotherhood. Interestingly, in relegating the use of special tasabih to the 
colonial past, he also stressed that even though the brotherhood might have had secrets once, it certainly 
does not anymore. Significantly, Shaykh Abdul Kerim allowed me to speak freely with his muridin 
precisely because, he told me, in his zawiya he did not have anything to hide183. When commenting on the 
subject he explained that Islam is, quite simply, a very clear religion:  
 
“Igor, and let me say simply ‘Igor’, like you were one of my sons… if we say that Sufism means 
religion, the right religion…the right way to Allah, then I can say I am sure that there are not 
secrets, Our religion is very clear. Mohammed (May Allah honour him and grant him peace) 
announced to the people all religion in its entirety....and he did not….he did not have the right to 
keep for himself, or to hide any part of religion. We are speaking about religion, and I am sure 
that Sufism is the right religion. So, if we said that even Mohammed (May Allah honour him and 
grant him peace) did not have the right to keep something for himself, this applies much more to 
the people that came after him” 
 
When I asked Abdul Kerim about the secret aspects of Islam (that Ramadan had previously described as 
“the truth” or “science of the hidden”), he told me that, when it comes to Islam, the esoteric and the 
exoteric are indeed intertwined. Unlike Shaykh Ramadan, however, Abdul Hakim used this point to argue 
that both Islam and Sufism have, effectively, no secrets.  
 
                                                          
183  Unlike Abdul Kerim, a shaykh who performed karamat regualrly told me once that he did not want me to interview his 
muridin, particularly about secret tasabih. He told me that if I had tried to ask his muridin to reveal the secret tasabih to me 
they would have lied in order to protect the secret. On lying, though in a very different context, see Gilsenan 1989 
“… (some shuyukh) speak about ‘the truth ...and they say that the religion has two branches: the 
‘law’, and the’ truth’, do you understand me? …but law and truth are two faces of the same 
coin…and the prophet brought these two faces (together), there is no conflict between 
them...Mohammed (May Allah honour him and grant him peace) brought these two “faces” and 
gave them to the people: so, no shaykh has this “truth” only for himself, to hide it, and nobody 
has the right to keep this “truth”, or a part of this “truth” for himself...you call it  “science””, 
“science of the hidden”; it means that anybody can study it! Like “medicine”, “mathematics”… 
it is not secret! ... It is science! It is an open door for the common people! And anybody who 
wants to get in will get in...we have to mention a very important point about this subject, when 
we speak about the secrets or about this “science of the hidden”: maybe you are not Sufi, but...it 
is not necessary to be Sufi in order to knock at the door and get in; if you have a right 
relationship with God, and if you are going on the right path, you will get inside, even if you 
don’t have any relationship with any shaykh of any tariqa in the world. Is that clear? our tariqa 
is as Mohammed said: ‘I will leave you, after I am gone, on a very large road... a very large and 
clear highway to go to Allah...nobody who is (in the) right walks away from it to follow the small 
paths that depart from the highway. So, the right way or the highway, call it whatever you like, it 
is not just the tariqa. When we speak about this ‘highway’ we speak about the religion itself, 
Islam! So the Sufi orders are just doctrines of thinking and acting, and it is not necessary to be 
one of the followers of one of these brotherhoods” 
 
Shaykh Abdul Kerim was not the only Issawy who expressed this dismissive attitude towards secrecy. In 
fact the majority of the shuyukh I interviewed constantly downplayed the importance of secret 
information, emphasising that the order has no information to keep secret because it is explicitly based on 
Qur’an and Sunna. In this perspective, the Issawiya was presented to me as a brotherhood that retains 
special blessings but no exclusivity over grace (“it is not necessary to be a Sufi…”). Often members of 
the brotherhood referred to Issawy knowledge as a “special knowledge” (“elm al qass”) that is not known 
to other Muslims. Nonetheless, the same Issawis always clarified that, unlike special formulas for the 
acquisition of animal powers, this knowledge is made of spiritual exercises that bring about blessings, 
cure of the soul and explicit benefits that anyone could understand. In excluding the “names” from this 
paradigm of ‘explicitness’, some Issawis told me that they recognised the Quranic principle behind the 
special tasabih of the animals, but also that they could not possibly  grasp the reasons why one might 
want to ‘become’ an animal. Others emphatically highlighted this ‘lack of explicitness’ and described 
karamat as bida’184 with no clear basis in the texts of Islam. For the greater part, however, members of 
the order maintained an ambiguous (if not contradictory) position on karamat describing them both as 
powerful practices that once had a purpose and as heterodox aberrations that have no place in an Islamic 
order with no secrets.  
 
Shaykh Mansur, for example, vigorously repeated to me that he whole-heartedly rejected the performance 
of secret tasabih. Mansur is a well-respected shaykh in his sixties who has been educated in the order by 
his father (from whom he ‘inherited’ the leadership of a number of zawaya in Western Libya). He enjoys 
a vast network of friendships and acquaintances within the order, and when I asked him to elaborate on 
his position towards esoteric practices he told me that:  
 
“in the correct tariqa you do not find these (practices); the bases of the Sufi brotherhoods are the 
(holy) book, the Sunna, the spiritual exercises...these are the bases...some shuyukh have used 
karamat...but in the wrong way...they have taken the formulas of the tasabih and used them...for 
(the karamat with) the knife...yes, at that time (in the colonial period) it was important (for 
Issawis) to give a ‘proof’, but it is forbidden to do these things in all periods, we do not have 
these things, these things are forbidden...the Perfect Shaykh did not do these things, when the 
Perfect Shaykh spoke he presented his wisdom, he gave a proof through his knowledge..the 
Perfect Shaykh did not do these things, because he followed the prophet...therefore if someone 
comes and does new things and gives proofs in that way, then he does things in a way which is 
different from (the prophet and Ben ‘Aysa) who are greater than him...” 
 
 
In the words of Shaykh Mansur, karamat were described to me both as potential proofs for non-Muslims 
(“at the time it was important to give a proof”), and as ‘innovations’ that were never endorsed by the 
founder of the order or by the prophet.  Showing an ambiguity which I found also in other Issawis, shaykh 
Mansur related to secret tasabih almost as an ‘un-resolved’ feature of the order. The “names” were 
described by him as a set of practices that the Issawiya once used and for good reasons, but also, 
                                                          
184Innovation”, ideas or practices that are considered to be outside of the textual tradition of Islam (Glasse’ 2002: 87, Winter 
2008). 
somehow, as a distortion of the original Issawy message. Similarly, when I asked Mansur to further 
develop his views he told me that even though secret formulas are based on the Qur’an they are 
nevertheless, at the same time, in conflict with Qur’an and the Sunna. 
 
“What is the secret? What is the tasbih? The names of God and the verses of the Qur’an, do you 
understand? Things regarding religion and the Islamic law...miracles are the result of the fear of 
God (“taqwa”)...a result of being close to God...there are not secret things, the secret is the 
tasbih for God, the recitation of the Qur’an...there is not such a secret thing...do you know what 
it is that these shuyukh told you about? You recite a particular tasbih...what is the secret in this? 
There is not! The secret in this: if I recite these words within me, or loudly, the secret is specific 
to that sentence, for instance a particular verse in the Qur’an, or a tasbih have a specific secret 
that is known to God, not to the shuyukh, for instance...there are verses in the Qur’an for the 
healing of the sick, or to facilitate difficult situations... there are tasabih against poison...but if 
you look at the truth of these tasbih (you will find that)  they are nothing more than verses from 
the Qur’an...for the poison, for instance you say: (at this point the shaykh recited a specific verse 
from the Qur’an to me)...I do not have (the tasabih of the animals), but some shuyukh use 
them...but in the correct tariqa there are not such things...in the past these things were done a 
lot, but not now, because now everything (we do) is based on...the Qur’an,... the sword... the 
knife...these are special tasabih but we do not use them...they used to do it in the past... (now) it 
is wrong, (to do it) because it is not the time for these things... (these things) were used in the 
time of the colonisers, in the past...as a proof...but doing these things now does not make any 
sense”. 
 
 
Shaykh Mansur’s comments are particularly interesting for a number of reasons. Regarding secrecy, the 
shaykh referred to the ‘secret’ as power inherent in certain practices (“a tasbih has a specific secret that 
is known to God”) rather than as hidden information (“there are no secret things”). Interestingly, in 
privileging an understanding of ‘secret’ as mystery rather than as concealment he even revealed one of 
the secret tasabih to me (“for the poison, for instance, you say...”). For what concerns the orthodoxy of 
the “names”, Mansur described special tasabih both as a textual knowledge made of “nothing more than 
verses from the Qur’an” and as practices of the past that cannot be performed because “now everything is 
based on the Qur’an”. On the one hand, the shaykh stressed that the “names” of the Issawy order are 
nothing more than textual knowledge rooted in the holy book (showing therefore that the brotherhood 
does not deal with any secret source of knowledge from which other Muslims are precluded). On the 
other hand, however, he also described the “names” as not being ‘textual enough ‘to be included in a 
paradigm of undisputed textuality. This ambiguous attitude (which informed the decision of many 
shuyukh to keep the special tasabih they had received through their assanid while simultaneously being 
critical of them) testifies to a certain ‘difficulty’ in assessing the secret practices in the order. The 
“names” were presented to me as elements of Issawi-ness that cannot be completely rejected, but also as 
practices that are not fully correct. Interestingly, I found a similar attitude even amongst Sufis who had 
personally experienced the power of the formulas.    
 
Though not a member of the Issawiya, Ali, for example, told me that he had tried the “tasbih of iron “ a 
number of times because his shaykh had learned how to perform them. Ali, a nice student of medicine in 
his twenties who had joined a minor Sufi order, told me that he had felt pain as any other human being 
would. The Sufi who performs the “names”, he clarified, is subject to the same biological laws as anyone 
else (he feels the pain, he bleeds, “he can even go to coma”), with the only difference that “there is not 
damage”. Ali told me that he was aware of the Quranic principle behind the practice. However, he also 
added that “karamat do not belong to Sufism” (“karamat mush min atTasawwuf”) because “they do not 
have a basis in the (holy) book and in the Sunna”. When I asked why a Sufi should therefore feel the 
need to perform the “names” he explained to me that sometimes, particularly when they are accused of 
not being orthodox Muslims, Sufis need to provide a proof of the special divine favour they enjoy185. 
When I replied that this view of karamat as non-Islamic tools used to prove orthodoxy seemed 
paradoxical to me, he added that, in the end, both those shuyukh who perform the “names” and those who 
criticise them can furnish a proof of their opinions, even though this proof is textual in the first case and 
experiential in the second. Almost in an attempt to divert the subject, he finally explained to me that “the 
                                                          
185  Similar accusations will be dealt with in the next chapter.   
iron” (“el hadid”) is not amongst the more important aspects of Sufism anyway, and that therefore it is 
better not to perform them.  
 
Unlike Ramadan and Ashraf, the majority of the Sufis I spoke with portrayed special tasabih as practices 
that do not fully meet the educational and textual requirements of the Issawy order. In this perspective, 
the “names” were described to me as practices that are Issawy (but not completely) and Islamic (but not 
totally). Even though I have never seen Issawis quarrelling with each other over the subject, secret 
practices were often described to me as the only true source of division within the brotherhood. Shuyukh 
who were deeply critical towards those who performed karamat only criticised them privately (and for 
the greater part, politely) stressing that in the end they all belonged to the same brotherhood. More than 
once, for instance, I have seen shuyukh putting aside their differences on the matter, and greeting each 
other or inviting each to their respective zawaya. Nonetheless, karamat and secret tasabih were always 
talked about as a delicate topic, one that is better not to mention at all. Often I found myself discussing 
with Shaykh Ramadan (or other Issawis who regularly performed karamat) about the divergence of 
positions between them and the majority of the Issawy shuyukh. Interestingly, Ramadan told me that the 
main reason why many shuyukh do not value the secret tasabih is simply because they have never tried 
them. “Lazem jarabha”, “you have to experience them”, he said, quoting the same principle to explain 
not only why I, a non- Sufi, could not possibly understand the karamat, but also why Issawis themselves 
had lost the will (if not the capacity) to perform them.  
 
Conclusion 
In previous sections of the thesis I have demonstrated how the Issawy discursive tradition allows the 
members of the order to articulate a sense of common identity. As I have repeatedly explained, however, 
the Issawy tradition also leaves scope for difference and disagreement, and in this chapter I have shown 
how this is particularly true for what concerns esoteric practices and miracles. After presenting the 
spiritual exercises of the brotherhood, I have elucidated how some Issawis see secret formulas as part of 
this corpus of spiritual education while the majority of them do not. In unpacking this phenomenon I have 
demonstrated that the discriminating factor between the two is the way in which they approach secrecy. 
Though all are prone to highlight that their order enjoys a special relationship with the ‘secret’ 
(understood as mysterious supernatural power), members of the brotherhood differ in the way they relate 
with the notion of secret information. The majority of the Issawis criticise esoteric practices for not being 
explicitly textual and pedagogical, and stress that the brotherhood is not concerned with secrets but with 
miraculous healing of the soul.  Those Issawis who perform miraculous formulas, however, explain that 
esoteric knowledge has an educational purpose and a Quranic foundation, but also that both these aspects 
can be appreciated only through experience. In light of these considerations the contemporary Issawiya 
does not appear to be more ‘disenchanted’ and ‘text-oriented’ than in the past, but only more interested in 
demonstrating that it has no secrets, and it is on this particular aspect that I will concentrate in the 
following chapter. By contextualising the brotherhood in terms of its relationship with the Libyan state I 
will develop a discussion aimed at explaining why Issawis feel the need to show that they have nothing to 
conceal.  
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“NOTHING IS CLEARER THAN THE ISLAMIC FAITH” 
The Interaction between Sufism and the Libyan Regime 
 
 
 
 
 
The murid was telling me about the Darwysh. The Darwysh is a peculiar kind of Sufi saint. In his search for God, 
the Darwysh has been consumed by divine truth. As a result the Darwysh appears like a crazy person who has lost 
his mind: a weird, simple-minded and unpredictable saint. The murid advised me to stay far from the Darwysh 
people. “They might ask you to do something and if you do not then you will feel remorse…”. He told me that the 
actions of a Darwysh might seem meaningless (or even morally wrong) while in fact they are often guided by a 
mysterious divine plan. “They have a secret with God”, the murid said. From then onwards the ‘saints with a 
secret’ became a common theme in our conversations. Soon I realised that people used the term with reference to 
eccentric shuyukh, unconventional characters and mendicants. With time, however, I noticed that the word was also 
applied with another connotation. “Darwysha “was also used to indicate backwardness, weirdness, religious 
heterodoxy and even witchcraft. For some the strange saints were agents of the mystery, while for others, they were 
the antinomy of what is good and orthodox. In both cases, the Darwysh was described to me as borderline figure at 
the edge of the understandable.  
 
 
 
 
‘Clarifying’ Sufism (Introduction)  
The majority of the Issawis refer to ‘secrecy’ only as a privileged relationship with the invisible, 
describing the Issawiya as a mystical order with special blessings, but with no secrets to keep. In 
analysing this phenomenon I have shown how those Issawis who reject miraculous performances (or 
karamat) have not necessarily lost their belief in the uncanny or gained a greater attention for the texts of 
Islam. On the contrary, many members of the brotherhood simply feel the need to highlight the 
‘explicitness’ of their practices in terms of overt educational purpose, clear textuality and unambiguous 
orthodoxy. Having shown how Issawis struggle to reconcile secret knowledge with this paradigm of 
transparency (and deal with it as an ‘unresolved’ aspect of the Issawy past), I will now turn to the reasons 
behind this need to accentuate unambiguousness and intelligibility.  In doing so, I will consider an aspect 
of the brotherhood that so far has remained only in the background of my analysis: its relationship with 
the state. In particular, I will show how the Libyan regime has created a specific religious rhetoric focused 
not only on the ‘textuality’, but also on the ‘clarity’ and ‘intelligibility’ of Islam. In analysing the impact 
of this discourse on Sufism I will shed light on why many Issawis distance themselves from those ‘less 
explicit’ practices that require experientiality in order to be understood and appreciated. 
 
Studies that have dealt with forms of experiential knowledge have often drawn attention on processes of 
transmission through practice. In analysing the acquisition of skills and crafts (Marchand 2003, 2009, 
2010), the internalisation of habitual behaviour, or the role played by bodily dispositions in learning 
processes (Bourdieu 1977, 1990: 271-283; Wacquant 2004), these works have suggested that some 
distinct forms of knowledge are acquired through mute imitation and unconscious assimilation186. Even 
though this approach has shown that knowledge can be internalised “beyond the grasp of consciousness” 
(Bourdieu 1977: 93) and “without attaining the state of discourse” (Bourdieu 1977:87), it has also 
attracted some criticism for offering only a partial understanding of the process of knowledge-making. As 
demonstrated by a number of anthropologists dealing with religious and ritual systems, the acquisition of 
experiential knowledge can indeed also involve agency (Mahmood 2005; Van Der Veer 2008), 
deliberateness (Lambek 1992) and, most importantly, conscious ascription of meaning by different agents 
including the state (Bowen 1989; Starrett 1995; Starrett 2008). Bearing this in mind, in this chapter I will 
contextualise Issawy ‘experiential secrets’ within the broader hegemonic discourses formulated by the 
Libyan regime. In doing so, I will show that the changes in the conceptualisation of secrecy that have 
characterised the Issawiya are related, amongst other things, to a broader operation of ‘re-definition’ 
carried out on Sufism by the Libyan state.  
 
                                                          
186  A larger overview of this literature can be found in Chapter 3 page 124 and footnote 34.  
The relationship between the regime and Sufism has considerably changed in the last two decades. As I 
have briefly explained in the introduction of the thesis, after being the object of Gheddafi’s antipathy for 
nearly thirty years,  in the nineties Sufism was rehabilitated as part of Libyan religiosity and, more 
importantly,  proposed as an alternative to ever growing Salafi-inspired forms of Islam187. In this chapter I 
will further explore this political manoeuvre. More specifically, I will analyse the accusations of 
backwardness initially made by Colonel Gheddafi against Sufism, and I will consider the way in which 
the Sufi ‘rehabilitation’ has taken place. Doubtlessly, the Libyan government has used Sufism as a tool 
against forms of Islam that were perceived to be more ‘political’ and ‘threatening’. Nonetheless, as we 
will see, the Libyan government has not simply reintegrated the Sufis as ‘moderate’ Muslims to be used 
for a specific political agenda. Rather, the regime has also produced a series of discourses aimed at 
rearticulating Sufism it in order to make it compatible with Gheddafi’s ideology and religious rhetorics.   
 
Analysts of Libyan politics have often clarified that ‘religion’ is not the most important component of 
Gheddafi’s thought. In their works, however, these scholars have also described the ‘centrality of the 
Qur’an’ and the ’return to pristine Islam’ as two fundamental points in the propaganda of the “guide of 
the revolution” (Bearman 1986: 157-164; Davis 1987: 67; Joffe 1988). These studies have certainly 
contributed to illuminate the ‘omni-textual’ and ‘nostalgic’ character of Gheddafi’s rhetoric. 
Nevertheless, these works have not duly emphasised the importance of a rhetorical trope which stems 
directly from these two facets of the Green Thought188 : the notion that “nothing is clearer than the 
Islamic faith” (Gheddafi 1982). In articulating his hegemonic discourse of modernisation 189  (based, 
amongst other things, on the idea that Libya has entered a new age,  freed from the stains of colonialism 
and ignorance- Vandewalle 2006: 126), Gheddafi has constantly highlighted the need to sanitise Islam 
                                                          
187  See Introduction page 25. 
188  One of the names of Gheddafi’s ideology.  
189  See introduction page 29. 
from corruptive elements of the past (Bruce St John 1983; Davis 1987: 30, 50).  In explaining the collapse 
of pure religion, however, the Libyan leader also emphasised that Islam is a “clear” (“uadihu”) religion 
(Gheddafi 1982) that has been made opaque by some ‘agents of corruption’, and this is particularly 
important for an understanding of the Sufi rehabilitation that has taken place in Libya190. 
 
Gheddafi’s belief that pristine Islam and the clarity of the Qur’an have been obfuscated by an 
accumulation of “commentaries, traditions and precedents” (Davis: 1987: 47; Vandewalle 2006:123) has 
been analysed by scholars as a move to undermine un-aligned religious interpretations (Bleuchot & 
Monastiri 1981; Bearman 1986: 162-63). His stress on the need for a personal interpretation of the 
Qur’an191  has been generally considered as an attempt to weaken local ulama192 by clarifying that their 
exegesis and expertise was no longer needed (ibid.).  Nevertheless, the notion of an ‘explicit’, 
immediately understandable Islam cannot be reduced only to a political escamotage aimed at depriving 
religious scholars from their power to criticise the ruler on grounds of religious proficiency (Gellner 
1981: 64). Indeed, the idea that Islam is a religion of clarity and transparency is also a powerful 
component of the regime’s peculiar objectification of religion193, and this is very visible in its approach to 
                                                          
190  ‘Clarifying religion’ was also the concern of other North African regimes. On ‘clarity’ being the guiding principle in the 
organisation of State Islamic education in Egypt in the 80’s see Starrett 1998: 126-153. 
191
  “Ijtihad”, the principle that attests the “exercise of independent judgment” in relation to the Qur’an and Sunna 
(Bearman 1986: 163). For an analysis of this complex concept of Islamic jurisprudence see Ali Khan & Ramadan 2011. In terms 
of legal system, Shariya (see previous chapter note 36) was applied as the only valid source of law in Libya until the late 
seventies, when the regime slowly began to realise that some aspects of Islamic law were, effectively, in contradiction with 
the principles of the revolution (Mayer 1977, 1995; Vandewalle 2006:123). 
192  Sing. “Alim”, “men of religious learning”. On the difficult relation between Gheddafi and the ulama see Bearman 1986 
and Davis 1987.  For an interesting analysis aimed at challenging the idea that ulama are conservative custodians of static 
religiosity see Zaman 2002, and 2004. Insightful reflections on the relationship between ulama and the spread of mass 
education that has characterised the Muslim world from the nineteenth century onwards can be found in Eickelman 1992 and 
Eickelman &Piscatori 1996: 37-79, 131-135. 
193  According to Eickelman and Piscatori (1996: 37-45) the tendency to conceptualise religious beliefs as ‘an objective 
system’ is one of the defining aspects of modern Islam. The phenomenon entails the notion that Islam “has been made open, 
manifest, and clear” (Eickelman & Piscatori 1996: 42).  
the Sufi brotherhoods194. Doubtlessly, Libyan Sufism was redeemed for political reasons. However, in 
this process it was also re-defined as a form of religiosity whose authentic essence had to be cleaned up 
from ‘un-clear’ and ‘incomprehensible’ elements. 
  
Even though state apparatuses have often accused Sufism of being an obstacle in their projects of 
modernisation (Sirryeh 1999: 153-160; Schielke 2007; Silverstein 2007, 2009, 2011; Bruinessen & Day 
Howell 2007), in some cases they have also publicly favoured it (Baldick 2000:86-131; Haroon 2007: 33-
63; De Jong 1978), co-opted it in nation-building initiatives (Pinto 2006; Louw 2007 : 42-61) and even 
recognised it as an influential social force that has to be appeased in the name of political stability 
(Behrman 1970: 85-131). Whether rejected or embraced, however, Sufism has often been the object of a 
‘domesticating’ process by the state. As shown by a number of works, this process has involved measures 
aimed at reducing Sufism’s supposed religious heterodoxy (Schielke 2008), limiting its domain to the 
purely religious (Gilsenan 1973) or private (Silverstein 2007; 2011) sphere or aligning it with mainstream 
national ideologies (Gilsenan 1990: 237-250; Starrett 1995; Schielke 2006, 2007).  More importantly, as 
part of this effort to cultivate the governmentality 195  of Sufism, state apparatuses have frequently 
endorsed a distinction between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ Sufis, and this is particularly relevant for 
                                                          
194  The idea that Islam is an explicit and ‘self-evident’ religion can also be detected in Gheddafi’s missionary attitude. 
Though reasonably respectful towards the Christians present in Libya, the Libyan leader has often invited them to accept the 
‘obvious’ truth of Islam. In 1976, for example, the regime organised an Islamo-Christian seminar in Tripoli aimed at repairing 
the diplomatic relationship with the Vatican after Gheddafi had openly accused the Pope of being an agent of imperialism 
(Davis 1987: 52). Having no intention to follow the agenda of the meeting Gheddafi and some of the Libyan personnel 
intervened inviting the Catholic delegation to accept the self-evident truth of the Qur’an (risking therefore a second diplomatic 
disarray) (ibid.). The Christian population of Libya is made up entirely of foreigners and it includes Catholics, Anglicans, 
Greek Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox and members of the Union Church.  
195  “Governmentality” is a notion first crafted by Michel Foucault. The term indicates a series of techniques whose purpose is 
to produce citizens suited for the policies and strategies adopted by a specific form of government. (Foucault 1991b; 2004; 
Inda 2005). Brian Silverstein applies the concept in his analysis of the relationship between the Turkish state and the Sufi 
brotherhoods. In Silverstein’s view, the Turkish government had an interest in  “normalising the objects of governance and the 
particular kinds of knowledge and subjectivities associated with them” (Silverstein 2007: 58) Broader ethnographic reflections 
on the relationship between religion and  the state can be found in Zubaida 1989; Gupta 1995; Lapidus 1996; Hansen & 
Stepputat 2001; Navaro-Yashin 2002,. Eickelman & Salvatore 2004. 
 
what concerns the Libyan case. Bearing this in mind, in this chapter we will see that the rehabilitation of 
the brotherhoods carried out by the regime has involved also a re-articulation of Sufi legitimacy in terms 
of ‘clarity’.  
 
In a number of contexts the separation between licit and illicit Sufism operated by the state has entailed 
discerning between ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’ Sufis (Pinto 2006; Van Bruinessen 2007: 101), or 
selecting certain Sufi practices as part of the national culture while dismissing others as inappropriate 
(Harris & Dawut 2002). As suggested by Katherine Ewing, however, often more than dissecting the Sufis 
into ‘good’ and ‘bad’,  nation states have effectively attempted to establish what is to be put under the 
rubric of Sufism and what is not (Ewing 1983, 1997). According to Ewing, the ‘selection’ operated on 
Sufism by the state can be identified as an  attempt to re-define what counts as Sufism in the first place, 
so that some practices that are broadly associated with the Sufi world are re-articulated as inauthentic, or 
‘non-Sufi’ (Ewing 1997:49).  Bearing this in mind, in this chapter I will show how the Libyan regime has 
extrapolated a particular aspect of Libyan Sufism and re–defined it as a non-Sufi component to be 
expelled from an otherwise authentic core. In analysing this interesting example of “managing tradition” 
(Boddy 1995) we will see that the regime has described these ‘inauthentic elements’ using a term that 
invokes ambiguity and incomprehensibility: “darwysha”. 
 
The word “darwysh” (pl. darwysh, probably Persian for “poor”, later incorporated into Arabic) can be 
found in different Sufi contexts with different meanings (Houtsma 1993: 949-952;   Espin & Nickoloff. 
2007: 332-333), but in Libyan Sufism it has a specific connotation. Though occasionally used as a 
synonym for ‘Sufi’, in Libya ‘darwysh’ indicates a particular kind of Sufi saint who has lost his mind as a 
result of his intense vicinity to God. These ‘holy fools’ are supposed to be characterised by an 
incomprehensible behaviour behind which they hide their saintly status,  and in some Libyan Sufi circles 
they are accepted as a spiritual phenomenon that embodies the mysterious and secretive nature of 
Sufism 196 . However, if for some Sufis “darwysha” indicates an authentic, though enigmatic, 
manifestation of the divine in the discourses of the Libyan regime the word assumes a negative and 
different nuance. Though keeping the sense of ‘incomprehensibility’ embedded in the term, in his 
speeches Gheddafi has re-articulated darwysha as a category to be opposed to tasawwuf (“Sufism”). In 
these declarations, as we will see, “Sufism” appears  as a religiosity marked by explicit modesty, ‘clear’ 
piousness and understandable religiosity, while “darwysha” as a category that comprises all the unclear, 
backward (and therefore inauthentic) practices that are supposedly in contrast with Sufi orthodoxy. 
 
By showing how Sufism has been re-defined as an entity whose ‘clear’ essence needs to be purified from 
the ambiguity of ‘darwysha’, I will demonstrate that the Libyan government has created a hostile 
environment for Issawy secret knowledge. Being a form of knowledge that does not fit within the 
paradigm of ‘explicitness’ proposed by the Libyan regime, Issawy secrets are in fact  dismissed as 
inauthentic practices that have nothing to do with Sufism and, consequently,  put under the rubric of 
‘darwysha’.  In exploring this dynamic, I will shed light on the influence that Gheddafi’s notion of 
religious clarity has and has had on Sufi practices in general and on Issawy practices in particular. In 
doing so, I will explore the more evident factors that push Issawis to ‘clarify’ their practices, while in the 
                                                          
196  The figure of the ‘mad saint ‘is present in a number of Sufi traditions (Crapanzano 1980; Frembgen 1998, 2004, 2006) 
though it is only in Libya (to my knowledge) that this figure is unanimously referred to as ‘darwysh’. Shocking behavior, 
apparent insanity, and inscrutability of thoughts are some of the typical features of this special kind of Sufi (ibid.). Often they 
are described as wondering mystics (Ewing 1997: 52-61) who live outside of the urban consortium “in the way of the ancient 
cynics, provoking the people, admonishing them, and mixing freely with social outcasts” (Frembgen 1998: 145). Broader 
reflections on sainthood in Sufism (though not focused on the darwysh type)  can be found in Lings 1961; Gellner 1969; 1971; 
Hammoudi 1974; Gilsenan 1973, 1990, Ewing 1994: 1997; Lewis 1998; Pinto 2004; Schielke & Stauth 2008. For an analysis 
of ‘holy madness’ in Christianity see Fairfax Pope 2003, and for an ethnographic account dealing with sainthood and 
schizophrenia see Scheper-Hughes 2001.  
next chapter I will pay attention  to some less visible, but not less important, factors that  also need  be 
taken into account.    
 
 
4.1   Socialism, Sorcerers and Spies (Brief overview of a Troubled Relationship) 
Sufism plays a very visible role in contemporary Libya. The Libyan national television broadcasts the 
annual Issawy procession in the old city 197 ,  Sufis appear in the media in the course of musical 
performances, and renowned citizens of Tripoli (whether state functionaries, well-known personalities 
and even ambassadors) occasionally attend Sufi gatherings198. On a number of official occasions Colonel 
Gheddafi himself has been publicly awarded with symbolic ijazat from prominent shuyukh becoming an 
honorary member of some Sufi brotherhoods199. Bearing this in mind, it is only understandable that many 
of my Issawy friends did not want to talk about the time when Sufism was not the highly celebrated 
component of Libyan society that it is today.  Only after a while did a few of my informants decide to 
open up on the troubled state of Sufism during the first three decades of the regime, and it is on this initial 
phase of friction that I will first concentrate in my analysis. My informants provided very different 
recollections of this period and very different explanations for Gheddafi’s early antipathy towards the 
Sufis. Before I explore how Sufism was rehabilitated I will therefore present a brief overview of these 
                                                          
197   See Chapter 2 page 99. 
198  A festival of Mal’uf music (“Maharajan al Mal’uf”) is organised and televised every year in the city of Tripoli. Given the 
strong link between this type of music and the Issawy zawaya (see chapter 2) often members and devotees of the Issawiya take 
part to the festival performing pieces from the Issawy repertoire. The Maharajn al Mal’uf is highly appreciated by the Libyan 
general public. Interestingly, when in 2007 Tripoli was nominated “Capital of Islamic Culture” a troupe of Issawy musicians 
from Morocco was invited for the occasion. Their performance in the “msrah el kashef” (the “boy-scout theatre”, one of the 
auditoria of the capital) attracted a relatively large number of people amongst whom myself. In May of the same year the 
Moroccan ambassador participated in a dhikr session in the “Great Zawiya”, the oldest Issawy zawiya in the medina of Tripoli 
(see chapter 1 page 48). On Sufi music and the state see Harris & Dawut 2002 and Qureshi 1999. 
199 This information was confirmed to me by a number of different sources (both close to and far from the Sufi world). The 
ijaza, as explained in chapter 1, is the ‘licence to shaykh-hood” (see page 57).   
succinct, cursory and contradictory narratives in order to highlight some similarities and differences 
between them.  
 
For some of my interviewees, the regime’s opposition to Sufism was the manifestation of a deeper 
antagonism towards Islam in general. Despite his public rebuke of Marxism (Vandewalle 2006: 106; 
Davis 1987:36-40), Gheddafi retained, according to some of my informants, a ‘socialist aversion’ towards 
religion. Seventy year old, university educated, Shaykh Fatallah, for instance, explained to me that, being 
initially inspired by radical leftist ideas, Gheddafi developed a hate for religious figures and, 
consequently, repugnance for the Sufis. Shaykh Fatallah has no particular interest in esoteric knowledge 
and he is one of the most active Issawy shuyukh in Tripoli (apart from being the head of an influential 
sanad that counts a number of zawaya both in the East and in the West of the country). At the beginning 
of his shaykh-hood, however, Fatallah only had one zawiya outside of Tripoli which was bulldozed over 
by the government in 1982 for unspecified reasons. One of Fatallah’s muridin – only a teenager at the 
time – also described the event to me, specifying that this was one of the saddest moments in his entire 
life.  According to Fatallah during the seventies and the eighties the regime was “giving signs against 
religion in general”, and since Sufism was the “only organised religious group in the country”, Gheddafi 
decided to antagonise the zawaya. The shaykh told me he witnessed policemen arresting a number of 
Sufis during that period, and that Colonel Gheddafi changed his approach towards the Sufis only in the 
first part of the nineties. Taking advantage of the repression of Sufism, the shaykh told me, various Salafi-
inspired groups started to spread in Libya because “you cannot control the people…they need religion like 
food, and if you do not give them a good (religious) idea, someone else will come and give them a bad 
one”. In Fatallah’s view when the government was faced with this new challenge it decided to rehabilitate 
the Sufis in order to fight the Salafis, judging the first as less dangerous than the second.  
 The notion that Gheddafi persecuted Sufism because of a supposed anti-religion stance was reported to 
me also by Shaykh Ramadan. Though initially reticent to discuss “politics” (“siyasa”)  in the course of 
our conversations, after some time Ramadan explained to me that at the beginning of the regime Gheddafi 
had embraced “Marxist ideas” (“Marxiya”). Since the Libyans are traditionally deeply religious people, 
the shaykh told me, Gheddafi wanted to change their mentality in order to reduce the influence of Islam 
on the country. Ramadan clarified to me that Gheddafi outlawed Sufism for a while not only because of 
his political ideas but also because he hated the Sanusy order200. Ramadan was not the head of his sanad 
at the time, and though precociously interested in Sufi matters he was still learning the bases of mysticism 
from his grandfather (who preceded him as khalifa201) while furthering his religious education with 
another shaykh. Conscious of the situation, however, Ramadan did not want to endanger himself and his 
family and he used to hide books of religious content under his jumper while walking back home after 
visiting his teachers. The shaykh confirmed to me that some zawaya in different parts of the country were 
closed down by the government (but not his own), and that the situation only changed in the nineties 
when Salafis started to be perceived as a threat by the regime. Ramadan ended the conversation by 
clarifying that Gheddafi has no love for Sufism, only the desire to manipulate it as a political tool against 
other religious groups.  
 
If some of my interviewees told me that the regime attempted to repress all zawaya, others explained to 
me that Colonel Gheddafi did not despise Sufism per se, only some Sufis. Forty year old Shaykh Bilal, for 
example, told me that between the seventies and the nineties the government only persecuted those Sufis 
who used to do “wrong things “from a religious point of view. Bilal is the head of a fairly large Issawy 
                                                          
200  The Sufi order whose head became the first and last king of Libya, see Introduction page 13. 
201  The head of an Issawy sanad see Chapter 1 page 64. 
zawiya in Tripoli (apart from being the appreciated imam of a popular mosque in the city), and he assured 
me that neither he nor his muridin had ever had any problem with the police. Though not a supporter of 
the regime, Bilal clarified that the police only antagonised those zawaya whose members used to 
“perform hadra every night, going to trance until four o clock in the morning without even praying the 
Fajer202 prayer”. Because of these few zawaya, Bilal told me, “there was a time when one could not even 
say ‘I am a Sufi’ without incurring in some issues with the police”. The Shaykh clarified to me that the 
government had no intention of eradicating Sufism from the country: the regime only wanted to make 
sure that Libyan Sufism was orthodox.  In order to prove his point, Bilal told me that many men who 
work for the government (and even people from Gheddafi’s inner entourage) are devotees or members of 
Sufi brotherhoods.  
 
Thirty years old Salem (an unmarried accountant with no particular sympathy for Sufism or the regime) 
gave me a very similar account.  Salem told me that the government did not persecute all Sufis, but only 
those who were “not good”. Salem explained to me that the regime always supported the zawaya out of 
convenience because, unlike other religious groups, “they do not create political problems”.  In Salem’s 
view, during the first decades of Gheddafi’s power the police was only after those Sufis who, under the 
disguise of religious shuyukh, were in fact practising “witchcraft” and dealing with the jnun203. Salem also 
told me that at the time the regime was broadcasting programmes on television where false Sufis (who 
were actually sorcerers) were forced to make a public confession of their misdeeds. These measures were 
applied, according to Salem, in order to encourage Libyans to be careful when deciding to follow a Sufi 
master: it was a way to make people understand that sometimes religious figures “are not who they say 
                                                          
202  The first of the five daily prayers prescribed in Islam.  
203  Sing “Jin”, supernatural creatures that inhabit the world and live a parallel existence to the one of human beings. The Jnun 
are understood to be creatures of God who will account for their actions on the Day of Judgment. In Libya witchcraft or 
“sahar” (see also chapter 3 note 29) is widely defined as the art of manipulating jnun in order to harm people. The topic will be 
looked at again later on in the chapter.  
they are”. Interestingly, this information was also confirmed to me in the course of a brief conversation 
with a group of three Tripolitans working for a television channel. Being afraid of repercussions for their 
comments the three gentlemen did not want to deepen the matter, but they told me that similar 
programmes were indeed part of the regular repertoire of Libyan television up until the early nineties. 
  
For some of my interviewees the regime had a substantial antipathy either towards Sufism in general or 
towards some deviant manifestations of it. For others, however, the repression of the Sufis was only an 
act of political precaution. For example, Shaykh Amir - a wealthy professional in his late seventies - 
explained to me that no zawiya was ever closed down or destroyed by the government. In the eighties, he 
told me, a number of Sufi shuyukh (amongst whom some Issawis, including himself) were simply 
summoned by the police and asked to report on any suspect character in their zawaya. Amir added that 
“one of the government people” was a devotee in an important Sufi zawiya at the time, and that this 
person had lost the favour of the regime for unspecified reasons. As a result, the shaykh told me, the 
authorities thought that many Sufis were somehow related to this person, and applied a series of 
precautionary measures against the zawaya. Similarly, seventy year old shaykh Atif (who, 
notwithstanding his age, had become head of his zawiya only recently at the time of our conversation) 
told me that the regime only wanted to monitor the Sufis. Atif explained to me that the shaykh who 
preceded him as the guide of his zawiya was once asked by the police to keep a register of the attendees. 
According to Atif, the shaykh refused and one occasion, during one of Gheddafi’s public appearances, he 
even confronted the Colonel telling him: “the zawiya is open, send your people but it is them who have to 
do the job”.  
 
In some cases my informants explained to me that the regime had no interest in Sufi practices in 
themselves and that the government persecuted the Sufis simply because it suspected the zawaya of illicit 
political activities. Thirty year old Mohsin, for example, told me that the only zawaya who were targeted 
by the government were those that entertained relationships with clandestine political groups. Mohsin (a 
translator with journalistic aspirations who has no particular interest in Sufi matters) heard from his 
mother that in the eighties the regime suspected a relationship between the zawaya and a local branch of 
the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’204. Mohsin told me that it is difficult to reconstruct what happened because 
“over here everyone knows, but none talks”. However, he also explained to me that both his grandfather 
and his uncle used to visit a zawiya in the suburbs of Tripoli, and that his uncle was implicated in the 
matter and imprisoned for five years despite not having any relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
“The zawiya frequented by my uncle was dismantled and transformed into a clinic”, he said “while other 
zawaya were destroyed with bulldozers”. Mohsin told me that the Sufis were closely monitored until the 
government realised that they could be used as an instrument against more aggressive Islamist groups. “In 
Libya you cannot have a movement linked with religion” he added “because it is a dangerous 
instrument”. The power-holders, Mohsin told me, have always been aware of this danger, and they have 
therefore decided to play one religious group against the other in order to keep their grip over the country.  
 
A similar account was given to me by Dr. Khaled, a senior functionary in the Auqaf offices of Tripoli205. 
According to Dr. Khaled, the Sufi zawaya were closed down by the government purely for security 
reasons. He told me that “in the eighties all the countries Libya had trouble with sent secret agents to 
                                                          
204  “Akhwan al Muslimin”, a reformist movement founded in 1928 by Egyptian scholar Hasan al Banna (Rubin 2010). The 
brotherhood is massively diffused in a number of Islamic countries. Though tolerated at the time of the monarchy the Libyan 
branch has been outlawed and persecuted by the Gheddafi regime during the first years after the revolution (Joffe 1988; 
Pargeter 2005; Martinez 2007: 59-60).  In the eighties the group renamed itself the “Libyan Islamic Group” (“Al Jama’a Al 
Islamiya al Libiya”) and started to promote a full application of Shariya law through peaceful means. This second wave was 
also crushed by the Libyan government (ibid.) although some members of the brotherhood managed to keep a base of consents 
in a number of Libyan mosques (Pargeter 2013: 168). 
205  The insitution dealing with religious affairs in Libya (see Introduction page 18 and later on in this chapter).  
infiltrate the Sufi zawaya 206 ”. Khaled explained to me that “the zawaya gather all kinds of 
people...militaries, politicians, people working in the foreign affairs sector...(and Sufis) do not hide 
anything, so (the spies) sit with them and took all the information they needed...therefore Sufism was 
suspended by the government”.  Dr Khaled insisted that Gheddafi did not have anything against Sufism, 
and that in fact the Colonel has always had great devotion for some famous Sufi figures of the past. In 
Khaled’s view, however, the regime was forced to forbid all Sufi gatherings and practices for a long time 
out of precaution. It was only in the nineties, Khaled told me, that the matter was clarified and Sufism 
rehabilitated. When I asked him why, he explained to me that Sufism “is the only thing that stands up 
against all the extremism that is causing troubles in the world in the name of Islam and of the Muslims...”. 
According to Dr. Khaled, a number of zawaya were in fact bulldozed, but those were the ones whose 
members exhibited suspicious behaviour: they had “enemy movements inside”.  
 
The accounts of my informants are particularly interesting. On the one hand, my interviewees   agreed 
that before the nineties being associated with Sufism was problematic and that the situation only changed 
once Libyan Salafism started to expand. On the other hand, however, my interviewees disagreed on 
whether colonel Gheddafi favoured Sufism or not, and diverged on whether the motifs behind the 
persecution of the Sufis were of political or religious nature.  In a sense, the fact that my informants 
expressed very different interpretations of the inclinations of their leadership testifies to the lack of 
‘political information’ that, according to some scholars, has characterised Libyan society during the first 
decades of the regime (Obeidi 2001; Werfalli 2011). Nonetheless, once contextualised in the light of the 
                                                          
206  During the late seventies and in the eighties Libya was involved in a series of sporadic warfare events in Chad (1978 -
1987) and Egypt (1977). During the same period the country had also particularly conflictual relationships with Sudan, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Italy (Bruce Saint John 1988; 
Bennafla 1999; Grégoire 1999; Vandewalle 2006).   
‘public transcripts’207 propagated by the Libyan government at the time, this difference in the accounts 
appears less surprising. As I will show in the following section, in his speeches Gheddafi has effectively 
oscillated between praising Sufism as a legitimate form of religiosity and condemning it as politically 
dangerous or religiously unorthodox entity. Bearing this in mind it is only natural that, according to 
different personal perceptions, people associated with Sufism felt either praised or condemned. By briefly 
analysing the declarations of the Libyan leader, however, I will demonstrate that behind the contradictory 
attitude expressed in Gheddafi’s speeches lies an attempt to promote a very specific understanding of 
what counts as legitimate Sufism and what does not.  
 
 
4.2 “The Sufism which is not Darwysha” (Gheddafi and the Sufis) 
First of all, it is important to highlight that the speeches of Colonel Gheddafi support some of the 
statements made by my informants. As we will see, after accusing the Sufis of ignorance and 
irreligiousness in his early declarations, the Colonel shows a change of attitude in the nineties expressing 
the desire to counter Salafi-inspired movements with the spreading of Sufi practices. The speeches, 
however, show something more than a mere intention to use the Sufis as a political tool against the 
Salafis.  In embracing Sufism as a newly found resource against the Salafi encroachment, the Libyan 
leader highlights also the need for the Sufis to re-discover the authentic core of their doctrine, and in 
doing so he makes an interesting use of the word ‘darwysha’.  In Libya the term ‘darwysh’ is occasionally 
deployed with the meaning of ‘Sufi’, but it also has other semantic connotations, particularly amongst 
some Sufi circles. Before I explore ethnographically the complexities related to the notion of ‘darwysh’, I 
                                                          
207  According to James Scott, every relationship between dominant and dominated produces a series of’ public’ and ‘hidden’ 
transcripts. If the first category includes the public narratives promoted by the power –holders, the second indicates accounts 
produced ‘offstage’, far from the glance of power.  In Scott’s view both types of transcripts have to be taken into account in the 
analysis of a power relationship (Scott 1990b).   
will highlight its place in Gheddafi’s rhetoric. More specifically I will show how ‘darwysha’ is used as a 
synonym for Sufism in the earlier speeches and with reference to the corruptive elements from which 
Sufism needs to be sanitised in the later ones.  
 
In his declarations during the early eighties Gheddafi accuses Sufism of two major sins, namely religious 
backwardness and political divisiveness. In these speeches the Sufi orders are described as ‘darwysha’ 
and  listed together with other organisations as  groups that spread factionalism  and as elements that 
pollute the pristine clarity of the Islamic doctrine. In a famous speech delivered in 1982, for instance, the 
Libyan leader declares: 
 
“...the revolutionary movement takes on the struggle on behalf of the people...( the) rotten 
political powers...use the struggle for their own agenda, and therefore they serve 
colonialism...the struggle between us and them must be clear, all the political parties, all the 
sides, all the factions, all the classes, the darwysha, the Sufi orders, the Issawiya, the 
brotherhoods... they all represent stumped growth and rottenness and regression... there is 
nothing clearer then Islamic faith: in Islam you pray five times a day and if you don’t who will 
pray on your behalf...I do not accept a shaykh or a religious leader to be between me and god... 
what is this filth, in this age mankind tries to solve all the secrets of the universe... at this present 
stage, you are not a backward person for you to listen to a Sufi order and the zawaya and the 
Sufi rituals: things of the darwysha... what’s religiously permissible is clear and what is 
religiously prohibited is clear...you worship Allah, I worship Allah... I do not need...the Muslim 
Brotherhood208  or a Sufi order, and the person who embraces these things deserves to be 
slaughtered because his existence in this age is of no benefit...for someone to open their ears to 
such talk it is...political divergence, religion should go back to the way it was brought down to 
us...God gave us a Qur’an through Mohammed and it is believed that Mohammed is a prophet 
and that the Qur’an is from Allah” (Gheddafi 1982). 
 
 
In the words of Colonel Gheddafi Sufi practices, or “the things of the darwysha”, are presented as a 
corruptive praxis, and those who indulge in them as people who deserve “to be slaughtered”. Sufism (and 
specifically the Issawiya) is portrayed as a ‘confusing’ force that is in opposition with both the clear 
intelligibility of Islam (“nothing is clearer than the Islamic faith”) and with the progress of modernity (an 
                                                          
208  See footnote 19.  
age in which “mankind tries to solve the secrets of the universe”).  Being groups that serve “their own 
agenda”, the Sufi orders are also described as elements of division amongst the Muslims community and, 
therefore, as agents of “colonialism”.  The equation between ‘darwysha’, ‘Sufism’, ‘regression’ and 
‘colonialism’ can also be found in other declarations of Colonel Gheddafi. In a speech delivered on the 
same year, for instance, the leader offers an interesting re-interpretation of the figure of Omar al Mukhtar 
(the famous Sufi shaykh and Sanusy anti-colonial hero)209 explaining that he was, in fact, neither a Sufi 
nor a Sanusy. 
 
“...Omar al Mukhtar did not gather the Libyans through the darwysha of the Sanusis...neither 
through the Sufi rituals, nor through the Sufi orders and charlatanism, he did not bring them 
together with money and by reaching out to the Italians...by selling his country, territory and 
people... in the way that Idris asSanusy and the Sanusy family did” (Gheddafi 1982b) 
  
Similarly, in a declaration of 1987 Gheddafi explains that Sufism, or darwysha, has spread in the Muslim 
world with the complicity of Western colonialism. 
 
“... Most Islamic countries now fall into the realm of backwardness. Why? It is not because 
Islam is a religion linked to backwardness but because colonialism targeted Islamic countries 
and colonised them, made them backwards... in reality, wherever there is colonialism there is 
backwardness because these regions ...were targeted by crusader colonialism which harbours 
hatred against Muslims everywhere; as a result, sectarianism, division, partisanship and 
darwysha spread in parts of the Islamic world ...the Qur’an warned us from 
transforming(religion) into sects and parties...”(Gheddafi 1987) 
 
Throughout the eighties, whenever Colonel Gheddafi refers to Sufism he does so in terms of religious and 
political criticism. With the approach of the nineties, however, his approach towards Sufism seems to 
change. Traces of a different attitude can be found already in a speech delivered in 1982, where, in 
                                                          
209  As explained in chapter one, Omar al Mukhtar was a member of the Sanusiya and the most celebrated protagonist of the 
guerrilla against the Italians. Mukhtar was killed by the Italian fascists before the creation of the Sanusy kingdom by King Idris 
(see Introduction page 12.).   
praising the virtues of modesty and austerity, the Libyan leader makes a brief mention of Sufism 
clarifying that:  “Sufism, asceticism, and worship are all one movement...which in essence means that its 
followers free themselves from wealth...and from worldly gains...” (Gheddafi 1982c). Nevertheless, it is 
only in the late eighties that a completely new approach seems to emerge. Interestingly, in rehabilitating 
the Sufis the Libyan leader begins to use ‘darwysha’ as a separate category from ‘Sufism’. In a speech of 
1988, for instance, colonel Gheddafi states that: 
 
“ ... when Islam calls for mysticism and asceticism, this, in truth, is a call that makes us return to 
our right path....from this perspective, Sufism should spread, I do not mean ‘Sufism’ with the 
meaning of ‘darwysha’, I do not understand  the Sufism in the old yellow books210... the Sufism to 
which I refer and that comes from the heart of Islam should spread, instead of the spread of the 
veil and (instead of )stopping women from working...it is Sufism and Islamic principles that 
should spread instead of exploiting religion and distorting it, and instead of sorcery ... in front of 
you is the elimination of darwysha..” (Gheddafi 1988). 
 
 
In this speech, Colonel Gheddafi draws for the first time a clear differentiation between true Sufism 
(understood as “mysticism” and “asceticism”), and the “Sufism with the meaning of darwysha” (which 
entails “sorcery” and religious heterodoxy).  If the first is encouraged to spread as an alternative to 
Islamist interpretations of Islam (“the veil, and stopping women from working”), the second is condemned 
as a form of Sufism that does not come “from the heart of Islam”. Similar declarations appear more 
frequently throughout the nineties, where, in contrast with his earlier position, Colonel Gheddafi urges the 
Libyans to learn about Sufism and forget about the darwysha. 
 
“... (you need to) learn the Sufism which is not darwysha and that does not drug up the minds of 
people..Sufism is not extravagance, we need the Sufism which is austerity...the (agents of 
corruption) do not want us to have Sufism, what they want from us is extravagance and 
corruption ... (Gheddafi 1995)” 
                                                          
210  In Libyan folklore the “Yellow Books”, or “Kutub asSafraa”, are legendary books containing the secrets of  witchcraft. 
Whoever possesses them can learn the art of manipulating the jnun at will (see also note 22).. In other speeches Colonel 
Gheddafi says that “the yellow books have things in them that the mind cannot believe” (Gheddafi 1995b) comparing  them 
with his Green Book in order to highlight the dangers coming from the former  and the advantages brought about by the latter 
(Gheddafi 1995c). 
 
 
If in the earlier speeches Gheddafi accuses Sufism of being in contrast with the clarity of Islam, in these 
declarations the Libyan leader explains that true Sufism is “not extravagance”, and that it is darwysha, 
and not Sufism, that “drugs up the minds of the people”. Contrary to what he stated in his previous 
speeches, Colonel Gheddafi also clarifies that authentic Sufism is the true enemy of colonialism because 
it encourages Muslims towards austerity.   
 
“...Sufism is a way of life, Sufism is economics, eat and drink but do not waste, surely the 
squanderers are the fellows of the devils… Sufism is to abstain from what we indulged in 
because of western colonialism, their food and their drinks; when you refuse western food and 
drinks and western clothing and everything that came from the West, this is Sufism...” (Gheddafi 
1995d) 
 
 
As it appears from a reading of the speeches, in 1995 Gheddafi organised an event called “Sufism World 
Islamic Forum” (“Multaqa atTasawwuf al Islami al ‘Alami”) in the city of Tripoli as part of this public 
rehabilitation of Sufism211. In the opening speech the leader expresses in clear terms the need to free 
Sufism form the shackles of darwysha: 
 
 “... (we) benefit from our spiritual power, from the power of Sufism, from the power of 
asceticism, from the power of piety, from the power of faith, from the power of Islam, from the 
power of the Qur’an, from the power of the Sunna, from the power of our spiritual and 
intellectual heritage... (all these things) we want to turn into provisions for this battle... we have 
met here to turn Sufism into a weapon in the battle of the age in order to dust off accusations of 
darwysha... we want the community to wake up, to rise, and to turn all its intellectual, positive, 
academic and historical components into a tangible and meaningful modern weapon... and if we 
take a quick look at history it confirms to the world the validity of our predictions and compels 
us to believe that we will benefit”. (Gheddafi 1995e) 
                                                          
211  The event has been cursorily mentioned to me by a number of informants. None of my interviewees, however, appears to 
have participated. Only on one occasion an Issawy shaykh told me that his defunct brother (a shaykh also) was invited to 
deliver a paper in the forum.  Even though he did not attend the event, the shaykh reported to me that both Libyan Sufis and 
personalities form abroad were invited. The Forum seems to have been the first public conference dealing with Sufism since 
the revolution of 1969. In the course of a series of conversations I had in the “Markaz Jihad al Libyiin” (the “Center for the 
Struggle of the Libyan people”, the most important research institution of the city of Tripoli) I was told that from 1995 onwards 
the Center had promoted a series of conferences focused on the spirituality of famous Sufi figures of the past. Once again, none 
of my informants took part to these initiatives.  
 
As shown by these declarations, the rehabilitation of the Sufi orders operated by the regime has entailed 
also a public re-definition of Sufism. Colonel Gheddafi has passed from dismissing the Sufis as 
incompatible with religious clarity and modernity to defining them as a spiritual resource and as a 
“meaningful modern weapon “against Salafism. In this process, a certain component of Sufism, which the 
Libyan leader labels ‘darwysha’,  has been isolated as an ambiguous, extravagant and inauthentic element 
to be expelled from the true Sufi core.  Having shed light on this process I will now move to a broader 
contextualisation of the term ‘darwysh’. As we will see, for some Sufis ‘darwysha’ is effectively an 
ambiguous and extravagant part of Sufism, but it is also (in sharp contrast with the declarations of the 
Libyan leader) an authentic manifestation of it. By analysing the use of the term amongst some Sufi 
circles I will show how the regime has effectively promoted a ‘re-definition‘ of Sufism. In creating a 
separation between clear ‘Sufism’ and ambiguous ‘darwysha’ - whereas some of my Sufi informants see 
a continuity between the two- the regime has attempted to re-articulate Sufism in terms of clarity and 
transparency. 
 
4.3   Incomprehensible Saints (the Darwysh) 
If in the speeches of the Libyan leader ‘darwysha’ is presented as the extravagant counterpart of Sufism, 
in the words of some of my informants ‘darwysh’ indicates an extravagant Sufi saint. In order to highlight 
this very different use of the term I will present an in depth exploration of the notion of ‘darwysha’ 
showing how, for some Sufis, the word refers to a valid, though enigmatic, element of Sufism.  Needless 
to say, the concept was first presented to me by Shaykh Ramadan. In discussing the role of sainthood 
(“wilaya”) in Sufism, Ramadan explained to me that there is a fundamental differentiation between types 
of holy men, or “awlià”212.  The shaykh told me that amongst the saints there are some who have achieved 
                                                          
212  Sing. “Wali”, “friend (of God)”.  
perfection through a long process of spiritual evolution, and others who have had a precocious, over-
whelming experience of the divine. The first type - whom the shaykh, like many others, called “salekin”, 
“those who has passed through (spiritual stages)” – includes, according to Ramadan, holy men who are 
able to guide the common people on the same spiritual path they have travelled. The second category, on 
the contrary, comprises the ‘darawysh’ or “majadhib”, “those who have been taken (by God)”, individuals 
who have contemplated the divine nature so intensely to lose the capacity to interact fully with the world.  
If the first (amongst whom Ramadan included also the Perfect Shaykh) manifest their saintly status in an 
unequivocal way, the second remain hidden under the disguise of madmen, simpletons, and social 
outsiders213. 
 
When I asked Shaykh Ramadan whether the two types of holy men were equally close to God, he 
explained to me that in the end the darwysh is a ‘lesser’ saint because he cannot fully guide others along 
the path that leads to divine knowledge. Nonetheless, Ramadan also clarified that the ‘mad saint’ is an 
important figure of the Sufi universe and that ‘darwysha’ is, in a sense, a condition that affects all those 
who practise Sufism. Every Sufi is “majdhub” – “taken (by God)”- because the ‘secret’ (understood as 
divine power) “takes you, attracting the soul like a magnet attracts iron”. The only difference, Ramadan 
told me, is that the darwysh is a constant state of jedheb (“being taken”) while the majority of the Sufis 
have an episodic experience of this phenomenon. The shaykh also told me that if an Issawy is extremely 
zealous and intense in performing his spiritual exercises he can temporarily enter the state of darwysha, 
and that it is the job of a good shaykh to help the murid keeping a balance in the management of his 
                                                          
213  In some Arab countries like Egypt the term “majdhub” has the explicit meaning of “mad”. In Libya, however, “maklub 
“or “majnun” are preferred when referring to a mentally ill person. Though occasionally deploying ‘majdhub’ for ‘crazy’ 
Libyans usually use it in the way I have explained here. The term “Majdhub”, as I have mentioned in chapter 2 is also used to 
indicate a person in the state of trance during a Sufi ritual. 
spiritual affairs214. Far from condemning darwysha, however, Ramadan stressed that becoming a ‘mad 
saint’ is one of the many paths that lead the Sufi to God, though perhaps not the most advisable. In our 
conversations Ramadan - like other Issawy shuyukh - depicted darwysha, quite simply, as a style of 
sainthood.  
 
The ‘mad saints’ were described to me in terms of ambiguity and reverence. In a number of conversations 
I was told that the God reveals his secrets to the darawysh and that, being affected by such a strong 
experience of the divine, they lose their mental faculties while retaining a deep spiritual wisdom. Being a 
saint, the darwysh helps those in need, demonstrates the power of God through miracles and teaches the 
spiritual truths to the people.  Having been ‘burnt out’ by divine power, however, the mad saint 
implements his saintly duties through bizarre and unusual actions. As an Issawy shaykh once explained to 
me, ‘regular’ saints are like pieces of bread that have been patiently baked by God, while the darawysh 
are “loaves that have been taken out of the oven before time”. If the first drink regularly from the well of 
divine knowledge, the shaykh told me, the second “have been thrown in it “. In the words of my 
informants, the mad saints were portrayed as having an intense but childish character, the resemblance of 
a mentally ill person and no intention to conduct a normal life. Due to their irregular and erratic nature, I 
was often advised to keep a respectful distance from those affected by a state of “darwysha”. “When they 
ask you to do something do as they command...” I was once told by an Issawy friend “...but do not eat 
with them, do not drink with them and do not wear their clothes”.  
 
Even though I heard extensively about the darawysh, I had very few contacts with them, mainly because 
they were difficult to spot. In the course of Sufi gatherings and saints’ festivals, the attendees would 
occasionally point out certain individuals in the assembly and whispered to me that they were 
                                                          
214  On the relationship between madness and excessive exposure to secret spiritual knowledge see Soares 2005: 138.  
darawysh 215 . During these occasions, however, I have seen people applying the label to a highly 
differentiated plethora of characters. Scruffy looking vagabonds, old men dressed with odd clothes, 
shuyukh with a particularly eccentric character, jovial young bachelors, Sufis who exhibited moments of 
wild trance and even handicaps were all described to me as darawysh.  My attempts to interact directly 
with this variegated spectrum of individuals were never successful, and in reply to my questions on 
darwysha I often collected angry looks, enigmatic smiles or awkward moments of silence.  Only on one 
occasion I had the chance to talk with a self-declared darwysh -  a seventeen year old mentally retarded 
boy  who ensured me that he was one -  but  when I asked him what a darwysh was he candidly  replied to 
me: “God knows ”. Some of my informants warned me that true darawysh never reveal their identity. 
Shaykh Ramadan, in particular, told me that whereas people might simply consider the darwysh as a crazy 
person the true Sufi can see the secret that lies behind the appearance and distinguish between illness and 
darwysha.   
 
When I asked people to describe darwysha to me, they would often draw from a vast body of brief oral 
stories concerning famous mad saints (whose name, of course, was always preceded by ‘Sidhi’216). In 
doing so, some of my informants told me that darawysh are not bound by religious rules like any other 
Muslim. Famous darwysh of the past Sidhi Ahmed Attiar, for instance, was renowned for enjoying 
sessions of wine-drinking with the Italians in the town of Zlitan because, in the words of one informant, 
“God had granted permission to him” (“attahunnah Allah”).  Others, however, stressed that the true 
darawysh follow all the requirements of Qur’an and Sunna, and that they simply like to scandalise those 
around them with seemingly unlawful gestures.  The renowned mad saint Sidhi Imhammed Hanesh, for 
                                                          
215  Some mazarat (or festivals held in honor of a saint – see chapter 2) are explicitly dedicated to deceased holy men of the 
darwysh type.  
216  On the use of this title see introduction footnote 25.  
example, used to drink leghbi217 so that people would not know whether he was breaking God’s law or 
simply refreshing his palate. “It was a secret between him and God”, I was told by the Sufi devotee who 
reported the story to me. If some portrayed the darawysh as ‘special Sufis’ who are beyond the 
constraints of religion, others described them as secretive holy men who hide their sanctity on purpose. In 
both cases, however, those who recognised darwysha as a genuine expression of Sufism told me that the 
ultimate characteristic of a mad saint is his enigmatic behaviour. Whether described as being freed from 
the prescriptions of the shariah or respectful of them, darawysh were depicted as incomprehensible 
beings whose words and actions are characterised by ‘incomprehensibility’ and ‘ambiguity’.   
 
The most famous darwysh at the time of my field-work was certainly Sidhi Mohammed Adhfer 
Kasherma, a Sufi shaykh from the town of Zlitan, and the protagonist of a number of stories circulating 
amongst my Tripolitan informants. Kasherma was described to me as a charismatic but enigmatic 
member of the ‘Arusy order218, and given his fame I will briefly present him as an archetypical example 
of mad saint. The darwysh had died at an old age five years before my arrival in Libya but his 
supernatural deeds were still discussed, his name remembered in the course of a festival  in Zlitan, and his 
pictures hanged inside a number of ‘Arusy zawaya. In some of these portraits the darwysh appeared as 
having small moustaches, good-looking features and a jocose glance. Apart from being famous for his 
miraculous powers (due to which he was apparently  able to walk into Bab el Aziziya219 at will, and drive 
for days without putting petrol in the car),  Kasherma was also known for making puzzling comments, 
confusing statements  and incomprehensible gestures.  Famously, the darwysh used to welcome people 
                                                          
217 A date-based beverage that is halal when drunk fresh and haram if left to ferment.  “Halal”, “Lawful”, indicates practices 
that are permissible according to Islamic law, while “Haram” refers to what is forbidden by it.  
218  See Introduction of the thesis page 17. 
219  Residence of Colonel Gheddafi in the center of Tripoli. Bab al Aziziya is constantly guarded by a conspicuous number of 
soldiers (and occasionally by tanks) and it is surrounded by more than one row of walls in order to prevent the observer from 
seeing the internal area. Stories of people being shot only because they stopped their cars close to the building have been 
reported to me on more than one occasion.  
with random phrases like ‘get a hair-cut’,   or ‘give me five dinars’. At times the saint would even call 
people with strange names for no apparent reason, as in the case of a young man I met in Tripoli who was 
once told: “from now on your name is Aysha220”. If some of my friends confessed to have never grasped 
the sense and purpose of these strange statements, others explained to me that, in typical darwysh fashion, 
they had a hidden prophetic meaning, a secret purpose and a strong miraculous efficacy. 
 
Forty-five years old businessman and Sufi devotee Zohayr, for instance, told me that for a period of his 
life he used to travel regularly from Tripoli to Zlitan in order to visit Sidhi Kasherma. Since the saint was 
constantly surrounded by a large number of followers, Zohayr never had the chance to talk with him 
personally. Nonetheless, after few visits (during which Kasherma had neither spoken with him nor 
acknowledged his presence), Zohayr was surprised to discover that the darwysh had written him a letter. 
Upon receiving the letter, Zohayr was even more surprised to read the request made by the mad saint:  
Kasherma expressed the desire to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca and asked Zohayr to book a flight for 
him to Saudi Arabia. Zohayr was deeply puzzled by the bizarre demand of the darwysh, and for a while 
he was indecisive about fulfilling the request or not. After some time, however, he simply (and strangely) 
forgot about the entire story. Nine months later, Zohayr decided to take his wife and children to Jordan 
for a holiday, and on his way back he had the inexplicable inspiration to use his savings in order to open a 
travel agency specialising in pilgrimages. Only after starting his new business Zohayr realised that  
through the strange letter Kasherma wanted to implant the idea in his head, so that he could start a 
remunerative, and at the same time pious, activity.  
 
According to Zohayr, Kasherma was able to predict the future even though his predictions were always 
expressed in an initially incomprehensible way. In this regard Zohayr told me that in the nineties the 
                                                          
220  Highly popular female name.  
darwysh was once asked to foretell the results of the presidential elections in America.  To everyone’s 
surprise Kasherma replied that the next president would be “the one who eats tuna” (“elli iakul al Tun”), 
and after the television announced that the presidency had gone to Bill Clinton people realised that the 
strange statement had a close assonance with the president’s surname.  Zohayr explained to me that 
Kasherma had the capacity to deliver enigmatic messages through dreams and visions, and that he had the 
opportunity to experience this power of the saint personally. One day, for instance, Zohayr had a strange 
dream where the darwysh suddenly appeared and commanded him to kill a cat. Feeling compelled to 
fulfil the absurd request, Zohayr instinctively tried to slaughter the beast according to Islamic fashion221, 
but the saint insisted that the animal should be cut into halves. Waking up, Zohayr consulted a popular 
book for the interpretation of dreams that was lying in his house, and discovered that the cat is often 
associated with death. Only few days later, when his sister died at a young age (“having lived only half of 
the years she should have”) Zohayr grasped the meaning of the dream and understood that Kasherma 
wanted to prepare him for the sad event. 
 
Thirty-five year old university educated Abdul-Basit also confirmed to me that Kasherma was an 
exceptional and eccentric character. Being a passionate Issawy devotee Abdul-Basit accompanied me in 
many of my visits to the zawaya, and during one of these occasions he told me that Kasherma could 
easily come across as a madman while in fact he was a Sufi saint who wanted to help people in difficult 
situations. Once, Abdul –Basit told me, a teenager went to see the saint because he felt depressed. The 
young man told Kasherma that, having reached eighteen, he was going to start his military service on the 
next day, and that he felt deeply unsettled at the thought of wasting one month of his life with the 
                                                          
221   Following the Qur’an and the Sunna an animal should be slaughtered by cutting its throat while invoking the name of 
God. The method provides a quick and merciful death, and helps the blood (considered un-clean) flow out of the body Campo 
2009: 246 -250 
soldiers222.  The boy confessed to the darwysh that he did not want to go, and - in his typically cryptic 
style - the saint told him to buy a large quantity of bread loaves before arriving to the barracks. Surprised 
by the enigmatic comment (but determined to follow Kasherma’s command) the youth went home and on 
the following day he stopped at the bakery before reaching the military barracks.  Upon arrival, he left the 
loaves inside one of the barracks, and joined a row of men who were waiting to be called in. 
Unexpectedly, the captain in chief came out, said that he had found the bread and enquired about it, to 
which the young man replied that he had bought it. The captain told him that from then onwards he only 
had to bring bread for the soldiers every morning, and that as long as he was willing to do so he did not 
have to attend military service.  
 
A similar story was reported to me by Zakariya, an Issawy shaykh and a labourer in his early forties. Even 
though Zakariya had not met Kasherma in person he recognised his holiness and sanctity. More 
specifically, Zakariya told me that many had benefited from following the apparently meaningless 
commands of the darwysh. On one occasion, he told me, the mad saint approached a man in the middle of 
the street (something the darwysh was famous for doing).  Quite randomly, Kasherma asked him whether 
he was willing to spend an entire month in his company. Aware of the saint’s reputation, the man did not 
want to decline the strange request, but he explained to the darwysh that he was supposed to attend 
military service and that he would be arrested if he did not present himself to the military barracks on the 
next day.  The saint insisted so much that the man finally agreed, risking a prison sentence but enriching 
his soul at the presence of the darwysh for thirty days.  After the month had passed, Kasherma finally told 
the man that he was free to leave, and commanded him to go to the barracks of the soldiers and behave as 
if he had been with them the whole time. Once there, the man was surprised to realise that none had 
                                                          
222  All Libyans who are older than eighteen are required to attend a month of military service every year. Very often this 
experience was described to me as an annoying occurrence and as a waste of time. Some older informants told me that in the 
past young boys undertaking the service were often beaten up and bullied by superiors and seniors.  
noticed his absence and that by responding to the cryptic request of the mad saint he had spared himself a 
tedious month of boredom and gained a holy experience.  
 
Mabruk, a shopkeeper and Sufi devotee in his late fifties, told me that the saintly status of Kasherma was 
unanimously recognised by his fellow saints (whether of the darwysh or the ‘regular’ kind) and vice 
versa. In order to explain the difference between the mad saints and the sane ones (and the reciprocal 
respect between the two), Mabruk told me of two encounters between his own shaykh (recognised by his 
muridin and devotees as a saint) and the famous darwysh.  According to Mabruk the shaykh used to invite 
Kasherma to his house because he considered him a holy man. During one of these meetings the darwysh 
approached the shaykh and asked him, inexplicably, to give him ten dinars. Upon receiving the money, 
however, Kasherma pulled a surprised expression and shouted: ‘I did not know you were one of God’s 
friends, here take your money back!’ thus publicly recognising the shaykh as a saint.  When, later on, the 
darwysh was once again invited to a meeting with the shaykh and his muridin he addressed them and 
made one of his usual incomprehensible requests: he asked them to get a hair-cut and to give him five 
dinars each. Being a ‘sane’ saint the shaykh felt compelled to intervene respectfully but promptly, and 
told the darwysh: ‘I am the one who gives (spiritual gifts), not them’. Having heard the reply, rejoicing 
for the confession of sainthood, Kasherma stood up as in ecstasy, put his hand over his heart and 
commanded those present in the meeting to prepare some food and celebrate the holy event. 
 
The accounts of Kasherma’s deeds – and indeed the figure of Kasherma himself – can furnish some 
useful narrative coordinates for an understanding of the notion of darwysha. Doubtlessly, the figure of the 
darwysh as described in these stories begs for a comparison with other ‘borderline’ characters analysed by 
anthropologists in different contexts223.  However, the aspect of these narratives that I would like to 
highlight is that they portray ‘darwysha’ is as an authentic, though incomprehensible, manifestation of the 
divine that belongs to the Sufi world. This consideration is particularly important when bearing in mind 
the negative use of the term that, as have I previously shown, characterises the public speeches of 
Gheddafi. Both in these accounts and in the speeches, darwysha is understood as an obscure and 
ambiguous force. However, if in the declarations of the Libyan leader the concept epitomises the 
ambiguous elements that do not belong to true Sufism, in the stories of my informants darwysha is 
described as yet another mysterious aspect of the Sufi universe. In light of a full contextualisation of 
‘darwysha’ one can easily realise how the regime has attempted to re-articulate Sufism as a ‘clear’ form 
of religiosity needing to be freed from religious extravagances. Having shown how the Libyan 
government has extrapolated an element of the Sufi world and re-define it as its opposite, I will now 
concentrate on the effect of this re-articulation on Issawy practices.  
 
4.4   “All Stabbing Knives and Nonsense” (Issawy Secret knowledge as Darwysha) 
The differentiation between ‘Sufism’ and ‘Darwysha’ is not peculiar to the speeches of the Libyan leader 
only. On the contrary, the necessity to discern between authentic Sufi doctrine  and ambiguous  ‘darwysh 
practices’ was expressed to me in a number of conversations 224 ,  and particularly in the course of 
interviews I had with people working in the administrative side of Sufism. As I have previously 
                                                          
223  Being an unpredictable entity to be both feared and loved, untouched by the limitations of conventional behaviour, the 
darwysh resembles, for instance, the ‘trickster’ of a certain ethnographic literature (Guenther 1999; Winzeler 2008: 133-
137).As a droll being that helps common people circumventing the constrictions of power, the mad saint is also a 
‘carnivalesque’ figure: a burlesque reminder that rules can be broken and subverted (Bakhtin 1968; Ivanov 1993; Sheperd 
1993). Finally, as a creature suspended between the mysteries of the spiritual realm and the contingencies of the material 
world the darwysh is a ‘liminal’ character living “betwixt and between” (Turner 1967:  93-111) the visible dimension and 
invisible one (Turner 1968; 1977b; Ashley 1990). 
224
  In order to collect the full transcripts of Colonel Gheddafi’s speeches I made a number of visits to the “Markaz el Alami lil 
dirasat wa abhat al kitab al akhdar” (the “World Centre for the Studies and Researches on the Green Book”) of the city of 
Tripoli. Upon hearing about the subject of my research, the personnel of the Centre warned me more than once to make sure 
I studied only authentic Sufism, leaving darwysha out of my research.  
mentioned, Issawy shuyukh and zawaya are supposed to be coordinated by a secretary (or “Amin”) of the 
Issawy order, and by the “Idhara Turuq wa Zawaya” (“Administration of the Brotherhoods and of the 
Zawaya”), both of which operate under the direct supervision of the central Auqaf offices225. Bearing this 
in mind, in this section I will briefly explore the organisation of the Idhara as an administrative interface 
between the zawaya and the government, and then contextualise the figure of the Amin explaining his 
functions and tasks. More importantly, however, I will show how people working in the administration of 
the zawaya re-produce the dichotomy of authentic ‘Sufism’ and ‘darwysha’ that is found in the speeches 
of the Libyan leader. In doing so, I will pay particular attention to the fact that  these informants dismiss 
Issawy esoteric knowledge and miraculous performances as inauthentic elements that do not belong to 
true Sufism and, consequently, put them under the rubric of ‘darwysha’.   
 
Since the “Idhara Turuq wa zawaya” was created in 1990 (while the post of the Issawy secretary was 
created in 2004), one can easily realise how the rehabilitation of Sufism carried out by the regime in the 
nineties has entailed also an attempt to ‘institutionalise’ the zawaya.  The Idhara, which consists of a 
couple of small, hardly furnished offices far from the city centre, constitutes one of the five sections of the 
Auqaf (the others being much larger administrative organs dealing with the management of the mosques, 
the organisation of Quranic schools, the registration of lands and goods that belong to these or other 
religious institutions, and the distribution of the zaka’ 226 ). As explained to me on a number of 
conversations I had in the offices of the Auqaf, the Idhara is composed of two aqsam (sing. “qism” 
“sections”), namely the “Qism al Adriha” (“the Shrines section”) and the “Qism atTuruq asSufiya” (the 
“Sufi brotherhoods section”), each one with its own director and personnel. If the first section deals with 
                                                          
225  See chapter 1 page 51 and Introduction page 18.  
226 ‘Alms giving’, one of the five pillars of Islam (see Chapter 3 footnote 8). Every Libyan is legally bound to pay zaka’ (whose 
amount is proportional to salary). 
the maintenance of the most popular Sufi shrines 227  in the country, the second takes care of the 
administrative side of the zawaya, facilitating the cooperation between shuyukh and between the different 
brotherhoods present in Libya. The “Sufi brotherhoods section”, in particular, has the task of keeping a 
register of all the shuyukh operating in the country and the purpose of organising a monthly payment of 
120 dinars for each of them in order to contribute to the expenses of their zawaya228. 
 
The employees working in the Idhara are not required to belong to a Sufi order, and their tasks are 
supposed to be only of an organisational (tandhimiya) and administrative (idhariya) nature.  As I was told 
many times during my visits to the “Sufi brotherhoods section”, the Idhara has no say on the actual 
management of the properties of a zawiya229 and, more importantly, no right to interfere with the religious 
aspects of the life of a Sufi congregation. Even though every shaykh is required to have the official stamp 
of the Auqaf on his ijaza230 (and on any piece of documentation that is related with his zawiya), the 
Idhara has no jurisdiction over the spiritual side of shaykh-hood (be it the validity of the spiritual 
genealogy contained in the ijaza, the organisation of the weekly meetings in the zawiya, or the decision to 
admit someone in a Sufi brotherhood). The only exception to this rule, I was told, relates to those shuyukh 
who have received their ‘licence to shaykh-hood’ abroad (particularly if they belong to a Sufi order which 
is not present in Libya). In the majority of cases the Idhara only requires the shuyukh to prove that they 
have Libyan citizenship, but when a Sufi master exhibit an ijaza produced in another country the Idhara 
                                                          
227  See Chapter 2 page 93.  
228 This amount of money is not particularly conspicuous. The expenses faced by an Issawy zawiya during the celebration of 
the birthday of the prophet, for instance, amount to anything between 4000 and 5000 dinars. The production of khamra (a 
special sweet which, as explained in chapter 2 page 100, is freely distributed to the attendees of the mawlid nights in the 
zawaya) can cost some 2500 dinars (of which a typical breakdown is: 600 dinars for 60 kilograms of honey, 1000 dinars for 
100 kilograms of almonds, 160 dinars worth of olive oil, 700 dinars worth of peanuts and some 20 dinars to be spent for sugar, 
hummus and aromas). Occasionally Saints festivals (whose larger expenses are certainly those related to food) are paid for by 
people who live close to the shrine, while other times (if the festival is organised by a Sufi zawiya) the shaykh of the zawiya 
can ask the Auqaf for extra-funding, even though it is quite rare.  Some shuyukh have regular donors (at times anonymous) 
paying for the expenses of their zawaya, while others resort to personal savings or ask their muridin and devotees to contribute 
regularly with whatever they can.   
229 See Chapter 1 page. 52. The topic will be touched upon again in the fifth chapter.  
230 Or licence to shaykh-hood. See chapter 1.  
has the right to check the validity of the licence either by contacting the Auqaf offices of the country in 
question, or by asking for an expert report from another Libyan shaykh231. Other than this, the Idhara was 
presented to me as an organisation dealing with the Sufis rather than as a Sufi institution.   
 
Even though the majority of the Issawis told me that the Idhara did not interfere with their dealings, 
shuyukh would occasionally make remarks that suggest otherwise. Though eager to maintain a formal 
relationship with the director of the “Sufi brotherhoods section”, many shuyukh urged me to understand 
that Libyan Sufi masters are free to run their zawaya as they wish as long as they do not break the law232. 
Issawis often explained to me that shaykh-hood is a spiritual status that has nothing to do with state 
administration and, in some cases, that they were not willing to accept money from the Idhara because 
they were not “employees of the Auqaf”.  Nonetheless, at times Issawis would describe the relationship 
between the zawaya and the Idhara in terms that go beyond formal supervision. Shaykh Ramadan, for 
instance, explained to me that he was once summoned to the offices of the Auqaf and explicitly asked not 
to perform karamat. The shaykh allowed me to take note of the event, but he did not furnish me with the 
details of the story, perhaps due to the delicacy of the matter. In some cases Issawis would tell me that 
performing karamat was not safe because “... there is the administration, there is the law” (“... fi Idhara, 
fi qanun...”), while in other cases I was told that the Idhara had explicitly banned karamat and that those 
Issawis who perform them are only able to do so because the regime “cannot control everyone”233. Even 
                                                          
231  In my conversations with the personnel of the idhara I was told that this measure has two purposes:  preventing people 
(and specifically spies) from producing fake ijazat and infiltrate the zawaya, and  making sure that Libyans who have practised 
Sufism abroad do not spread Sufi practices that are “culturally incompatible” with Libyan society.  This might partly explain 
the absence of immigrants amongst Tripolitan Sufis that I have mentioned in chapter one footnote 10.  
232 Some shuyukh decide not to accept the monthly payment of 120 dinars by the state. Some told me that they did not 
consider themselves as people employed by the Auqaf and that shaykh-hood is a spiritual duty that has nothing to do with 
money. In one case a shaykh told me that he had decided to donate all the properties of his zawiya to the state because he did 
not want his zawiya to become an economic enterprise.  
233  Zawaya, like any other gathering place in Libya, are certainly monitored by the secret police. On one occasion, during a 
Sufi ritual in Tripoli I was almost arrested by two agents in plain clothes. Even though the ritual had been quite un-eventful I 
had my camera confiscated and I was detained in a car for some time. Eventually, I was allowed to leave and on the next day I 
though none of these informants was willing to elaborate, these cursory comments appear particularly 
important in light of the opinions I collected during my interviews in the offices of the Idhara. 
 
Karamat were harshly criticised and dismissed as ‘darwysha’ in all the conversations I had with the 
administrative personnel dealing with zawaya. In our chats (which were often accompanied by tea and 
cigarettes) employees of the Idhara would regularly tell me not to write about weird people harming 
themselves and pretending to be an animal. During a conversation with the director of the “Sufi 
brotherhoods section”, for instance, I was explicitly advised to focus my research on authentic Sufism 
leaving karamat out of my investigation. The director (a talkative, university educated bureaucrat, and a 
self-described Sufi devotee in his forties) explained to me that in the past true Sufism had been polluted 
by “darwysh things”, and that the karamat of the Issawiya were one of these elements of corruption. 
Though admitting that in Sufism there are things “that go beyond human comprehension”, he told me that 
Issawy karamat were simply heterodox, darwysh practices: 
 
 “...(people) do not know anything about Sufism, they think that it is all stabbing knives and 
nonsense….darwysha…( but) this era has turned Sufism from darwysha into thought (fikr), 
Sufism is thought, it is knowledge, it is culture, it is traditions, it is feelings, and Sufism is not 
bandir234 and knives, On the contrary!  In Sufism they are fighting these things, and these things 
should be fought.. in the past these things were all forbidden....(as for now) not only (it is 
forbidden) by law, but also by the Sufi brotherhoods themselves, by law if one kills himself it is 
suicide! And if someone stabs another one with a knife, and this one dies, it is homicide! We can 
never confuse between Sufism and darwysha, I told you that Sufism is knowledge (elm)... Sufism 
is not Darwysha,...Sufism is a science on its own, we must renew the Sufi culture, when you come 
to see all the Islamic thinkers, all of them are Sufis my brother!... What is Sufism? It is to do 
everything that our prophet did...no, this thing of the karamat does not make any sense...” 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
was summoned to a police station to collect my camera and receive the excuses of the two agents. On the relationship between 
Sufi miraculous practices and state administration in Egypt see Gilsenan 1990: 237-250 and Hoffman 1995: 86. A very brief 
mention of the critical attitude of the Moroccan government towards Issawy self-harm can be found in Hammoudi 1997: 181. 
234  Musical instrument used in Issawy rituals (see Chapter 2 page 106) 
The director’s remarks epitomise the approach of the Idhara in Sufi matters, and particularly its position 
in relation to the karamat. On many occasions the director clarified to me that the “Sufi brotherhoods 
section” does not interfere with the way in which a Sufi shaykh chooses to practices his spirituality. 
However, in the course of our conversations he also stressed that karamat are practises that are 
“forbidden” from a legal point of view and actions that should be actively repressed because they do not 
belong to Sufism. In a sense karamat were described to me as sort of exception in the jurisdiction of the 
Idhara. Though formally un-interested in spiritual interference, the administrative personnel felt the need 
to trace a clear line between orthodox Sufism (“thought, knowledge and culture”) and darwysha (“knives 
and nonsense”).   
 
A similar opinion was expressed to me by Muammar, an Issawy shaykh in his sixties who had served as 
director of the Idhara at a younger age until the late nineties. Muammar, a charismatic professional and 
the head of a fairly large zawiya outside of Tripoli, told me that usually people working in the 
administrative side of the zawaya are not initiated to a Sufi order and that, being an Issawy, he was an 
exception. The shaykh explained to me that he was made director of the Idhara because he had an interest 
in putting “some order” in the disorganised structure of the zawaya and that this indeed has always been 
the only purpose of the Idhara, leaving the spiritual side of Sufism to the shuyukh. In reply to my 
questions on karamat, however, Muammar told me that one has to differentiate between “true Sufism” 
(“atTasawwuf al Haqiqi”) and the false Sufism which is all about “knives and bidà235”.  Though eager to 
highlight the purely administrative nature of the Idhara, shaykh Muammar expressed the opinion that the 
“Sufi brotherhoods section” would benefit from employing good Sufi shuyukh who practise correct 
religiosity. The shaykh also told me that the administration has always tried to fight false Sufis in the past 
                                                          
235  “Innovations”, see Chapter 3 footnote 42.  
(but not those Sufis who are “on the correct path”) and that karamat do not belong to the Issawiya 
because the brotherhood only deals with practises that are solidly based on Qur’an and Sunna. 
 
This blurring of the lines between administration and spiritual direction (particularly in relationship with 
karamat) was also evident in conversations I had with the secretary of the Issawy order. All my Issawy 
informants told me that the secretary, or “Amin”, was elected (as mentioned in the first chapter) by a 
number of shuyukh under request of the Auqaf and that, consequently, he only served as a figure of 
reference in organisational terms. Even though my informants stressed that the Amin was chosen by 
members of the brotherhood and not by the Idhara, they also told me that he had no right to interfere with 
spiritual affairs and that, for this reason, they had very little contact with him. In my interviews with the 
secretary, however, I was presented with a very different interpretation of the competences of the figure 
of the Amin. The secretary, an Issawy shaykh in his sixties and the head of a large sanad counting a 
number of zawaya inside and outside of Tripoli, told me that he saw himself as carrying a spiritual duty. 
As a consequence, he explained to me that he had full rights to have a say on the way shuyukh practised 
Sufism. In explaining his tasks, the secretary clarified that he was entitled to reproach those Issawis who 
do not conform to correct religiosity: 
 
“This is the spiritual aspect (and) this is my job, I go around visiting the (shuyukh or the 
zawaya), and I talk with them, we organise reunions (between shuyukh) in every area, and I see 
who follows the correct path and who does things that are not correct... I check whether a sanad 
is correct or not, for instance (someone) brings me his licence to shaykh-hood, I check it and I 
ask him....who made you shaykh?...now we have many things in the zawaya that are not correct, 
there are only few zawaya that do everything in a correct way...not all of them...but some of 
these zawaya do things correctly...” 
 
 
In defining himself as a guide dealing with “the spiritual aspect” of the order, the secretary traced not 
only a differentiation between authentic and inauthentic Sufism, but also a demarcation between true 
Issawy practices and false ones. For instance, in striking contrast with many of my Issawy interviewees, 
the Amin told me that he wanted to create a standard version of the litanies of the order 236and that he was 
in the process of publishing a “correct version” of them.  
 
“this is my job, I supervise (the shuyukh) from a spiritual point of view, for what concerns 
spiritual exercises…sometimes we organise meetings and give instructions (to the shuyukh) and 
we ask what are the activities in their zawaya, and how they perform the spiritual exercises, and 
we are printing out books in order to create a uniformed standard version of doing the spiritual 
exercises and the litanies, se that we all follow one way of doing things, and everyone has to 
follow what is written in these books…” 
       
 
The secretary explained to me that he had a spiritual responsibility over the entire Issawy order, and that 
he intended to suppress the performance of karamat because “in the true spiritual path there are not such 
things…and if I see someone doing these things I tell him it is wrong!”.  Significantly, the shaykh 
emphasised that similar practices are “forbidden” (“mamnua”) and despicable from a religious point of 
view (“haram”) because they do not have a base in the Qur’an and in the Sunna.  
 
As shown by these comments, the perception of Issawy karamat has been heavily influenced by the 
dichotomy of ‘Sufism’ and ‘darwysha’ produced by the Libyan government. The remarks made by the 
administrative personnel dealing with the zawaya help us understand that the form of ‘clear’ Sufism 
promoted by the regime leaves very little room for esoteric knowledge. In light of these considerations - 
and bearing in mind that, as explained in the previous chapter, the majority of the Issawis distance 
themselves from secret practices - one realises the link between the positions of the regime and the 
attitude of many members of the brotherhood. The fact that  Issawis feel the need to present themselves as 
an order that enjoys a special relationship with the mystical realm (rather than as a brotherhood that 
                                                          
236  As explained in the second chapter for many members of the order the fact that Issawy litanies are performed in different 
ways does not constitute a problem.  
indulges in ambiguous and incomprehensible practices) is, amongst other things, the product of a specific 
hegemonic discourse. The tendency to conceptualise ‘the secret’ as a mystical force rather than as a 
corpus of ‘non-explicit’ practices can therefore be analysed as an attempt to adjust to the mainstream 
religiosity put forward by the Libyan government: a desire  to demonstrate that Issawis are mystics, not 
darwyshes. Having shed light on the influences of the regime on Sufism and on the Issawiya, in the final 
chapter I will briefly draw some further conclusions in order better to contextualise the broader religious 
landscape of contemporary Libya.  
 
4.5   “They do Strange Things” (Sufis, Salafis and the Regime) 
As I have demonstrated throughout the chapter, the Libyan government criticised the Sufi brotherhoods 
for almost three decades and then rehabilitated them in order to counter balance the expansion of Salafi 
movements. In the course of my field-work, however, I developed the impression that this political 
manoeuvre has had the opposite effect on Libyan society. Even though Salafi Islam was not one of my 
research concerns I have noticed that many of those Tripolitans who are not involved with Sufism 
(particularly the youth born during and after the revolution) have a strong sympathy for the anti-Sufi 
arguments proposed by Libyan Salafis. It is reasonable to think that the anti-Sufi propaganda carried out 
by the regime in the past - and the view of Sufism as a religiosity in need of purification proposed by 
Gheddafi after the nineties- have strengthened the efficacy of the anti-Sufi rhetoric of the local Salafi 
cells237. Bearing this in mind, in this last section of the chapter I will briefly present the criticism of 
Sufism offered by Libyan Salafis. Far from proposing an in-depth analysis I will simply make some 
remarks in order to show the actual similarity between the Salafi positions and the views put forward by 
the regime, and then I will conclude with some final comments on the phenomenon of Libyan Salafism.  
                                                          
237  In his study of Moroccan Islam Dale Eickelman (1981) notices a similar dynamic, though in a very different socio-
historical context. According to Eickelman, by antagonising the Sufis the French colonisers indirectly contributed to the 
expansion of local Salafism (ibid.).   
 Salafism was ferociously persecuted by the regime at the time of my field-work. The Libyan media were 
constantly reporting on the imprisonment and execution of ‘dangerous Salafi extremists’ and even 
sporting a long beard was enough to attract attention from the police238. Due to this very tense situation, I 
had very few occasions to interview Tripolitans who are associated with Salafism. In some of these 
sporadic conversations, however, I collected opinions that closely resemble the dichotomy of authentic 
and inauthentic Sufism proposed by the Libyan regime. Thirty year old self-described Salafi Abdul Kher, 
for instance, told me that some of the famous Sufis of the past like Sidhi Abdul Qadir al Jeilani239 were 
authentic Muslims who followed in the steps of the prophet Mohammad and that, with time, Sufism has 
been corrupted by various religious innovations that cannot be found in the Qur’an and in the Sunna. 
“The Sufism of the past was good”, Abdul Kher told me, “but the one that you find today is not”240. He 
explained to me that, unlike the Salafis, Libyan Sufis “are not strong in their faith, they are not rigid 
enough”. According to Abdul Kher, people in the zawaya like to eat and drink, and Sufi orders “...attract 
good people but force them to do wrong things”. Expressing an opinion which echoes the declarations of 
the Libyan leaders prior to the nineties, Abdul Kher told me that Sufis do “strange things (shay gharib) in 
their rituals, things that seem miracles while in fact they are works of sorcery”. 
 
                                                          
238   Growing a long beard with trimmed moustaches is recommended by the Sunna (Gafeny 1994: 90). In Libya this 
particular style of facial hair is popularly associated with Salafism, but it is also sported by people with different religious 
inclinations. On a number of occasions my informants told me that they had been interrogated or bothered by the police 
because of the ‘suspicious’ length of their beards even though they had no involvement with Salafism.. Pargeter mentions the 
existence of Salafi pamphlets and recorded sermons in Libya (Pargeter 2012: 165-173). Personally I have not come across any 
Salafi pamphlet, book, video or audio-tape (means of proselytisation that are quite typical in Salafi contexts – Hirshkind 2006). 
Perhaps my Salafi interlocutors did not mention these tools of proselytisation because of the repressive anti-Salafi measures 
adopted by the Libyan government. Obviously, Salafi charities (another important tool of Salafi proselytism in many Islamic 
contexts) do not exist in Libya.   
239   Renowned medieval shaykh and founder of the Qadiry order (sees Introduction page 17 and Chapter 1 footnote 19.  
240  As noticed by Magnus Marsden often Salafi-inspired Muslims “rather than rejecting Sufi traditions out of hand have 
sought to reduce its teachings to their visions of purified Islam” (Marsden 2005:158). Recent publications have shown that the 
difference between Sufism and Salafism is often blurrier than it seems (Weismann 2007; Sikand 2007; Laffan 2007; Villalon 
2007).Even still, all my informants (and particularly my Issawy friends) described ‘Salafi’ and ‘Sufi’ as two completely 
opposite and distinct categories.  
Similar comments were reported to me by Ludvy, a university-educated Salafi in his late forties and an 
ex-Sufi.  “It is not that I do not love Sufism”, Ludvy told me, “Sufis are actually good people, but they 
make mistakes in the way they approach religion, and I feel for them because I was one of them”. Ludvy 
explained to me that when he was younger he was a Sufi devotee, and that he used to visit the zawaya 
regularly in order to enjoy the music of the Issawiya. Having met some Salafis during his pilgrimage to 
Mecca241, however, Ludvy reconsidered his ideas on Sufism and, in particular, his opinions on the 
miraculous performances of the Issawiya.  He told me that Issawy miracles are “tricks done with the help 
of sorcery and people believe these things to be true miracles because they are not educated”. 
Resembling the notion of a clear Islam put forward by the regime, Ludvy told me that “the prophet has 
always been clear in teaching Islam to the people, and the Qur’an clearly states that if someone loves 
God he has to follow only the instructions that were given to us by the prophet”. Ludvy ended the 
conversation by saying that Colonel Gheddafi is a good Muslim who preaches the correct Islam, and that 
he only persecutes the Salafis because he does not realise that their positions are very similar to his. 
 
The stress on the ‘clarity’ of Islam characterised all my conversations with people associated with 
Salafism. Fifty year old Iskander, for example, told me that many Libyans agree with the critique of 
Sufism put forward by the Salafis because “Salafism is a natural (tabihy) approach Islam that requires 
Muslims to live a normal life, and follow what is written in the holy book while Sufis do things that you do 
not find in the Qur’an”. Iskander explained to me that Libyans – whether Salafis or not- are very aware 
that “Sufism is ignorance (asSufiya jahel)”, that “Sufis do not know God (asSufiyin ma iarfush Allah)” and 
that behind certain Sufi practices there are “diabolic ideas (fikra shaytaniya)”.  According to Iskander, 
                                                          
241  From the conversations I had with Libyan self-professed Salafis it seems that the pilgrimage to Mecca is one of the most 
important occasions of encounter with Salafi ideology. Gheddafi’s antipathy towards Salafism should also be looked at bearing 
in mind the conflictual nature of the relationships between Libya and Saudi Arabia, a country that has actively contributed to 
the spreading of Salafi Islam worldwide (see footnote 21 and later on the chapter). 
Muslims “are required to believe in invisible things like paradise and hell, and miracles do exist”. 
Nonetheless, when I asked him about the karamat of the Issawiya he told me that “Sufis operate these 
things through sorcery” and that “these are things that the prophet has never done”. Iskander told me 
that when he was a young man he used to attend Sufi gatherings because zawaya were places where one 
could go to drink tea and have a chat with friends.  Having embraced Salafi Islam for a number of years, 
however, Iskander told me that he has finally realised that “God does not require Muslims to do strange 
things...before I used to ask myself many questions on religion to the point that I could not sleep, but now 
I can go to sleep at night with a clear head, I am not confused anymore”242.  
 
Though brief, these comments show a certain similarity between the peculiar form of religiosity 
publicised by the Libyan regime and the positions of some Libyan Salafis. Bearing in mind these 
similarities, it is safe to suggest that the propaganda of the Libyan government might have possibly paved 
the way for the spreading of the Salafi criticism of Sufism (and particularly of the Issawiya). As I have 
demonstrated, Gheddafi’s stress on the textuality and clarity of pristine Islam has entailed an attempt to 
re-define Sufism as a form of spirituality that has been polluted by darwysha. In framing this re-
definition, however, the Libyan government has effectively portrayed Sufi Islam as ‘defective’ approach 
to religion. By inviting the Libyan Sufis to get rid of their ‘extravagance’ the government had 
communicated the idea that Sufism is a ‘contaminated’ spirituality, thus indirectly supporting the 
arguments of the Salafis. Indeed, the political manoeuvres of the Libyan regime seem to have been 
successful in influencing Sufi practices, particularly for what concerns the negative perception of Issawy 
                                                          
242  Some publications have shown that Salafi Muslims are not necessarily critical towards the most esoteric aspects of Islam 
(Marsden 2005: 157-192) or towards secrecy in general (Van Der Veer 2004). Nonetheless, this does not seem to be the case 
with the Libyan Salafis I have interviewed. One might argue that there is a relationship between the diffusion of Salafism in 
Libya and the fact that the Issawiya has abandoned its secrets. Perhaps Issawis might have been influenced by Gheddafi’s 
understanding of Islam as much as by certain Salafi ideas. In my interviews, however, members of the order have always 
distanced themselves clearly and explicitly from Salafi Islam. Even though I could not investigate Libyan Salafism (and its 
relationships with Sufism) in depth, I still believe that the changes that have characterised the Issawy order have more to do 
with the Libyan regime than with anything else.  
karamat. The same cannot be said, however, for the regime’s attempt to play the Sufis against the Salafis 
since the first seem to be disfavoured – and the second supported – by a large portion of Libyan youth. 
Doubtlessly, an analysis of the relationship between Gheddafi’s views on Islam and Salafism would 
require a much deeper investigation. An analysis of the similarity between Gheddafi’s positions and the 
Salafi arguments might help shedding light on the changes that have occurred in the popular perception 
Libyans have of Issawy practices (and therefore, to an extent, on the changes that have occurred in the 
way in which Issawis articulate secrecy). Nonetheless, this similarity does not explain the spreading of 
Salafism in Libya in its entirety. The continuity one might detect between the discourses of the regime 
and the Salafi arguments is quite striking when it comes to the criticism of Sufism and to the scriptural 
‘clarity’ of Islam. However, the connection between the two is much weaker (if not completely absent) 
when it comes to other aspects of Libyan Salafism and of the Green Thought. There are other factors that 
have to be taken into account if one wants to understand the growth of Salafism in Libya.  
 
As I have mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, in the past scholars have linked the rise of Salafism, 
or to use a Gellnerian terminology, of ‘textual’ Islam’, to modernisation, the spread of literacy and the 
proliferation of a more ‘rationalistic’ (or even ‘scientific’) approach to religion and to the world in general 
(Geertz 1968; Gellner 1981). Contemporary Libya is certainly characterised by a certain growth of 
literacy and education243 (and by a certain ‘scriptural’ approach to religion fuelled by the regime), and this 
has certainly played a part in the spreading of Salafi ideas amongst the youth. However, as I have also 
explained in the introduction, the view of Salafism as a phenomenon propelled by modern rationalisation 
is one which is based on a simplistic understanding of Islam, disenchantment and modernity. More recent 
publications dealing with Salafi Islam have emphasised the ‘global’ nature of this phenomenon 
demonstrating that Salafism is, to a certain extent, an agent of (as well as a consequence of) globalisation 
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(Roy 2002; Meijer 2009). Some of these scholars have appreciated the global nature of Salafism but they 
have mainly analysed its spreading as a consequence of a foreign-policy platform shaped by Saudi 
interests, while others have demonstrated that the rise of Salafism is often the result of spontaneous 
dynamics shaped by both transnational and local flows that go beyond the mechanics of Saudi 
propaganda (Bonnefoy 2009; 2012). Others in turn have disregarded geo-strategic and cultural forces 
suggesting that militant Islam should not be looked at as the expression of pre-existing territorial and 
cultural factors, but rather as agents that create their own interpretative lense of reality and politics and 
that interact with others interpretative landscapes (often even opposite ones) in very complex ways (Devji 
2005). These considerations are particularly important because they show that the spread of Salafism is 
the result of a complex mixture of local, transnational and global factors that cannot be approached with a 
strictly deterministic approach. Even though it is reasonable to assume that Libyan Salafism might be 
propelled, to a certain extent, by ‘foreign’ (whether Saudi or more ‘global’) forces (and even ‘foreign 
money’), it is important to say that the regime has always adopted extremely repressive measures in 
dealing with any kind of foreign presence in Libya (Pargeter 2012: 163)244. Doubtlessly, the growth of 
Libyan militant Salafism should be looked at through global lenses, but together with the more 
‘transnational’ aspects one has to consider also more regional and local factors.  
 
On a transnational level, scholars have suggested that the spreading of Salafism in Libya should be linked 
to the general ‘Islamic awakening’ that has taken place in North-Africa since the seventies (Pargeter 
2012: 163). Even considering the anti-immigration (and anti-Salafi) policies of the regime it was 
impossible for Libya to remain immune to this broader North-African spreading of Salafi Islam (ibid.). 
Furthermore, as Pargeter suggests, in the eighties, when Salafism started to spread in the country, many 
Libyans were strongly impressed by events like the jihad in Afghanistan, and indeed a high number of 
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them left the country in order to take part to the jihad and came back ‘Salafised’ (ibid.)245. On a more 
local level, some scholars have suggested that the diffusion of Salafi-inspired movements in Libya might 
have been helped by a certain climate of reform and ‘political relaxation’ achieved in the Jamahiriya at 
the end of the eighties (De Bona 2013: 15)246. The same scholars, however, have shed light on the 
discrepancy between the reformed discourses embraced by the regime and the ferocious repression of 
Salafi groups operated by it (De Bona 2013: 81). The Salafi presence in Libya is indeed a complex reality 
whose study goes beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is safe to assume that behind this 
phenomenon there is a combination of both local and transnational factors, including the view of Salafism 
as a language of resistance against the regime. As in other contexts, Salafi Islam has provided a ‘global’ 
language that can be used locally in order to channelise the discontent Libyans have towards the regime 
and its corruption (Pargeter 2012: 163). Ironically, the regime has paved the way for the diffusion of some 
Salafi (or anti-Sufi) ideas, but it has also found in Salafism one of its more powerful antagonists.  
 
Conclusion  
In the previous chapter I have shown that many Issawis feel the need to reduce the importance of secrecy 
in their doctrines and practices and that, as a result, they conceptualise the ‘secret’, or sirr, as a spiritual 
power rather than as a body of secret knowledge. Bearing this in mind, in this chapter I have attempted to 
contextualise Issawy secret knowledge within a broader analysis of the relationship between the Libyan 
government and the Sufi orders after the revolution of 1969. In particular, I have elucidated that this 
                                                          
245 It is extimated that between eight hundreds and a thousand Libyans have joined the jihad in Afghanistan (Pargeter 2012: 
163). A group of Libyan fighters called the “Mujahideein Brigade” (later to be called the “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group”) 
formed in Afghanistan and sought to return to Libya in order de-throne Gheddafi and bring Islamic rule in Libya (Pargeter 2013: 
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attempted to assasinate Gheddafi in 1996) enjoyed a certain local favour buti it was harshly repressed by the regime. Many 
members of the organisation were detained in the infamous Abu  Slim prison in Benghazi. In 1996 the regime engaged in a 
massacre of prison inmates, and it is estimated that around 1286 individuals were killed and buried in mass graves. This was, as 
Pargeter rightly points out, “one of the most notorious crimnes of the Qaddafi era” (Pargeter 2013: 170).  
246 See introduction page 15.  
relationship has been marked by friction and criticism until the nineties when, in a complete change of 
attitude, the government has started to support Sufism as an alternative to Salafism. As I have also shown, 
the rehabilitation of the Sufi orders carried out by the regime has entailed an attempt to make Sufism 
compatible with Gheddafi’s peculiar understanding of Islam. As part of this process of ‘domestication’ 
Gheddafi has put forward the idea that authentic Sufi doctrine has been contaminated by in-authentic and 
extravagant practices, or ‘darwysha’. By exploring ethnographically the notion of ‘darwysh’, however, I 
have shown that Colonel Gheddafi has created a dichotomy between ‘Sufism’ and ‘darwysha’ whereas 
some of my Sufi informants see a continuity between the two. In doing so, I have demonstrated that the 
regime had effectively tried to re-articulate Sufism as a ‘clear’ form of religiosity where there is very little 
room for secret and ‘un-clear’ practices. Having shed light on the impact of Gheddafi’s ideology on the 
Issawiya, I will now consider other factors that need to be taken into account in an investigation of  the 
‘loss’ of secrets that has characterised the Issawy order. More specifically, I will show that this 
phenomenon is related not only to the manoeuvres of the Libyan regime, but also to the dynamics 
involved in the transmission of the esoteric knowledge within the brotherhood.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
“A SECRET THING AND A FAMILY MATTER” 
Familial Dynamics and Loss of Secrets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 The end of my field-work was approaching. I was about to leave the country. One evening the murid came to my 
house. He told me that he had changed his mind. Even though he still believed in the goodness of the Issawy 
spiritual path, the murid wanted to leave his shaykh. The murid told me that he had realised that karamat are not 
true miracles. He wanted to follow another shaykh who did not condone these practices. I was truly surprised (the 
murid had not mentioned any of this before). I asked him about the reasons that had pushed him to take this 
decision. I thought that the murid had somehow embraced the discourses propagated by the regime: perhaps he had 
realised that the form of ‘clear’ Sufism publicised by the government was more appealing. To my surprise. the murid 
explained to me that it was, quite simply, a personal decision that did not have anything to do with politics. The 
murid had simply met another shaykh who seemed to be more convincing than the previous one. I thought that it was 
a shame. I only had few days left, and still many things to do. There was no time to explore this change properly. 
The murid left early (he too had things to do). We planned to meet again and say bye to each other before my 
departure. The last time I saw him we walked around Tripoli at night, talking about everything and nothing. We 
grabbed a cup of tea from a street vendor and decided to call few friends. The evening was nice. And I did not have 
the heart to ask him whether he wanted to expand on his latest spiritual developments.  
 
 
 
 
 Familial Sufism (Introduction)  
In the previous chapter I have looked at the relationship between the Sufi orders and the Libyan 
government. In analysing this complex rapport, I have demonstrated that the regime has carried out a re-
articulation of Sufism in an attempt to transform it into a ‘un-ambiguous’ spirituality where there is no 
space for secrets. More specifically, I have shown that this re-definition of Sufism has pushed the 
Issawiya to abandon its secret knowledge in order to become compatible with the ‘clear’ religiosity 
sponsored by Colonel Gheddafi. Having shed light on this process, in this last chapter I will concentrate 
on other factors that need to be taken into account in an analysis of the Issawy ‘loss of secrets’. In order to 
broaden my investigation of the brotherhood, I will focus on the relationship between family dynamics 
and the transmission of Issawy secret knowledge. In doing so, I will demonstrate that the specific 
dynamics that regulate shaykh-hood within the different familial groups that constitute the Issawiya 
determine, to a certain extent, whether these groups preserve the secret knowledge of the order or not.    
 
As I have elucidated in the first chapter (and throughout the thesis) the Issawiya is divided into different 
groups, or assanid (sing. sanad), headed by independent shuyukh who do not recognise a common 
spiritual leader. Each sanad, as I have explained, articulates its identity in ‘genealogical’ terms: when a 
shaykh decides that his muridin are ready to become masters of the order, he gives them an ijaza (or 
licence to shaykh-hood) including them into his own spiritual genealogy (sanad). As I have also 
explained, however, a shaykh chooses only one of his ex-muridin as his successor, usually his son, so that 
assanid tend to become, with time, independent groups with a strictly familial character. Bearing this in 
mind, in this chapter I will examine the way in which specific dynamics of succession influence the 
transmission of secret knowledge within a sanad. In order to do so, I will analyse the history of three 
important familial assanid of the order. In two of these families, as we will see, shuyukh have always 
selected their eldest sons or their youngest brothers as successors even when these persons did not have 
an interest in esoteric knowledge. In the third family, on the contrary, shuyukh have applied a different 
strategy of succession: they have emphasised the importance of choosing a member of the family who is 
trained in the esoteric aspects of the order over the need to select a direct relative of the shaykh. As a 
consequence, the first two have lost the secret knowledge of karamat, while the third has kept it.  
 
Previous studies on Sufism have shed light on the importance of blood-relationships within specific lines 
of Sufi masters. In particular, anthropologists have shown that Sufi shuyukh have often the tendency to 
choose their sons as successors thus keeping their specific Sufi traditions within the confines of the 
nuclear or enlarged family (Gellner 1969; Gilsenan 1973: 75-76; Pinto 2004; Sedgwick 2005; Werbner 
2007). These ethnographers have suggested that the transmission of Sufi knowledge (and more 
specifically of esoteric knowledge – Soares 2005: 135) is very often a family matter, and in doing so they 
have identified Sufism as a religiosity entirely focused on blood-ties (Gellner 1969, 1969b, 1981) where 
knowledge and descent merge (Eickleman 1981). Doubtlessly, these ethnographers have illuminated 
some important aspects of ‘familial Sufism’ contributing to the anthropological debate on the relationship 
between knowledge and kinship (Bourdieu 1977; Eickelman 1981; Schneider 1984: 55; Lambek 1993: 
151; Ensel 1999; Vom Bruck 2005)247. When dealing with Sufism, however, anthropologists have failed 
to analyse how specific familial dynamics produce specific kinds of Sufi knowledge. As I will show in 
this chapter, those Issawy families which privilege a filial or fraternal succession (regardless of the 
personal inclinations of the successor) increase the possibility of selecting a shaykh who does not value 
secret knowledge, and expose themselves to the ‘risk’ of losing their secrets. Those familial groups which 
apply a less ‘family-oriented’ style of transmission of knowledge, on the contrary, have a higher chance 
of preserving the secrets of the order. In analysing these dynamics I will unpack the simplistic view of 
Sufism as familial religiosity which is necessarily focused on strict blood-ties (ibid.), but I will also 
identify some ‘internal’ factors that, together with the ‘external’ intervention of the Libyan regime, have 
determined the loss of Issawy secrets. 
 
5.1 The Descendants of the First Issawy (The Banun Family) 
The first familial sanad I will explore is the one of the Banun, a name that the reader has already 
encountered in the first chapter. As I have previously explained, the Banun are the descendants of the 
Moroccan Issawy master Mohammed al Allam Banun al Fasi, a disciple of the Perfect Shaykh who 
founded the first Issawy zawiya in Tripoli (the Zawiya al Kabyra, or the “Great Zawiya”) between the 
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sixteenth and the seventeenth century248. Today the Banun are both an important Issawy sanad (the oldest 
in the city) and a renowned sharif249 family whose members share an interest in jurisprudence.  Abdallah 
Banun, the head of the sanad, is both the shaykh of the “Great Zawiya” and a busy lawyer with a beautiful 
office in the old city of Tripoli. Shaykh Abdallah is a bearded, educated and charismatic character in his 
seventies who can speak, with his deep voice, English and Italian. He has been married for a number of 
decades and in raising his children he had them initiated to the tariqa as his muridin.  Even though 
Abdallah has become an Issawy master in 1968 he has succeeded his older brother as the guide of the 
“Great Zawiya” only in the year 2000. Since then, shaykh Abdallah has tried to implement his own 
understanding of Sufism and of Issawy spirituality in the zawiya.  
 
Shaykh Abdallah told me that, in his view, karamat should not be performed or taught in the zawiya. He 
explained to me that in the past the secret knowledge of karamat was used to demonstrate the truth of 
Islam to the Italian colonisers, and that now that Libya is no longer ruled by infidels this knowledge has 
lost its purpose. Abdallah told me that he had received this knowledge from his sanad, but he also added 
that he has never used it (“I do not need to”) because the brotherhood has now changed its spiritual 
priorities. Issawis, he told me, are not concerned with secrets anymore, but only with following Islamic 
orthodoxy. In order to strengthen the orthodoxy of the “Great Zawiya”, Abdallah has decided to forbid 
not only secret knowledge and karamat, but also musical performances in his congregation. He clarified 
that he had nothing against music in itself, but he also explained to me that by eliminating Mal’uf250 
music from the practices of the zawiya he wanted to encourage the muridin to focus on the more ‘Islamic’ 
of the Issawy rituals: the dhikr251, the “remembrance (of God)”, a practice which is solidly based on the 
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Qur’an. Shaykh Abdallah told me that some of his predecessors at the guide of the zawiya had a different 
approach towards Issawy practices, and particularly towards karamat. When I asked him to reconstruct 
the history of his sanad (and the different approaches of his predecessors towards karamat) the shaykh 
made use not only of his memory but also of his “Banuniat” (“Banun things”): a folder full of newspapers 
articles, documents and photocopies of manuscripts that he had kept in his office. In order to present these 
data I will first focus on the dynamics of succession in the “Great Zawiya”, and subsequently I will offer 
some reflections on how these dynamics have affected the transmission (and the loss) of secret knowledge 
in the Banun line. In order to facilitate the reader I will refer to the different shuyukh both with names and 
with numbers.  
 
After the death of the first Banun who brought the Issawy tariqa to Tripoli, another sixteen masters have 
followed him at the guide of the “Great Zawiya” (including shaykh Abdallah). Very little is known about 
the first eight shuyukh, but it is safe to say that in selecting their successors they have always chosen their 
sons (possibly their eldest, although this is not specified in the documents). Shaykh Abdallah, however, 
was able to tell me more information about the ninth, who was also called Abdallah (9). This first 
Abdallah had three male children Ahmeda (10), Abdul Qadir (11) and Arebi (12), and they all became 
head of the “Great Zawiya” (first the eldest, then the middle one and after that the youngest) following 
their father’s death. Shaykh Ahmeda (1240 hijri – 1335 hijri252), in particular, was a judge in the appellate 
court and had either five or six male children (together with a number of daughters). Nevertheless, all his 
male children, according to shaykh Abdallah, “did not care about the tariqa”.  After two years at the 
guide of the zawiya Ahmeda (10) decided that he did not want to be in charge of the congregation 
anymore (for reasons that are unknown), and since his children were not suitable candidates he chose his 
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younger brother Abdul Qadir (11) as successor because, in the words of shaykh Abdallah, “he was 
suitable for shaykh-hood and he was still alive at the time”.  
 
Shaykh Abdul Qadir (11) (born after the 1240 hijri - 1325 hijri) became shaykh after his older brother. He 
was an officer in the Ottoman army253, and he had six daughters and one male son, Mohammed Abdul 
Qadir (1288 ijri – 1945 miladi), a renowned lawyer who lived in Turkey and in Palestine (where he was 
general prosecutor) for a while. According to shaykh Abdallah, Abdul Qadir’s son did not have any 
interest in the tariqa, and he wanted to pursue a career as a lawyer. Shaykh Abdul Qadir (11) decided 
therefore that his son was unsuitable to be the successor as head of the zawiya. When, after six months as 
the guide of the “Great Zawiya”, Abdul Qadir decided to ‘abdicate’ for unknown reasons, he chose his 
younger brother Arebi (12) because, according to shaykh Abdallah, he “had the priority”. Arebi (1256 
hijri -1918 miladi) was a judge in the appellate court like his older brother. He succeeded Abdul Qadir as 
head of the sanad and married a woman from an important Ottoman family generating three sons and 
three daughters. His first born, however, was, according to shaykh Abdallah, “a very simple man…. a 
merchant of wood” who did not have the capacity to guide the zawiya, while his third son did not have 
any interest in Sufism. The second son, Abdallah (13), was therefore selected as successor.   
 
Abdallah (13) (1281 hijri – 1938 miladi) was a lawyer. Amongst his famous cases, shaykh Abdallah 
remembers one where his predecessor defended the priest of an Italian catholic church of the old city 
against a famous Turkish military officer, winning the case. Shaykh Abdallah told me that the priest was 
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 In a list of the shuyukh of the zawiya written by Shaykh Abdallah’s eldest brother on the 12 of May 1991, Abdul Qadir (11) 
is described as the eldest and Ahmeda (10) as the second. However, in a document written by  shaykh Abdallah’s father 
Abdul Qadir is described as the first and Ahmeda as the second and this hypothesis is corroborated by the dates of birth of 
the two (1240 hijri for Abdul Qadir and “after 1240 hijri” for Ahmeda). Interestingly, shaykh Abdallah told me that, since 
Ahmeda was a judge in the appellate court (while Abdul Qadir only a military officer) “Ahmeda would have been more 
suitable (in his father’s eyes) because he was the eldest and he was more educated”. 
particularly grateful to his predecessor, and that when on one occasion Abdallah (13) was captured by the 
Italians he interceded for his release. Abdallah had two sons and since, as I have explained, his two 
brothers were unsuitable to be chosen as successor he decided to nominate one of his sons. Unfortunately, 
his first born, Bashir, died at a very early age, and consequently, his second child, Mohammed Zeki (14), 
was chosen as successor as head of the sanad. Mohammed Zeki (1896- 16th August 1970) became shaykh 
of the “Great Zawiya” in 1928, and he remained as the guide of the sanad until his death. He had six 
children: Ibrahim (who died at a very early age), Arebi, Ibrahim the second, Fawzi (who died in his 
twenties), Abdallah and Mahmud (who died a teenager in 1957).  Mohammed Zeki (14) decided to 
initiate all the three male children who remained alive to the brotherhood: Arebi (15), Ibrahim (16) and 
Abdallah (17 - the current head of the sanad) who all became shaykh starting from the eldest (15). Arebi 
(15) (1921 -1990) became shaykh of the “Great Zawiya” in 1970, and remained as the guide of the 
muridin until his death. Arebi had two male children, Fawzi and Mohammed. Fawzi, the first born, is 
today a young boy, and shaykh Abdallah does not know whether his father initiated him to the 
brotherhood before he died. Due to the young age of the two sons, Arebi indicated his younger brother 
Ibrahim (16) as successor. 
 
Ibrahim (16) (1925 – 2000) became shaykh at the death of his brother and remained in charge of the 
zawiya until he died. He had three sons. Shaykh Abdallah told me that while Ibrahim (16) was still alive 
two of his children, distanced themselves from Sufism, and became Salafis, while the third, Mahmud 
remained close to the “Great Zawiya”. Mahmud, whom I met on a number of occasions, is an extremely 
friendly person, a military pilot in his forties who is always present during the special occasions of the 
zawiya (particularly during the celebration of the birthday of the prophet254). Though close to the zawiya 
Mahmud has decided not to join the order (according to shaykh Abdallah, he often jokingly says that “he 
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is still too young to become an Issawy”). Since none of his children was a suitable candidate, shaykh 
Ibrahim (16) indicated his brother Abdallah (17) as successor (clarifying that, in case Abdallah had 
refused, his son Mahmud should have become shaykh of the zawiya). Shaykh Abdallah accepted to 
become the head of the “Great Zawiya”, a role that he still has. Abdallah has not made up his mind about 
succession. Even though his eldest son is already unofficially considered to be the successor by the 
muridin, Abdallah told me that he is still considering whether to choose him or his nephew Mahmud (in 
case he decides to join the order). 
 
5.2 Sons and Brothers (the Dynamics of Succession of the Banun) 
When I asked shaykh Abdallah about the rules of succession in the Banun sanad, he told me that the 
suitability of the candidate is the main parameter of choice. By looking at the sanad, however, it appears 
that blood-relationships (particularly of the filial and fraternal kind) are also an important factor in the 
choice of a successor. As I have shown, the first eight Banun passed the leadership of the sanad to their 
sons, and the ninth followed this trend selecting his eldest son as successor. The tenth and the eleventh 
were somehow faced with a problem because their sons were not suitable candidates, and decided 
therefore to pass shaykh-hood to a younger brother instead of a child. The twelfth (faced with the death of 
his first-born) decided to select his second child as thirteenth successor, who (faced also with the death of 
his first-born) chose once again a second born.  The fourteenth selected his first-born as fifteenth shaykh 
and he, in turn, chose his younger brother because his children were too young. Following the same 
scheme, the sixteenth, finally, chose his younger brother because his children were not suitable 
candidates. Bearing this in mind, one realises that the Banun have kept a ‘compromise’ between blood 
and suitability. Though concerned with choosing the more appropriate candidate they have also always 
chosen within a restricted pool of candidates made of children and brothers. In limiting the possibilities of 
choice (and in establishing that, in the end, a shaykh can only choose between his brother and his child as 
a successor) the Banun have exposed themselves to ‘the risk’ of selecting a candidate who has no interest 
for secret knowledge.  
 
Shaykh Abdallah told me that, as far as he knows and remembers, the first fifteen shuyukh of the sanad 
have made use of the secret knowledge of the brotherhood and performed karamat regularly. Even though 
Shaykh Abdallah’s father (14) and older brother, Arebi (15), used to perform karamat with less regularity 
than their predecessors they nevertheless kept the use of secret knowledge in the zawiya. Things started to 
change, however, with Abdallah’s other brother, Ibrahim (16) and with Abdallah himself (17). Unlike his 
brother Arebi, Ibrahim did not value secret knowledge, and once nominated shaykh of the “Great Zawiya” 
in 1990, he forbade the performance of karamat (and so did shaykh Abdallah after him). Abdallah told me 
that Ibrahim was “closest to Arebi for what concerns age, but closest to me for what concerns 
mentality...he was a very educated man, very open minded, he was really a modern person, a different 
type of shaykh”. The transition from Arebi (15) and Ibrahim (16) is particularly interesting here. In 
selecting a successor Arebi (who valued secret knowledge) chose his brother Ibrahim (who did not 
endorse karamat) because, as previously explained, his children were not suitable candidates. This 
dynamic shows that ‘suitability’ is a parameter in the choice for a successor, but it also shows that (as it is 
clear from the sanad) the Banun have always considered brothers and children as the only two possible 
options, even when this meant choosing someone who did not value the esoteric knowledge of the 
brotherhood. The strategy of succession deployed by the Banun has made them particularly prone to 
‘lose’ the secrets of the order. 
 
5.3 A ‘young’- but important-  line of Masters (The Massaudi Family) 
The second familial sanad I will analyse is the one of the Massaudi. The Massaudi are a family which is 
‘younger’ than the Banun, but that is characterised by dynamics of succession that are very similar to 
theirs, and that have also ‘lost’ the secret knowledge of the Issawiya. The current head of the sanad, 
shaykh Mohammed Said al Massaudi, is a quiet, soft-voiced, blue eyed man in his fifties who has been 
married for a number of years and who works for an oil company. Shaykh Mohammed Said is the head of 
an old zawiya in the city centre (the “Zawiya of Sidhi Abumushmasha”255) and the heir of a very important 
familial sanad that has produced a number of ijazat (originating a number of sub-assanid that, with time, 
have become independent). Shaykh Mohammed Said told me that he has received the special formulas of 
karamat through his sanad, but he also explained to me that he has never used them (and that he never 
will). Mohammed Said told me that he only wants his muridin to come to the zawiya and participate in 
the weekly recitation of the hezb256 and in the dhikr : secret knowledge, in his view, does not play an 
important role in the education of the muridin (or in the tariqa in general).  
 
Shaykh Mohammed Said told me that he has never spoken about the secret formulas of karamat with any 
of his muridin (or with his children). Mohammed Said clarified to me that he believes that there are 
“asrar”, “secrets”, in the tariqa, and that if he wanted to, he could use them. However, he also explained 
to me that these practices do not bring any spiritual benefit and that there are people who perform 
miracles because of their piety, without using the secret knowledge of the order. Issawis, the shaykh told 
me, should simply focus on following the teachings of the Qur’an. He explained to me that these 
practices might have had a purpose at the time of the Italian occupation, when karamat were used as 
proof of the truth of Islam for non-Muslims. However, he also told me that karamat are useless nowadays 
because Libya is a Muslim country whose population does not require any miraculous proof. Similarly to 
                                                          
255 The Zawiya is named after a saint buried in the vicinity of the zawiya. Originally the sanad was based in another zawiya of 
the city, but in 1934 the Italians decided to demolish the place and transform it into a hotel, forcing the sanad to relocate.  
256 See chapt 2 page 84.   
shaykh Abdallah Banun, shaykh Mohammed Said al Massaudi has abandoned the secrets he had inherited 
from his family. When I asked shaykh Mohammed Said about the history of his sanad and about the 
attitudes of his predecessors towards karamat, he showed me a series of family documents. In doing so, 
he started telling me the story of the Massaudi family starting from the first Massaudi who joined the 
Issawy order, the progenitor of the sanad, Mohammed Tuati.  
 
Mohammed Tuati (1) (1214 hijri – 1288 hijri) was a descendant of the prophet who belonged to a Libyan 
family of Moroccan origins. According to shaykh Mohammed Said, Mohammed Tuati was an extremely 
educated character with an interest in Sufism who wrote a memoir of his life which has been kept within 
the family for generations. Having been initiated to a number of Sufi brotherhoods, Mohammed Tuati 
decided that he wanted to join the Issawiya. For this reason he asked a Banun shaykh to accept him as 
murid (both the Banun family and the “Great Zawiya” were considered particularly important at the time). 
With time, however, Mohammed Tuati entered into conflict with his master and decided, therefore, to 
leave him 257 . Determined to find a shaykh that could satisfy his spiritual needs, Mohammed Tuati 
travelled to Tunisia with two friends, and, once arrived, he was received by a famous Tunisian Issawy 
shaykh, Ali ibn Qassim Asharif, who had dreamt about Mohammed’s arrival. Shaykh asSharif was 
particularly struck by Mohammed Tuati, and decided not only to initiate him into the brotherhood, but 
also to choose him as heir of his sanad.  
 
After nine months of permanence (during which shaykh asSharif passed away), Mohammed Tuati (now 
an Issawy shaykh), came back to Libya, where he started to introduce himself to the Issawy zawaya of 
Tripoli. During his visits to the zawaya, however, Mohammed Tuati noticed that the members of these 
                                                          
257 Being intelligent men, Abdallah Banun and Mohammed Said al Massaudi are today on very friendly terms, however they 
have both kept memory of this ‘incident’ between the two assanid.  
zawaya had the capacity to perform miracles. Issawis could drink poison or stab themselves with knives 
without dying, and Mohammed Tuati wanted to acquire the secret knowledge of these practices.  Having 
learned that a renowned Issawy shaykh (a member of the family of the “Perfect Shaykh”) had temporarily 
settled in Benghazi on his way for the pilgrimage to Mecca, he decided to visit him and ask him about the 
secrets of the order. After a long journey of fifteen days, he arrived in Benghazi and enquired with the 
shaykh about the karamat. The shaykh put his hands on his shoulders, and Mohammed Tuati had 
immediately a vision: he “saw” the secret formulas of the karamat, memorising them straight away. The 
shaykh told Muhammad Tuati that the founder of the order himself, the “Perfect Shaykh” had made this 
miraculous gift to him.  
 
With time Mohammed al Massaudi created a zawiya, and when the time came to choose a successor, he 
selected his only son, Ahmed (2). Ahmed al Massaudi (1252 hijri- 1413 hijri). had one male child from 
his first wife, Mohammed, and three sons from a second wife: Mohammed Said the first (3), Mohammed 
Saad edDin and Mohammed asSadek. All of them joined the Issawy order, becoming masters. However, 
in choosing his successor Ahmed selected Mohammed Said (3), his second child (the eldest from his 
second wife). Shaykh Mohammed Said the second (the current head of the sanad) does not know why 
Ahmed did not choose his first born as successor. However from a reading of documents it seems that his 
first child died at 39 (most probably while his father was still alive), hence one can argue that the shaykh 
was forced to choose the second born. Mohammed Said the first (1286 hijri- 1961 miladi) (3) was an 
educated and well-travelled man who studied Islamic jurisprudence in Egypt. He took part to the fight 
against the Italians in colonial times and kept in charge of the zawiya until his death.  
 
Like his father, Mohammed Said the first (3) married twice: he had one son from his first wife (Ahmed, a 
judge and a teacher who died in 1952 when his father was still alive) and four from a second (whom he 
had met while fighting against the colonisers in the Tripolitanian town of Gharian): Mohammed Sharif 
(4), Mohammed Fatha, Mohammed Adel and Mohammed Najib.  Shaykh Mohammed Said the second 
told me that he is not sure whether all of these four children joined the tariqa or not, but he also explained 
to me that in the past when a person used to come regularly to the zawiya he was considered to be an 
Issawy even if had not been formally initiated. Since his first son had died at a young age, Mohammed 
Said the first (3) chose his second born, Mohammed Sharif (4) as successor (the eldest from his second 
marriage). At the time, Mohammed Said’s brothers were still alive (and since they were, as I have 
explained, shuyukh, they were suitable candidates) but his son was also an educated man and a spiritually 
suitable option. Once nominated head of the sanad in 1961, Mohammed Sharif (4) (1916-1993 miladi), 
remained as the guide of the zawiya until his death. He had three children: Mohammed Said the second 
(5) (the current head of the sanad), Mohammed Hafth and Mohammed Aissam (plus a number of 
daughters). Even though his three brothers were still alive at the time of his death, Mohammed Sharif (4) 
selected his first born as successor and Mohammed Said (5) became head of the sanad in 1993, a role that 
he still maintains. Currently Mohammed Said is contemplating the possibility of choosing his eldest son 
as successor.  
 
5.4 From Father to Son (the Dynamics of Succession of the Massaudi) 
When compared with the Banun the Massaudi show dynamics of succession that are very similar. The 
Massaudi, however, present parameters of choice that are even stricter: if the Banun have always selected 
children and brothers as successors, the Massaudi have always chosen their children (even when their 
brothers were suitable candidates). As it appears from an analysis of the sanad, all the Massaudi shuyukh 
have chosen their first-born as successor, except with the second and the third shaykh, when the sudden 
death of the first-born has forced them to choose the second child. Shaykh Mohammed Said explained to 
me that a shaykh should consider a series of spiritual parameters in choosing the successor. The 
candidate, he told me, should be an educated person who has an interest in Sufi matters and he should 
take part to the life of the zawiya. In his case, for instance, the shaykh told me that he was chosen by his 
father not only because he was the eldest, but also because, unlike his two brothers he used to visit the 
zawiya even as a child.  Nevertheless, shaykh Mohammed Said told me that there are also other factors 
that need to be taken into account in the choice. The shaykh told me that the Massaudi zawiya has a series 
of properties (mainly land) which are registered under the name of the family, and he explained to me that 
if a shaykh choses someone outside of the Massaudi family the government is entitled to inherit the 
properties. This factor seems to have influenced the choice of the successor by pushing the Massaudis to 
keep the leadership of the sanad within the nuclear family. As in the case of the Banun (but even more so) 
the Massaudi have limited their range of choices in the succession, increasing the possibility that a first-
born might be chosen as head of the sanad even when he has no interest for secret knowledge. 
  
The story of the first Massaudi (and of his attempt to learn the secret knowledge of the brotherhood) 
shows that karamat were highly valued during the early days of the sanad.  According to Mohammed 
Said, the first three shuyukh of the family kept this knowledge and used to perform karamat regularly. 
The third, in particular, was renowned in the city of Tripoli because he performed a karama in front of the 
famous Fascist general Italo Balbo258, drinking poison without receiving any harm. Mohammed Said told 
me that at the time of the English administration, the same shaykh used to perform karamat weekly (more 
specifically he used to eat pieces of glass during the weekly recitation of the hezb) and that for this reason 
the zawiya was visited by many foreigners who wanted to see his miraculous performances. With time, 
                                                          
258 (1896- 1940), Balbo was nominated governor of Libya by Benito Mussolini in 1934 (Vandewalle 2006) 
however, the practice of karamat has been lost. Mohammed Said told me that his father (the fourth 
shaykh) has never considered the secret formulas of karamat as an important aspect of the tariqa.  This 
shows that the third shaykh (who performed karamat) selected his son regardless of the fact that he did 
not value Issawy secret knowledge. In choosing always their first born (or the second in case of the first’s 
death) the Massaudi have prioritised the necessity to preserve a strictly familial succession over the need 
to choose a successor who is interested in the secret knowledge of the brotherhood. Like the Banun, they 
have therefore kept a strict familial character but lost their secrets. 
 
5.5 A Secret Sanad (The S. Family): 
The third familial sanad I will focus on is the one of the S., the family of my main informant shaykh 
Ramadan (the current head of the sanad), whom I mentioned extensively throughout the thesis. Like the 
Banun and the Massaudi, the S. are a sharif family of Moroccan origins. Unlike the first two assanid, 
however, the S. have adopted a strategy of succession that has allowed them to preserve both the familial 
character of the sanad and the secret knowledge of the order. As I have explained in the previous chapter, 
shaykh Ramadan (unlike shaykh Abdallah Banun and shaykh Mohammed Said al Massaudi) values 
karamat as an important part of the tariqa and treats them as a pedagogical tool to be used in the 
education of the muridin. Before I contextualise Ramadan’s approach to secret knowledge within a 
discussion of the dynamics of succession of his family, I will present the S. sanad in detail. Like Abdallah 
and Mohammed Said, shaykh Ramadan too kept a folder with old family documents and manuscripts, and 
in reconstructing the history of his family he made use both of this documentation and of his memory. 
 
Though largely based in Tripoli, the S. come originally from Beni Walid (a town South West of Tripoli). 
According to the family documents, Sidhi S., the progenitor of the family, was a judge (and a saintly 
figure) from the city of Fez, who left in the year 800 hijri in order to settle down in Tunisia first and in 
Libya later on. Even though Sidhi S. eventually came back to Morocco, he left his children (judges as 
well) in Beni Walid, and with time the town has become the main centre of the S. (though sections of the 
family have moved to Cyrenaica settling in Kufra)259. Being a family of judges the S. have always had 
links with the capital (where, as an Issawy sanad, they have produced a series of ijazat and sub-assanid 
that are now independent), but they have officially moved to Tripoli only at the time of Ramadan’s great 
grandfather260. Even though the ‘zawiya-mother’ of the sanad (the “Zawiya of Sidhi S.”) is located in Beni 
Walid, Ramadan decided to create a new zawiya in Ghirgaresh (a beautiful area of Tripoli, not far from 
the city centre) which is, effectively, the new zawiya-mother of the sanad. Nevertheless, both Ramadan 
and his family have maintained a close relationship with Beni Walid, where a group of Ramadan’s 
relatives still lives.  
 
Shaykh Ramadan told me that the first S. who joined the Issawy brotherhood was Huedi S. (1), a 
descendant of Sidhi S. who was initiated to the order some four hundred years ago by one of the sons of 
the Perfect Shaykh himself. Shaykh Ramadan explained to me that he is the fourteenth successor of Huedi, 
and even though he spent a large amount of time going through all the shuyukh of the sanad he also 
forbade me from publishing the names (and the biographic details) of the first ten masters. Ramadan 
explained to me that a sanad is a “secret thing and a family matter” and that by publishing it in its entirety 
I would have exposed the family to a risk: someone could have used the names to produce a fake ijaza 
and claim a false spiritual genealogy from the S. Ramadan told me that as head of the sanad he felt the 
                                                          
259 Ramadan has kept a document dated to the 1207 hijri which testifies to the importance of the family in Beni Walid. The 
manuscript is a letter where the Ottoman leader Ahmed Pasha al Garamalli exhorts the tribes of Beni Walid to treat the 
descendants of Sidhi S. with utter respect.  
260 In the past the family used to own a zawiya in the famous Tripolitan mosque of Sidhi Bel Imam (named after a saint who 
belonged to the S. family) close to the city port. With time, however, the family has lost control of the zawiya (today the 
zawiya belongs to a shaykh linked with the Massaudi sanad). 
responsibility of preserving the integrity of his line, adding that a sanad is not simply a list of names, but 
a record of the people through which a specific spiritual power has been transmitted. When I suggested 
the use of pseudonyms Ramadan insisted that I should tell the story of his family without recurring to lies 
(even ‘methodological’ ones), and, finally, we reached the compromise of publishing only the names of 
the last four shuyukh of the sanad (from the tenth to the fourteenth). This need to preserve the secret 
shows already a sense of secrecy which is not found amongst the Banun and the Massaudi. More 
importantly however, the section of the sanad I report here, though partial, shows dynamics of succession 
that are different from the ones of the Banun and the Massaudi.   
 
The tenth head of the sanad was Abdul Khalaq S., a judge who lived in Beni Walid and a direct 
descendant of Huedi (1). The dates of birth and death of Abdul Khalaq (and of many of his predecessors) 
are not known. Shaykh Ramadan, however, showed me a document dated on the 1245 hijri which 
mentions the ninth shaykh as being alive at the time. In Ramadan’s view, therefore, Abdul Khalaq might 
have become head of the sanad after that date. Abdul Khalaq, according to Ramadan, was a saint261 
(recognised as such by many of his contemporaries) and an educated Issawy master who enjoyed the 
company of a number of famous Sufis of the time (amongst whom Mohammed Tuati al Massaudi, the 
first shaykh of the Massaudi line). Abdul Khalaq (10) had two brothers, Mohammed al Gheddafi and 
Ibrahim, who were also members of the Issawiya. Ibrahim died during Abdul Khalaq’s lifetime, but 
Mohammed al Gheddafi was still alive when the head of the sanad decided to nominate a successor. Even 
though al Gheddafi was perhaps a suitable candidate for succession, Abdul Khalaq (10) selected his only 
son Nueji (11) as eleventh shaykh. One factor that might have determined this choice is the fact that, most 
probably, al Gheddafi was not a shaykh, while Nueji was. This hypothesis appears to be plausible when 
                                                          
261 Ramadan told me that according to a family tradition there are always ten saints amongst the S., and that when one of them 
dies another one is born to replace him in order to keep the number of S. saints constant.  
bearing in mind that, as attested in the documents, al Gheddafi’s son was initiated to the order by his 
uncle Abdul Khalaq, not by his father. Perhaps, in choosing his son as successor, Abdul Khalaq was 
motivated both by paternal affection and by a concern for the suitability of the candidate.  
 
Nueji (11) (who died in 1937 miladi) was a very educated man. Unlike his predecessor he did not work as 
a judge, but, according to Ramadan, this had to do with the fact that at the time of the Italian occupation 
all Islamic tribunals were closed down. Nueji however was also a well-respected Sufi whose miracles (as 
I have already briefly mentioned in the introduction of the thesis262) were known in all of Tripolitania. 
Shaykh Ramadan told me, for instance, that once an important Italian officer in Beni Walid expressed the 
desire of having an ‘exotic’ photo with a snake, and that Nueji took this opportunity to demonstrate his 
miraculous powers to the officer. He sent one of his muridin to capture a large snake, and using one of the 
secret formulas of the Issawy order he tamed the creature, presenting it to the officer so that he could have 
his picture taken. Nueji unleashed the snake in the room of the Italian and, apparently, the beast was so 
strong that he destroyed a chair. The officer was so scared that he jumped on the table, and in the end 
Nueji called one of his relatives who accepted to pose with the snake. Nueji (11) had only one son 
(together with a number of daughters), Ali (12), whom he chose as his successor.   
 
 Ali (12) (who died in 1961, and was probably born around 1900) was less educated than his father, but 
not less popular, at least in Beni Walid. Since Ali (like his father) was not a judge one can argue that it is 
with him that the traditional role of the S. as judges of Beni Walid comes to a definite end. During Ali’s 
time, the sanad counted an incredibly high number of muridin. Ramadan told me that the great majority 
of the old muridin of the sanad he had met in his life were all initiated by Ali. According to Ramadan, 
this had to do with the fact that Libya was solidly in the hands of the Italians at the time: Libyans were 
                                                          
262 See introduction page 23.  
turning towards religion more intensively almost as a political stance against the infidels. Ali (12) had 
only one son, Mohammed, an Issawy master who is today in his seventies, and who would have been a 
good candidate as head of the sanad. Mohammed, however, was not selected as successor. Even though 
Ali (12) initiated Mohammed to the brotherhood and wrote for him an ijaza making him a master of the 
order, he did not choose him as his heir. Enacting a dynamic which is not found amongst the Banun and 
the Massaudi, Ali (12) S. chose a distant relative (who was also an Issawy), Mabruk (13). 
 
Even though Mabruk (13) (1913-2002) lived in Beni Walid and was a murid of Nueji (11) he was a very 
distant cousin of Ali (12). By looking at the family history (and at the different generations of S. that have 
originated from Sidhi S.) it is possible to calculate that at the time of Mabruk’s nomination the bloodline 
of Ali and the one of Mabruk had been ‘separated’ for eighteen generations (their only common ancestor 
was Sidhi S. himself). According to Ramadan, Mabruk (13) was a very educated man who studied in Italy 
and was fluent in Italian. Being an intelligent and practical man, he worked for the local administration 
both under the Sanusy king and after Gheddafi’s coup. Mabruk, however, was also a very reclusive 
character who did not want to have many muridin, and who spent the majority of his time at home. 
Mabruk, according to Ramadan, was very knowledgeable of Issawy secrets, but he also used to say that 
many people join the brotherhood only because they want to see miraculous performances, and not 
because they want to understand the spiritual principles behind these practices. When Mabruk decided 
that he wanted to choose a successor he had a large plethora of possible candidates around him.  
 
Mabruk (13) was the third of three children. His older brother Yunnis (who was alive at the time), was a 
shaush263 in the zawiya, and had two sons who were also well-respected shauash. Khalifa, his second 
brother had died at a young age, but he had also left a son (who was alive at the time), Ibrahim, a shaykh 
of the order. Mabruk (13) had also six male children who all lived in Tripoli. Ali, his first-born (who is 
today in his seventies) joined the order and was very close to the zawiya but he never became a shaykh. 
Being particularly educated, however, he was a good candidate. Mohammed, the second, who had studied 
in Italy, and al Makhluf, the third, who had became an atomic engineer in the States were also good 
candidate because they were both educated and particularly close to the brotherhood. Mustafa and Yussef 
(the fourth and the fifth, who are both still alive today) were even better candidates since they had become 
masters of the order rather early in their lives, while Khaled (the sixth) was simply a murid of his father.  
Mabruk (13) had one brother, three nephews and six sons who presented the right characteristics to 
become head of the sanad. Nevertheless, he chose the son of his first-born Ali, his grandson Ramadan 
(14) (born in 1973), the current leader of the sanad.  Ramadan does not have siblings, and since his 
grand-mother was the niece of a previous head of the sanad (Ali - 12) he‘re-unites’ in his person the 
families of both the twelfth and of the thirteenth leaders of the S. line.   
 
5.6 Presages and Distant Relatives (the Dynamics of Succession of the S. Family)  
The first difference between the S. family and the other two assanid I have analysed is that the S. do not 
present dynamics of succession that follow necessarily the filial and the fraternal line. Though partial, the 
sanad presented to me by Ramadan shows that the twelfth shaykh has chosen a distant relative as 
successor despite having a male son who was a suitable candidate. Similarly, as I have demonstrated, the 
thirteenth head of the line has chosen his grandson as heir despite having a large plethora of sons and 
                                                          
263As explained in the second chapter (page 84) a shaush (pl. shauash) is a person who is in charge of one of the aspects of the 
ritual life of the zawiya. Yunnis, in particular, was a “shaush el hadid “(“shaush of the iron”): he took care of the weapons and 
items used during the performance of the self-hurting karamat.  
brothers who were suitable to be selected as successors. These dynamics show that for the S. keeping the 
sanad within the confines of the nuclear family is not particularly important (or at least that it is less 
important than with the Banun or the Massaudi). ‘Freed’ from the obligation of choosing between 
brothers and children, the S. (or at least two of them) have selected their successors using parameters 
which are particularly conducive for the conservation of the secret knowledge of the order. By not 
limiting the possibilities of the choice they have increased the chances of having a successor who values 
secret knowledge as an important aspect of the tariqa. Unlike the Banun and the Massaudi, the S. have 
not exposed themselves to the possibility of ‘sacrificing’ the secrets of the order in the name of a filial or 
fraternal succession. At a closer examination, however, one realises that the fact that the S. have kept their 
secrets is not due to a ‘freer’ mode of succession, but to a specific style of transmission of knowledge. 
 
When I asked shaykh Ramadan about the parameters of choice that regulates the leadership of his sanad 
he told me that the head of the S. line should be a person who is knowledgeable of the basics of Islam, 
familiar with the esoteric aspects of the brotherhood and talented in dealing with spiritual matters 
(“ruhaniat”). However, he also explained to me that selecting an heir does not simply involve a pondered 
decision by the head of the sanad. Ramadan told me that the choice of a successor is always accompanied 
by a presage, or, to be more precise, by an “order” (“amr”).  According to Ramadan, when a S. shaykh 
decides in his heart that it is time to select a valid replacement, he has to wait for an inspiration, a sign, or 
a vision (perhaps a dream) from God that pushes him (or rather ‘orders him’) to choose a particular 
person. Ramadan explained to me that, as far as he knows, all his predecessors have followed this 
supernatural procedure. He also told me that the heads of the sanad have always put a great emphasis on 
training, and that his predecessors have always trained a group of possible candidates (teaching them a 
portion of the secrets of the order and insisting that they experience them personally) in the hope that the 
“order” might indicate one of their favourites as successors. Ramadan himself, at the time of my research, 
had already chosen his group of possible heirs (though he had not received any “order” yet, perhaps 
because he is still young). Doubtlessly, the imponderability of the “order” (and the fact that the 
knowledge of the entire background of secret practices of the sanad is reserved only to the heir) seems to 
expose the sanad to the possibility that someone might be chosen despite not having a particular interest 
in secrets. Nevertheless, the need to prepare a plethora of possible heirs has allowed the sanad to have, 
constantly, a group of people who are familiar with the secret knowledge of karamat increasing the 
possibility that these practices might be preserved.  
 
Unlike the Banun and the Massaudi, the choice of a S. successor is not an automatic selection that takes 
place regardless of the personal inclinations of the heir, but a choice that requires preparation (and 
training) in order to be prepared to deal with the imponderable.  It is also interesting to notice that the 
imponderability of the supernatural “order” is somehow ‘regulated’ by the emphasis on training that 
seems to characterise the S. sanad. Ramadan told me that all his predecessors were part of a pre-selected 
group of possible candidates, but he also explained to me the “order” can manifest itself in erratic ways. 
Ramadan told me, for instance, that his grandfather Mabruk (13) had initially trained his second and third 
sons (al Makhluf and Mohammed) teaching them some of the secrets of the Issawiya in the hope that one 
of the two might have be chosen as successor. However, when Mabruk (13) was in his sixties he received 
the un-expected “order” to choose his grandson, Ramadan, who was still in his mother’s womb. This 
situation could have been potentially risky for the preservation of secret knowledge (growing up 
Ramadan could have turned out to be a person with no interest in secrets).  However, the ‘pre-natal’ 
nomination of Ramadan proved be, on the contrary, an incentive to educate the successor in the secrets of 
the order. In fact, Mabruk found himself in a situation where he had to ensure that Ramadan was exposed 
to the secret knowledge of the brotherhood as soon as possible (if Mabruk had died a portion of 
knowledge would have been lost for ever). As soon as Ramadan was old enough to understand the 
spiritual secrets of the Issawiya his grandfather gave him “cursat” (“courses”) in all aspects of Sufism 
paying particular attention to the knowledge of karamat. Ramadan was therefore forced by his 
grandfather to experiment with all the secret formulas of the order, gaining a direct experience of the 
secrets of the Issawiya from a very young age. Unlike the other two families I have analysed, the S. have 
adopted a strategy of succession that has allowed them to keep the secret knowledge of the order even in 
situations where this knowledge was ‘at risk’ of being lost. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have looked at the relationship between family dynamics and the transmission of Issawy 
secret knowledge. In particular, I have compared the strategies of succession amongst the shuyukh of 
three Issawy assanid, the Banun, the Massaudi and the S. As I have demonstrated, in the first two familial 
groups Issawy masters have always selected members of their nuclear families as successors, regardless 
of whether these persons had an interest in secret knowledge or not, and as a consequence they have lost 
with time the secrets of the order. The shuyukh of the third sanad, on the contrary, have adopted a 
strategy of succession which is focused on the need for a successor to be trained in the esoteric aspects of 
the order thus reducing the possibility of losing their secrets. By educating a number of possible 
successors (and by emphasising the training of the successor over his blood relationship with the 
predecessor) the S. have created good conditions for the preservation of the secrets whereas the other two 
assanid have not. These considerations show that in analysing the reasons that have pushed the Issawiya 
to abandon its secrets one has to consider not only the intervention of the Libyan government, but also the 
internal dynamics of the order. Doubtlessly, the Issawiya has been deprived of its secrets by the regime of 
Colonel Gheddafi. However, Issawis themselves (or at least some of them) have contributed to create the 
conditions that have determined the loss of their secret knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Keeping the Secret, Losing the Secrets 
 
 
 
 
 
  
In this thesis I have provided an anthropological analysis of a Sufi order that seems to have lost its 
miracles, but in fact it has only lost its secrets.  More specifically, I have demonstrated that in abandoning 
the miraculous performance that had made them famous in the past (karamat) Issawis have not 
abandoned their sense of the miraculous, but their secret knowledge. In articulating this argument I have 
tried to dismantle a series of assumptions one might formulate when faced with the peculiar 
characteristics of the Issawiya. The first of these assumptions concerned the very structure of the Issawy 
order. As I have shown at the beginning of this research, the Issawiya is divided into different familial 
groups that have different understandings of Issawy rules and practices, so that one might be tempted to 
see the order as a loose organisation without any sense of commonality. By closely exploring the 
dynamics of shaykh-hood, however, I have demonstrated that the Issawy brotherhood is characterised by 
a specific discursive tradition that allows Issawis to approach their tariqa in different ways but also, at the 
same time, to maintain a sense of common identity. In showing that the Issawiya is marked by a complex 
mixture of differences and commonalities, I have paid particular attention to the notion of “sirr” 
(“secret”) in the Issawy tradition. As I have elucidated, all Issawis refer to this important concept, but 
(following the dynamics of the Issawy discursive tradition) they do so in different ways. Some members 
of the order articulate the esoteric facet of their practices in terms of secret knowledge, while the majority 
of them refer to “sirr” simply as ‘mystery’, explaining that Sufis have a privileged relationship with the 
mysterious world of the unseen, but no secret information to hide.  
 
The analysis of the double meaning of “sirr” has allowed me to problematise a second assumption which 
is rooted in the literature on Sufi esoterism: the idea that all Sufis articulate the notion of ‘secret’ in the 
same way (Brenner 1984: 105; Soares 1996:742, 2005: 127-152; Flueckiger 2006, 2008: 178).  More 
specifically, I have demonstrated that Issawy esoterism is not simply about ‘keeping a set of information 
secret from the public’ but also about ‘conceptualising the universe as been made of mysterious (and 
therefore secret) dynamics’. In shedding light on this double aspect of secrecy, I have shown that many 
Issawis do not see the esoteric dimension of their rituals as a realm which is completely cut off from the 
public, but, quite differently, as a set of mysterious spiritual dynamics that often take place publicly, even 
though only few can fully experience their power. More importantly, I have shown that Issawis can 
position themselves differently within the paradigm of secrecy, articulating specific ‘rhetorics of secrecy’ 
that allow them to privilege ‘mystery’ over ‘secret’ if they so prefer. In uncovering these dynamics I have 
moved to an exploration of the secret knowledge of the order in an attempt to understand why many 
members of the brotherhood emphasise the ‘mysterious’ aspect of their practices but distance themselves 
from the notion of secret information. In particular, I have demonstrated that those Issawis who have 
abandoned karamat in the name of a more ‘orthodox’ and ‘textual’ religiosity have developed an 
‘explicit’ spirituality where there is space for mystery, but not for secrets. This consideration has allowed 
me to reflect more broadly on the role of miracles and of the text in Issawy practices.  
 
As I have explained, both those Issawis who value the secret knowledge of karamat and those who do not 
share a strong belief in mysterious or miraculous manifestations, and a robust dedication  to the textual 
apparatus of Islam. More specifically, I have shown that the difference between the two does not lie in 
their degree of textuality or in their level of enchantment, but in the way they see the role of secret 
information in relationship with both miracles and the text. Whereas those Issawis who practise karamat 
portray themselves as orthodox mystics who deal with mysteries through secret knowledge, those who 
dismiss them, on the contrary, describe themselves as Sufis who deal with the supernatural only through a 
paradigm of explicit orthodoxy with no secrets. By demonstrating that Issawis have kept their sense of the 
‘mysterious’ and of the ‘textual’ (but changed their attitude towards secrecy) I have unpacked a third 
assumption: the notion that by abandoning karamat the Issawiya has moved towards a more ‘textual’ and 
‘disenchanted’ religiosity. In particular, these considerations have allowed me to dismantle the simplistic 
dichotomy of ‘text’ and ‘miracles’ put forward by a certain anthropological literature of the past, but also 
to highlight the limits of the recent scholarship that has criticised this literature. As I have explained, 
recent anthropological works have illuminated the limits of previous ethnographic analyses focused on 
the idea that modernity brings an endemic disenchantment of religious practices. In doing so, however, 
these scholars have simply demonstrated the modern persistence of enchantment without analysing the 
specific ‘styles of enchantment’ produced by specific encounters between religion and modernity. In an 
attempt to overcome this limit, I have shown that the specific political scenario of modern Libya has 
pushed the Issawiya to develop a specific ‘style of enchantment’ where there is no room for secrets. 
 
In my analysis of the relationship between the Libyan regime and the Sufi orders I have shed light on the 
complexities that have characterised this rapport. More specifically, I have explained that the Libyan 
government has sponsored a specific understanding of Islam based on the notions of religious clarity and 
doctrinal explicitness, and in doing so I have explored the impact of Gheddafi’s religiosity on Sufism. As 
I have shown, Colonel Gheddafi has initially antagonised the brotherhoods treating them as agents of 
corruption that have polluted the pristine clarity of the Qur’an, changing his attitude towards the orders 
only in the nineties. After three decades of anti-Sufi propaganda Gheddafi has re-integrated Sufism as part 
of the national discourse in an attempt to counter-balance the growing expansion of local Salafism. In re-
habilitating the orders, however, the regime has also proposed a re-definition of the concept of ‘Sufi’ with 
the intention of making it compatible with Gheddafi’s peculiar understanding of Islam. More specifically, 
the Libyan government has carried out a re-articulation of Sufism transforming it into a form of ‘clear’ 
spirituality which is incompatible with the notion of ‘secret’. In uncovering this process, I have 
demonstrated that this re-definition in terms of clarity has forced Issawis to re-shape their relationship 
with secrecy and, eventually, to abandon its secret knowledge.  Having explored this phenomenon, I have 
also identified some ‘internal’ factors that have contributed to the loss of secrets that has characterised the 
order. In particular, I have shown that the specific dynamics of transmission of secret knowledge within 
the order have made some Issawy groups prone to lose their secrets. In doing so I have, in a sense, 
problematised a fourth assumption one might formulate when faced with the argument of this thesis: the 
idea that the political manoeuvres of the regime are the only cause behind the changes that have taken 
place in Issawy spirituality.  Doubtlessly, the re-articulation of Sufism proposed by Gheddafi is the main 
factor behind the Issawy loss of secrets. Issawis themselves, however, have played a part in depriving 
their order of its secret knowledge. 
 
Throughout this thesis I have documented the complexities of Issawy spirituality, challenging a series of 
simplistic assumptions and contextualising the Issawiya within the political scenario of Gheddafi’s Libya. 
My analysis has been mainly concerned with the changes that have characterised the Issawy attitude 
towards secrecy. Through this research, however, I have also indirectly shed light on another important 
aspect of the order: the strength of its identity. Issawis have developed a differentiated approach towards 
their secret practices as a result of their encounter with Libyan modernity, but they have also retained 
certain common elements of ‘Issawi-ness’ that have proven to be too strong to be erased by the 
manoeuvres of the regime. Doubtlessly, the members of the order have depurated the notion of ‘sirr’ from 
its most secretive connotation, highlighting its mysterious aspect instead. Nevertheless, as we have seen, 
they have also maintained the idea that the Issawiya has an esoteric dimension. The concept of ‘sirr’ is so 
deeply rooted within the Issawy tradition (and, one might say, within Sufism in general) that Issawis have 
‘preferred’ to change it instead of removing it completely. The members of the order have succeeded in 
creating a fascinating paradox, a form of esoterism with no secrets, and if it is true that this enigma sheds 
light on the way in which the order has changed, it is also true that it testifies to the persistence of Issawy 
identity. The Libyan government has succeeded in re-articulating Sufism, but it has not been able to 
demolish the Issawi-ness. This consideration appears particularly significant when bearing in mind that 
Issawis keep on seeing themselves as members of the same Sufi order regardless of their differences. 
Indeed, the regime of Gheddafi has managed to gobble the secrets, not the secret. And, for some 
mysterious (or rather secret) reason, I find this rather consoling.   
 
I believe that my thesis has offered not only a solid anthropological analysis, but also a platform for future 
investigations on Libyan Sufism. Since the completion of my field-work Libya has witnessed a series of 
radical changes, entering into a new phase of its history. The fall of the Gheddafi regime has generated a 
series of new socio-political dynamics that will require further investigations. However, any exploration 
of the role of Sufism in the new Libya will have to be based on an analysis of the way in which the Sufi 
orders have co-existed with the regime for the past forty years. My work provides future research with 
such a basis. Unfortunately, one of the most recent developments in the Libyan religious landscape is the 
destruction of a series of Sufi shrines by local Salafi cells. As reported by the world media, Libyan Salafi 
groups are experiencing a revival in the post-Gheddafi phase: freed from the repression of the regime, 
Salafis are now pushing to take part in Libyan political life but they are also embracing violence as a way 
to express their anti-Sufi stances. In light of the findings of this thesis, however, this phenomenon 
becomes less surprising than it appears to be. With his focus on textuality and religious clarity Colonel 
Gheddafi has effectively paved the way for the diffusion of Salafi ideas. Furthermore, in its attempt to use 
the Sufi orders as tools in the fight against Salafism the regime has created an association between Sufism 
and the ideology of Gheddafi that, though misleading, has certainly re-enforced the Salafi critique 
towards the brotherhoods in recent times. Hopefully, my research will contribute to shed light also on 
other aspects of Libyan religion in the post-Gheddafi era. Undeniably, this thesis has been limited in 
scope. Nevertheless, in approaching the spiritual life of the Issawiya I have attempted to offer an 
anthropological analysis for whoever is willing to take it further.  In articulating my arguments I have 
tried to pay respect to the ethnographic truth, or at least to the way in which I have experienced this truth. 
I believe I managed to do so successfully. And in the end, to paraphrase those Sufi friends who know that 
partiality is the defining aspect of the human condition, “God knows best”.  
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX  A: DISTRIBUTION OF ZAWAYA IN TRIPOLI  
 
These figures have been  collected by the central Auqaf of the city of Tripoli in 2007. This is the most 
recent census of the zawaya, and the Auqaf has granted permission for the publication of the data. The 
data concern only the jurisdictional area (“shabia”, pl. “shabiat”) of the city of Tripoli. Areas of 
Tripoli that are commonly considered to be part of the city but that were not under Tripoli’s 
administrative jurisdiction in 2007 are not considered in this census (e.g. the area of Jamzur). It is also 
important to clarify that the organisation of the shabiat in Libya has a tendency to change every few 
years. For a complete list of the brotherhoods diffused in Libya see the introduction of the thesis.  
                                                                                                                                            
        Areas of  Tripoli                                                    Issawiya            Arusiya         Qadiriya        Alauiya       Khaliliya      Tijaniya              (n.s264.)             TOT           
         _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          Abuslim                                                                       3                         2                    0                      0                 0                 0                            0                    5 
 
           Tripoli                                                                          15                       4                      3                    1                  0                 0                          0                   23 
           (city centre) 
 
           Hay al’andalus                                                            4                       4                      2                     0                  1                 0                           0                    11 
 
           Suq Juma                                                                     6                       0                        1                    0                 0                 0                           7265                   14 
 
           Ain zara                                                                       6                        3                       0                    0                  0                 3                           0                     12 
 
            Tajura                                                                         0                         0                      0                    0                  0                  0                          48                    48 
          ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________ 
            TOT.                                                                           34                      13                      6                  1                   1                   3                           55                    113 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
264 “Not specified” 
265 According to a senior functionary of the Auqaf these 7 zawaya might be ‘Arusy . 
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